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ABSTRACT
At the outset of the twenty-first century and despite the challenges presented by
the global networks and communities, conceptions of culture, religion and rights
in the West remain firmly situated within the moral frameworks of western
universalism and cultural relativism. Indeed it seems that the uncertainties of local
and global conditions have only served to entrench cultural and religious diversity
as fixed, bounded and uncontested. A striking feature of this development in the
West has been the rigid adoption of liberal multiculturalism to accommodate the
emergence and settlement of diasporic minority ethnic communities into
mainstream society. More recently, the specific cultural practices that can lead to
intra-family inequalities for women from minority ethnic communities as
generated much discussion in political and social theory. While much of this
literature has contributed to our understanding on the relationship between gender
equality, justice and the limits of liberal multiculturalism, it also seems that the
fluid and contradictory understanding of identities has been lost and replaced by
the acceptance of culture as essentialized and homogeneous. In this context we
have also witnessed the emergence of a 'culture of rights' and the 'politics of
recognition' under the framework of human rights. Yet in the process the
contestation over 'meanings' and the intermeshing and complexity of cultural and
religious practices have in essence been lost, only to be replaced by static and
fixed definitions of culture, religion, identity and community.
It is within this context of liberal multiculturalism that we have seen the
emergence and development of unofficial non-statutory bodies identified as
Shariah Councils in Britain. Framed as sites upon which family law matters are
resolved according to Muslim family law they have developed frameworks that
are characterized by specific cultural and religious norms and values. This
mobilisation of communities challenges the hegemonic power of state law and
unsettles the multicultural project in its attempt to reconfigure social and legal
discourse in matters of Family Law. Most interestingly, for the socio-legal scholar
this process opens up the conceptual space in which to see in evidence the
multiple legal and social realities in operation, within the larger context of state
law, liberal multiculturalism and the rights discourse.
This thesis explores the ways in which these bodies constitute as unofficial
dispute resolution mechanisms between and within the context of local
'community' and the overarching determinancy of state law. Of particular concern
is how gender is transformed through the position and participation of women in
this process of 'privatized dispute resolution'. The discourses produced by the
participants in such processes constitute and transform understandings of British
Pakistani Muslim women that are significant to their position and autonomy in the
family, home and community. Drawing upon fieldwork data and interview
material the study explores the socio-legal reality of these women's lives in
relation to the complexities of attachment, belongingness and identity that
multicultural society introduces -
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INTRODUCTION
Of late, it seems the relationship between Islam and the West has become ever
more entangled with ideological differences, practical incompatibilities and the
perceived lack of propensity of Muslims to transpose of fundamentalism and to
fully embrace the western ideals of 'progress, modernity and globalisation'
(Sayyid 2000:32). Indeed the recent events of 11 September 2001 and the
conflicts in Afghanistan (2001-) and fraq (2003-) have only further served to
increase this binary opposition of Islam versus the West and to confirm for some
at least, the view that what we bear witness today is in essence the 'clash of
civilizations' (Huntington 1996:3). For Muslims in the West, the 'war on terror'
and the new emergence of the 'home-grown Muslim terrorist' has further
compounded this binary opposition that identifies western Muslims as the 'Other',
in conflict, incompatible and disloyal to the state.
Interestingly the centrality of gender to these debates is crucial. From a liberal
perspective Muslim women are often presented as dominated, controlled and
insubordinate to archaic religious traditions. And, within this discourse it is the
gendered construction of the Muslim family that is perceived to be the barrier that
denies Muslim women access to rights, equality and empowerment, bestowed
upon other women in the West (Okin 1999, Nussbaum 1999). Yet conspicuously
absent from these debates are the voices of Muslims themselves and in particular,
Muslim women living in the West. This is surprising, bearing in mind that there
are diverse generations of British Muslims within local, national and transnational
networks and communities which in themselves generate immense differences
(Werbner 2000).
It is the purpose of this thesis, to explore this lacuna in order to illuminate the
diversity of experiences of one heterogeneous group of women identified in this
study as 'British Pakistani Muslim Women'. Underlying this analysis is an
exploration of their experiences in obtaining a Muslim divorce from a British
Shariah Council. Thus we pose two central questions: How do Shariah Councils
in Britain constitute as unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms? And, what are
16
the experiences of Pakistani Muslim women using such 'privatized' forms of
dispute resolution to obtain a Muslim divorce? In trying to understand these
multiple and conflicting socio-legal processes we critique the dialectic of
'unofficial law' and 'rights' and 'multiculturalism' and 'community' that has
created a renewed assertion of internal community homogeneity and instead draw
upon the awareness that identities are complex, diverse, and contested.
The Scope of the Study
It is of course both difficult and contentious to speak of a 'British Muslim
Pakistani community' as "the very process of naming involves thawing
boundaries around and 'freezing' the diversity which exists within all social
groupings" (Burlet and Reid 1998:270). As far as this study is concerned, we are
rarely in a position to capture the multi-faceted nature of diversity, difference and
complexity manifest within minority etlmic communities. Nevertheless there are
spaces, which provide us with the opportunity to engage with this process, and the
complexity of Muslim legal pluralism is one such example. In this instance we see
how the fragmentation of communities has led to competing claims of power,
'voice' and representation that in turn allow us to investigate and explore the
relationship between Pakistani Muslim women and the processes of unofficial
dispute resolution.
Drawing upon fieldwork data we explore how expectations of marriage and, the
process of divorce interact with Shariah Councils and consider how such socially
sanctioned parameters embody notions of honour and shame may affect their
decisions and autonomy. In doing so this thesis builds upon the insights of
existing research, which provide fascinating accounts on the nature of Muslim
legal pluralism in Britain, but which ultimately pay insufficient attention to
internal contestation and change within Muslim communities (see Bunt 1998,
Carroll 1997, Hamilton 1995, Menski and Pearl 1998, Shah-Kazemi 2001, Yilmaz
2001). Thus disappointingly, the current coalescence of literature situates these
debates within the framework of 'cultural rights' that embody fixed, essentialized
definitions of community, culture, religion, identity and belonging. Instead we re-
17
evaluate these debates in the light of empirical reality providing a more nuanced,
complex understanding.
The Organisation of the Study
Muslim family law defines the position of women in relation to marriage, divorce,
child custody, dowry and inheritance (see Nasir 1990). An empirical approach
offers the opportunity to explore how these unofficial legal norms manifest in the
'private sphere' of family, home and local community and the nature of
interaction with state law.' For Yilmaz, "Muslims do not only wish to be
regulated by the principles of Islamic law when they are living in a non-Muslim
state; they also seek to formalise such an arrangement within the states own legal
system" (2001:299). Indeed few voices have expressed caution or outright
opposition to the development of some kind of cultural autonomy or what Parekh
refers to as the creation of 'self-disciplinary communities' for Muslims in Britain
(2000:295). Given the potential effects upon individuals within communities and
in particular women, it seems extraordinary that the centrality of gender relations
has been largely ignored and, that an understanding of the gendered nature of the
'informal' legal sphere(s) remains a theoretical construct.2
Since these and related questions form the core basis of the study we begin in
chapter 1 with a conceptual and theoretical analysis of the key debates. The
purpose of this chapter is twofold, firstly to provide a critique of existing material
and, secondly to explore the relationship between legal pluralism, dispute
resolution and multiculturalism in Britain. Thus the attempt to link law with
debates on multiculturalism, gender and identity provides the conceptual space to
explore how cultural and legal diversity is characterized by difference and
complexity. To gain a clearer understanding on the relationship between empirical
research and theoretical understanding the next chapter goes onto discuss the
research methodology adopted in the study. The challenge here is conceptualize a
methodological approach that recognizes difference and complexity from the
standpoint of women and the researcher.
This is insufficiently explored due to the limitations of the study. See chapters 4 and 5.
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In the next three chapters we draw upon empirical data and situate the study in the
context of South Asian Muslims in Britain. In chapter 3 we focus on debates on
citizenship and explore the relationship between individual and collective
identities. A particular focus here is to draw upon the experiences of marriage for
the women in the sample. The next chapter explores how 4 Shariah Councils
chosen for fieldwork research constitute as unofficial dispute resolution
mechanisms in Britain. Here in microcosm and drawing upon fieldwork data we
can begin to explore the particular and multiple ways in which unofficial law
operates, the different ways in which it is conceived and the role it plays in
configuring legal discourse at all levels (see Griffiths 2003:2).
This dialectic between legal centralism and legal pluralism raises the underlying
relationship between gender and legal discourse and the role of gender in
configuring legal discourse at the unofficial level. Thus in chapter 5 we draw upon
interview data to understand how gender is constructed in the realm of unofficial
law. We question how Pakistani Muslim women engage with unofficial law and
whether these socio-legal processes act to silence women within the community?
Situating this study within the context of the lived experiences of women's lives is
extremely significant. As Griffiths points out, "Women cannot escape from the
fact that what shapes the power and authority of women within social life also has
an impact on them in the legal domain" (2002:304).
The Limitations of the Study
This study has obvious limitations. An interdisciplinary approach to the study of
law and social theory provides an exciting opportunity to combine multiple
perspectives and a variety of data sources to explore compelling outcomes and
possibilities. An overwhelming feature of this approach is to draw from key
theoretical concepts while revealing the complexities and tensions between them.
Nevertheless, in a study of this size the use of a interdisciplinary approach can
also have the effect of weakening arguments and reducing the 'analytic
2 The exception is Shah-Kazemi (2001) but even here Muslim communities are presented as
bounded and homogeneous.
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kaleidoscope' (Mccarthy, Holland and Gillies 2003:19) to sideline complexity in
favour of commonalities. In order to establish the empirical reality we may
adjudicate to a pragmatic approach that accommodates a combination of
paradigms and a diversity of approaches, but in effect limits the interdisciplinary
approach. For example in this study the gendered dimension of informal law pays
insufficient attention to how these processes may interact with state law and
international law which lead to a conflicts of law scenario.
The most obvious limitation in this study however relates to the fact that although
the study draws upon Muslim literature 3 it does not comprehensively explore the
contributions from Muslim legal scholars and Muslim feminists to debates of
human rights and gender equality from an Islamic perspective and, hence one may
legitimately conclude that these analyses remains insufficiently explored (see Ali
2000, An-Na'im 1997, Mayer 1999). This is intentional and for two reasons:
firstly the study does not seek to focus on the specificity of a single religious
identity but instead explores the multiplicity of identities that reflect the complex
lived realities of the lives of Pakistani Muslim women in Britain. For this reason
we draw upon the work of feminist sociologists and social theorists who have
explored the multi-faceted nature of identities in 'multicultural Britain' for the
past four decades. Secondly a study framed upon the Islamic human rights
perspective would undoubtedly pose a completely different set of questions and
possibly produce different outcomes. In other words the most important
component of the study would most probably be the dimension of a religious
identity and as stated earlier it was not the objective of the study to focus on the
specificity of a single religious identity.
A related matter involves the processes involved in collating empirical data and
the benefits and/or drawbacks to be found in the sample. For example originally a
larger qualitative study was envisaged which included case-file analysis from all
the Shariah Councils under study but this proved virtually impossible due to
constraints on access to materials. Possibly a more important limitation was the
sample of interviewees itself. Apart from a bias in the socio-economic background
20
of the interviewees there was an imbalance on regional variations from where the
sample was drawn. Again this was due to problems of access and the subsequent
need to adopt the 'snow-balling technique'. We discuss the significance of these
issues to the study in chapter 2.
In what follows then, this thesis not offer a new theory, but instead engages in the
intellectual strategy of rethinking the relationship between Shariah Councils and
British Pakistani Muslim women in the light of the "messiness of social life,
where competing claims and contestation over meaning are not a sign of cultural
or community failure but, rather, part of the human condition" (Cowan, Dembour
and Wilson 2001:21). It is this process which enables us to challenge the current
totalising approach of Muslim Personal law and culture in existing literature, as
partial and incomplete.
3 Primarily the principles of Muslim Family Law as they relate to marriage and divorce.
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CHAPTER 1
LINKING LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY:
A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a review of literature. It draws upon a number of different
but closely related disciplines and adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the
study of law, drawing upon social theory, feminist political theory, feminist legal
theory, anthropology, legal pluralism and literature in the area of race and
ethnicity. A socio-legal approach to the study of law 4 thus provides us with the
conceptual tools with which to explore the complex relationship between 'law',
'unofficial law' and social life.
The first section of the chapter 1.1 draws upon studies on legal pluralism to
explore the complexities of socio-legal reality in Britain. As has been argued
elsewhere, Muslim legal pluralism manifests in the area of family law (Carroll
1997, Menski 1998, Pearl 1996, Poulter 1998, Yilmaz 2001). Informal Muslim
legal bodies known collectively as Shariah Councils provide advice and assistance
in matters concerning marriage, divorce and custody. 5 Drawing upon a 'thick,
deep, strong or new' (Banakar and Travers 2002:4) description of legal pluralism
this section explores the contested 'space(s)' Shariah Councils occupy between
and within the boundaries of community and law (Santos 1987).6 In other words,
to challenge the dichotomy of formal versus informal law. Furthermore, literature
on 'postmodern analyses' of law, suggest that a definition of legal pluralism must
4 The terms 'sociology of law', 'socio-legal studies' and 'law and society' are often used
interchangeably and can create conceptual difficulties on precisely their 'meanings'. For an
interesting discussion see Roberts (1998).
For an in-depth analysis of the ways in which Shariah Councils constitute as unofficial legal
bodies see chapter 4.
6 It does not provide a comprehensive review of the different approaches within the field of legal
pluralism but instead only focuses on those approaches drawn upon in the study. To simplify
matters we can 'categorize' legal pluralism into 3 periods: the first focused on the debate between
'colonial laws and indigenous law' in post-colonial countries and the relationship between the
state and non-state dimension of social regulation through law (see Hooker 1978). The second
period focused on community justice where theorists such as Abel (1982), critiqued the traditional
idea of informal law as a social transformative ideal. And fmally the third period can be described
as 'postmodern legal pluralism' that includes new forms of legal pluralism such as 'internal legal
pluralism' and supra or 'transnational legal pluralism' which introduces the idea of multiplicities
of law transcending national boundaries (see Santos 1992).
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incorporate "differing legal orders within the nation-state" (Griffiths 2001:289).
The present study therefore constitutes an attempt to investigate the relationship
between 'unofficial' decision making bodies, law and social life.
Studies on dispute resolution processes in the context of community and family
mediation programmes suggest that the distinction between state and non-state
dispute resolution is far more complex than previously envisaged (Roberts 1979,
Gulliver 1963, Abel 1984). Thus in this study, a critical reading of the relationship
between state, law and power allows us to question how moves towards the
introduction of non-adversarial procedures in matters of divorce illustrates a
blurring of boundaries between official mediation policies and unofficial
mediation practices pursued by Shariah Councils. In other words, we can see the
way in which 'negotiations' may take place within the private sphere of Shariah
Councils and how such processes that have traditionally been defmed as non-legal
may co-exist in multi-faceted ways alongside state law. This process is described
by Santos as 'porous legality', involving "the conception of different legal spaces
super-imposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as much in our actions (that
constitutes) inter-legality" (1987:280).
In the present study, we are also interested to understand this process of dispute
resolution from the perspective of women. Thus in section 1.1.4 we draw upon the
work of legal pluralists who have used ethnography in their analysis of law to
explore how gender frames the relations of power on which negotiations may be
based within the family and unofficial decision making bodies. The 'ethnographic'
approach to 'law' evolves from legal anthropologists and is based on the idea that it
allows people a voice to put forward their stories on how they perceive law, what it
means to them and how they deal with issues of control, power, domination and
subordination.7 However, much of the early literature on legal pluralism does not
incorporate a gender perspective and subsequently the "specific lived realities of
women's lives remains largely marginalised" (Griffiths 2001: 156). In addition,
the traditional 'structure' of legal pluralism itself gives insufficient weight to the
For Geertz (1963) such local, specific micro-studies allow a thick description of law. For an
overview of his approach and other legal pluralists see Woodman (1998).
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power of non-legal social arrangements within the spheres of the family, home
and community. With regard to understanding the way in which women
participate in such processes, the present study attempts to synchronize theories
on law, legal pluralism with the power of legal and non-legal social processes to
consider what effect it may have upon their decisions to access 'law' both at the
formal and informal level (Griffiths 1997, Hirsch 1998 and Helium 1999).
Drawing upon a Foucauidian analysis of 'power' and feminist critiques of the
public/private dichotomy it questions what impact these 'unofficial' legal processes
may have upon women's power to negotiate family law matters regarding marriage
and divorce (O'Donovan 1985, Mackinnon 1983, Rose 1987). Furthermore given
the differential'position women occupy within family, home and community we
must also, "document how this gives rise to the exercise of different forms of
power, which impact upon individuals abilities to negotiate with one
another"(Griffiths 2003: 304).
If we accept the complex socio-legal reality of Muslims in Britain it becomes
imperative to locate these debates within a wider social and political context. The
fmal section 1.3 briefly analyses literature on the relationship between
multiculturalism, feminism and conceptions of the family to explore the
relationship between 'unofficial law' and gender inequality. Thus we draw upon
'multicultural theories' to explore how a fragmentation of identities (based upon
ethnic and religious specificities) challenge the liberal notions of 'common
citizenship' and 'equality before the law'. A critical reading of citizenship allows
us to question whether a multicultural definition of citizenship undermines the
liberal principles of autonomy, choice and free will for women within minority
communities.8 This raises a number of important conceptual and theoretical
questions regarding the relation between individual and groups rights, how these
are distinguished and how clashes between individual and group rights may be
reconciled. Embedded in these is the key question of what makes a community a
8 As Purvis and Hunt point out that citizenship, "has always operated in tandem with assumptions
about who are valid political actors and what are the appropriate boundaries of community"
(1999:46 1). Also the debates on citizenship must be understood as part of the wider issues on
immigration and immigration control. See Bhabba and Shutter (1994) for an invaluable
contribution to our understanding of the relationship between immigration control, citizenship and
gender in Britain.
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community of rights. Does the state, in granting individuals the right to enjoy their
culture, have an obligation to foster that culture and ensure its survival?
O'Donovan argues, that the liberal public/private distinction is crucial to
understanding the subordination of women and which liberal political theory fails
to investigate (see Phillips 1993). This distinction designates women to the private
sphere, an area of greater legal 'deregulation' and "central to liberalism is the
concept of privacy as a sphere of behaviour free from public interference, that is,
unregulated by law" (O'Donovan 1985: 181).
This also raises questions on what we mean by the term 'community'.
Communities nest within one another: local, national, and global. They also
intersect: British Muslims belong to the global Muslim umma, for example. Some
individuals may regard the recognition of a cultural/religious practice as a 'right'
and by other members of the same community as a means of oppression. A
particular cause for concern for liberal feminist theorists has been whether the
practice of personal laws within the family context leads to the unequal treatment
of women within these communities. This area of work has been couched within
the context of tensions between multiculturalism and feminism (0km 1999,
Phillips 2002, Shachar 2001). Hence we consider how women may have to
balance social expectation based on cultural duties with religious obligations and,
explore how socially sanctioned parameters that embody notions of 'family
honour' and 'shame' interact and affect their ability to negotiate disputes within
families and communities whilst maintaining their autonomy and independence
(Griffiths 2003: 305).
Moving away from the traditional liberal western approaches, the chapter draws
upon the work of black feminists who have developed more complex and nuanced
conceptual and analytical frameworks to understanding the relationship between
gender, justice and equality. In particular the 'intersectional' approach (Crenshaw
1999, Volpp 2001) and the concept of 'translocational positionality' (Anthias
2002) provides the conceptual frameworks with which to explore the complex,
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situated positionings of women according to race, class and gender differences as
well as understanding the relations of power underpinning these categories. Thus
these analyses interrogate what we understand as culture, community and identity
as fluid, changing and contested entities that are open to social and cultural
contestation within diasporic communities and such a dialogue allows us to
develop what Yuval-Davis has called the "multi-tier approach to citizenship"
(1999:5).
1.2 Studies of Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism moves away from the study of law based upon abstract legal rules to
understanding its meaning and existence in the context in which it operates. For
many theorists, it provides a space for critical thought and discussion where they
are able to explore the relationship between law, culture and social change in
society. Griffiths notes that, "it raises important questions about power- where it is
located, how it is constituted, what forms it takes- in ways that promote a more
finely tuned and sophisticated analysis of continuity, transformation and change in
society" (2001: 289).
The different approaches to legal pluralism are dependent upon the ways in which
law itself is constructed as a concept. Much discussion therefore centres on what
we understand as law, which in turn has invoked much debate, discussion and
dissension.'° Early legal theory defmed the relationship between law and state as
central to understanding the political and social organisation of society. Law was
designated the role of maintaining the prevailing social order and served to entrench
the existing social status quo facilitated by the highly stratified hierarchical class
system and the power of the state (Kelly 1992:17). Legal pluralism directly
challenged this claim and early studies focussed on undermining the ideological and
hegemonic position that state law assumes, a doctrine many defme as 'legal
0km argues that such tensions become especially clear when we consider a controversial
proposal endorsed by some multiculturalists: to provide cultural minorities with 'group rights' as a
way to preserve those minorities from undue pressure on their ways of life (Okin 1999:5).
an interesting discussion on the historical development of law in western society see
Tamanaha (2001).
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centralism' (Griffiths 1986:11)." The term 'legal pluralism' itself has been subject
to much critical discussion and hindered by some conceptual difficulties.' 2
 Much of
the discussion has focussed on its meaning and implications for legal relations in
society (Gilissen 1989, Galanter 1981, Benda-Beckmann 1988). A simple but clear
defmition by Merry (1988) serves as a useful starting point. She defmes legal
pluralism as "as a situation in which two or more legal systems co-exist in the same
social field" (1988:45). This defmition recognises the existence of a plurality of legal
orders in operation within society and challenges what we understand as 'law' in the
traditional sense.'3
1.2.1 'Weak' and 'Strong' Models of Legal Pluralism
Much of the literature categorises legal pluralism, in either 'weak' or 'strong' terms.
These distinctions originate from Griffiths seminal article on legal pluralism, in
which he discusses the development of the concept in its challenge to the
'doctrine of legal centralism' (1986:4). Given the diverse and multifaceted nature
of the different approaches in the studies of legal pluralism, it is useful to analyse
their differences in order to merit their application to this study.
Examples of 'weak' models of legal pluralism originate from early
anthropological studies that highlight the existence of customary law or
indigenous law in postcolonial countries. In this context the state defines the
parameters of legal systems and hence their autonomy is controlled by the
hegemony of state power. 14
 Thus critics point out the 'weak' model of legal
pluralism remains largely limited as it relies too heavily upon a legal centralist model
of law which, promotes a uniform view of law and its relationship to the state
1 For Griffiths legal centralism is described as a 'false ideology' perpetuated by the state in order to
maintain its hegemonic position in society. See Griffiths (1986).
12 The concept developed in the field of 'legal anthropology' where the study of law focused on
the relationship between colonial and indigenous laws. A number of theorists have been critical of
those engaged in an anthropological approach to the study of law, for example Benda-Beckmann
argues that "many legal sociologists submitted to, and inevitably romanticized the dominant legal
s'stem" (1989:56).
Other definitions of legal pluralism include "the situation in which two or more laws interact"
(Hooker 1975:6) and "the condition in which a population observes more than one body of law"
(Woodman 1998:157).
t4 Examples include Hooker (1971) and Chiba (1986).
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(Griffiths 1986: 12). Thus in reality, state law remains dominant, hierarchical while
maintaining a false image of neutrality and equality.
To put it simply, strong forms of legal pluralism recognises multiple forms of
ordering which may be central to the lives of individuals and is not dependant upon
state or state law for recognition or legitimacy. In the present study we are keen to
adopt this approach for our understanding of Muslim legal pluralism in Britain. As
for just how the 'thick, strong or new' form of legal pluralism manifests, we can
begin with the work of Pospisil (1958) and his notion of 'different legal levels' and
Smith's concept of 'corporations' (1978).
From the point of view of Pospisil (1958) the traditional definition of law is both
inadequate and dismissive of those legal systems that do not fulfill the criteria of
the traditional state-centered definition of 'law'. Instead he argues that in different
societies there are different levels of law, which we must recognise and not simply
dismiss as having no law. Thus in order for us to understand 'law', we must
explore the complex interaction of legal phenomena operating within society. He
explains, "Society, be it a tribe or a 'modern' nation, is not an undifferentiated
amalgam of people. It is rather a patterned mosaic of subgroups that belong to
certain, usually well-defined (or definable) types with different memberships,
composition, and degree of inclusiveness. Every such subgroups owes its
existence in a large degree to a legal system that is its own and that regulates the
behaviour of its members..." (1958:125). The nature of legal pluralism therefore
varies among the groups (depending upon inclusiveness) and is stratified
accordingly, thus constituting different 'legal levels'. Criticisms of his work focus
on his emphasis on the structural presentation of society into groups and sub-
groups essentially being bounded and delineated into groups "to idealized to do
justice to social reality" (Griffiths 1986:17). Thus although Pospisil challenges the
power of state law his approach remains rooted within the structural approach to
what we understand as 'law' as 'legal levels' (1958:123).
In turn, Smith's theory of legal pluralism is based upon his concept of
'corporation' that acts as a basic unit of social structure (1981:78). The
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corporation acts as a form of political organisation and the individual membership
to the corporation is the source of their duties, rights and obligations. These
corporations exist in all parts of society for example, the Church or within a caste
group. There are different levels of 'corporations' and he outlines three different
types of legal pluralism, which he describes as cultural, social and structural
pluralism. The main objection with Smiths work is that it is present in an 'ideal
type form' and there is very little room for variance within the phenomena under
study. Griffiths explains, "An ideal-type approach undermines the applicability of
the theory, by making it unclear how its basic entities, corporations, can be
identified in practice. Features such as permanence, autonomy and distinctiveness,
etc. of corporate groups are treated as defmitional attributes rather than as
dimensions of variation" (1986:112). Both these studies depart from the 'weak'
description of legal pluralism in their recognition of other legal system,
nevertheless both studies remain limited by their structural approach to the study
of law.
An alternative approach to the study of legal pluralism has developed within the
'sociology of law' paradigm and derives from the work of Ehrlich (1913). He
developed a descriptive theory of legal pluralism where law becomes part of
another "ordering" and cannot therefore assume a dominant position. He describes
this as "living law", the law "which dominates life itself even though it has not
been posited in legal propositions" (Ehrlich 1936:493, quoted in Griffiths 1986:
26). This approach subsumes all social norms into legal norms and challenges the
power of the state in the creation and administration of 'law'. Critics however
stress how Ehrlich has failed to address the issue of conflict between the different
bodies of living law (see Fitzpatrick 1995).
In an attempt to challenge the dominance of state law and its overarching power
and influence in society, Moore (1978) developed the concept of a 'semi-
autonomous social field'. This concept analyses the ways in which social change
takes place in society which state law and its legislative mechanisms fails to take
into account. She defmes a semi-autonomous social field as one that "can generate
rules and customs and symbols internally, but that. . . is also vulnerable to rules and
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decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is
surrounded. The semi-autonomous social field "has rule-making capacities, and the
means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social
matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of
persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance" (Moore 1978:720). This
framework is certainly useful as it allows us to explore the complex interplay of
different legal orders in operation for example in this study, state law, family and
Shariah Councils. The notion of 'semi-autonomous social field' allows us to
conceptualise multiple forms of ordering that maybe perceived as 'legal' but do
not rely upon state law to determine their power or authority. It thus challenges the
dominance of state law and the doctrine of legal centralism. Under this framework
we can understand how state regulation filters into different organisations via
different social fields. This approach has been further developed by Fitzpatrick
(1984) with the concept of 'integral plurality' where the state legal order is deemed
to be part of other social ordering which includes the family, the workplace and
social networks. He departs from Moore in that he does not see the semi-
autonomous necessarily constituted by the state but vice versa and thus law "is the
unsettled resultant of relations with a plurality of social forms and in this law's
identity is constantly and inherently subject to challenge and change" (Fitzpatrick
1984:138).
1.2.2 Limitations of the 'Weak/'Strong' Dichotomy
It is very clear that as a concept 'legal pluralism' provides us with the conceptual
tools to challenge state-law power and recognise other forms of legal ordering.
Nevertheless as indicated earlier, it remains hindered by conceptual difficulties on
what is understood as 'law' and the distinction between social and legal norms.
Most legal pluralists dismiss the 'weak' model of legal pluralism for its
embodiment of legal centralism and its failure to challenge hegemonic state power
(Hooker 1981). A criticism of the strong model centres on the difficulties in
distinguishing between differing normative orders that subsequently all fall under
the rubric of law. Merry questions, "Where do we stop speaking of law and find
ourselves simply describing social life?"(1988:878). For Collier and Starr (1989),
the concept of legal pluralism remains limited as it fails to take into account the
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power between and within legal systems- power which is not equally shared. We
can also conclude that little attention is paid to power relations within families and
communities consequently the strong legal pluralist approach purports an anti-
state ideology that presupposes that "non-state or indigenous law is good"
(Tamanaha 2001:199).
Thus a strong description of legal pluralism, rather than solely being an object of
our analysis, can be used as a means of developing a better understanding of the
particular ways in which power operates between and within law, unofficial law
and social life. In this way, "social investigators can ask who (which group in
society, which social practices) identifies what as 'customary law', why and under
what circumstances? What is its interaction with state law, and what relationship
does it have, if any, with actual customs circulating within society?" (Tamanaha
2001:199).
1.2.3 Legal Pluralism and the Study of 'Disputes'
A rather different literature shifts from the study of 'law' to the study of
'disputes'. This approach adopts a cross-cultural dimension to the study of law
that allows a comparative approach between 'groups' and 'societies' to explore
what is understood as law. Based upon an ethnographic approach, it moves away
from the instrumentalist approach to the study of law whereby primacy is given
back to the individual at the centre of the 'dispute' allowing us to understand the
complex reality of 'law' in practice. It highlights both the ethnocentric bias
implicit in the traditional conception of 'law' and the dynamic processes involved
in law (see Abel et al 1984).
More recent analyses, challenge the limitations of the 'dispute' paradigm which
stem from its claims upon 'knowledge' and 'representation' of the group under
study. The main criticism with the dispute paradigm is that it adopts a relativist
approach to understanding cultural difference, with culture presented as 'fixed',
homogenous and indeterminate and little attention paid to exploring issues of
dissent and diversity within the group under study. In this way it replaces one
framework of analysis, law based upon substantive rules and procedures, with
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another the dispute paradigm that also remains fixed and rigid. This approach
therefore, fails to address the key issue of power within and between groups but
remains useful to the extent that law in modern societies must be understood in
relation to the cultural context in which it operates.
In response legal pluralists have developed conceptual frameworks where gender
and dispute processes are the focal point of analysis. Yet this approach adopts the
intellectual strategy which incorporates the everyday lived experiences of
women's lives that "produce hybridities of identities, cultural forms and
perceptions of difference" (Cowan, Dembour and Wilson 2001:20). Clearly this
approach can provide us with a useful insight into the experiences of Pakistani
Muslim women using unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms in Britain.
1.2.4 Gender and Legal Pluralism
In her study of gender and marriage among the Kwena tribe in Botswana,
Griffiths (1997) examines how gender frames the relations of power upon which
negotiations concerning family relationships are based. This study draws upon the
narratives of the women, focusing upon their perspectives and experiences and
challenges the traditional constructions of law and culture as fixed and bounded.
Instead she focuses on how meanings are constructed and "raises questions about
the power and authority to construct meaning, whether at a local, national or
international level" (2001:102). The narratives focus on dispute resolution and
dispute resolution mechanisms and analyse the different strategies employed.
This work illustrates how women can be both empowered and constrained by
these processes in different contexts.
For Hirsch (1998), feminists must develop an epistemological approach to the
study of law to incorporate "ways of knowing" that "shape understandings of
social life" (1998:3). Through close analysis of specific disputes she explores
how gender is constructed at a micro-level of interaction, Of particular interest to
this study is her analysis of the language and disputing in cases and mediation in
local Islamic courts. Thus she locates broader gendered discourses on exploring
"how gendered people can and should speak" (1998:3). Thus in this way we
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understand the complex intersection and interaction between social and legal
norms within a particular social context.
Finally, Helium (1999) problematizes the relationship between women's identities
as individuals and as members of a family group. In doing so she critiques
existing debates on cultural relativism, universalism and pluralism that fail to
understand the unique experiences of women's lives that give rise to different
social and legal relations. By applying a gender perspective, this fascinating study
based on the Shona-speaking women in Zimbabwe, is one of the few studies that
challenges legal centralism and cultural relativism and provides an insight into the
inconsistencies, contradictions and challenges that local practices may have upon
legal relations.
What each of these studies provides us with, is a more complex and nuanced
approach to understanding the relationship between gender, law and dispute
resolution. By citing the multiple axes of differentiation between and within
communities in terms of power relations and symbolic meanings, it unsettles the
ideologies of law as universal and homogeneous. Further, these studies recognize
that culture is constantly changing, reformulating and that women are active
agents in this process. Thus while in some contexts they may challenge patriarchal
norms and values in others they actively participate in these processes. Thus law
must also be understood as 'situation specffic' a product of negotiation and
discussion rather than just formal imposition. The key question for us is whether
we are able to draw upon these approaches to understand the experiences of
Muslim women in modern western liberal societies? The shift to a postmodern
understanding of law opens up this conceptual space.
1.2.5 Postmodern Approaches to 'Law'
Most recently scholars point to a shift in our conception of law that explores the
impact of globalisation upon the power and legitimacy of state law (Santos 1987,
Fitzpatrick 1996, Greenhouse 1998, Flood 2002, Merry 2001, Griffiths 2001,
Yilmaz 1999, 2001). Here, the international human rights context provides the fora
for challenges to the traditional sources of power brought about by a new assertion
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of 'rights' deriving from local, cultural, religious and indigenous groups.
Significantly this has led to interesting discussion on the relationship between legal
pluralism and cultural identity in modern western liberal democracies (see
Greenhouse 1998)' and the impact of modernism upon the fragmentation of the
nation-state that has led to new understandings of 'law' (Benton 1994). It is
interesting to note that in response to new global challenges legal pluralists draw
upon social theory to understand this process of fragmentation and the plural
nature of legal orders. These approaches are significant as they challenge the
'state law/non-state law' dichotomy that remains prevalent in many studies of
legal pluralism.
One of the key theorists to link the development of globalisation to law is Santos
(1987, 1995). He defines law as, "a body of regularised procedures and normative
standards, considered justicable in any given group, which contributes to the creation
and prevention of disputes, and to their settlement through an argumentative
discourse coupled with the threat of force" (1995:428-9). He goes onto limit the
characteristics inherent within social life, which can be defmed as law to 6 clusters
defmed as domestic law, production law, exchange law, community law, systemic
and territorial or state law. Each of the 6 clusters interacts and overlaps with each
other. Santos's account of law and legal pluralism is both complex and elaborate
and for the purposes of this study will not be extensively critiqued. Nevertheless the
present writer is interested in two of these clusters, domestic law and community
law. He describes domestic law as, "the set of rules, normative standards and
dispute settlement mechanisms both resulting from and in the sedimentation of
social relations in the household" (1995:429). He goes on to describe this as, "very
informal, non-written, so deeply embedded in family relations that it is hardly
conceivable as an autonomous dimension thereof' (1995:429). Community law
challenges state power, "it may be evoked either by hegemonic or oppressed groups"
(1995: 434). These analyses provide a clearer understanding on the nature of legal
pluralism within diasporic communities in the West. Yet despite the vast array of
literature now available, we continue to learn very little on the experiences of
15 For example the power of trausnational forms of law and ordering derived from such diverse
sources as the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, the World Trade
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minority ethnic communities in Britain. How then are we to understand the nature
of legal pluralism within diasporic Muslim communities in Britain?
1.2.6 Muslim Legal Pluralism in Britain
As discussed earlier, existing literature presents the socio-legal reality of Muslims
as a complex scenario whereby official and customary laws interact to produce a
new set of hybrid laws (Bunt 1998; Carroll 1996; Menski & Pearl 1998; Poulter
1996; Yilmaz 2001; Shah-Kazemi 2001). In attempting to develop a conceptual
framework, which both adopts a 'postmodern approach' to the study of law and
recognises pluralism and diversity in social life, Menski (1998) employs the
analytical framework by the jurist Masaji Chiba (1986) and constructs a legal
model he defines as 'Angrezi Sharia'. According to Menski, Asian Muslims in
Britain, have not simply given up Islamic law but combine Islamic law and
English law to form 'Angrezi Sharia'. He describes a three-fold process
generated by internal conflicts within Asian communities and leading, as
mentioned, to the creation of 'British Asian Laws in Britain. The first stage
occurred at the time of migration. At this stage ignorance of the legal system
meant that customary practices continued to be observed. For example, up until
1970 many Asians did not register marriages and this later resulted in huge
matrimonial disputes. Subsequently, however, Asians learnt to adapt to English
law but rather than abandon their customary traditions, they built the requirements
of English law into them. The result has been that new British Muslim, Hindu
and Sikh law, unique to Britain, has emerged, differing in some important aspects
from the Indian, Pakistani or Bangladesh laws and customs. This was the second
phase, which created the corpus of precedent law Menski labels 'Angrezi' law.
The third stage in this process might involve abandoning ethnic customs and
religious personal laws altogether, and practising only state law, but this has not
happened and is, indeed, unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future in the case of
most Muslims. Thus English law remains the official law while angrezi sharia is
the unofficial law. As part of this complex process, redefined Muslim laws in
Britain have become 'hybrid' and thus "all ethnic minorities in Britain marry
Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. See Greenhouse (1999).
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twice, divorce twice and do many other things several times in order to satisfy the
demands of concurrent legal systems" (Menski 1998:75).
In Britain, Muslim family law is referred to as personal law as there have been
some voices within the Muslim community in the UK demanding that a 'personal
regime of law' be adopted for the Muslim community as a whole within the area
of family law (Nielsen 1991: 56). Muslim Family law, like other South Asian
religious and customary corpuses of law, defines the position of women in
relation to marriage, divorce, child custody, dowry and inheritance (Nash 1990,
Ali 2000). In the case of Islam, Muslim Family Law is subject to interpretation by
different religious leaders and communities. There is no one comprehensive
Islamic legal system but varieties exist according to ethnic or religious
backgrounds. For example, the Islamic personal laws which exist in the Indian
subcontinent vary greatly in comparison with those which exist in Iran or Iraq.
There are two main groups of Muslims in Britain, Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, and
the practice of Islam within these groups varies in accordance with the different
Shariah schools of thought (see chapter 3). There are also many class and
sectarian divisions, however, operating according to different Islamic codes of
laws; for example, Ismaili Muslims are part of the wider Shi'a group but practice
distinct laws applicable only to them. It is therefore difficult to speak of 'Muslim
family law' in Britain when it varies so widely according to ethnic and sectarian
affiliation. Nielsen notes that the discussion of Islamic family law in Britain in the
Muslim magazines centres on the ethics of the subject rather than the law (1991:
12). This means that the general principles highlighted in these texts are based on
human relations. According to one interpretation, custom is dependent on place,
time and circumstances; others regard the role of religious leaders as crucial in
defining current Sharia practice. Muslim feminists argue that there is a
fundamental tension in Islam between its ethical or spiritual vision of sexual
equality and the unequal hierarchies contained in family laws, instituted in early
Islamic society and perpetuated over time by those holding power (Ahmed 1992,
Mernissi 1987).
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1.2.7 Unofficial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Locating Shariah Councils
In addressing the issue of legal pluralism in western liberal societies we can see that
writers fall into two categories. The first highlight the ontological divide between
state law and personal laws which may produce a new set of hybrid laws but in
effect replicate the legal centralist approach it seeks to challenge. In this context it is
vital to differentiate state law from non-state law as it involves different notions of
power and "monopolizes the symbolic power associated with state authority"
(Merry 1988, Cotterrell 1992). Critics of this approach fall into the second category,
pointing out that the ontological divide between state law as doctrine and non-state
law as social ordering is false and misleading. Instead it is argued that studies in
legal pluralism must include the operation of 'state legal pluralism' in order to
understand the interaction of state legal processes with customary law (Woodman
1998). State law is not homogeneous and there are areas of contestation and
incompatibility' 6 between the two systems. The dichotomy between state law as
formalist and centralist and legal plural order as fluid therefore does not exist and we
can begin to understand the different perceptions of law in operation. Law is
therefore described as a social fact. This approach allows us to understand how the
distinctions between state and non-state law may in fact be blurred.
In Britain, the distinction between state and non-state law has come under
increasing scrutiny. In this context the practice of Muslim Personal laws can
manifest in the form of Shariah Councils (Menski 1998). In this scenario personal
law operates in the private spheres away from both the knowledge and recognition
of state law (Menski and Pearl 2000). Yet the relationship between state law and
customary law in modem western societies cannot be seen as so clear-cut
(Fitzpatrick 1984, Woodman 1998, Santos 1987). Santos points out that the
practice of personal laws in western countries has led to a situation where the state
expands and involves itself in areas that are traditionally defined as non-state, a
process he describes as 'secondary civil society' (1982: 252)! In this context we
16 For an interesting analysis of this approach see Petersen and Henrik (1995).
17 Explanations range from informalism challenging existing ideas on the nature of law and
embodying a social transformative role to materialist explanations where informal social control
works to discipline labour; a repressive state initiates 'informalism' as a mode of social control
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can see how the emergence of a 'politics of identity' with demands for communal
autonomy may in fact lead to an "ever greater internal heterogeneity of state
action" where the state realigns itself and manifests in different ways. According
to Santos, "the unity and universality of the official legal system break down, new
forms of legal pluralism within state legality may arise which are identified
'internal legal pluralism' "(1987:54). In the British context we can see how this
dialectical relationship between state law and unofficial law in relation to
mediation illustrates the need to develop a theory of legal pluralism, which is wide
enough to capture different forms of pluralism(s) rather than focusing on the
dichotomy of state law versus indigenous law. In his fascinating historical
account on the development of formal state law in nineteenth-century England,
Arthurs, illustrates the existing dialectic "between centralism and pluralism"
(1985:3) and the development of a "single legal culture out of a pluralistic
system" (1985:8). Hence a historical narrative allows us to understand the
pluralism inherent within state-law through mediation, arbitration and private
arrangements.
The role of the individual within these plural legal developments has also been
extensively developed. Henry (1983; 1985) develops the work of Fitzpatrick and
draws upon Giddens (1992) and his idea of the 'self' to illustrate the role of the
individual and individual action in such legal processes. In this study the issue of
choice and whether or not the individual wishes to use these non-official legal
bodies is crucial. Poulter points out that Muslim women may be compelled to use
these bodies which may be conservative and patriarchal due to issues of family
honour (1998:14). Shariah Councils are part of a Muslim community (the Muslim
umma) and these demands of belonging to a Muslim community may conflict
with local ones. Cownie and Bradney point out that there may be different levels
of pressure to comply as, "even with voluntary dispute resolution mechanisms
there may be considerable pressure to accept the dispute resolution mechanisms
ruling. A person who refuses to accept the jurisdiction of the family to mediate in
a family quarrel may find that they lose contact with that family" (1996:7).
and fmally the role of professionals in informalism that serve the interests of the state. See Santos
(1982).
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1.2 The Relationship of 'Mediation' to Law
The relationship between state law and personal law brings into question of where
the latter is located within the social, political and legal sphere(s). Literature
suggests personal laws manifest in the area of mediation (Harrington 1992, Merry
1992, Muichany 2000). In other words, mediation serves as a useful link between
official and customary law as these programmes are located on the boundary
between state law and non-state ordering. As Merry suggests, mediation "can be
thought of as intermediate, distinct from both sides but linked to each"
(1992:164). It is this linkage between state law and unofficial mediation bodies,
which is of interest to the present writer.
In seeking to understand how Muslim legal pluralism manifests in Britain, it is
pivotal to explore how Shariah Councils challenge the state/non-state law
distinction. How does the state define dispute settlement processes? To what
extent are disputes settled within the private arena of the family and home and in
the community by non-state agencies such as Shariah Councils? And in what form
does this non-state intervention take? In doing so this thesis explores the
relationship of 'mediation' to law. Is there a blurring of boundaries between
official mediation policies and unofficial mediation practices? We can see with
informal dispute resolution mechanisms that the distinction between state and
non-state dispute resolution collapses. Religious bodies embody legal rules and
norms and can demand different levels of obedience even though they may be in
conflict with state law rules. Menski argues that "While it would be alarmist to
speak of a parallel Muslim court structure in Britain, there is much evidence that
many disputes among Muslims in Britain are today settled in the context of such
informal family or community conciliation involving senior family members or
community leaders, depending on the length and seriousness of the dispute"
(1998:79). Adversarial proceedings are to be avoided, if possible.
Mediation is a contested space where competing legal discourses interact. It can
be deemed as oppositional to state law but equally be supervised and supported by
the state. Working in tangent with individuals and local communities, it is
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perceived as the natural space in which conflicts arising from formal and informal
legal systems may be amicably resolved. This increase in forms of 'informalism'
has been generally perceived as a positive development against the overarching
power of state law and which can have a social transformative role on 'law'.
Indeed, the relationship between mediation programmes and the community have
generated an interesting array of literature (see Abel et al 1984). For Fitzpatrick,
the relationship between mediation and state law is closer than envisaged and it
acts as "a mere mask or agent" of the state (1992:199). Further, he describes the
relationship between the two as 'mythic' where popular forms of justice can
oppose formal law "even while being identical to them" (1992:200).
1.2.1 Community Mediation
Literature on mediation and its relationship to the community has raised
interesting issues. For example, the San Francisco Community Boards in the US
are based around the notions of 'civic responsibility' and 'local self governance'
in order to encourage settlements away from state law (Harrington 1992:32). The
relationship between mediation and the community has led to interesting
discussion on the nature of state control. Abel points out that mediation works
under the guise of reducing state control and though presented as being less
coercive and oppressive in fact it demands greater forms of state control and
domination. He accepts however that state law mediation can offer protection
against forms of abuse which informal mediation may fail to protect against.
"Formality" he states, "can frequently be a useful weapon for the powerless. It can
justify the demand for equality across lines of race, religion, gender and even
class" (Abel 1982:10). But he concludes that mediation does not embody a social
transformative role and as it remains a part of the existing legal system it cannot
instigate any real change.18
One of the interesting issues to consider is how communities are constructed in
mediation programmes. Yngvessonn and Fitzpatrick illustrate how mediation
18 Adopting a dialectical approach to the relationship between law and community justice, he
illustrates the contradictions within the law. He argues that to understand the dialectical
relationship between formal law and informal justice we must focus on the intersection between
law, justice and power (see Abel 1984).
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actually creates "representations and identities for 'community' in a legal setting"
(1992:178). In the US the role of religious bodies as conflict resolution
mechanisms has in recent times generated much interest. Harrington points out
that prior to setting up of community boards dispute resolution was organised
around religious, cultural and ethnic lines. She states, "They were established to
maintain cultural values and preserve ethnic and religious identity, often seen as
being under attack from the 'outside" (2000:186). In his early research into the
formation of such tribunals during the early twentieth century Auerbach (1983)
describes the role of the tribunals within the Chinese community in New York. He
states that the tribunals played a specific role in maintaining close-knit ties within
the community and ensuring assimilation was being resisted. He also traces the
origins of the Jewish Conciliation Board in similar terms. Thus in the 1960s there
were a number of government initiatives such as funding programmes aimed at
resolving conflicts within communities. The aim of such programmes was not
empowerment within the community and it was the courts that were given
powers. During this time private mediation bodies also came into operation, for
example the Ford Foundation' 9
 set up bodies to resolve racial disputes in order to
prevent widespread disobedience. In this way the relationship between community
and law is conceptualised according to the different contexts in which it operates.
Thus law plays a minimal role in some contexts and a greater role of governance
in others. In the British context, religious bodies are not part of official mediation
processes but as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, these initiatives are being
developed by some Shariah Councils.
1.2.2 Official Family Mediation
Mediation in English Family law has been presented as a dilemma for the liberal
state that grapples with regulating 'family life' on the one hand and with
preserving 'family privacy' on the other (Maclean 1997, Bottomley 1984). This
relationship between the state and the family 2°
 is epitomised through family law
19	
a brief outline on the role of the Ford Foundation see http:/www.fordfoundation.ac.uk
20 Sociological accounts of the family vary from functionalist writers such as Talcott Parsons who
argue that the family serves a particular purpose to ensure the stability of all individuals and hence
the stability of the existing social system. Marxist and feminist accounts of the relationship
between state and family is based "on the notion that state activity is not simply family-relevant
but presupposes, reinforces and perpetuates, as the appropriate unit for personal care and for the
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legislation. Kurczewski explains, ". . .the duty of the State is to support and protect
the authentic institution of the family, respecting its natural shape and natural and
inalienable rights"( 1997:5). Most commentators accept that the 'authentic' shape
of the family is based on the idea of the 'sacred character' of the family with the
centrality of gender relations. In so doing, what the family means in English
family law, is transformed to reflect male interests.21
For feminist scholars the analytical framework of the public/private dichotomy
underpins the subordination of women in English law. Rather than seeing women
as active participants in civic and political life they are consigned to 'private
sphere' at the expense of personal autonomy (Freeman 1985). In her critique
Olsen (1983) analyses the interrelationship between the market and the family and
the public and private dichotomy. She points out that these dichotomies serve to
control family and productive lives and this obscures the power relations between
women and men and the state and the individual. Moreover the ways in which the
state intervenes in family regulation has also been subject to extensive critique.
The designation of marriage, divorce, sexual behaviour and domestic violence to
the private sphere under the liberal political discourse of personal choice and
freedom means that women are often left with little state protection (Olsen
1983:1503).
It is under this analytical framework of the public/private dichotomy that has led
to recent proposals to resolve marital disputes back to the sphere of the 'private'
against 'unnecessary' state intervention. In this context the development of
informal justice in the guise of mediation derives from the liberal legal conception
of public and private space whereby family privacy becomes a natural extension
of liberal philosophy. As Mnoonkin points out, "The core reason is rooted in
notions of human liberty. Private ordering is supported by the liberal idea that
regulation of sexual and parental relationships, a privatized nuclear family based on the sexual
division of labour and the subordination of women"(see Smart 1987:45).
21 In particular the role and position of women within the family serve to reflect male interests. In
her work Mackinnon argues that as the law itself is patriarchal family law merely reflects this. She
writes, "If objectivity is the epistemological stance of which women's sexual objectification is the
social process, its imposition the paradigm of power in the male form, then the state will appear
most relentless in imposing the male point of view"(1983:447).
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individuals have rights, and should largely be left free to make of their lives what
they wish" (1984:366 quoted in Diduck and Kaganas 2000:350). Yet as Rose
points out such proposals "gloss over, ignore or obscure the different powers and
interests of different members of the family" (1987:66). This emphasis on
analysing the power relations which underpin new reform strategies and the
development of 'informalism' offers us the opportunity to engage in debates on
legal pluralism and diversity without simplifying the categories of family, state
and individual. Thus as discussed in section 1.1.3 the development of informalism
in resolving family disputes can in practice extend state control to monitoring and
defming family relations. Thus a "critical analysis of family law must relocate
legal regulation within the complex networks of powers which link up domestic,
sexual and parental relations with social, economic and political objectives" (Rose
1987:74). This approach reveals the ambiguities in family life that are not always
noticed in theoretical accounts. The complex lived realities of women's lives
means that they are both regulated and active participants in the process of social
and family life. Recognising the multiplicities of power means that we can
uncover the conditions upon which such processes are based.
Clearly this approach provides a conceptual framework in exploring how the
public/private dichotomy in English law remains central to constructing the
boundaries within which the free practice of cultural customs and religious beliefs
is deemed acceptable. We engage in these debates in order to contextualize
demands by some community leaders and religious scholars for recognition of
Muslim Personal Law into English law.
1.3 Multiculturalism and Family Life in Britain
The relationship between 'family' and liberal political theory has focused on the
family threatening 'citizenship' and loyalty to the state. It is deemed to
undermine democracy with its emphasis on loyalty to family networks, rather than
the state. Kurczewski explains, "Family, in the theory of liberal democratic
politics, threatens the freedom and purity of individual judgement and decision.
Under the influence of family, the citizen instead of voting according to his or her
beliefs may vote for those whom he or she fmds personally unworthy. Even
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worse, the family presupposes a bond that rivals the bonds of interests or
communality of beliefs" (1997:6).
Yet it has been argued that in a multicultural and heterogeneous society there
must be a commitment to cultural diversity and pluralism in the area of family
life, just as in other areas, and that the law should uphold and support a diversity
of family arrangements whether or not they are reflective of differences in race,
culture or religion (Bainham 1995: 235). This is echoed by Raz, who argues "the
phenomenon of a multicultural society goes beyond mere toleration and non-
discrimination. It involves recognition of the equal standing of all stable and
viable cultural communities existing in a society" (1986:38). Raz suggests, that
we need a radical policy of liberal multiculturalism that would transcend an
individualistic approach but would at the same time "recognise the importance of
unimpeded membership in a respected and flourishing cultural group for
individual well-being" (1986:44). A redefinition of society would mean there
would no longer be majority and minority groups but rather a plurality of cultural
groups each of equivalent worth. Debate on the question of what we mean by the
'family' raises the question of whether there is "an irreducible core of family
values to which everyone could subscribe" (1996:234) or whether English family
law has the "scope for accommodating a plurality of views about the family and
family lifestyles" (Bainham 1996:234). More recently, the issue has moved to one
of 'rights' and 'participatory democracy'. This raises two key questions: To what
extent is the law committed to multiculturalism in the family context? And, does
the practice of Muslim personal laws lead to the unequal treatment of women
within these communities?22
1.3.1 Multicultural Citizenship: Recognising 'Diversity' and 'Pluralism'
'Multiculturalism' is a relatively new concept in western political thought. Hesse,
points out that it has become "a contested frame of reference for thinking about
22	 to the limitations of the study the conflicts of law scenario with state law and cultural
practice is only briefly addressed and only in the context of this study. Yet this issue raises a
number of interesting questions which merit further research. There seems to be an inevitable
tension inherent in social legal policy which seeks at one and the same time to admit and accept
cultural difference and value pluralism, while supporting what may be thought to be basic, non-
negotiable values which are within the very concept of the family.
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the quotidian cohesion of western civil societies uncertain about their national and
ethnic futures" (2000:1). Bhabha describes it has a 'floating signifier' where
"differentiation and condensation seem to happen almost synchronically" (1998:).
Indeed the conflation of 'multiculturalism' with the related terms 'identity',
'race', 'ethnicity' and 'diaspora' has led to epistemological questioning over its
precise meaning. 23
 The term remains useful however to understand the different
strategies and policies employed by the state in its attempts to 'govern' and
'manage' the problems posed by the presence of minority communities (Hall
1996).24
'Multiculturalism' remains a contested idea (see May 1999) though within the
British context it is commonly accepted that it arose from political thinking on
how to deal with post war Commonwealth migration to Britain. The nature and
practice of multiculturalism in Britain has been extensively documented and
critiqued (Hall 1996, Gilroy 1987, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, Sahgal and
Yuval-Davis 1999, Parekh 1996, Brah 1996, Bhachu 1992, Modood 1998,
Rattansi 1992, Hesse 2000, Vertevoc 1996, Werbner 1998).25 These critiques have
focused on the tensions between a defmition of citizenship based upon liberal
notions of universality and equality with the reality of a fragmentation of
identities, which has led to 'claims' of recognition from various groups based
upon an etlmic and/or religious specificity. Such critiques explore the implications
of the failure of citizenship to accommodate other forms of identity and
investigate the possibility of developing a 'multicultural' model that recognizes
group rights in the form of cultural rights. Purvis and Hunt describe this process
23 Hall argues that it has now become so discursively entangled that it can only be used 'under
erasure' (2000:234).
24 Multiculturalism is not a singular doctrine and has been described as embodying 3 different
types: Conservative multiculturalism insists upon assimilation, Liberal multiculturalism focuses
upon integration in mainstream society whilst tolerating certain cultural practices in the private.
And, Pluralist multiculturalism affords groups rights for cultural communities under a
communitarian political order. See Hall (2000. He engages in a very interesting discussion on
whether multiculturalism as any epistemological value when it has been appropriated and critiqued
in so many difference disciplines (2000: 210-211).
The debate on multiculturalism has been accompanied with critiques on what is understood as
'British' and Britishness' (see Hall 1988, Rattansi 1992, Gilroy 1987). Also Hall (1999) has
challenged the popular misconception that prior to post war migration to Britain, Britain symbolised a
fixed, unified nation-state. In fact, the presence of 'black' and Asian communities in Britain has been
documented as early as the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries (see Ballard 1997).
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as a "neo-liberal mode of governance which decenters the state" and thus "neo-
liberal rule is better conceived as a new alliance between the state, autonomous
experts, and self-governing individuals" (1999:469-470).
The term citizenship is a contested term with inherent definitional tensions.26
Marshall's definition of citizenship as "a status bestowed on those who are full
members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the
rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (1950: 28-9) has served as a
useful starting point for critiques. The key elements in this definition are thus
membership of a community, equality and the rights and obligations that derive
from this membership but the emphasis upon a singular identity has led to
criticism on its failure to recognise the actuality of a plurality of social identities
in operation (Purvis and Hunt 1999). Literature on citizenship falls into two main
camps with an analysis of the social implications of citizenship debates and those
considering the political implications. Mouffe develops a synthesis between the
different approaches and argues that we must "go beyond the conceptions of
citizenship of both the liberal and the civic republican traditions while building on
their respective strengths"(1992:65). Thus she advocates a dialectical approach to
understanding the social and political dimensions of citizenship, whereby it
emerges as a dynamic concept but the core to this synthesis is the important role
of human agency.
Feminist writers point out that women have historically been excluded from
citizenship debates (Walby 1992, Phillips 1995, Yuval-Davis 1999).27
Furthermore citizenship as well as constructing men and women differently is also
an ethnicized and racialised concept (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Women are
affected by ethnic and national processes including as biological and cultural and
26	 are number of different citizenship models. The first can be defmed as the liberal approach
where citizenship focuses on equality and rights bearing citizens. On the other hand the republican
approach to citizenship focuses upon the conceptualization of citizenship as active political
participation and civic engagement. Riley (1992:180) has called it a 'slippery term' referring to the
vast literature which exists on the subject and the impossibility therefore of arriving to a
comprehensive common defmition.
27 Lister argues "a conceptualization of citizenship is particularly important in challenging the
construction of women (and especially minority group women) as passive victims whilst keeping sight
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national reproducers; as cultural embodiments of collectivities and their
boundaries and as carriers of collective honour. As Yuval-Davis points within
citizenship debates the notion of 'the community' assumes an organic wholeness
and naturalness in that it is out there and something to which you can either
belong too or not (1997). This construction of a 'community' as led to the
designating of community leaders as representatives of the interests of the
community. The term 'multicultural citizenship' therefore remains problematic as it
defmes all cultural groups as homogeneous and operating around fixed categories
and does not take into account issues of control, power and conflict arising from
conflicts of interest within minority groups. Instead we must view citizenship as 'a
multi-tier construct' that operates in a number of different ways (Yuval-Davis 1997).
For many the rise of a 'politics of identity' has brought to the fore such tensions
with the claim for recognition of groups rights being based upon fixed
constructions of identity (Soysal 1999). Thus it is argued that a focus on
universalism has merely "served to entrench social divisions of gender, race,
sexuality and culture" (Purvis and Hunt 1999: 468). This has led to discussion on
the social and cultural contestation of identities. For Squires, the benefits of
multiculturalism are innumerable if it is grounded in a "diversity politics
framework" (2001:115). This attempts to move away from the pitfalls of identity
politics and focuses on the need to develop a fully inclusive political citizenship
that enables all citizens to "have equal opportunity to take part in the decision-
making process' whereby rules are formulated" (Squires 2001:123).
1.3.2 Multiculturalism and the 'Rights' Discourse
More recently debates on the limits of the 'multicultural citizenship' have been
located within the discourse of rights and in particular the conflictual relationship
between individual and community rights. Under liberal political theory the
principles of individual choice, personal freedom and religious toleration are
grounded in the notion of individual rights. Within this tradition group rights are
viewed with suspicion and seen as inherently dangerous and oppressive if they fail
of the discriminatory and oppressive male dominated political, economic and social institutions which
still deny them full citizenship" (1990:34).
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to acknowledge conflict and diversity within the group. Recently, however,
liberals have begun to argue that group interests may, in fact, be accommodated
within the framework of individual rights (Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995).
One kind of critique of liberalism comes from 'communitarians' who argue that
liberalism has failed to encompass the concept of 'community' adequately within
its analysis of rights. These critics claim that liberalism, by assuming that the
individual exists prior to a community, fails to capture the reality of human
experience. By contrast with liberals, communitarians aim to place the individual
within a community, seen to play a defming role in identity formation. According
to Sandel, the introduction of 'community' into the liberal conception of rights
enhances self-consciousness and individual identification with a wider
subjectivity of "participants in a shared identity, be it family, community, class or
nation through a sense of participation and engagement with others" (Sandel
1982: 79). Belonging is central to the communitarian ideal. Human beings are
defined as being socially interdependent, connected over their life course through
complex social networks. People as subjects are continuously 'made' through
their engagement with their society and its institutions (Bay 1978: 45).
'Community' thus provides a sense of social selfhood and identity, a moral
biography embedded in the 'story of those communities from which I derive my
identity' (McIntyre 1981: 205; Parry 1969:182). What we are or are able to
become depends to an important extent on the wider community in which we live.
The limitations of the 'communitarian' approach is in its failure to address the
issue of difference and diversity within a group. For Hirsch, the communitarians
fail to acknowledge the negative dimensions of 'community', "[b]oth
homogeneity and moral education can be politically dangerous in several ways:
by encouraging the exclusion of outsiders; by encouraging indoctrination or
irrationalism; by compromising privacy and autonomy". (Hirsch 1986: 14)
The notion of community constructs boundaries, which involve processes of
exclusion as well as inclusion. The development of the individual thus becomes
dependent upon the community yet this fails to recognise that individual and
group rights may diverge. The issue is, therefore, how a theory of cultural
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minority group rights may include recognition of difference, including gendered
difference, within groups. The principle of recognition may open a Pandora's box,
as van Dyke points out, "from which all sorts of groupings might spring,
demanding rights" (1995: 234). To avoid this proliferation of 'groups' claiming
'recognition', Fiss identifies two characteristics of a social group, which
differentiate it from 'mere aggregates': its 'entity' and its interdependence. By
entity he means that the group has a distinct existence and identity apart from its
members, and that individuals derive their sense of well being, status and identity
from their membership in the group (see Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987: 57).
Poulter argues that, given liberal principles, we must be clear about the limits of
cultural pluralism 'which need to be imposed in support of the overriding public
interest in promoting social cohesion' (1992: 156). This view is shared by Lester
and Bateman who warn that cultural tolerance must not become a "cloak for
oppression and injustice within the immigrant communities themselves" (cited in
Poulter 1992) nor must it endanger the integrity of the 'social and cultural core' of
English values as a whole. Providing provisions for ethnic minority groups
seeking to practice religious customs and practices has raised the question of the
need for 'special treatment'. This is because, as Montgomery argues, "Provisions
providing for formal equality may result in greater restrictions of the freedom of
minority groups than is experienced by the majority" (1992: 193). Such
restrictions must be viewed in the fight of the legal commitment to protect rights
of religious freedom that make it necessary to devise special rules for particular
groups. But does recognising a group right mean compelling all members of the
group to partake of the right in question, even against their will?
Montgomery outlines four different types of group rights. The first is where
individuals acquire rights by virtue of their membership of the group, once
membership is established. This principle has been applied in English law to
Quakers and Jews, for example, who are allowed by the Marriage Acts 1949-86 to
solemnize marriage acts. Their special privileges date from 1753 and they are not
subject to the regulations. English domestic law makes no concessions, however,
to other religions or customs, apart from Christianity. The second type of a 'group
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right' recognizes a 'private' space in which "a self-contained parallel system of
rules would operate" (.Montgomery 1992: 195). The Ottoman Empire operated
with a plural system according autonomy to religious groups or dhimmis to
manage their family law internally. The third type of group right is a dispensation
or entitlement allowing members of the group, as a collective body, to act in a
way which would otherwise be unlawful. For example, the Sex Discrimination
Act 1975, section 19, allows qualifications and authorizations to be withheld from
one sex 'for purposes of organized religion' in order to comply with the doctrines
of that religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant
number of its followers. Finally, the fourth sense of a group right is where the
right permits some individual members to have special privileges deriving from
their membership in the group. For example, both the Jewish and Muslim
communities have designated members of the community who have the right to
slaughter animals differently from the rest of society. Furthermore Muslim girls
have been allowed to wear headscarves to school, contravening the school
uniform, and a similar dispensation exists for Jewish boys to wear religious caps.
Prior to changes to the law, Muslims and Jews were exempt from Sunday trading
prohibitions.
Despite his strong advocacy of an active and transformative multiculturalism,
Parekh (1995) is critical of calls for autonomous group rights from different
religious groups. He believes that Britain cannot allow separate legal systems for
different communities without violating the fundamental principles of common
citizenship and equality before the law. The law, he points out, has evolved and
accepted cultural differences in case law without violating these principles.28
28 Parekh analyses a number of cases that illustrate that religious/cultural traditions can be
practised within the private sphere of the family, as long as they do not conflict with liberal legal
principles of 'equality before the law' and 'common citizenship' (Parekh 1997: 23). For example,
in R v Bibi (1980) the Court of Appeal reduced the imprisonment of a Muslim widow, found
guilty of importing cannabis, from three years to six months on the grounds that, among other
things, 'she was totally dependent on her brother in law and was socialized by her religion into
subservience to the male members of her household' (Parekh 1992: 200). In R v Bailey and R v
Byfield the moral codes of men brought up in the West Indies were taken into consideration in
sentencing them for having sexual intercourse with girls under the age of 16, and in Malik v
British Home Stores (1980) it was decided that in appropriate circumstances Asian women may
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In Britain there have been demands for Muslim personal laws to be recognized in
English law under the context of multiculturalism and 'rights' and we explore
these demands in chapters 3 and 4. In English law, personal laws are defmed as
ethnic customs (Poulter 1992, 1998) which are recognized, as long as they are not
deemed 'unreasonable' nor clash with the principles of English law (this also
includes violation of any international treaties to which Britain maybe
signatory). 29
 Menski notes that the framing of these claims drive from western
human rights approach. He asks "who determines the criteria for what is
acceptable and what is not? Should the official law restrict itself to controlling the
limited space that it recognises, knowingly ignoring the rest of the social field, or
should it attempt to control the entire field while being prepared to make
concessions to diversity?" (Menski 1998:68). While we may be sympathetic to
both arguments we would be reticent in adopting either analytical framework on
the basis that they are both firmly located in the dichotomy of western
universalism versus cultural relativism. Conceiving this situation as the
juxtaposition of two distinctive approaches and their embedded legal systems
(English Family Law versus Muslim Personal Laws) is not a useful way to make
sense of the process. Furthermore this approach does not deal adequately with the
power relations and continues to see cultures and religions as homogeneous
entities. There are clearly underlying assumptions about the role of the individual
and general relations within cultural and religious identities that may run counter
to the lived complexities of social life in Britain. We thus turn to the work of
feminists who have critiqued the relationship between the individual and the
community.
wear trousers at work, even though white women may not. Full citations of cases can be found in
the Table of Cases.
29 Legislation to protect specific cultural and religious practices include: The Race Relations Act
1976 which aimed to promote equal opportunities and to eliminate discrimination in employment,
housing, education and the provision of goods and services. The legal system has over time
recognised certain other demands of ethnic minority groups. The Shop Act 1950 exempted Jews
from Sunday trading laws. The Slaughterhouses Act 1979 allows the slaughter of animals for the
purpose of obtaining kosher and halal meat for the Jewish and Muslim communities; and since
1976, a Sikh with a turban may ride a motorcycle in Britain without wearing a crash helmet under
the Motorcycle Crash Helmet (Religious Exemption) Act, which is otherwise compulsory. In
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1.3.3 Feminism and Multiculturalism
More recently ideas of gender equality, justice and the limits of liberal
multiculturalism have emerged from within the discipline(s) of political theory,
ethics and philosophy and couched within the context of tensions between
feminism and multiculturalism. Of particular concern is the extent to which the
liberal state should recognise and accommodate differences based upon cultural
and religious values or whether it should adhere to a single set of norms and
values that apply to all citizens in an 'equal' way (0km 1999 et al). Shachar refers
to this as the 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability', "which arises when an
identity group members rights as a citizen are violated by her identity group's
family law practices" (2001:6). As one of the central concerns in this study is to
explore the experiences of Pakistani Muslim women using Shariah Councils we
are particularly interested in engaging with this process, but from a perspective
that is located in the specificities of women's lives.
We find however that these approaches are imbued with simplified and
unqualified understandings of culture, religion, identity and community that fail to
adequately engage with the multiple positions women occupy in relation to race,
ethnicity, class, family and community (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Indeed
they posit western culture against 'other cultures' (the preoccupation mostly with
Islam and its 'subordinating' effects upon Muslim women) and lose sight of the
fact that women are social agents and "occupy positions in other categories of
difference and location" (Anthias 2002:276). Furthermore it is extremely self-
centered to think that the only a western framework of 'human rights' provides
Muslim women with access to equality, justice and autonomy. We should not lose
sight of the fact that Muslim feminists and scholars are currently engaged in
exploring the relationship between human rights, Islam and gender equality from
an Islamic perspective, some of which renders such simplistic analyses virtually
meaningless in relation to the complex lived realities of Muslim women's lives
(see An-Nai'm 1990, Mayer 1999, Ali 2002, Mirza forthcoming).
addition, voluntary-aided religious and denominational schools are funded by the state, as are
army chaplains and university theology faculties.
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It is this complex reality that leads us in this study to the work of black feminists
who have explored issues of difference and complexity and the intersection of
race, gender and class subordination. Moreover the complex nature of identities
leads us to draw upon the categories of hybridity and difference and, diaspora and
space to challenge the assumed homogeneity of community.
1.3. 4 Translocational Positionality
The distinctive dependency of feminists such as Moller 0km (1999) to rely upon
uncontested definitions of culture and identity has led some theorists to challenge
the premise underlying the dichotomy of feminism and multiculturalism. It
appears that while challenging the inherent superiority imbued within liberal
definitions of multiculturalism and human rights it has been especially difficult to
avoid the pitfalls of cultural relativism and identity politics and, the issue remains
paradoxical and potentially difficult.
In her work Anthias (2001, 2002) introduces the notion of 'translocational
positionality' which provides the potential to recognise the importance of context
and location in relation to shifting positions and identities. She explains, "A
translocational positionality is one structured by the interplay of the different
locations and their (at times) contradictory effects. The 'translocational' acts to
fissure the certainties of fixed singular locations by constructing potentially
contradictory positionalities" (2002: 279). On a practical level this involves a
different grids in operation and at particular contexts, times, positions women may
accordingly be in a position of dominance or subordination. In this way
individuals are actively engaged in the process of cultural contestation, renewal
and change.
This analysis is useful for it reminds us that we need to draw upon theoretical
approaches that recognise contradictions and ambiguities in women's positions
within families and communities. In this way the binaries of insider/outsider
become destabilised "where one may be an insider and an outsider simultaneously
in relation to different dimensions of power and hierarchical difference" (Anthias
2002: 282). The purposefulness of this approach is recognizing the complexity
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and difference of women's lives but also understanding how their positions within
the family and community may be fragile and potentially exploitative. This
complements the 'intersectional' approach, developed by the writers Crenshaw
(1989) and Volpp (2000) who point out that race, class, gender and other systemic
oppressions work through rather than alongside each other.
1.3.5 Hybridity and Difference
In response to the essentialism of culture and community we now draw upon the
concepts of hybridity and difference to explore the relationship between
'homeland' and new cultural formations. Mercer defines 'hybridity' as "the
processes and products of cultural mixing which articulates two or more disparate
elements to engender a new and distinct entity" (1999:89). As a concept it seeks
to challenge and subvert essentialist and exclusionary notions of ethnicity and
identity and challenge the dichotomous approach of liberal pluralism and
essentialist definitions of community (Bhabba 1994). Developed within the
discipline of postcolonial studies and popularised by Bhabba (1990, 1994) it
contrasts to multiculturalist notions of diversity, which identify homogeneous
organic cultures that remain unaffected by each other. Instead Bhabba views
cultures as never existing 'in' or 'for' themselves, but as always in processes of
cultural translation, as articulating with each other. This interplay of meanings
and discourses gives rise to the 'Third Space', "a new arena of negotiation of
meaning and representation which produces counter-narratives from the nation's
margins, which may be incommensurable with the anterior traditions" (Bhabba
1990:2 1 1). The subversive parody of the colonizers by the colonized, and the
mixed forms of ('high' or 'popular', progressive or 'fundamentalist') culture
produced by postcolonial migration all indicate fissures in the center, spaces for
agency and ambivalence (Bhabba 1995). As Bhabba argues, "I want to take my
stand on the shifting margins of cultural displacement- that confounds any
profound or 'authentic' sense of a 'national' culture or 'organic' intellectual"
(1994:21). As a fluid concept its opens up spaces to interrogate notions of
difference and diversity. Hence, Bhabba (1994) critiques the dialectic relationship
between identity and culture and the totalising structures of power upon which
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they are based.3° In this way we have an increase in forms of diversity and
difference by redefining our understanding of community.
The main criticisms levelled against the concept of hybridity are its destabilizing
ability producing ambivalence and confusion. For some the concept of hybridity
fails to recognise issues of social inequality and class and gender differences
(Anthias 1998, Ahmad 1995). Importantly, Anthias (1999) argues contra the
'Third Space' of 'negotiation and translation', of counter-narrative, of 'in
between', that the notion assumes that postcolonial intellectuals lack a central
narrative of their own. She suggests that the 'Third Space', too, may be boundary
making. The 'hybrids' inhabiting it are not only homogeneous but also internally
differentiated.
The concept of difference emerged in response to the essentialism of much
thinking on race and ethnicity. Hall (1992) celebrates difference through the
construction of new ethnic identities while interrogating traditional
understandings of culture and ethnicity (see also Gilroy 1987, Bhavnani &
Phoenix 1994). For feminists the notion of difference has been articulated around
the concept of 'situated knowledges' (Hill-Collins 1990:19) and situatedness
where female subjectivity introduces alternative narratives. Under a
multiculturalist context debate as also focussed on how the differentially situated
groups in society and, this has led to a discussion on 'the politics of difference'
which gives rise to claims for 'differential treatment' and access to 'equality'.
Baumeister points out that "for liberals the 'politics of difference' raises important
questions regarding the nature of diversity, the conception of the self and the role
of the political" (2000:5)
Yet this epistemological position of difference has been subject to extensive
critique. Anthias points out that the debates on difference have ignored the
dynamics of gender and class inequalities (1998). The focus on difference
between groups risks the perils of cultural relativism which homogenise cultural
difference in opposition to otherness. Instead Anthias reformulates difference in
30 Werbner identifies hybridity in two forms as cultural hybridity and political hybridity (1990: 14)
terms of "imaginings around boundaries" and "hierarchical difference"
(2002:279). This reformulation of difference re-evaluates the ways women are
situated within different and often conflicting categories of race, gender, class and
within the institutions of family, home and community. It recognises the existing
power relations within these spheres that give rise to a complex interplay of
values. Therefore the concept of difference in this study is employed as a
conceptual tool to challenge the existing patterns of domination and exclusion
within social and legal processes.
1.3.6 Diaspora and 'Space'
Most recently, and departing from the traditional approach to the study of race and
ethnicity, social theorists have turned their attention to the concept of diaspora to
understand processes of transnational migration and community settlement in
Britain (Brah 1996, Vertovec 1996, Parekh 1994, Gilroy 1997, Hall 1990).
Theorists have used the term to explain firstly, the reasons and impetus for
migration; secondly to question what impact new migrations are having upon
older settled communities and fmally to understand how the term can be
employed to understand globalisation and the transnational configurations of
power (Soysal 1999).
The South Asian diaspora has been described as a "transnational network of
dispersed subjects, connected by ties of co-responsibility across the boundaries of
empires, political communities or (in a world of nation- states) nations" (Werbner
2000:307). Employing, Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities'. 31 Werbner
argues, that we now have ideas of "spatialised complex 'imagined communities'
where despite dispersal members share "a collective past and common destiny,
and hence also a simultaneity in time"(Werbner 2000:308). Thus the idea of an
imagined community embodies the relationship between the process of migration
and the settlement of communities culminating in the creation of a new
'homeland'. This etlmographic approach to exploring and defining the Pakistani
Muslim diaspora in Britain provides a fascinating insight into the relationship
between identity and the active participation in the politics of 'homeland' and
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'hostland' (Butler 2001: 189). Indeed the emergence of a discourse of 'diasporian
studies' (Butler 2001:190) has led some scholars to produce a list of defining
characteristics of what constitutes as a diaspora (see Safran 1991: 834).32
Yet it is precisely this kind of extensive and deterministic use of the concept as an
epistemological tool that has led to a critique of its 'unproblematized' use in
social science (see Anthias 1998, Soysal 1999). Hence the ethnographic
approach has contributed to the empirical enlargement of the term diaspora 34 but
fails to explore the inherent difficulties in describing all migratory experience as
culminating in a 'diaspora'. Clifford is aware of the dangers and points out that it
is not easy to avoid the slippage between diaspora as a theoretical concept,
diasporic 'discourses', and distinct historical 'experiences' of diaspora. Thus each
diaspora is so firmly rooted in particular histories and maps that the term cannot
be used to describe 'the' migratory experience (1994:56). Soysal takes this
further and critiques the use of diaspora as an analytical category in explaining the
immigration experience (1999:1). She points out that a focus on "ethnically
informed diasporic arrangements" fails to take into account the processes of
modernisation and globalisation. Instead a focus on the different proliferating
'sites' of making and enacting citizenship allows a fuller understanding "of the
new dynamics and topography of membership" (1999:3). Another criticism
relating to this is that the use of diaspora has become essentialized, resembling the
framework of ethnicity with little understanding of difference, division and
diversity within a social group (Anthias 1998:558). One of its obvious limitations
is its failure to take into account issues of gender and class differences. Thus
Anthias points out that we need to move away from its preoccupation of ethnicity
to "other ontological spaces such as gender and class" (1998:578).
u See Anderson (1983).
32 He argues that a diaspora can only be defmed as a diaspora if it embodies the following
characteristics, dispersal to two or more locations; collective mythology of homeland; alienation
from hostland; idealization of return to homeland and on-going relationship with homeland.
Brah is also aware of the problematic nature of adopting the tenn as a 'fixed' category but
argues that it remains useful if it can be understood in terms of "historically contingent
'genealogies' in the Foucauldian sense (1996:180).
For example there are now journals devoted to 'diasporian studies' and studies which explore
the Irish diaspora, the Greek diaspora among others. See Butler (2001).
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Not surprisingly, perhaps the manifestation of the concept in anthropological and
sociological research has led to criticism, especially the essentialist interpretation
of diaspora. Yet in light of such a critique we can draw upon the work of Soysal
(1999) and Anthias (1998) to possibly transcend these impasses and raise new
kinds of questions. In shifting our attention from a descriptive analysis of the
Pakistani immigration experience (see Dwyer 2000) to one in which we explore
the practice of citizenship with the mobilization of identities and claims-making in
the public sphere, we are able to explore the relationship between new forms of
membership and citizenship (Soysal 1998:7). Thus, rather than seeing the concept
as being premised upon a set of fixed meanings or a prescriptive mode of analysis
we engage with the "plethora of immigrant experience in a multitude of arenas"
(Soysal 1998:11).
This concept relates closely to the notion of 'space' and the positioning of
minority ethnic groups in Britain. In this context there are different types of
'space', physical space that the groups may inhabit; 'social space' in which
networks and identities are delineated as new contexts are negotiated (Mirza
2000:4) and fmally 'cultural space' where exchanges between Muslims and the
wider community take place (see Massey 1993). However this understanding of
space presupposes that individuals can be situated in one space at one particular
time and leaves no room for internal contradiction and ambivalence. It only refers
to the present and in this way remains limited.
Conclusion
As emphasized at the outset of this chapter a conceptual and theoretical analysis
provides the means by which we are able to link law and social theory and locate
this study within a socio-legal context in Britain. A key to point to recognize is
that this process is able to assess the limitations of existing literature and consider
what has been excluded in contemporary debates. Thus in what initially seems
like the presentation of conflicting theoretical paradigms is in fact a powerful
rejection of the essentialism of law, identity, community and citizenship. In this
regard the potential of recognizing the complex and diverse experiences of
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women's lives justifies the expansive review of literature. In the following chapter
we explore the research methodology adopted in the study.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD AND METHODOLOGY: 'STANDPOINT',
'DIFFERENCE' AND 'FEMINIST' RESEARCH
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research methodology adopted in the study. It explores
the methodological dilemmas in accessing, collecting and analysing data in an
area of study that is confined to the 'private' sphere, that is traditionally defined as
non-legal and that remains largely under-researched. Moreover, it questions
whether these issues raise a specific set of ethical and methodological challenges
for the socio-legal researcher. The chapter is grounded in a feminist discourse to
explore the nature and process of social research. While seeking to explore the
ontological and epistemological tensions presented by feminist standpoint theory
with cultural difference, it reflects on the notion of 'standpoint differences' to
consider the need to adopt a multi-faceted approach to conducting research within
diasporic minority communities in Britain.
The chapter addresses three main issues. The first draws upon debates on
'reflexivity' and the 'self' to analyse the role of the researcher within the
ethnographic research process. 35 Here it explores debates on identity and cultural
difference to consider how 'differences' may affect the research process. 36 It
draws upon the concept of 'positioning(s)' to consider the limitations of
categories such as 'insider/outsider' that fail to capture not only the complex and
varied experiences within the various groups under study, but also obscures the
richness and diverse experiences between the researcher and the researched (Song
and Parker 1998:112).
The second examines issues concerning 'access', 'consent' and 'disclosure' and
questions whether traditional research methods (in this case in-depth interviewing
and participant observation) need to be used in specific ways when faced with a
This has been described as the 'politics and ethics' of social research. For an introduction to
these debates see P. Atkinson and D. Silverman (1997: 304-25).
36 For a fascinating analysis see McCorkel (2003: 199-231).
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particular set of methodological issues.37 It explores, for example, whether sharing
a gender, ethnic or religious commonality with the interviewee led to any
difficulties and/or advantages. This issue also relates to questions surrounding the
centrality of privacy, the relationship between public and private 'space' and the
situation where the researcher has little control over the research process.
The fmal part of the chapter addresses the issue of the researcher 'leaving the
field' and explores ways of managing the personal relationships formed with
one's informants (Taylor 1998). Further, if we take the view that the informants'
decision to participate in the research project may be conditional, then we must
also consider the implications this may have upon interpreting and presenting the
data. Hence questions can be raised about the interpretive process and the chapter
concludes by briefly considering the social and political implications of writing up
research deemed 'politically sensitive'.
2.1 Defining the Research Question(s)
The central methodological questions for this study relate to formulating ways for
fieldwork research with Shariah Councils and, to explore how to encourage
women to share their experiences of using such a 'privatised' method of dispute
resolution. An ethnographic research approach was chosen as it allows the
researcher to "adapt the research focus to what proves available and interesting
rather than imposing an outsiders sense of what is going on" (Fielding 2001:148).
This approach is also useful in developing a workable and productive
methodology as it allows the researcher to understand human interaction within
specific contexts and to acknowledge the public! private spheres. Preliminary
fieldwork led to the selection of three methodological approaches: participant
observation, in-depth qualitative interviewing and content analysis of case-files.
The first method, participant observation was chosen for a number of reasons. As
discussed in chapter 1, existing research documents the development of Shariah
Councils in Britain as evidence of an emerging parallel legal system (Pearl 1986,
an interesting discussion on the problems of conducting fieldwork on sensitive topics Lee
(1999) and Coffey (1999).
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Pearl and Menski 1998, Poulter 1998, Yilmaz 2001). Thus the socio-legal reality
of Muslims in Britain is presented as a complex scenario whereby official and
customary laws interact to produce a new set of hybrid laws. The present study
attempts to problematize this approach by examining the gendered nature of the
informal legal sphere(s). In doing so, it deconstructs the binary oppositions of
state law and customary law and seeks instead to explore the contested spaces that
Shariah Council's occupy as an empirical reality rather than a theoretical
construct. Drawing upon observation data38 it traces how notions of power, status
and legitimacy interact with the "socio-cultural reconstruction of Islamic identity"
(Yilmaz, 2001:297) that lead to the establishment of Shariah Councils in Britain.
Here the central methodological questions relate to the extent to which marital
disputes are settled within the context of family, home and community by non-
statutory agencies such as Shariah Councils, the nature in which this form of non-
state intervention may take and, finally how such mechanisms of unofficial
dispute resolution mechanisms that have traditionally been defined as non-legal
may co-exist alongside state law in Britain.
The second method, content analysis of Shariah Council case-files, analyses
correspondence between Muslim women and the Shariah Councils. It provides an
insight into the administrative procedures implemented by the Shariah Councils
when issuing divorce certificates 39 and goes onto consider the methodological
obstacles faced by the socio-legal researcher in eliciting data from documentation
within the informal legal sphere.
The fmal method, in-depth qualitative interviews with 25 Pakistani Muslim
women, explores the motivations of this sample in using a Shariah Council. It is
the 'voice' of the women that the research seeks to bring out and hence a feminist
approach to interviewing is adopted (Reinhaz 1992, Stanley & Wise 1998).° In
38 This comprised of observing mediation and counselling sessions with 3 of the 4 Shariah
Councils under study. See chapter 4.
The Muslim Law (Shariah) Council based in Ealing, West London refused permission to
observe mediation and counselling sessions but permitted an analysis of 25 case-files.
° Qualitative feminist studies explore women's accounts through in-depth interviewing, open
questions and qualitative analysis. Of course there is much debate on what constitutes as 'feminist
research' and for an interesting discussion see Oakley (1998:707-731).
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particular, it explores experiences of marriage and analyses strategies to obtain a
religious divorce. In doing so it considers how women balance social expectation
based on cultural duties with religious obligations and how gender frames the
relations of power on which negotiations maybe based within the family and
unofficial decision making bodies (Griffiths 1997).41
2.2.1 Sampling Profile
The snowballing technique was used to forge contacts and make connections. The
fieldwork was carried out over a period of 18 months between 2000-2002 in three
cities Birmingham, Bradford and London. As outlined above, the fieldwork
research comprised of in-depth interviews with 25 Pakistani Muslim women,
interviews and observation research with 4 Sbariah Councils and interviews with
various Muslim community organisations. 42 Each interview ranged between 1-2
hours and was subsequently transcribed. The women were all offered anonymity
for their accounts and have been given pseudonyms in the thesis.
2.2.2 The Women
The logic of why a sample of British Pakistani Muslim women was chosen for
research as opposed to 'Muslim women' as a general category is two-fold. Firstly
as a result of the complex and changing nature of identity this approach provides
the opportunity to explore the subtleties of cultural difference between Muslim
women. In this way we are also able to provide an insight into the dynamics,
representation and practice of power within Muslim communities. To categorize
all British Pakistani Muslim women as belonging to a homogenous Muslim
community presumes the primacy of a universal religious Muslim identity.
Underlying this approach is not being able to explore ambivalence and
antagonism outside the binaries of insider/outsider, muslim/non-muslim and
subordinate/dominant (Bhabba 1998:35). This does not mean however that some
British Pakistani Muslim women do not embrace this unifying identity that
41 This approach draws upon the work of Griffiths (1997). In this fascinating study she explores
the relationship between gender relations, power, family and legal relations in Botswana.
42 This included interviews with the representatives of 3 Muslim organisations the 'Union of
Muslim Organisations', 'The Muslim Women's Help-line' and the 'An-Nisa Society'. See
chapters 4 and 5.
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homogenizes cultural and religious difference, clearly some do. But, evidence also
suggests that there are also unique differences between and within the category of
'Muslim women' and by focusing upon one group of women we are able to
explore the conditions under which they develop strategies to obtain a Muslim
divorce and participate in family and community mediation. Hence we can
explore how identities maybe ambivalent, situational and strategic (Anthias 2002,
Yuval-Davis 1997).
Secondly the importance of this approach lies in exploring further the claim made
by Shah-Kazemi (2001) that Muslim women are in favour of official
mediation/reconciliation services being developed specifically to suit their
religious needs, as opposed to current practice of developing services according to
race, gender and language differences. In her study of 'Muslim women, Divorce
and the Shariah' Shah-Kazemi reports that the women in her sample also
indicated support for the eventual introduction of a parallel legal system to govern
Muslims in the sphere of Muslim personal law (2001:69-70). Again the
multiplicity of Muslim identities, differentiated by gender, ethnicity, age,
generation, class, sectarian affiliation and so on, allows us to interrogate this
claim, the purpose of which seems to be to maintain the specificity of a religious
identity with little observation to complexity, difference and ambivalence.
2.2.3 Profile of the Women
Figure 2.1, below outlines the profile of the interviewees and the variations in
their background. Due to the complexity of using class as the variable against
which to measure differences the study uses educational attainment. In discussing
the sample of women, it should be acknowledged that problems of access and
refusal to participate influenced the research design. Over a period of time, it
became obvious that there was little point in trying to uncover 'a more complete'
picture if access was in effect being denied. This research stance is consistent with
existing research in this area, which yields very little empirical data (Menski and
Pearl 1998, Yilmaz 2001, Poulter 1998, Hamilton 1995, Carroll 1997). On the
other hand, in this research project the snowballing technique did eventually lead
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to a number of respondents agreeing to participate in the study and the sample of
female interviewees was finally drawn from Birmingham, Bradford and London.
Nevertheless this approach, highlights the practical limitations entailed in the
sample. This figure illustrates how the pattern reflects a bias towards a particular
educated, socio-economic group.
Figure 2.1 Educational Background
0	 2	 4	 6	 8	 10	 12	 14
No. of Women
Having access to this group of women only, meant that it was difficult to establish
what was 'really' happening within the Pakistani communities. The professional
women, for example, all drew on similar themes of openness, discussion,
independence and autonomy in discussions of marriage, divorce, familial and
community expectations. Whereas, for some women in the other categories it
became apparent, that there was a marked reluctance to divulge personal details
and to engage in discussion. This is not to deny that the women did not all share
experiences, understandings, nor frame realities, which did transcend these
variables of educational attainment and class background but the emphasis on
privacy and personal space did reveal a subtle difference.
Access to this group of women also raised a more fundamental limitation and one
particularly pertinent to this study. This related to how the snowballing technique
skewed the ethnic profile of the sample. Figure 2.2 below shows that the largest
group of women, originated from a Punjabi background and based in the
43 The exception is the study by Shah-Kazemi (2001).
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Midlands and South-East England. This unequal distribution was in contrast to
the experience of Shariah Councils who reported the largest users of Shariah
Councils belonging to the Pakistani communities were of Azad Kashmiri
background.
Figure 2.2 Ethnic and Regional Profile
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Consequently, the complexity in defming the profile of the sample brings to the
fore the task on how the analysis should proceed. Taking into account the
limitations entailed within the sample we could simply prioritise an analysis based
on the standpoint of education and class background. An alternative approach
would be "to pursue an analysis based upon difference, in the sense that we would
not prioritise any particular identity for interviewees, seeking instead to
understand each account from within processes of sense-making based in highly
specific and individualised contexts and drawing attention to a fragmented,
shifting and indeterminate view of subjectivities, meanings and difference"
(Henwood et al. 1998:6). Inevitably both approaches can produce incomplete
fmdings and instead this study adopts the approach of 'standpoint difference' to
explore how the cultural and religious identities of the disputants may interact
with the normative structure of the Shariah Council. From the standpoints of
gender, ethnic, generational, class, educational differences and regional variations
we are thus able to identify key issues and report fmdings whilst bearing in mind
the complexity of these complex, interwoven lives.
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2.3 Research Design: The Ethnographic Approach
It is largely accepted that the ethnographic research process originates from early
anthropological research. Baszenger and Dodier outline three objectives
associated with this approach which includes; the need to adopt an empirical
approach; to remain open to elements in the field that cannot be codified at the
time of the study; and grounding the phenomena observed in the field. One of the
key elements of ethnography is to ensure that the fieldworker remains 'open' in
the field to ensure that they are able to adopt different approaches to interact with
those under study. Fielding (2001:6) describes the emergence of a 'new urban
anthropology' that has led anthropologists to describe not only the social reality of
their own social world but also to critically engage in discussions on the role of
the researcher conducting the research. The ethnographic approach can therefore
be described as a 'hybrid' approach whereby "the fleldworker is present in two
agencies, as data gatherer and as a person involved in activities directed towards
other objectives" (Bazenger and Dodier 1998:10). Yet the relationship between
method and data collection as part of the ethnographic research process remains
tenuous and can be fraught with difficulties. For example, Glassner and Strauss
(1967) stress the need for researchers to work from the ground up using theories
as examples of empirical evidence. Yet adopting a purely 'open' approach can
lead to tensions in the fieldwork if method is sidelined solely in favour of
openness.
Feminist ethnographers have addressed this issue in an attempt to understand the
complex reality of women's lives. They critique the traditional sociological
interpretations of 'knowledge' in society, which they claim are based upon
patriarchal, and androcentric norms and values. 45 For Reinhaz, feminist methods
must be employed to challenge existing social relations that render women's lives
invisible. She explains "Ethnography is an important feminist method if it makes
women's lives visible, just as interviewing is an important feminist method if it
In particular the influential work of early twentieth century anthropologists including Bronislaw
Malinowski, Edward Evans-Pritchard and Margaret Mead are considered the foundations of early
anthropological research. For discussion on their contribution to the ethnographic approach see,
Baszenger and Dodier (1998).
" For an introduction to these debates see Oakley (1979 46-66).
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makes women's voices audible. Thus it is not ethnography per se. . .but
ethnography in the hands of feminists that renders it feminist" (1992: 122).
This approach with its focus on agency, subjectivity and positionality privileges
those voices speaking from the position of oppression and marginality. 46 Further,
the complexity and multifaceted approach to feminist ethnography enables
researchers to provide unique insights into the relationship between personal
experience and the position of women in society.
2.3.2 Observation Research on 'Sensitive' Topics
Conducting research on 'sensitive' issues raises a specific set of ethical and
methodological challenges. Sieber and Stanley define sensitive topics as those
studies which involve "potential consequences or implications, either directly for
the participants in the research or for the class of individuals represented by the
research" (1992: 34). These include topics that involve taboos for the local
community, such as sex or death or those deemed sensitive due to the socio-
political context under which the research is conducted (Brewer 1990).
2.3.3 The Question of Ethics
Research on the experiences of Muslim women using 'unofficial dispute
resolution processes' can be deemed 'sensitive' for a number of reasons. Firstly
issues concerning marriage and divorce embody notions of familial honour and
shame and are largely confined to the private sphere of the family and home. The
implications of discussing private matters through what is ultimately viewed as a
public forum can have detrimental effects for the women and their families. In
relation to observation research with Shariah Councils a number of scholars
voiced concern as to the implications of discussing personal matters of marriage
and divorce 'in public' to a complete stranger. It became apparent that my
presence was deemed an 'intrusive threat' by most Shariah Councils with my
attempts to gain entry into areas deemed 'private' by respondents, their families
and the communities to which they belonged. One religious scholar explained,
46 For a fascinating paper on personal narratives and feminist research see Pierce (2003).
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You must understand confidentiality is of utmost importance to our
work. It is very difficult for our people to discuss these issues and we
spend a lot of time and effort convincing them to seek our help.
Divorce is shunned in our communities and rightly so. It should not
be given the air of respectability but that doesn't mean we condemn
those who want to divorce. Divorce is permitted in Islam and we
work with Muslims to achieve the best possible situation.. .and to
allow someone they don't know to sit through our sessions would
mean they would lose our trust and confidentiality.47
A further issue concerned the rise of Islamaphobia and the perception of 'risk'
associated with collaborating with the research project. The women voiced
concern about the possibility of this study contributing to existing stereotypes of
Muslim men as patriarchal tyrants and Muslim women as passive victims of
archaic religious traditions.
Further discussions revealed concern about the possibility of such research
contributing to the demonisation of Muslims, described as "the growing climate of
fear in the name of Islamaphobia" by one religious scholar. 48 Consequently, when
access to observation research was permitted it was made clear that it was done so
on the basis that as a Muslim researcher, it was expected that the data would be
presented "in an appropriate way". 49 In turn discussions with religious scholars
revealed concerns on the presentation of data. One scholar explained,
We discussed your request (to observe reconciliation sessions) at our weekly
meeting and a number of us are concerned about what will happen to the
material once you've completed your project.5°
That is to say, the representation of Muslims would be fair and accurate. What
then can be said about the ethics of conducting research under such conditions?
Perhaps not surprisingly what signifies the link between private experiences and
public discourses is the framework under which the research is undertaken. Lee
suggests that the researcher must provide a 'framework of trust' based upon
confidentiality and a non-condemnatory attitude whereupon researchers can
encourage those under study to confront issues that are perceived as "personally
with Dr. Nasim, Birmingham Central Mosque, Birmingham, 21st July 2001.
48 Interview with Dr Suhaib Hasan, Islamic Shariah Council, 14 October 2001.
Interview with Maulana Mohammed Raza, Muslim (Law) Shariah Council, 22nd November
2000.
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threatening and potentially painful" (1992:98). Moreover, we must remind
ourselves that 'sensitive' research can only be understood as 'sensitive' according
to the context and conditions under which it is situated. Nevertheless, the
necessity presents itself for the researcher to address their own religious, moral
and political beliefs that may affect the interpretation and presentation of data.
2.3.4 Access and Consent
Gaining consent and access for observation research with Shariah Councils
proved difficult, lengthy and problematic. The aim of observation fieldwork is to
provide a rich insight into the particular organisation under study. Yet this process
can be limited when access to private organisations is controlled and in some
cases blocked by its 'gatekeepers' (Walsh 1998). Some writers point out that the
social dynamics of 'access processes' needs to be more fully explored. For
example, Lee complains "neither has much attention been paid to patterns of
access and non-access across studies, or to the potential consequences of
differential accessibility to some settings rather than others" (1992:121). In this
study the absence of direct measures, a result of restricted access to Shariah
Councils, meant that comparisons between the bodies could not be sufficiently
drawn.
This raises the question of the ways in which the gatekeeper may exercise their
power to curtail or prevent access. Form points out, that this unequal relationship
leads to the researcher 'bargaining in the access situation' (1991:23). He identifies
this as the 'politics of distrust' which can only be overcome if there is trust
between the gatekeeper and researcher, even though there may be differences of
opinion. In Morrill et al (1999) the researchers points out that identifying
gatekeepers provides useful analytic devices for learning about the vocabularies of
structure in an organization. Second, successfully managing gatekeepers requires
that one understands the vocabularies of structure in use in an organization.
For other scholars, the issue of 'mistrust' can only be overcome if the boundaries
of the research relationship are clearly demarcated prior to the start of fieldwork.
° Interview with Maulana Abu Saeed, Islamic Shariah Council, 30th September 2001.
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In this vein, Lofland and Lofland devise a series of questions which the researcher
must address, before the research begins. These include, "am I reasonably able to
get along with these people? Do I truly like a reasonable number of them, even
though I disagree with their view of the world? Why did I pursue research when it
became obvious that it was going to be difficult to maintain in the long run?"
(1994:94). Such questions provide a useful criterion to explore the issue of ethics
in fieldwork research. But we must also remain aware of a new and different set
of ethical questions arising during the course of the fieldwork. For example, in
this study observation research revealed a high incidence of domestic violence but
the women were given very little information on the available services.
Paradoxically, as a former caseworker for a women's organisation, I had this
information at my disposal but had been acutely aware that access had been
granted on the basis of no contact with the women using its services. In this
instance, my decision to approach the religious scholar with a list of relevant
agencies proved worthy, as I was thanked for my intervention. This example
illustrates, how the boundary between ethics and consent at times becomes
difficult to maintain. Again it raises ethical issues concerning responsibility
towards the respondents and the conflict with reporting issues from the
perspective of the researcher. For Mason, the researcher has a 'moral duty' to
overcome potential difficulties that can be achieved if the researcher is aware of
which groups or individuals maybe affected by framing the research in a
particular way (1996:30). The issue of trust therefore is central to gaining both
consent and access into private organisations. This can be summed up by
Hammersley and Atkinson who state, "Whether or not people have knowledge of
social research, they are often more concerned with what kind of a person the
researcher is than with the research itself. They will try and gauge how far he or
she can be trusted, what he or she might be able to offer as an acquaintance or a
friend, and perhaps also how easily he or she could be manipulated or exploited
(1993:78). In this study, access though limited, was granted on the basis of
privacy, trust and confidentiality and the informed consent of clients. For
example, prior to each mediation/reconciliation session, the client was informed
of my presence and if any objections were permission to observe the session was
refused. Finally, it was agreed that all feedback of the study and copies of
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interview transcripts would be made available to the Shariah Councils under
study.
2.3.5 The 'Self' in the Field
One of the interesting aspects of observation fieldwork is to explore the role of the
researcher in the field. Coffey describes 'the marginality and presence' of the
researcher as critical to exploring, "how identities are constructed, reproduced,
established, mediated, changed or challenged over the fieldwork process"
(1999:14). Hence the identity of the researcher raises questions on how the
researcher may affect the outcome of observational research.
In this study, the ways in which the dynamics of gender, race, culture, class and
religious identity interacted with the social setting under study was an important
focal point of analysis. For example, how the interplay of gender and power may
affect the outcome of data, did my gender interact with the subjects (religious
scholars and users) during observation research? In her research with Kenyan
informants, Oboler (1986) found that being pregnant increased her rapport with
the informants.
Yet the process of 'identity construction' is complex and at most times subtle.
Prior to fieldwork very little thought had been given to how I should negotiate my
presence during observation fieldwork. It had been assumed that my religious and
cultural background as a Pakistani Muslim woman, would grant easier access. My
assumptions proved to be both true and false. Over the course of the fieldwork, it
became apparent that some scholars were happy for me to observe mediation
sessions as they believed that Muslim women would be sympathetic to a Muslim
woman conducting such research. And in some instances this was clearly the case.
For example, on two occasions female clients requested that I sit next to them for
support. On other occasions, however I was asked to leave the sessions when the
client was visibly uncomfortable in revealing private matters in the presence of a
stranger. The 'self' in the field, therefore raises complex issues. Coffey points
out, ". . .who is stranger or a member, an outsider or an insider, a knower or an
ignoramus is all relative and much more blurred than conventional accounts might
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have us believe" (1999:22). She goes on, "It is not clear that, in practice,
fleidworkers engaged in researching their 'own culture' actually manage to
estrange themselves radically. Nor is it necessarily the case that forcing a distance
from the mundane, lived, esoteric knowledge of a culture really enables relevant
research questions to be posed, beyond the obvious and those devoid of cultural
specificity" (1999:22).
2.4 Interviewing Pakistani Muslim Women
The interview method in social science originates from large-scale quantitative
surveys conducted in Britain in the 1930's and 1940's. This method was viewed
as the primary source in the collection of data about aspects of the respondent's
behaviour or attitudes. Later research focused on the reflexive relationship
between the respondent and the interviewer and this method raises a number of
interesting conceptual questions. For example how the interaction between the
respondent and the interviewer may lead to bias in responses and how the process
of the interview technique can itself distort the 'real' picture.5'
2.4.1 In-Depth Qualitative Interviewing
Feminist ethnographic research emphasises notions of 'reflexivity' and 'situated
knowledge(s)' where the relationship between the respondent and the interviewer
is acknowledged and recognised and thus becomes part of the data and not
external to it. It contests the traditional constructions of 'knowledge' and
'society' defmed within a structuralist paradigm and underlined by patriarchal
norms and values (see Harding 1987). The feminist approach emphasizes the
personal and subjective experiences of the researched subject which can produce
invaluable data. Here the researcher is encouraged to place themselves in the
position of the researched in order to understand the dynamics of the relationship
between the two and locate all research within a historical and contextual setting.
Using her research on 'motherhood', Oakley (1979) argues that a subjective
approach to interviewing is central to establishing a 'rapport' with female
respondents, gaining their trust and thus enhancing their willingness to take part in
the research. Reinharz, (1992) puts forward a participatory model of research that
For an introduction to these debates see Gilbert (1993).
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aims to produce non-hierarchical, non-authoritarian and non-manipulative
research relationships. This approach has led to the development of 'standpoint
theories' whereby the focus of the research is on the experiences of women from
the perspective of women themselves. Such research is located within a historical
and political context that provides the space for potential social and political
change in the lives of women. And, given the multi-faceted experiences of
Pakistani Muslim women we can adopt this approach to explore issues of
complexity and difference.
2.4.2 Researching across Gender, Ethnicity and Religion
There has been much discussion over the issue of race matching during
interviews. The argument is rooted in realist epistemology which holds that there
is some kind of 'unitary truth' that interviewers should obtain. The reasons for
race matching are based on the idea that a black researcher is more able to blend
in with a black interviewee and therefore get an insight that may otherwise not be
possible. Constructivist theories differ from this perspective, arguing instead that
all accounts from interviews must be understood in the context of the interview
and any information given cannot be taken to mean the 'truth'. This raises the
question of whether there are unique methodological obstacles in conducting
research among minority communities (see Andersen 1993). In particular
questions have arisen in relation to the unequal power relationship between a
white researcher and non-white communities. It is argued that white scholars can
only produce incomplete data as interviewees view them with distrust, hostility
and exclusion. This view however, has been challenged by a number of theorists.
Among them is the feminist writer P. Hill-Collins (1988) who develops the notion
of "outsiders within". Under this model, white researchers are able to conduct
research on minority communities as long as they recognise how institutional
racism may have shaped and developed their research.
Therefore, the question becomes not whether white researchers should conduct
research on minority communities but that their interpretation should not be
considered the most authoritative. Indeed there can be both advantages and
disadvantages to this type of matching. In her research on Black women
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Andersen (1993) writes that she became aware that the women might not have
reported the same things to her as they may have done to a black interviewer and
that her data may therefore have been impartial and incomplete. Her data also
revealed, however, women reporting that they were able to speak to her openly
and freely without baniers, whereas they may not have been able to do so with a
black interviewer. In this context she was able to adopt a self-reflexive approach
to research where her role in the research was pivotal in gaining the trust of the
respondents and not imbued with problems of power based on race matching. For
her, "Developing analyses that are inclusive of race, class and gender also requires
that discussions of race, class and gender be thoroughly integrated into debates
about research process and the analysis of data. This requires an
acknowledgement of the complex, multiple and contradictory identities and
realities that shape our collective experience" (Andersen 1993:137).
2.4.4 'Insider'/'Outsider'
This section draws upon fieldwork data to explore the limitations of
interviewer/interviewee matching. In doing so, it analyses the complex ways in
which the gender, 'religious' and ethnic positions of respondents may intersect
with those of the researcher and explores how this may affect the research data.
Throughout the interview process, issues of 'commonality' and 'difference' were
pivotal in this study and played a significant role on the extent to which
relationships were forged with female interviewees. This dichotomy of
commonality and difference regarding our identities was in reality complex and
intermeshed. Yet at the onset of the interviews, it had not been envisaged how the
perceptions and assumptions by the interviewees would shape the interview
process.
2.4.5 Negotiating Participation
Negotiations with female respondents were long and difficult. Matters concerning
marriage and divorce are largely confined to the private sphere of the family and
home and women are often involved in lengthy and complex negotiations in
resolving marital disputes. Consequently, they may understandably be reluctant
to discuss such personal issues in a 'public forum' as epitomised by a research
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project. It is also important to remember that women from minority ethnic
communities are seen as carriers of 'collective honour' in the family and
community and play a central role in the symbolic reproduction of 'community'
and its survival (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Matters concerning marriage
and in particular divorce are closely tied to the honour of the family and the
repercussions of private familial issues becoming 'public' may be far too great for
some women. On the other hand all the religious scholars were all willing to be
interviewed and these interviews lasted approximately between 20-30 minutes
each and took place prior to the start of the observation research.
Existing research literature fails to adequately address this issue on the specific
methodological obstacles faced when conducting research within diasporic
minority communities in Britain. For example, it is commonly held that
respondents agree to take part in a study once they are faced with the researcher
(see Phoenix 1998) yet this is not always the case. In this study, consent depended
upon lengthy discussions and 'assurances' on the specific ways in which the
research would be used and the importance of confidentiality and anonymity.
Furthermore, only 25 of the 32 women who were approached and who fitted the
criteria for the study agreed to take part. The other women failed to return phone
calls or said they were not ready to share their personal experiences (See Phoenix
1989). This raised enormous methodological problems regarding how contact
could be made with the women and once contact had been made how to keep in
touch with them.52
As discussed earlier number of women revealed that they were concerned about
participating in a research project that may contribute to the stereotype of Muslim
women as victims of a patriarchal culturallreligious system. Some women
therefore refused to take part in the research as they felt that their participation
might be more damaging than beneficial. Out of 25, a total of 13 women
expressed concern on the implications of divulging private details for themselves
and their immediate families. One interviewee explained,
52 It is interesting to note that Phoenix reports similar problems in her study. See Phoenix (1994).
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I have to be careful about what I say... its not that I don't trust you but
I have to think about what will happen if what I say gets back to my
family.
Interestingly, assurances of complete confidentiality and anonymity were not
enough to convince some of the women. This raises the question as to why
respondents choose to take part in research projects at all. Phoenix points out that
respondents have their own, varied reasons that "include simple curiosity; desire
to talk and to be listened to; to help with the researcher's training or the aims of
the study; to complain about the aims of the study or about the specific kinds of
research" (1989:56). In this sample, the women were asked why they had chosen
to contribute to this study and interestingly their responses were both diverse and
conflicting. For most women it provided an opportunity to put across their
viewpoints on Shariah Councils and their accounts for the reasons for the
breakdown of marriage, others were keen to challenge stereotypes of Muslim
women as 'traditional' and passive and finally, a small number of women hoped
the research would hasten the introduction of Muslim family law into English law.
For the most part, the period of negotiations between the researcher and
respondent to participate in the study is a formidable time. It is during this time
that the respondents are in the powerful position in refusing to take part and
possibly curtailing the objectives of the project (see Phoenix 1989:58). However
once consent is approved, negotiations do not end. In fact discussions with the
women over how the research would proceed and develop continued once the
interviews had been completed. Out of 25 women, unsurprisingly perhaps, 8
expressed concern over what would happen to the interview tapes once the
research had been completed. Braimen suggests, that participants respond
favorably to some methods and not to others when there is an overlap between the
concerns of researchers and those of participants and, "where both parties are in
search of similar explanations" (1988:324).
2.4.6 Disclosure and Power in Interviews: An Unequal Relationship?
There has been much discussion in research literature over the unequal power
relations between the interviewer and interviewee. Feminist writers point to the
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unequal relationship with the interviewer having greater power over disclosure
and instead put forward a method, which emphasizes notions of 'rapport' and
'self-disclosure' on the part of the interviewee (Reinhaz 1992, Harding 1996).
Hence, through shared gender identification, female interviewers are able to
establish a 'rapport' in the interview that ultimately leads to greater disclosure.
However this approach has been challenged for its failure to recognise that power
relations transcend gender identification. Wise points out that class, ethnic and
religious factors must be taken into account (1986:56).
Similarly in this study, the researcher was positioned in different ways by the
interviewees in terms of a perceived cultural, religious and gender identity. This
raises interesting questions that challenge the traditional research relationship
which states that the researcher is in a more powerful position. For example, how
was the research process affected when I was perceived in ways in which I found
objectionable? If I felt I was perceived in an objectionable way how did the
interviewees respond to them being objectified? Song and Parker point out that
those interviewees who are of the same ethnic or religious background are not
necessarily excluded from objectification than those who share the same
ethnic/racial identities (1998:13). In addition, the research process must take into
account the ways in which interviewees position interviewers and how they are
perceived and constructed. Researchers may feel, for various reasons, that they
want to respond to positionings themselves and that this is an integral part of any
interview dynamic. These positionings by both the interviewer and the
interviewee are important as they may affect the research process. For example
the interviewees may withhold or disclose certain kinds of information, depending
upon their assumptions of the researcher; interviewees might describe aspects of
their lives and their identities in terms that compare themselves to assumptions
about the researcher.
Likewise this raises the question of the extent to which the interviewer ought to
divulge personal details during the course of the interview. Ribbens notes, "It
does seem to me that to talk about yourself completely openly in an interview
situation might significantly shift what is said to you, in fairly unpredictable ways.
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We need more work on the various advantages and disadvantages of such
different approaches. Perhaps what we should be sensitive to, is to take our cue
from the person being interviewed" (1991:579). This approach can make an
important contribution to the research process. In spite of the obvious difficulties
concerning confidentiality the interviewees in this project did directly and
indirectly ask questions. Sometimes the discussions went on once the tape
recorder had been switched off. This process is important for the researcher to
illustrate their contribution and commitment to the research.
2.5 Commonalities and Differences
From a feminist perspective recognizing commonalities and differences between
the researcher and the interviewee underlies the epistemological position of
constructing a particular way of undertaking research and subsequently making
sense of data. Thus the concepts of 'standpoint' and 'difference' explore how
interviewees speak from particular positions contextualized by gender, race and
class as well as the power dynamics of age, generation and positioning within the
family. In this study the two important standpoint differences that emerged were
religious and ethnic identity. We turn to explore these in more depth.
2.5.1 Religious Identity
Prior and during the interviews the respondents discussed at great length their own
religious identity often in relation to me. For example, prior to the interview Safia
explained that she was willing to take part in the research because "Muslim
women need to do more research on our communities". Being Muslim was of
central importance to her and she referred to her 'Muslim identity' throughout the
interview. Drawing upon her own experiences, Song (1998:117) explains she was
put into a position whereby she found herself having to decide how far she would
respond to the 'positionings' of her by her interviewees. Similarly, I found myself
in a comparable position and pondered long and hard as to whether discussions
regarding my 'Muslim identity' may affect their responses. This position
resonates with debates on the role of the researcher as insider/outsider in the
research process. For example what are the advantages and/or disadvantages of a
Muslim woman conducting research on a Muslim community? How does this
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type of matching actually affect the interview process itself? Are the accounts any
fuller or more complete than those situations where 'matching' is not involved? In
her research, Edwards (1990) discusses the expectations of the interviewees upon
first meeting the interviewer whereupon the interviewer may challenge
expectations and the interviewee may not know where to place the interviewer.
Given the similarities in ethnic and religious background it is perhaps not
surprising that interviewees would often begin answers with, "being a Muslim
woman yourself. . ." The response to this standpoint indicates the importance some
women attached to my religious background. This contrast was most vivid when
on one occasion an interviewee describing her family's reaction to the breakdown
of her marriage stated, ". . .actually I don't feel comfortable discussing this with
you". When probed further she explained, "...cause you know what goes on in the
community. . .you're Muslim... and... well. . .1 just don't feel comfortable
discussing it with you". It is of interest that this respondent considered myself as
an 'insider' and was therefore unable to divulge intimate details to me. I was
struck by the way that this perception, one that I did not immediately identify
with, had led to limited feedback from this interviewee.
2.5.2 Ethnic Identity
My being British Pakistani also bought up issues of commonality and difference.
For example Salma spoke at length about the different attitudes between
Pakistanis and the English towards marriage. She explained,
We do things differently don't we? Our families have expectations of us and
we have to do certain things, English people don't understand that do they?
Some of them they think we're all forced into marriages but it's not like that.
More significantly differences were discussed in the context of how far I
identified myself as 'Pakistani', which part of my Pakistan did my family
originate from and could I speak any other languages apart from English? There
were also a series of personal questions, including whether I was married and
whether I had children. Upon informing them of my marriage it was interesting to
note how some women related this to their own situation.
That's good being married is important for Muslim women. I don't think
women are recognised in the community unless they're married". When
probed further on what she meant she explained, "well when I was married I
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was more accepted you know like what I said and did seemed to have more
authority with the elders of the community and family. Divorce is really
shunned upon and that's why I think a lot of women will only get divorced
as a last resort (Mina, London).
I was asked how, why and where I got married and on more than one occasion I
felt my being married was a commonality, a space in which they were
comfortable to discuss their experiences of marriage and marriage breakdown.
Similarly, dress code and appearance also raised questions of difference and
commonality. While a few women queried as to why I did not wear the Muslim
headscarf most women shared similar tastes in clothing and dress. Hina
commented, "I like your scarf.. .you're like me, I don't wear it on my head but I
always have a scarf around me". Through this commonality the women were able
to share personal experiences.
2.6 Leaving the Field
We discussed earlier the ways in which relationships with informants may
impinge upon the research process. Similarly, once the research has been
completed, we must consider whether and if so, this relationship should proceed.53
Indeed, making sense of this relationship is rooted in the possible repercussions of
participants divulging private details and the responsibility of the researcher in
protecting their participants. Different researchers have developed different ways
of leaving the field including 'easing out' or 'drifting off' (Glaser and Strauss
1968). Miller and Humpherys point out that leaving on good terms with
participants is the most important way of leaving the field as this provides the
basis for research in the future (1988:12). In this study all the participants were
keen to remain in touch and some of the religious scholars asked me whether I
would like to contribute on their emerging research projects on Muslim personal
law in Britain.
A final request from the religious scholars and some of the women was to be kept
informed of any policy implications that the research may generate. Given the
complexities of conducting such research this raises the question of writing up
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research that may be deemed 'sensitive'. In this study it was clear from the outset
that participants were concerned about the rise of Islamaphobia and the possibility
of this study contributing to the presentation of Islam as deterministic and
patriarchal. Furthermore the interviewees were only prepared to contribute if all
transcripts of interviews remained anonymous and if pseudonyms were used in
the study. All the women questioned what would happen to the interview tapes
once the research had been written up and 7 women requested that the interview
tapes be destroyed once the research had been written up. In terms of the ethical
dilemmas this may raise for writing up the research we can draw from the feminist
approach of women's agency to overcome or at least limit these constraints. In
presenting data as 'translating' the experiences of women we can make clear their
viewpoints as they are experienced and articulated by the women positioned
within concrete social and political contexts.
Conclusion
In this chapter we examined the tenuous relationship in social research between a
feminist standpoint theory and cultural difference in order to explore how the
researcher's 'positionality' shapes the structure and substance of the research
study. The key question posed was how to explore and present complexities and
tensions in data based upon cultural and religious difference within the context of
feminist research? Today there is growing literature which seeks to understand
identities as multiple, fluid and dynamic yet social research has lags behind in
developing methodological and conceptual frameworks that are able to
incorporate the divergent experiences of the respondents.
In this study we found that the gendered experiences and realities of Muslim
women's lives' means that a multi-faceted approach to conducting feminist social
research must be adopted. Further, the influence of the religious and gender
identity of the researcher on the research process is subtle and complex. As
McCarthy, Holland and Gillies (2003:12) point out, we must question how "we
place ourselves as researchers, with our own sympathies and particular
For an interesting discussion on what happens 'after the interview' a "strip" of time between the
end of the formal interview and the culmination of leave-taking rituals see Warren (2003: 93-110).
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perspectives, within such multiplicities?" The dichotomies of 'insider/outsider'
are too limiting and fail to capture issues of difference and commonality when the
researcher shares similar ethnic/cultural and religious identity.
Furthermore, do we need a radically different approach to conducting socio-legal
research on 'sensitive' issues such as marriage and divorce within minority ethnic
communities? Research fmdings in this study suggest that we need to incorporate
notions of difference and diversity into the feminist analytical approach to
interrogate different approaches. For example, in this study the concept of
'standpoint differences' allows us to draw upon different theoretical approaches
while recognizing the complexity of "individual histories, shared family lives and
standpoints of gender, generation, class and ethnicity.. .all interwoven in these
related but individual accounts" (Mccarthy, Holland and Gillies 2003:19). This
approach allows us to interrogate what we understand as culture, community and
identity as fluid, changing and contested entities which are open to social and
cultural contestation within diasporic communities. As a feminist researcher in
this study, I was able to draw upon these multiplicities and move away from the
traditional presentation of Muslim women as subordinated and oppressed within
the communities to which they may belong. My ethnic identity, as a Pakistani
British woman means I was successfully able to navigate between the notions of
'insider/outsider' and hence situate the study within a wider historical and socio-
political context.
Finally, when conducting such sensitive research it is useful to remind ourselves
of the contributions made by those who participate in the study. As Coffey points
out, "We incur debts during fieldwork that can never be fully repaid. We are, by
and large, the great beneficiaries of our research endeavours. We develop intimate
and personal friendships and, even when we do not, we remain dependant upon
others for our data" (1999:161). In the end, despite the challenges such research
throws up, it is not only more complex but also more meaningful.
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CHAPTER 3
CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY:
THE 'PAKISTANI MUSLIM DIASPORA' IN BRITAIN
3.1 Introduction
In chapters 1 and 2, we outlined the theoretical framework and the methodological
approaches adopted in the study, in an attempt to situate the thesis within a 'socio-
legal' paradigm and, to establish the relationship between theoretical development
and empirical research. In chapter 3, we elaborate on the concept of 'active
citizenship' 54
 to consider what Anwar describes as "the status, duties and
responsibilities of South Asian Muslims in Britain"(1998:6). In other words, we
situate this study within the social dynamics of the 'Pakistani Muslim diaspora' in
Britain. According to Ballard, the notion of 'desh pardesh' encapsulates how
South Asian Muslims reconstruct a 'home away from home' to maintain cultural
and religious links with original homelands and to keep 'customs' and culture
'alive' in Britain (1996:4). Moreover it is argued, that a consequence of this
development is the emergence of a parallel legal system with Muslims failing to
utilise English law (Menski 1998, Poulter 1998, Pearl 1986).
Much of this literature presents 'culture', 'identity' and 'religion' as fixed,
bounded and indeterminate with little analysis on diversity and dissent within the
groups under study. Indeed this rather problematic approach to the study of both
'law' and 'identity' within diasporic communities leaves little room to explore
issues of power, conflict and change, within family life. Cultural and legal
diversity must instead be understood as complex, negotiated, contested and
historically unstable. In light of this reality, dispute resolution for women within
Muslim communities must also be understood in the context of complexity and
ambiguity. In short, the relationship between 'social life and legal pluralism'
demands closer inspection than present literature suggests.
' The term 'active citizenship' has been used by a number of theorists to analyse the
organizational dimensions of 'diasporas'. See for example Werbner (2002: 119-133) and also
Modood (2000:54).
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The first section 3.2 of the chapter analyses migration and settlement patterns of
South Asian Pakistani Muslims in Britain. It employs the concept of 'diaspora' to
explore how the group came to be situated, to understand the distinct historical
experience of the group and analyse what impact the diasporic journey may have
had upon the formation of the community (Brah 1996, Soysal 1999, Werbner
2000).
The renewed visibility of South Asian Pakistanis as a 'Muslim diaspora' leads us
to section, 3.3 of the chapter. Here we explore what Modood terms, "the place of
Muslims in British secular multiculturalism" (2000:2). The racialisation of
Muslims in Britain following events post 11 September 2001 has led to renewed
discussion on the tenuous relationship between religious pluralism and citizenship
in Britain and, the assertion of a new British Islamic identity. Furthermore the
current debate on the rights and obligations of Muslims as minorities has also led
to a number of scholars developing practical agendas for 'participatory
citizenship' for Muslims in Britain (Lewis 1994; Modood 2003; Parekh 2002;
Shadid and Koningsveld 1996; Werbner 2000). Hence in this section we explore
the tenuous relationship between 'equality and diversity', namely the public
accommodation of religious practices and the limits of liberal multiculturalism.
The fmal section of the chapter 3.4 shifts our attention to the lives of Pakistani
Muslim women in Britain. The debate on the limits of multiculturalism has also
focused on the regulation of gender relations within the family and home (0km
1999, Shachar 2000). Drawing upon these concerns this section analyses
interview data to gain an insight into how familial relationships and localised
cultural practices impinge upon the process of marriage for the women in this
sample (Afshar 1994:128). It moves beyond discussions of identity to explore
how family concerns about 'family honour' may affect female autonomy and
choice in relation to marriage.
3.2 Pakistani Muslim Settlement in Britain
The history of South Asian migration and settlement in Britain has been
extensively documented (Anwa.r 1997; Ballard 1994; Gilliat-Ray 1992; Joly 1987;
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Lewis 1996; Modood 2000; Nielsen 1998; Parekh 1998; Shaw 1988; Werbner
1988). Commonly referred to as 'New Commonwealth' migrants 55 and recruited
in response to the chronic labour shortages that accompanied the post war
economic expansion, public debate initially focussed on the assimilation of such
groups into British society (see Rex 1989).
According to the most recent census figures, Pakistanis comprise 747,285 or 1.3
% of the total British population. 56 Of the total, 4.6 million people who belong to
ethnic groups, a total of 50% comprise of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi
background. The census data also reveals the geographic distribution of Pakistanis
in Britain and this highlights interesting settlement patterns. For example, of the
total number of Pakistanis in Britain, 19% reside in London, while 21% live in the
West Midlands, 20% Yorkshire and the Humber, and 16% in the North West. If
we explore the reasons behind migration, we see that they are reflected in
settlement patterns.
Migration from Pakistan began in the 1950's primarily from rural farming areas of
the Mirpur district and some parts of Punjab,57 to satisfy the acute shortage of
labour following the post-war boom in Britain. In relation to female migration,
Anthias and Yuval-Davis have shown that the commonly held view that women
migrants came to Britain as mere dependants on their husbands is far from
accurate. Instead, women remained important contributors to the family in terms
of waged/income and unwaged work (1992:97). Perhaps not surprisingly, as with
other migrant labourers, Pakistanis were originally positioned at the lowest labour
stratum, employed as unskilled or semi-skilled labourers and were
disproportionately represented in textiles, clothing and footwear, metal
manufacture, transport and communication and the distributive trades. 58 Recent
In his study Ballard points out that the presence of South Asian migration in Britain began as
early as the seventeenth century (1994:8).
56	 last Census was conducted in April 2001. For full breakdown of the Census data visit The
Office for National Statistics website at http:Ilwww.ons.gov.uk
" Most Pakistani's are drawn from just a few areas in Pakistan: mainly from Faisalabad and
Jhelum Districts in Punjab, Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir, and the Attock District in the North
Western frontier Province. See Shaw (1994) and Werbner (1988).
Again settlement patterns of Pakistanis in Britain have been extensively documented. For an
overview see Ballard (1994).
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research indicates that Pakistanis continue to be disadvantaged with respect to
unemployment and occupational and educational attaimnent (Blackburn et. 1997;
Heath and McDonald 1997).
The particular circumstances under which Pakistani communities have emerged in
various parts of the country, has been extensively documented in anthropological
and sociological research. 6° What we can discern from this literature is that our
understanding of Pakistani communities has become synonymous with the
theoretical paradigms upon which such analyses are based. For example early
literature on Pakistani presence in Britain continued to question their "ability to
adopt Western attitudes and their tenacious retention of traditional beliefs and
lifestyles" (Shaw 1988:35). And, these tendencies are described in essentialist
terms, Anwar (1979) and Jeffrey (1976) point to the 'myth of return' while Dahya
(1972) and Khan (1975) focus on the 'imposition' of purdah and the continued
practice of Islam.
Today there is growing literature, which seeks to understand identities as multiple,
fluid, dynamic and partial and which can only be understood in interaction with
other identities, ethnicities and social structures (Allen 1994; Barth 1969; Macey
1996; Wallman 1986). This has led scholars to focus on the 'cultural identity' of
the community. In her study Shaw (1994:37) examines the implications of
continued traditions such as 'biraderi' membership, kinship migration and
informal networks such as the tradition of 'lena-dena' with the Pakistani
community in Oxford. Werbner concludes that one of the early aims of Pakistani
communities was to sustain a cultural identity and, "as a culturally enclaved
minority in the West, British Pakistanis are having to come to terms with an
experienced, everyday loss of autonomy and cultural control which permanent
settlement in Britain entails" (1994:226). In this context we have seen a
proliferation of research on the formation of mosques, cultural organisations and
businesses.
See Blackburn, Dale and Jarman et al (1997).
60 For a fascinating study on the processes of 'gift-exchange', marriage and affluent Pakistani
businessmen in Manchester see Werbner (1989).
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More recently discussion has focussed on the complex, shifting and fragmented
identities within the Pakistani diaspora. This understanding of identity, as fluid
and changing6 ' as led many commentators to conclude that at specific times, a
particular aspect of the group identity will emerge has more important than at
other times (Modood 2000). In Britain empirical research suggests the emergence
of a 'renewed' Muslim religious identity within South Asian Muslim communities
(Afshar 1992, Anwar 1997, Burlet & Reid 2001, Dwyer 1997, Modood 2000,
Shah-Kazemi 2001, Werbner 2000). In this way the Pakistani diaspora has been
transformed as part of the 'Muslim diaspora' or Muslim Unima (Castells 1997).
Furthermore the loss of autonomy within local communities in the West has led to
the assertion of an Islamic identity and the identification with a global Muslim
community (Ahmed & Donnan 1994: 79).
This emergence of a 'Muslim subjectivity' and its challenge to citizenship has led
many commentators to essentialize the 'Muslim community' or the 'Muslim
Umma' as bounded, fixed and stable. Castells writes, "For a Muslim, the
fundamental attachment is not the watan (homeland), but to the Umma, or
community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah" (1997:15).
In this way the term 'community' continues to be used as a rubric to identify
different collectivities in relation to ethnic and cultural difference that may
provide "a sense of solidarity in the face of social and political exclusion"
(Alleyne 2002:609). In doing so however, it ignores the multiple and shifting
identities within these bounded communities serving to ignore uncertainty and
doubt in favour of conceptualizing community as unified by faith and thus
transcending national state boundaries. This shift in understanding community as
being culturally and religiously bounded and fixed ignores the complex processes
of globalization and differentiation (Sayyid 2000). Castells, rejects this argument
and argues that though globalization may indeed be the process which best
captures transformations and the development of trans-national networks 62 it can
also cause "some people to wish to retreat into a more simply conceived
61 And recognizing a distinction in group identity between a 'mode of oppression' and 'mode of
being' (see Modood 1990: 56)
62 In fact the process of globalization, increased forms of communication and what he calls the
'world of flows' form the basis of his arguments see Castells (1997).
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community as a defence against globalization's ceaseless transformations" (1997:
3-4). In this way the global Muslim Umma serves as the focal point of a primary
religious identity, "where the search for identity becomes the fundamental source
of social meaning" (1997: 4). Yet as Sayyid (2000) points out the Muslim
'Umma' cannot be understood in such a uniform way. While recognising the
scope in this argument, the heterogeneous nature of Muslim communities coupled
with social and political rivalries in reclaiming this term, reveals the ambiguities
in the notion of 'Muslim Umma'. Thus the particular features of the Muslim
umma are contested, debated, challenged and appropriated and this process is not
always noticed in purely theoretical accounts. In this study, it enables us to ask
who benefits, from this version of umma? If we accept this mobilisation of South
Asian communities based on a local and national construction of a Islamic
identity, we must then explore the nature of its interaction with the state. In other
words we must explore how British Muslims may connect themselves to a diverse
set of public spheres in order to base their claims on this renewed assertion of a
religious identity. (Werbner 2000:307).63
3.2.1 The Emergence of Islamaphobia
The emergence of a new form of cultural racism, identified as Islamaphobia and
directed at Muslims provides the backdrop to understanding the relationship
between citizenship rights and Muslim demands in Britain (Modood 2000). In
1997 The Runnymede Trust in their report on Islamaphobia cited the stereotypical
assumptions on the position of women within Islam, arranged marriages and the
defining of Muslims and Muslim leaders as inherently 'fanatical' as examples of
this new form of racism. More recently there have been a number of reports in
Europe that document the increase of Islamaphobia across Europe. Underlying
this discourse is a heightened sense of identifying Muslims and Islam as anthetical
63 In relation to South Asian Muslims a number of studies have found religion to be the most
prominent in their self-description (see Modood et al 1997, 2000, Dwyer 2000, Evans and Bowly
2000, Werbner 2000). For Modood, this emergence has important social policy implication. He
explains, "Once out, the genie has not been re-corked. In a very short space of time 'Muslim' has
become a key political minority identity, acknowledged by Right and Left, bigots and the open-
minded, the media and the govemment"(2000: 134).
See for example Sheridan (2002).
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to the values of Europe leading to "a greater receptivity towards anti-Muslim and
other xenophobic ideas and sentiments to become more tolerated" (2002:15).
Thus the root of Islampahobia lies in the perceived cultural difference between
Muslims and non-Muslims. Werbner points out that is not confined merely to the
press but that "some western liberals, who pride themselves on their enlightened
tolerance, appear concerned about the capacity of this culturally alien presence as
they see it to 'integrate" (2000:13). Indeed following the events of 11 September
2001 and the upsurge of 'terrorist attacks', we witness western liberal scholars
engaging in discussions that serve to re-affirm the construction of Muslims as the
Other. In this discourse Islam is presented as the new threat to western civilization
and the modernity project (see Sheriff 2001). This idea of the oppositional
dualism between Islam and the West has led to racist constructions of the
Muslims as the Other. Allen points out, "Islamaphobia, in its myriad
manifestations and multi-faceted expressions, exists on a multitude of levels
across society. While societal receptivity to anti-Muslim ideas and expressions
was already increasing in the pre-9/1 1 period, the phenomenon that has emerged
since will continue to shape and influence the foreseeable future" (2003:3 1).65
The centrality of gender relations to this discourse is based upon the assumptions
about Muslim women. Muslim dress for women is considered a sign of
subservience and control, and Muslim women considered compliant, passive and
unintelligent. Muslim marriage is constructed around the image of a forced
marriage again those who willingly participate in the arranged marriage process
are pathologized as victims. In its report on Islaniaphobia the human rights
organisation IHRC reports, "The overwhelming picture is to dehumanise Muslims
in such a way that people don't really care if Muslims are attacked on the street.
Every Muslim woman knows someone who has been at least verbally abused. We
feel under siege depressed and isolated." 66 The significance of these
developments becomes evident in debates on 'claims-making and citizenship' to
which we now turn.
65 There have been a number of reports that highlight the increase of Islamaphobia across Europe.
See for example, Sheridan (2002).
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3.2.2 British Muslims and 'Participatory Citizenship'
The recent census figures reveal a total of 1.6 million Muslims resident in
Britain.67 The inclusion of the category religion in the 2001 census reveals
important changes to conceptions of ethnic identity. Yet in trying to understand
the emergence of a distinct Muslim identity in Britain, it seems that scholars often
fmd themselves requiring to identify with ever-changing social contexts. For
example as discussed above, if ethnic groups are so fragmented and diverse how
can Muslims be perceived in such a uniform way? For many what differentiates a
Muslim religious identity from others is the unique form in which this may take
within the context in which it is situated (Modood 2000, Werbner 2002). Thus the
development and emergence of a Muslim identity must be understood as part of
wider social, political and economic developments in Britain. This renewed
assertion of a religious identity has important implications for public policy
because if religious practice is no longer confmed to private life as Modood
questions "then to what extent should public policy reflect these developments?"
(2002:23).
3.2.3 Multiculturalism and 'Diversity'
The growing polarity between a theoretical understanding of multiculturalism and
its public incorporation into state policies and practices reveals an interesting set
of dynamics in conflict. The development of multicultural policies can be traced
back to the 1980's with local state authorities developing and implementing
policies to foster equality and diversity under the rubric of recognising diverse
minority ethnic groups in Britain as equal to majority communities. What is
striking about this approach is its emphasis upon culture whereupon 'diversity' is
defined in essentialist and deterministic ways (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992).
Vertevoc points out that "notions of multiculturalism convey a picture of society
as a 'mosaic' of several bounded, nameable, individually homogenous and
unmeltable minority uni-cultures which are pinned on to the backdrop of a
similarly characterized majority uni-culture" (1996:5 1). Hence, minority groups
Reported in The Guardian, 21 April 2002.
67 Op cit. 56
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were differentiated according to their cultural background which made it easier
for the state to identify community leaders so that it could deal "with those who
claim to both speak for and define those cultures. In so doing, the state may well
increase the authority of patriarchs at the expense of individuals" (Barker
1991:50-5 1). In relation to South Asian communities, Ellis (1989) describes a
pattern where local authorities choose to work with a specific individuals and
organisations by way of addressing all the needs of the community in question.
Werbner describes the role of such individuals as 'ethnic brokers' (1991:134).
Thus in developing their policies, local authorities rely on reified constructs of
community solely based upon cultural difference whereby "the use of the
'community' becomes completely universalised" (Anthias and Yuval-Davis
1992: 16768).68
This form of relativism ignores the extent to which activists and members of
minority ethnic communities have negotiated the contradictions and redefined
meanings of culture and religion within communities. This work has been
pioneered by black feminists who are critical of the emergence of the 'community
leader' which grants men the position and status of representatives of the
community as a whole often at the expense of female autonomy (see Anthias and
Yuval-Davis 1992, Brah 1996, Bhachu 1992, Pate! 2003).69 For black feminist
organisations such as Southall Black Sisters the traditional public/private divide
inherent within the western liberal framework and espoused in multiculturalist
policies has led to reluctance by state agencies such as the police and social
services to intervene in matters such as domestic violence and/or forced
marriages.
Conceptualizing diversity and equality as to include the notion of 'difference'
provides the basis for understanding culture as a process of meaning rather than as
a static shared system of beliefs and values (Merry 2001:39). Drawing upon her
68 Reading this literature one is struck by the relevance of such critiques today. Current initiatives
have led to proposals for the introduction of citizenship tests and a redefmition of 'Britishness'
under the rubric of multiculturalism. See Travis (2004).
69 Kepel, refers to these individuals as 'community interlocutors who are able to fit into the
political system and serve as a link between the two (1997:133).
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fieldwork with the Muslim women's organisation Al Masoom Werbner (2000)
illustrates how Muslim women are also able to create autonomous spaces and
participate in 'transnational activities' (2000:127). In sharp contrast to the image
of Muslim women as victims of archaic religious traditions, they "literally rewrote
the moral terms of their citizenship- from passive to active, from disadvantaged
underclass to tireless workers for the public good, from racialised minority to an
elite cadre of global citizens responsible for the plight of the needy of the Islamic
ummah and of their national homeland" (2000:127). In this study interviews with
the representatives of the organisations, Muslim Women's Help-line70 and the An-
Nisa Society7 ' reveal how they are able adapt their approaches to local concerns.
We explore this in more depth in chapter 5.
3.2.4 Muslim 'Civic' and 'Political' Participation
An interesting dimension to debates on citizenship is the nature and level of civic
and political participation of Muslims in Britain. In his research of Muslim local
councillors Purdam, found the high level of participation within the political
electoral process but questions whether this welcomes Muslims into the
democratic process as "Muslims invoke various interpretations and rhetoric of
Islam to justify and inspire particular political strategies. They operate both inside
and beyond the liberal democratic system" (1996: 130).72 In a fascinating study of
political participation of two Muslim organisations in Britain (The Muslim
Parliament of Great Britain and the Islamic Party of Great Britain) Hopkins and
Hopkins (2002) point out that it is impossible to speak of Muslim identity as fixed
and essentialized as "Representations (that is, characterizations) of community
identity are invariably bound up with claims to represent (speak for) a community.
Inevitably then, identity definitions are strategically organized and the cultural
commonplaces (stories, myths and concepts such as da'wah) invoked by
70 The MWHL aims to provide any Muslim girl or woman in a crisis with a free, confidential
listening service and referral to Islamic consultants, plus pratical help and information where
required. See http://www.mwhl.org
71 The An-Nisa Society is a women-managed organization working for the welfare of Muslim
families.
72 In his research Andrews, found that Muslim participation in the British political process can be
traced to political developments in India both during and post British rule. He argues, "rather than
seeking explanations of current trends by referring to Islamic law, or theories of an Islamic state, it
93
community members as they define who they are and how they should act, are
shaped by their political projects" (2002:305). This research reflects the
complexity of political representation of Muslims.
More recently the visibility of political organisations such as the Muslim Council
of Britain73 highlights how contemporary claims for Muslim political
representation must be understood as a strategic dimension to constructions of
Muslim identity. Thus such organisations have strong ties across and within
Muslim communities but are not representative of the varied Muslim perspectives.
For Brunt (1989) representation can have two sets of meanings, thus "on the one
hand, there is the issue of what the identity is, that is, what image or
representation of the community is advanced? On the one band, there is the issue
of 'who or what politically represents us, speaks and acts on our behalf?"
(1989:152). Interestingly it has been the process of resolving disputes within the
community, which has led to contending visions of identity within Muslim
communities. During the last two decades the demands made upon the state by
Muslims communities include, state funding for voluntary aided Muslim schools,
demands for the extension of the blasphemy laws to cover Islam; state initiatives
to challenge the practice of forced marriages; employment rights regarding
religious practice (dress, prayer and financial remuneration) and also demands for
the extension of the 1976 Race Relations Act to include religious discrimination.
Further the participation of Muslims in civic spaces includes the establishment of
mosques, cultural centres, halal meat shops and the establishment of religious
schools (see Modood 1997).
3.2.5 Islam and Citizenship Rights
This model of multiculturalism raises questions in Islamic thought and
jurisprudence, on the relationship between rights and duties of Muslims living as
is perhaps better to concentrate on the way in which power became centralized within the Indian
subcontinent.. ." (Andrews 1996:121).
' The key question therefore is how Muslim identity is represented? Post 11 September 2001 this
organisation in particular has evolved to become the 'representative' of Muslim needs in Britain. It
is an umbrella organisation with over 50 affiliated organisations and seeks to provide a unified
approach to needs of Muslims in Britain. See 'The Muslim Council of Britain- its history,
structure and workings" found at http/www.mcb.co.uk
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minorities in non-Muslim western societies (Lewis 1994, Esposito 1988, Fadl
1994). The relevant issue here is whether the voluntary migration of Muslims to
non-Muslim countries is permitted. Traditionally Muslim theorists have drawn
upon the Hadith literature and employed the concepts of dar al-Islam (Land of
Islam) and dar al-Kufr (Land of War) to explore the legitimacy of post-colonial
migration. This has led to a confusing situation whereby some scholars permit
migration but only under extreme conditions whereas others argue that it is
forbidden for Muslims to migrate to non-Muslim countries unless they are fleeing
as refugees. Shadid and van Koningsveld (1996) point out that this situation has
been further compounded by the failure of Muslim scholars to incorporate new
developments within Islamic thought. This major weakness has led to the
conflation of these two terms, whereupon debate has been largely confined to the
specific historical migration patterns of Muslims with little mention of the lived
realities of Muslims in western societies. Instead they contend that the debate on
legitimacy of migration, the conflict over the limits of religious practice and
issues concerning citizenship rights and duties of Muslims must be understood as
ongoing, dynamic and diverse (2000:3 10).
Following this approach Shadid and van Koningsveld, categorize Muslim
literature into four main approaches. It is useful to outline these approaches in
order for us to locate how demands for the recognition of Muslim Personal law
are articulated in Britain. The first, 'pragmatic approach' encourages Muslims to
fully participate as citizens in their chosen countries of migration as long as there
is no conflict over religious practice. The second, the 'utopian view', "advocates
the creation of a unified and legally autonomous Muslim community in Britain
and the West, as part of an expansive, transnational Islamic ummah" (2000:313).
This may include demands for communal self-regulation of Muslim personal law
or voluntary bodies that may advise on Muslim affairs. The third category is the
'modernist approach' which advocates 'dawaa' (preaching) as opposed to
understanding migration in terms of migrating to either the dar al-Islam (Land of
Islam) and dar al-Kufr (Land of War). Finally the 'traditionalist approach' argues
that permanent migration and settlement are both unacceptable and restrictive to
the complete practice of Islam (2000:313-314). While accepting that these
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categories are themselves dynamic and at times interchangeable we can see from
the findings in this study how they are appropriated by different Muslim
organisations at different times. We discuss this further in chapter 4.
3.3 Negotiating Identities: Pakistani Muslim Women in Britain
For the past three decades literature on Pakistani Muslim women has traced the
processes of social change within the local Pakistani communities as they relate to
gender. The critique of essentializing black and minority groups as classless and
ungendered groups and the theorization of the relationship between race, class and
gender is now commonly accepted in social science thought and this has meant a
much better understanding of the complex interrelationship between religious and
ethnic identities and social change within minority diasporic communities in
Britain (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1984, 1993; Allen, Anthias and Yuval-Davis
1991; Brah 1991; Anthias 1992, 1996; Afshar and Maynard 1994; Allen 1994).
More recent writing on gender and identity investigates the dynamics of gender
relations within family households with a focus on the marriage process and,
suggests not only a differentiation between religion and ethnicity as sources of
identity but in particular, a strong affirmation of an Islamic identity (Butler 1995,
Jacobson 1997, Burlet and Reid 1998, Hennink, Diamond and Cooper 1999).
Drawing upon interview data we now explore how cultural meanings attached to
the process of marriage and family honour have been transformed, under the
context of 'diaspora' for the women in this sample. As such, we seek to
understand how these women struggle to create a new space that challenges the
stark opposition of an essentialized interpretation of marriage with their own
personal experiences.
74 Early literature drew upon a 'cultural image' of Pakistani women who were assigned the role of
carriers of traditional 'cultural patterns' within the family and home. These explanations focused
on the 'conflict model' with young Asian women presented as being caught between two
conflicting cultures represented by the home and the school. Largely disempowered within the
family and home, their lives were perceived as incompatible with the outside world. These ideas
were later replaced with the idea of 'best of both worlds' where women were deemed more
successful in synthesizing their lives in both the public/private spheres and were acceded more
control and initiative (see Knott and Khokker 1989).
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3.3.1 Combining Marriage and Family Honour
The symbiotic relationship between the individual, marriage and family honour
reflects how marriage must be understood as complex and contested that
comprises of intricate negotiations but which can ultimately lead to unacceptable
levels of compromise and compulsion. Yet its portrayal solely in terms of power,
control and coercion is not only misleading but as data analysis in this study
suggests, simply inaccurate. Instead, marriage must be understood as a subjective
experience of 'symbolic meanings' contextualized according to age, ethnicity and
class background as well as religious practice and familial obligations and
relational upon the structures of family, home and the state. These variables are
interwoven, often contradictory and at times in conflict. Yet it is here within this
context of 'entanglement' and contestation that we can explore marriage as a
process of change and transformation for the women in this study.
3.3.2 Types of Marriage
For the purposes of this study the types of marriages have been categorised as
'arranged', 'own-choice' and 'forced' marriages. However, given the
complexities involved in the marriage process we use these categories cautiously
and recognise they do not allow us to explore the subtle interconnections between
the different types of marriage. By way of illustration Figure 3.1 below outlines
the number of marriages found in each category. Out of the 25 women, 13
described their marriages as 'arranged', 8 had chosen their own spouses (but with
the approval of their families) and 4 had been 'forced' into marriage.
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Figure 3.1 Type of Marriage
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Whilst the analysis between the three sets of interviews did reveal a number of
commonalities, it is noteworthy that attitudes to marriage did differ according to
age, generation, education and class background. Most women considered
marriage and having children a natural course of events but this was neither
universally nor uncritically accepted and much of the discussion centered on
consent in marriage and the perceived unequal power relations within the family
household. For example, the women complained that male members of the family
were not only given greater choice as to a possible marriage partner but also given
greater flexibility as to when they should marry.
Its different for men they don't have to start thinking about marriage until a
lot later. But for us it's different. Once you're at college that's it, the family
starts talking about when you should get married. It doesn't mean you have
to get married straight away but it's just that they start talking about it
(Sameena, London).
This, seemingly unequal set of social relations within the family and household
illustrates how power can be hierarchically distributed according to age and sex
within the traditional Asian family structure and how the notions of 'respect',
'prestige' and honour ensure that the family structure remains intact (Anwar
1998:32). Yet the multi-faceted context of families means that these notions of
respect and honour are likely to throw up a range of understandings based upon
the experiences of the interviewees. Indeed the term 'family expectations'
cropped up in 22 of the interviews in this study, though often disguised in subtle
ways and was closely associated to the notion of 'family honour'. According to
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Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992), much of 'ethnic culture' is organised around
rules relating to sexuality, marriage and the family and in this way, ". . .communal
boundaries often use differences in the way women are socially constructed as
markers" (1992:114). Such markers include expectations about honour whereby
women are deemed the preservers of 'family honour'.
This notion of 'family honour' has been described as a process used to control
female sexuality through restriction of movement (Afshar 1992, Anthias 1992,
Bhopal 1997). In her study of the structure of female authority within Pakistani
households in West Yorkshire, Afshar points out that the significance of izzat
(honour) is the way in which women are expected to conduct themselves both in
the private and public spheres. Wilson describes izzat as, "essentially male but it
is women's lives and actions, which affect it most. A woman can have izzat but it
is not her own, it is her husband's or father's. Her izzat is a reflection of the male
pride of the family as a whole. (What is more) saving her izzat (and through that
their own izzat) is perhaps the greatest responsibility for her parents or guardian."
The role of women as preservers of family honour means that only they can
increase the honour of the family through obedience and only they can "lose it"
and thus shame the family. As Anthias points out, "A significant element is to be
able to control the behaviour of the women in the family, both wives and
daughters, for any transgression by them is an imputation of a failure to exercise
proper patriarchal control" (1992:78). Yet the precise meaning of 'family honour'
is problematic and can only be understood in relation to highly specific and
individualised contexts to which the women belong. In this study the significance
of family honour to the marriage process raises the question of whether the
commitment to marriage is contingent upon the consent of parents and the wider
family. Here in microcosm we can explore the different types of marriage in the
sample from the standpoint of the women while simultaneously drawing attention
to the fragmented, shifting and highly individualized meanings attached to the
notion of 'honour'.
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3.3.4 The Reasons for Marriage
The reasons given for their decision to marry ranged from age, family
expectations, 'family pressure', gaining independence to a reluctance to conduct
sexual relationships outside of marriage. Perhaps not surprisingly, parents and the
wider family played an important part in the process of decision-making and to
this end, family concerns concentrated on when the interviewees should marry to
their choice of husband. Traditionally, a woman is considered of marriageable
age from her late teens until her mid-twenties (Anwar 1997) but of course, this
varied considerably amongst the sample and interestingly reflected generation,
age and class differences. For example, the younger women reported they had
been expected to marry between the ages of 24 to 28 years whereas older women
had married between the ages of 18 to 22 years. There was no discernible
difference between the two groups of women from Punjabi and Azad Kashmiri
backgrounds as they reported similar reasons for marriage.
I was brought up knowing that I would have to be married by the time I was
18. That's just the way it went back then. Marriage is important to Muslim
families and young girls are taught this at a young age but I think most wait
until they're a little older these days (Anisa, Bradford).
You can talk to lots of Asian girls at college and they'll all tell you the same,
going to college is really important because it gives you a few more years of
not having to get married, that's what I did (Shabana, London).
Well the thing about marriages and particularly perhaps Pakistani marriages
is that there is something that is set in motion that happens when you are
fairly young, perhaps 12, 13 and this process starts to happen and you're an
incidental part of it (Yasmin, London).
I don't believe it's just an Asian thing because women from all backgrounds
face the pressure to get married or have to consider getting married. But in
our communities, marriage carries the added burden of izzat and so there's
always some pressure (Hina, London).
Hence the women described the expectations to get married and the bargaining
strategies they employed in an attempt to delay marriage. But perhaps the most
salient fmding is the fact that the interviewees were aware of the importance of
preserving 'family honour' by getting married. Yet the data also revealed the
shifting and entangled defmitions of 'family honour' and its centrality to the
marriage process.
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Women of our mothers background were not in a position to challenge what
was going on in terms of izzat, shutting up and staying quiet. I think one of
the things we're doing is redefining what izzat means. We're claiming it
back, izzat is our own. I don't agree that izzat is keeping male honour in the
family. I think that's total rubbish. We all have izzat, men have izzat and
they're responsible for it, it doesn't mean they can go out and have
girlfriends and drink and gamble and do what they want. I think its blown
out of proportion by western writers (Yasmin, London).
I suppose me getting married was important for my parents cause of the
honour thing.. .but don't we all have this honour? I just sometimes worry
that its all exaggerated you know the way izzat controls everything. Well it
doesn't not in my experience anyway (Shaheen, London).
Other factors such as women occupying different positions of power within the
family means that honour also operates as a different set of expectations. For
parents in particular age signifies the chances of their daughter's marriage
prospects.
I was the eldest and I was expected to get married. It sounds strange but I
knew I had to cause of the izzat thing and that it probably wouldn't be as bad
for my sisters (Noreen, Birmingham).
I was 29 and was getting a lot of pressure from my parents to get married. I
was promised that I would be made the 'senior sister in law' and we thought
of this as a big honour (Fauzia, London).
These extracts acknowledge the complexities involved in how 'family honour'
may affect their decision to marry and thus we must understand the 'social
meanings' attached to the negotiation of family expectations to gain a more
nuanced understanding of 'family honour' (see Finch and Mason 1993).
3.3.4 Arranged Marriage
Clearly, as with all measures, the arranged marriage process can be measured
against a set of often-conflicting variables such as the involvement of family
members and the process of negotiation. In the most straightforward cases, issues
of consent remain paramount upon which all negotiations are based. However, as
the data below suggests, this process often occupies a difficult space between the
consensual participation of both parties and forms of coercion and levels of
pressure to comply. Stopes-Roe and Cochrane construct a typology of arranged
marriages that outlines the differences in the arranged marriage process. These
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include the 'traditional pattern', the 'modified traditional pattern' and the 'co-
operative traditional pattern' and the tensions inherent within all three approaches
are the underlying values of kinship patrilineal networks and 'biraderi' which
result in a conflict between western norms and values of 'marriage' and the Asian
customs of marriage (1999:95). This way of understanding the arranged marriage
process is useful in terms of providing an insight in the different normative
criteria attached to the process. However, it is also important to note that such a
paradigmatic approach is unlikely to tease out the tensions and contradictions
evident within the context of multi-faceted families. Because of the issues of
honour, conflict, loyalty and belonging in families we need to ensure that we are
able to capture divergent experiences effectively and to simply present marriage
in such an either-or structuralist manner is problematic.
In this study some women expressed complete satisfaction with the arranged
marriage process. For Fauzia, despite considerable uncertainty about her
prospective husband, she believed that the shared values of family and cultural
background, education and class position enabled her to actively participate in the
process of arranging her marriage. A family friend had suggested a possible suitor
and they had been introduced and her decision to keep her parents involved had been
paramount to her:
He was from a middle class family. He was presented as a 'suitable match'
and it was agreed we would have chaperoned meetings with a view to
marriage. They were very well educated and I thought this was a
environment that I would feel comfortable. I wanted to keep my parents
involved as much as possible so that we could make the decision together as
a family so that they know what's going on and I feel open enough to tell
them what's going on with me. And also at the back of my mind if anything
goes wrong you know, no one can point the finger at me and say well you
went out with him alone, why didn't you fmd out. At least this way I felt I
was being protected should anything ever happen in the future and that my
parents would always be there. So I was very careful about that.
These strategies shifted the responsibility to her family and parents in order to
strengthen her position in the process and in this context the interviewee was able
to frame the marriage process as encompassing contradictions, inconsistencies and
confirmation.
The only problem I felt a little uncomfortable about was the fact that they
weren't very religious but I thought that's ok because well I don't see myself
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as too religious. I mean I don't pray 5 times a day and I don't wear the hijab,
I'll do other things but not those things so I thought there really won't be a
problem.
Interestingly, within this framework, some women were thus able to adopt a
pragmatic approach to marriage, exploring different options to accommodate their
needs and the expectations of their families. Furthermore, working within this
paradigm allowed the women some control over the marriage process whilst using
the family as a mechanism for meeting potential marriage partners and to ensure
protection against any unwanted interest and intrusion. In doing so, they were
able to successfully navigate the competing demands placed upon them.
The important thing for me was that my parents listened to me. If I didn't
like him, you know if we didn't have anything in common they did
understand and we moved on. For me that's what an arranged marriage is,
making sure your parents understand what their role is in the whole thing. Of
course sometimes we all get it wrong (laughs).
Yet the extent of family involvement in the arranged marriage process did vary
amongst the sample and discussion here focused on consent to marry and choice
of marriage partner. The ambivalence described by the women regarding their
decision to marry reflects how the categories of arranged and forced marriage
maybe blurred. Some women found it difficult to disentangle the two categories
whereas other women were keen to emphasize the underlying differences between
them. Paradoxically, for some women who had been forced into marriage, family
and in particular parental input remained vital to any future plans to re-marry.
Having an arranged marriage was the only option for me and I never thought
about challenging my parents. Getting married the way I got married was
like for.. .well for keeping the family together, you're meant to be keeping
the ties together. It's meant to be like this you know some sort of guarantee
that if anything goes wrong, then you've got the family there to help sort
things Out. I'd have another arranged marriage (Shazia, London).
The family is my bedrock, without them you don't amount to much. I mean
it, I really do... it's the people in the world that care for you, that you know
will always be there for you (Nasima, London).
Such congruent fmdings are likely to throw up a wide range of issues based upon
the experiences of the individual with the arranged marriage process. As we fmd
in this study, consensus is necessary to the arranged marriage process but the
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underlying notions of honour, duty and expectation also play a pivotal role. Thus
for Sameena, marriage was based on the values of family loyalty and respect.
My sisters all had arranged marriages.. .we all did, our parents used to say
that we had to marry someone in the family, because an outsider couldn't fit
in and they would cause trouble.. .It wasn't like people sat me down and said
you should get married. I think what happened is that, my family didn't
think I was going to have a career so therefore what else is there to do and as
long as I'm at home the family home I'm their responsibility you know in
tenns honour and izzat.
Such a view lies at the paradox of the arranged marriage process whereby an
individual's decision to participate in this process is influenced by the notions of
duty, family honour, respect and family expectations. Hence, there were many
explanations of why this group of women chose to participate in the process.
Their loyalty to family and in particular parents appears to have led some women
to ignore the obvious difficulties inherent with the system of arranged marriage.
I'm sure there was times when I thought do I really want this but what
stopped me was thinking well I'm sure its going to work out because we're
both getting married for the same reasons, we both know what its all about,
well that's what I thought (Naheed, London).
In her research Bhopal, found very little evidence, which challenged the
traditional practice of arranged marriages 75 in South Asian households. Her
empirical fmdings suggest that because women are accorded less power within the
family and household the arranged marriage process further disadvantages them
and creates what she describes as a 'private patriarchy' (1997:67). The
requirement to comply no doubt restricts the terms upon which women are able to
develop strategies to challenge parental authority and limits the space upon which
they are able to instigate change within the process. It is for these reasons we see
the ambivalent stance taken by the women.
On the surface the arranged/forced marriage distinction seems more or less clear-
cut but if we scrutinise what is understood as consent and the individual
This study draws upon interviews to elicit Asian women's views on arranged marriages,
including their defmitions of arranged marriage, their importance within South Asian communities
and, in cases where the women themselves were involved in arranged marriages, the type of
contact they had with their prospective husbands. It also examines whether women would want
their own daughters to have arranged marriages and their views towards women who do not have
arranged marriages. See Bhopal (1997).
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participation in the process, we see that the distinction becomes increasingly
difficult to maintain.
It was more my uncles and aunts and the elders of my family that got
together and they chose a good family in Pakistan and they approached my
parents, not me. And there was a family conference and at some point I was
told about this process happening and I was allowed to say yes or no
(Raheela, London).
Other women did not perceive such a process to be a forced marriage as they did
not feel 'compelled' to participate in the process.
My parents did the hunting down if I can call it that. I mean they looked out
for people they thought were suitable, people that they thought I would get
on with and I was ok with that. It was always understood that they would do
that. I was told of certain people and I was allowed to meet with them if I
wanted to. So you see it wasn't forced or anything and I did participate
Some women, therefore, felt that parental support was obviously of great
importance. As discussed earlier, some women employed a number of strategies
to delay marriage where the sanctions of the honour community could be avoided
(Bradby 1999:157). By postponing entry to a family-contracted marriage, young
women were able to reassess and renegotiate their role within the system rather
than rejecting it in total. By preventing their behaviour from coming to the
attention of their parents, it was possible for young women to engage in activities
that would be defined as questionable before entering an arranged marriage
(Butler 1999:134).
This discussion reveals the diversity of experiences and the multiple perspectives
women adopt in their understanding of the arranged marriage process.
Interestingly, the women shifted the emphasis away from coercion to notions of
compromise and negotiation. In doing so, they were able to adopt a number of
different strategies to participate in and make sense of the arranged marriage
process. Keeping our minds open to these more complex understandings allows us
to develop a more nuanced approach to what obviously remains a difficult and
protracted process for many women.
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3.3.5 Forced Marriage
By contrast 4 women had been forced into marriage, against their will. For these
women, the overriding concern had been the potential loss of family honour for
themselves and their families. They were painfully aware of family demands and
were less able to resist the pressures imposed upon them. Zareena, expressed
regret that her parents had forced her into marriage to a distant cousin in Pakistan,
when she had been so vociferous in her opposition to the marriage. Yet she
conceded that these protests were not enough to challenge parental authority and
in particular her father's authority in the household, thus she explained that there
had been little option for her but to accept the marriage.
Given the complexities of family honour, duty and respect it is not surprising that
some women regard this as the only option. In her study Philips found that
women forced into marriage are unlikely to exercise the 'exit option' of leaving
the family and local community to which they belong (2003: 520). This finding
was confirmed in this study particularly from younger women who were anxious
of the effects their departure may have upon younger siblings.
The only girls that I knew who had left the community were bought back the
next day and married off. That was my only experience of women leaving
the community was that they probably went to Birmingham town centre or
something and, they were bought back.. .so I didn't particularly want any of
that (Sadia, Birmingham).
Even when some women did consider the option of leaving they were concerned
about being marginalized from the community and their families.
I couldn't just leave, I knew everyone would turn their backs on me and
anyway where would I have to go? I do feel constrained at home but I know
being on the outside isn't all its made up to be. I know some girls who've
run away and they're really alone and with no support. I couldn't do that
cause... well I just couldn't live that way (Nighat, London).
Attitudes to leaving were circumscribed by living in close-knit communities
where conformity is expected and women are under pressure to comply.
Furthermore the costs of leaving the family and community were calculated as
being too high. Most recently, we have seen a shift in focus in challenging the
practice of forced marriages under the rubric of 'honour crimes'. In fact the
visibility of 'honour crimes' is an important development of developing more
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grounded approaches in challenging such crimes. Hossain and Welchman,
describe an honour crime as "patterns of conduct cutting across communities,
cultures, religions and nations manifested in a range of forms of violence directed,
in the majority of cases, against women, including murder ('honour killings') and
forced marriage" (2000:2).76
Most recently the issue of forced marriage has been addressed at a national and
increasingly international level. 77 In Britain the recent murders of young women
who had been killed for refusing to marry 78 has mobilized a 'multi-agency'
approach in tackling the problem. Apart from feminist initiatives to mobilize state
resources to combat these crimes, of particular concern has been on the extent to
which cultural and religious beliefs are used as partial defences in law against the
charge of murder. In her extensive analysis of English case-law 79 which has
sought to introduce the use of cultural defences Phillips (2003) concludes that
"cultural arguments only have an effect when they resonate with mainstream
views" (2003:531).80
With regard to the ways in which these women were forced into marriage, in this
study discussion centred on threats to disown them to accusations of disloyalty
and the perceived lack of respect to parents. None of the women reported that they
were subject to any physical abuse and/or threats but it is quite possible that they
were simply unwilling to divulge such details. Simultaneously, they were
concerned about the refusal of marriage may have upon parents and younger
siblings.
76 In 1999 CIMEL(Centre for Islamic and Middle Eastern Law) and INTERIGHTS (International
Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights) began a three year project on 'honour crimes'
which worked closely with national and international organisations to explore ways in which to
develop strategies to combat the practice of honour crimes. See 'Roundtable on strategies to
address 'Crimes of honour' (2002:10) at http:/www.honourcrimesproject.ac.uk
In August 1999, the Home Office established a Working Group to investigate to what extent
forced marriage was a problem in England and Wales and to make proposals for tackling it
effectively. In its report, a forced marriage is defined as a marriage conducted without the valid
consent of both parties and where duress is a factor. In January 2004, the Metropolitan Police set
u a Taskforce to deal with the practice of 'Honour Crimes'.
Including, Rulchsana Naz (1999) 1-Jeshu Yones (2003), and Shafilea Ahmed (2004). See The
Guardian l7the March 2004.
See for example R v Bailey; R v Byfield; R v Shabir Hussain, R v Shazad, Shakeela and Iftikar
Naz, R v Faqir Mohammed. For full citations see List of Cases.
is beyond the remit of this study to explore these issues in any depth.
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I didn't care what they (extended family and community) thought of me, I
really didn't but it's my parents... my parents will suffer so I had to think of
what the community thinks for their sake.
Of these women, two had been forced into marriage in Pakistan and these women
reported confusion as to the validity of their marriages conducted abroad in
Pakistan and the immigration rules permitting the entrance of unwanted spouses.
I was taken to Pakistan, without knowing I'd be forced into marriage, I
honestly thought we were going on holiday. Anyway I really don't want to
go into it but just to say that I've written to immigration to tell them not to
let him in (Zareena, Bradford).
In response to tackling this issue the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has set
up special section to deal with forced marriage conducted abroad. Again due to
the limits of this study this issue is not given sufficient merit for analysis.
3.3.6 'Own choice marriages'
Of the sample, 8 women had chosen their own spouses and discussion here
focussed upon parental consent, the level of family involvement and community
reaction to their choice of partner. Unsurprisingly perhaps, parental consent
remained a central factor in their decision as to whether or not to proceed with the
marriage. In fact of this group only 2 women decided to go ahead with the
marriage when parental consent had not been secured. One interviewee spoke at
length about the strategies she employed for her parents to accept her choice of
husband.
I first told him (her father) about Naveed and he just mumbled something
about 'keeping my honour' and that was it. He just expected me to be
discreet, he just didn't want to think about what I might be doing (Farhana,
London)
Aside from parental consent she had been concerned of the implications her
decision may have upon her family, as she would be marrying an "outsider."
I did understand where my parents were coming from because in Asian
communities it's the norm to marry in your own biraderi and I knew my
parents were going to get a lot of stick from the community.
Invariably for some women now in the midst of divorce the decision to marry had
been a source of regret.
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I should have listened to them, I know that I made a mistake. I mean it's not
as if they were forcing me to get married. I just thought he was the right
person (Sadia, Birmingham).
3.3.7 Marriage, Islam and Family Honour
Interestingly, a number of the women in this study redefined the notion of family
honour and marriage within an Islamic context. The relationship between Islam
and honour is closely associated with marriage and motherhood. Some of the
younger women interviewed felt that codes of behaviour explicit within the
Qu'ran had been distorted in order to impose greater restrictions upon their
freedom. In her research with Pakistani Muslim women in West Yorkshire,
Afshar (1989) found that many young Muslim women were choosing to adopt the
Islamic identity, donning the scarf as part of a universalist Islamic identity. She
points out, "Amongst Muslims, women have traditionally been the appointed site
of familial honour arid shame and the representatives of the public face of the
society's apparent commitment to its faith. Thus Muslim women are both the
guardians and the guarded" (1989: 129).
However, in all cases there was consensus that forced marriage was not permitted
in Islam and it was this fact which propelled them to challenge parental authority.
It took me a long time to realise that in Islam marriage is based on mutual
consent, love and trust and when I'd decided that I wasn't going to take the
abuse any more I took this to my parents. Of course they refused to speak to
me but in my heart I know that I'm doing nothing wrong because it was
wrong in the first place.. .it should never have happened (Yasmin, London).
As a Muslim I understand the importance of honour.. .1 don't accept that this
honour means we don't have the choice to marry the person we choose or
whether we can go to college or not. That's not about honour, it's about
control. In Islam we have these rights and I try to explain this to my parents
(Noreen, Birmingham).
Greater concerns were expressed about community expectations upon the women
and their families and that these community expectations made it harder for
Muslim families to challenge what honour in Islam actually meant.
Even if my parents had given me more freedom it just would have caused
them more problems. People talk about you, oh she's doing this and that.
What can you do? (Rabia, Birmingham).
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Thus women are deemed the custodians of the religion but it has been men who
have interpreted the norms and values of Islam. Afshar explains, "Women
whether they have wished it or not, have been required to reflect the religious
commitment of the group in their attire and behaviour as well as in most aspects
of their lives" (1989:129). This has been a problematic relationship where over
time women have had to negotiate their position in relation to the patriarchal
position that they find themselves in (Kandiyoti 1991). This issue is discussed
further in chapter 5.
3.3.8 Reforming the Marriage Process
It is unsurprising that the most salient finding with the women in this sample was
the extent to which they challenged the norms of the cultural group to which they
belonged. Many of the women in the sample were actively engaged in the process
of redefming the notion of 'family honour' and negotiations. As Bhachu points
out: ". . . ethnic cultural values are represented as repressive traits that they must
accept rather than as values they continuously adapt, choose to accept, reproduce,
modify, recreate and elaborate, according to the circumstances in which they are
situated" (1989:24).
The interviews revealed the complex relationship between the women and their
families as Brah points out that the family "remains an area of acute ambivalence
for women" as it provides women "with a sense of belonging and family support
in the struggles against the onslaughts of racism" (1996:98). The multi-faceted
context of families means that the women actually occupy different social
positions through different ages and experiences and have different sources of
power within the family. Thus for example some women reported that as the
eldest of siblings they were better able to negotiate terms of marriage, as parents
were more likely to listen to their concerns by virtue of their age and position in
the family. Similarly a large sample of the women reported it was female
members of the immediate and extended family that took the decision on whom
they should marry and then went onto broker the terms of dowry and dower.8'
We are thus given the impression that the different sources of power to which
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women have access can result in them actively colluding in cases of forced
marriage and such a view challenges the presupposition of an underlying family
truth based solely upon patriarchal power. Herein lies the paradox whereby the
understandings and interpretations of marriage can often appear as contradictory
and complex. Furthermore existing literature pays little attention on discussion on
how the arranged marriage process can itself be reformed. Nor has there been
much discussion on the use of modern mechanisms in arranging marriages for
example, Muslim marriage web-sites and agencies. In this study very few women
used such services but this is most probably reflective of the limitations in the
sample rather than indicative of the use of such methods.
In this study the women were keen to discuss the ways in which the arranged
marriage process could be reformed. And, recognizing this method of marriage as
a tradition based on cultural values allowed them the possibility of it being
modified. In some cases the women explored the possibility of disposing of the
term arranged marriage and renaming it as a 'assisted' marriage.
The term arranged marriage has got such a bad press now with all the focus
in the media. I think we need to start again, where we have assisted marriage
you know where parents help us.. .assist us in marriage (Fauzia, London)
I think its time the arranged marriage thing changed because I think a lot of
the time the individual gets forgotten in the process. Like for example my
cousin the arranged marriage things worked out really well, I mean they're a
really successful couple, fantastic in fact and are a really good role model.
But for me it just didn't work out. I think this needs to be challenged that to
understand that what may be good for one individual may not be good for
someone else. It's this blanket that we have to change (Anisa, Bradford).
For other women entering into the marriage process itself, limits the choice for
women.
I personally don't think either systems work and for me I would just go with
the system that causes the least amount of heartache to my parents and
family (Raheela, London)
Conclusion
In this chapter we situated the study in relation to the experiences of Pakistani
Muslim communities in Britain. Underlying this analysis was two key issues:
firstly an attempt to explore how Pakistani communities have mobilized around a
81 See chapter 5.
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renewed Muslim subjectivity and secondly to explore the experiences of marriage
for the women in this sample. We found that the women are combining traditional
and contemporary values to create a new way of being which facilitates their
individual growth and aspirations within the basic family structure. Nevertheless
pressure to get married remains strong and the institution of arranged marriage is
often perceived as the only acceptable form of marriage, which can lead to
intergenerational conflict. Thus for the majority of women, marriage remains a
process of negotiation, compromise and struggle. This may suggest that parental
involvement in the marriage process is far greater than studies suggest and the
nature of this involvement is complex entailing material, emotional and
psychological factors. Afshar points out that "Women are the perceived
transmitters of cultural values and identities and are the standard-bearers of the
groups public and private dignity. Yet women themselves are burdened with a
diversity of values and identities which may not always converge to produce a
rich entirety" (1989:129).
In the first part of the chapter we found that at a time where the relationship
between Muslims and the British State is predicated on the notions of loyalty,
belonging and Britisimess, a culturally relativist notion of multiculturalism fails to
incorporate heterogeneity within communities. Instead Muslim identities are
complex, negotiated, contested and historically unstable. Purdam points out that
"Muslims themselves are debating and contesting exactly what it means to be a
Muslim, what Islam means and how it should be constructed and reproduced both
in the West and in the rest of the world" (1996:130). We draw upon these debates
and turn now to exploring how Shariah Councils constitute as unofficial dispute
resolution processes in Britain.
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CHAPTER 4
RESOLVING MARITAL DISPUTES:
SHARIAH COUNCILS IN BRITAIN
"Muslim law is not adversarial in nature but rather conciliatory.
We seek to bring people together, to reconcile them
rather then to create dissension between them"
(Zaki Badawi 1995:78)
4.1 Introduction
Shariah Councils have been described as "internal regulatory frameworks"
(Menski 1998:396), "complex informal networks" (Poulter 1998:61) and sites
where "new ijtihads"82
 are taking place (Yilmaz 2000:1). This form of Muslim
seif-organisation is characterized as 'Muslim legal pluralism' and has led to
extensive discussion on a possible conflict of laws scenario with English law
(Poulter 1998, Carroll 1997, Hamilton 1995). Indeed, existing literature presents
these bodies as evidence of an emerging parallel legal system whereby Muslim
family laws are reconstructed to accommodate the needs of diasporic Muslim
communities in Britain (Bunt 1998, Menski and Pearl 1998, Poulter 1998,Yilmaz
2001).
While this literature has been valuable in identifying the ways in which Muslim
family law may operate, it tends to omit any discussion on the key issue of
'power'. Shariah Councils are implicitly presented as unified with little
recognition of the internal and external contestation of power. Significantly, these
analyses fail to incorporate the experiences of the individual and are largely based
on theoretical understandings. Thus the main thrust of this work is framed around
debates on 'legal pluralism' and attention is paid to the failure of English law to
accommodate the needs of religious communities. Yet one cannot understand the
multifaceted nature of 'law' without drawing upon detailed empirical data (Santos
1987). Indeed, the presentation of legal discourse as structured, overarching and
determinist obscures the power relations upon which dispute resolution processes
82 Yilmaz describes Ijtihad as an activity, a struggle and a process to discover the law from texts
and apply to a new set of facts. In this way Muslim legal pluralism in Britain is an indication of
new ijtihad (2000:3).
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are based. In this way, existing literature does not give due salience to the
interconnection between the Shariah Councils, forms of power and gender
inequality. This thesis builds on these existing studies and draws upon detailed
empirical data in its attempt to fill the gaps. The major task of this chapter,
therefore, is to analyse the establishment and development of 4 Shariah Councils
as 'unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms' in the areas of marriage and
divorce. More importantly, the chapter investigates their approach to mediation
and reconciliation.
The first section of the chapter 4.2, traces the development of Shariah Councils in
Britain. The degree to which Shariah Councils have been transformed under the
context of diaspora leads us to question their legitimacy under Islamic law. In this
scenario, we consider how notions of 'homeland', 'belonging' and 'Muslim
identity' may interact to produce a specific type of Shariah Council to
accommodate the specific needs of British Muslims. Of particular importance is
the relationship of Shariah Councils to mosques and we explore this in some
detail.
Having supplied a historical and contextual background to Shariah Councils the
chapter then goes onto investigate in sections 4.3 and 4.4 how these bodies
operate in practice. In particular, it explores the interaction of 'social' and 'legal'
processes involved in obtaining a Muslim divorce. With each of the 4 Shariah
Councils, we see the combination of a specific set of rules procedures and
language that creates a unique form of dispute resolution.
The third section 4.5 of the chapter elaborates on the key issue of mediation and
reconciliation. As discussed in chapter 1, the Family Law Act (1996) has not
proceeded with its provisions on mediation but the question remains whether
Shariah Councils endorse such approaches. Mediation is a complex and difficult
process and here the emphasis is on the relationship between gender and 'private
space' to explore how these bodies partake in mediation practices and whether
this leads to the unequal treatment of women. The significance of this approach is
that it allows us to explore the relationship between official mediation policies and
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Shariah Council mediation practices and challenge the idea that these 'internal
regulatory frameworks' tend to avoid all 'officialdom' to settle disputes. Instead
in matters of reconciliation and mediation we see a degree of both conflict and co-
operation between state law and unofficial law. 83 In particular, we analyse the
centrality of the religious scholar to the dispute resolution process and explore
what his 'legal reasoning' is based upon.
Following this discussion, section 4.10.4 briefly examines recent arguments for
the adoption of a strictly legal pluralist arrangement for Muslims in Britain and
considers to what extent Shariah Councils are unified. Certainly for many
religious scholars the development of Jewish legal pluralism in Britain provides a
useful perspective on the relationship between multiculturalism and legal
pluralism for Muslims in Britain.84
4.2 The Development of Shariah Councils in Britain
Shariah Councils operate as unofficial legal bodies specialising in providing
advice and assistance on Muslim family law matters. They are neither unified nor
represent a single school of thought but instead are made up of various different
bodies representing the different schools of thought in Islam. 85 In essence, the
Shariah Council has three main functions, mediation and reconciliation, issuing
Muslim divorce certificates and producing expert opinion reports on matters of
Muslim family law and custom to the Muslim community, 86 solicitors and courts.
In addition to providing advice and assistance on matters of Muslim law, Shariah
Councils have also been set up to promote and preserve Islam within British
society (Bunt 1998:103). The process of dispute resolution therefore is produced
83 A situation identified as 'internal legal pluralism' (Santos 1987:98) and 'state legal pluralism'
(Woodman 1998:45).
Unfortunately it is beyond the remit of this study to explore this issue in any depth. But I hope to
conduct a comparative study later.
85 The four ancient Islamic schools of Sunni thought can be broadly categorized as Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafi'i and Hanabali. For an in-depth analysis on the historical development of these schools see
Coulson (1969) and Schacht (1964).
86 Shariah Councils also issue fatwas which can simply be translated as a ruling from a religious
scholar to members of the Muslim community over a contested issue. Observation research reveals
that at some Shariah Councils the scholars spend considerable time deliberating on issuing fatwas.
The outcomes of these fatwas are not known but this certainly raises interesting questions on how
the community attempts to deal with local conflicts within the boundaries of the 'Muslim
community' and the extent to which these processes may conflict with state law.
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through various discursive practices. That is, Shariah Councils must be
understood in relation to the locus of power in which they are embedded.
Similarly, the emergence of Shariah Councils in Britain can be traced to a diverse
set of social processes. According to Yilmaz (2001), there are four conditions
under which Shariah Councils emerge in Britain. Firstly, under Muslim tradition,
family issues are purposively left to 'extra judicial' regulation and diasporic
communities continue this tradition and resolve disputes within this sphere.
Secondly, Muslims do not recognise the authority and legitimacy of western
secular law on par with Muslim law and therefore deliberately choose to resolve
disputes through a non-adversarial process. Thirdly the familial notions of honour
and shame prevent familial disputes from being discussed in the 'public sphere'
and subsequently religious laws are given greater potency and legitimacy within
the communities. And finally, the failure of the state to recognize these plural
legal orders has led to the development of these 'alternative' dispute resolution
processes within the private sphere (2001:299). In short, what we see in this
analysis is the development of a parallel legal system in opposition to state law.
Yet conceptualizing unofficial dispute resolution in this way is premised on the
homogeneity of 'Muslim communities' without exploring how these bodies are
constituted within local communities. Furthermore, the primacy of a Muslim
identity means that we learn very little about cultural and religious practices that
may affect the autonomy of women using these bodies. There is very little
discussion on how such processes are contested, redefined and possibly open to
change. We explore these issues in chapter 5.
The history of Shariah Councils in Britain can be traced to the development of
Muslim organisations during the 1970's and 1980's. In chapter 3, we discussed
the emergence of religious and ethnic diversity and the development of
multicultural policies to accommodate such 'difference' (Modood 1999, Werbner
2000, Brah 1996). While some studies attribute this development to state
initiatives under the context of multiculturalism others see the communities
themselves taking the initiative to forge closer ties within the family and
community. For example, in his analysis on the relationship between the
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emergence of cultural and religious organisations and 'ethnic governance' ,87
Vertovec (1996) concludes that minorities have their own reasons for choosing
their "idioms of mobilization" as well as "their own orientations, strategies and
levels of experience that affect the kind of state liaisons which they foster and
maintain" (1996:66). The development of Shariah Councils can be understood in
this context reflecting developments of the communities in which they are located.
Unfortunately there are no known precise figures that can identify the precise
number of Shariah Councils operating in Britain but at a recent meeting, estimates
ranged between 60-70 councils across the country.88
The development of Shariah Councils encapsulates the development of Islamic
religious practice in Britain. From the initial stage of a prayer hall, to the
appointment of Imams and the construction of mosques, Shariah Councils are
symbolic of the cultural and religious norms which underlie these developments.
In his study of Muslims in Bradford, Lewis argues that the socio-political
establishment of Muslims in Britain via mosques and community organizations
indicates a shift "within the migrants self-perception from being sojourners to
settlers" (1996:56). In particular, it is the close relationship to mosques that has
shaped the type of Shariah Councils that we see emerging in Britain.
4.2.1 The Relationship to Mosques
It is useful to explore this relationship between mosques and Shariah Councils if
we are to understand the establishment, regulation and legitimacy of these bodies
within local Muslim communities. In fact, a focus on this relationship enables us
to engage with current issues facing mosques and their impact upon Shariah
Councils.
The establishment of mosques in Britain has been extensively documented with
mosque formation being closely tied to community development (see Lewis 1994,
87 A term he takes from Breton (1991).
88 An audience of community leaders and religious scholars from Shariah Councils across the
United Kingdom were invited to discuss the emergence of Muslim legal pluralism in Britain in the
hope of increasing efforts to lobby the state for the formal introduction of a parallel legal system in
Britain. "Muslim Personal Law" organized by The Islamic Shari'a Council in association with
Islamic Cultural Centre, London and Quist Solicitors, Sunday 22id August 2004.
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Werbner 2001, Eade 1996, Ballard 1994). As Lewis points out, "The creation of
mosque reflects the growth, location and differential settlement patterns of distinct
regional and linguistic communities" (1994:58). Consequently, we see the
proliferation of different mosques each fragmented according to village-kinship,
sectarian affiliation and intra-ethnic differences. Hence in Britain, mosques cater
to the needs of Muslims of various different ethnic backgrounds including
Punjabis, Mirpuris, Pathans, Bangladeshis, Yemenis, Somalians and Gujaratis. In
larger communities, mosques are not only based on ethnic differences but also
split along the differential doctrinal teaching. In Britain the different Islamic
schools of thought have been identified as Barelwi, Deobandi, Jama'at-I-Islami,
Ahl-I-Hadith, Shi'a and Ahamadiyya (see Lewis 1994:57). Most Pakistanis in
Britain belong to the Barelwi tradition and consequently mosques are closely
aligned to the sectarian affiliation of the local community (see Shaw 1988,
Werbner 1988, Geaves 1996, Lewis 1996).
Mosques are classified as charitable religious organisations and are essentially
free to develop their own policies within the framework of existing legislation.
Recent figures estimate over 1,500 mosques in Britain, each reflecting the diverse
ethnic profile of the local Muslim communities. 89 The mosque consists of a board
of trustees and a 'mosque committee' that takes care of the fmancial interests of
the mosque and its maintenance on a voluntary basis. The committee appoints the
Imam whose primary role is "to lead ritual prayers for the congregation five times
a day, perform marriages, funerals and other rites of passage, give religious advice
and guidance to the community on their daily lives and religious rituals such as
fasting during the holy month of Ramadan and pilgrimage during Hajj, collect and
distribute charity, provide counselling and teaching for both adults and children"
(see FAIR 2002: 12). Aside from the rituals and spiritual guidance the mosques
also seek to 'institutionalise' Islam within local communities and therefore
provide a 'Muslim space' where Muslims can discuss a wide range of issues from
an Islamic perspective. Shadid and Koningsveld point out, "Quite logically, the
89 Statistics complied by the Guardian Research Department see Travis (2002). There are a
number of umbrella Muslim organisations that aim to unite mosques, Imams and provide a
consensus for Muslim perspectives in Britain these include the Bradford Councils of Mosques,
Muslim Councils of Mosques and the Muslim Council of Great Britain.
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establishment of these places of worship implied the creation of social spaces
where new contacts could be made on the basis of a common religious identity"
(1996:111). In this way, mosques act as a focal point for the Muslim community,
identified as the "Islamization of local urban space" (Eade 1996:231) and as such,
mosques are markers of "shifts in. . . sacred geographies (and in) the maps of
meaning and profiles of power in the West" (Pieterse 1997:187). The mosque
itself is symbolic of the visible presence of Muslims in Britain- an indication of
their cultural and religious presence. Ahmad argues, "The mosque is by definition
the heart of the community. It has to be multi-dimensional if it is to adequately
succeed in harmonising all the varied elements within the community. . .1 have
always felt that mosques should be venues for issues of national importance such
as racism, unemployment, the environmental crisis, education, business, the arts
and sport. We are being restrictive if we keep them as prayer places alone. The
strength of our mosque can only materialise with their ability to attract a larger
audience. They have to utilise all the skills, abilities and talents of the
community"(quoted from Raza 1996:40-41).
The growing concern of the emergence of the 'home-grown Muslim terrorist' post
events 11 September 2001 has led to a renewed interest by the state in mosques
and in particular the role of Imams. The reason for this intervention is not merely
to prevent acts of terrorism but in doing so, to ensure that Muslims are fully
integrated into "the British way of life". 90 Understandably this has generated
concern within communities and generated enormous discussion within Muslim
newspapers and magazines where such intervention is viewed with suspicion and
hostility.9'
More recently, the recruitment of Imams from abroad has led to conflict within
mosques and concern from the government. There are a number of institutions in
Britain, which undertake the training of Imams 92 but there is no central body
° See The Guardian March 17 1998.
' See Q News 14 April 2003.
92 TheSe bodies include The Muslim College in London, Darul Uloom al-Arabiya al-Islamia in
Lancashire, Institute of Islamic Education in Dewsbur and the A1-Mandi Instititue in Birmingham.
See FAIR Report (2002).
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which oversees the training. This has led to concerns that Imams who have little
understanding of the lives of British Muslims may be contributing to disaffection
and alienation within local communities. Furthermore Imams are often employed
from a particular area in Pakistan to ensure they reinforce these religious values
imbued with localized cultural traditions, within British Pakistani communities
(Bunt 1998). Understandably this has led to criticism from British Muslims who
may only speak English of the language barriers and generational conflict. Geaves
points out, "The imam may well not speak English but his presence becomes the
focal point for legitimizing and reinforcing those customs from a particular rural
locale in the subcontinent that have been transported to a few terraced streets in a
British industrial city. Here the mosque functions more strongly as a means of
reinforcing kinship and ethnic ties than as a means of intensifying the sense of
belonging to the wider ummali whether in Britain or the Islamic world"
(1996:171). Interestingly however, in his study he found that most Muslims were
not aware of the different ethnic or doctrinal biases within mosques and prayed
there because of convenience.
New state initiatives to provide Imams with employment rights have stipulated
that Imams must be British Muslims so that they are aware of British social,
cultural and political life and are subsequently able to relate to their younger
congregation. This of course raises concerns outlined in chapter 3, where the use
of selected Muslim organisations in dialogue with the state, ignores the diverse
manifestations of Islam within communities. Furthermore the state seeks the
control and preservation of communal harmony against a background of high
unemployment, low educational attainment, social deprivation and social
exclusion for many Muslims in Britain (Modood et al 1997). Not only does this
approach fail to explore the underlying reasons why young Muslims maybe
disaffected, but it also ignores the dynamics of power within communities.
Hence we can see that the task of the Imam is both challenging and complex.
Apart from this national interest there has been discussion over the internal
conflicts of power between different sectional interests within mosques. Raza
describes this as 'mosque politics' and states, "mosques in Britain have become a
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battle ground for power politics.. .It is pointless to conceal that within the last few
years most of the trouble and discord have stemmed from the attitudes of some of
the Ulema and Imams and these have been the reason for many of the most
unpleasant scenes witnessed in the brief history of the Muslims in the United
Kingdom. In some cases, the troubles have escalated to such an extent that the
police have had to enforce the closure of the mosques" (1993:37). In this way we
understand how mosques compete and vie for power among themselves reflecting
its importance for local Muslims. All of these problems also reflect how the
mosque acts as a resource for access to Muslims. A myriad of objections on the
way mosques are run is commonly discussed and debated in Muslim newspapers
such as Q News and Muslim News.93
A second concern relates to the presence of women in mosques. This presence is
marginal and defmed according to the dictates of purdah which gives rise to the
creation of separate space, for men and women. Mirza explains, "The installation
of separate entrances, separate seating arrangements and the bifurcation of rooms
by screens or awnings to create sharp, well-defmed boundaries between sections
of the mosque are the means by which the contours of gendered space and the
pattern of restricted interaction between the sexes are produced" (2000:13).
Women are not actively involved in the mosque committee, they have little input
in the administrative task of running a mosque and when they are involved, they
are designated to the realm of 'women's issues'. Yet Imams at mosques can play a
central role in matters of marriage and divorce including introducing 'suitable'
marriage partners and advising women on matters of marriage breakdown. This
has led to concern from Muslim women's organizations such as Muslim Women's
Help-line and the An-Nisa Society how such advice may be steeped in local
customs and practices that may sanction intra- family inequalities such as forced
marriage.94
Analysis of these newspapers reveals that most objections are raised against the mosque
committees that are seen to be run by an older generation which has little understanding of the
needs of young British Muslims. See Q-News (2003).
We discuss this further in chapter 5.
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In Britain the formation of mosques is closely tied to the development of Shariah
Councils. In this study, 3 Shariah Councils had evolved under the guidance of an
Imam from a respective mosque. Prior to the establishment of Shariah Councils,
Imams provided all spiritual and religious guidance to Muslims in local mosques
and this included settling marital disputes and issuing divorce certificates. In his
study, Bunt (1998) found that Imams found this work to be time-consuming and
taking them away from their traditional duties of providing spiritual guidance and,
sermons for Friday prayers. This was confirmed by findings in this study, Dr.
Nasim at the BSC, explained, "we realized that some form of body was needed
which could resolve family disputes. Before the Shariah Council it was the Imam
who used to deal with these issues and this caused problems not only because he
was not versed in dealing with all the issues that confronted him but he didn't
have the time on top of his other duties. So in that respect the Shariah Council was
formed. This body is led by religious scholars including Imams". Thus an
important feature of the relationship between Shariah Councils and mosques are
that they continue to be based in Mosques and Imams serve as religious scholars
on the Council's body while operating from a separate room. In this study only
one Shariah Council (SCUK) had little contact with a mosque all the others were
closely aligned to one particular mosque. There are two important differences
between mosques and Shariah Councils. Firstly, that unlike mosques, Shariah
Councils are not voluntary bodies and therefore are not obliged to reveal details of
their organizational structure nor their financial status. Secondly many mosques in
Britain are organised on an ethnic basis reflecting the specific needs of different
groups of Muslims whilst Shariah Councils aim to cater to the needs of all
Muslims irrespective of ethnic, racial or national background.
Thus while some studies attribute decision-making power within the community
to Imams the emergence of Shariah Councils has led to an interesting 'separation'
in the roles of an Imam and religious scholar. In his study of informal decision-
making in the Pakistani Muslim community in Birmingham, Bunt (1998) found
Imams to be in a position of power, providing advice and assistance in matters of
marital and intra-family conflict. Conservative in attitude, they sought to control
female sexuality through forced marriages and thus prevent 'outsiders'
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threatening the stability of the Muslim family. In comparison, the religious
scholars in this study that were based at Shariah Councils were keen to distinguish
themselves from performing the traditional duties of Imams (though some were
also Imams) but they did point to "the mutual relationship between the Imam and
the Muslim scholar in resolving marital disputes" (Dr. Suhaib Hasan, ISC).
4.2.2 The Legitimacy of Shariah Councils
We can see from the discussion above that Shariah Councils emanate from
mosque formations and the structuring of discourse in this space has shaped their
self-definition and identification. Moreover, the way in which this discourse has
been transformed within the context of the 'British Muslim diaspora' raises
questions regarding their legitimacy under Islamic law. For example, how has the
experience and position of the Pakistani Muslim community in Britain
transformed Shariah Councils from their origins of existence? This of course
raises questions on the relationship between migration, diaspora and belonging
(Brah 1996, Werbner 2000).
In this study with each of the 4 Shariah Councils, it is notable that Pakistani
Muslims were involved in setting up the organisations and continued to be
actively involved in the administrative affairs as well as acting as religious
scholars. It might be observed therefore that the primary guidance for these
individuals in determining the type of Shariah Council set up reflects their
background, position and credentials in Pakistan. As discussed above with some
mosques Imams are deliberately recruited from Pakistan to keep alive localised
cultural practices.
In Pakistan, the relationship between divorce and mediation is one enshrined in
law. In cases of divorce the contending parties have to nominate their
representative while the 'Umpire' shall be the Chairman of the Local Council.
Under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO 1961) once a
husband pronounces a 'talaq' it must be registered with the Chairman of the
Union Committee or Arbitration Council and a copy of this notice must be
supplied to his wife. This notice remains valid for 90 days and during this time
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the couple are encouraged to resolve the marital dispute outside of the legal
framework. Thus section 7 sub-section 4 states, "Within thirty days of the receipt
of notice under sub-section (1), the Chairman shall constitute an Arbitration
Council for the purpose of bringing about reconciliation between the parties, and
the Arbitration Council shall take all steps necessary to bring about such
reconciliation". These bodies are thus appointed by the state to operate as official
dispute resolution mechanisms working in tandem with civil law (Abel 1984). Of
course this does not mean there is no conflicts of law scenario and there has been
much discussion in Pakistani case law as regards to the nature of the notice given
to the Chairman in order to determine the validity of the divorce (see Menski and
Pearl 1998: 339-342).
It is clear that Shariah Councils in Britain have potential overlaps with such social
and legal processes in Pakistan. In doing so, many reformulate cultural practices
of the specific Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain to fit within this
framework of dispute resolution. But as we shall see in this study, different sets of
power relations and normative values interact with this specific form of dispute
resolution and hence the process of cultural reformulation is far more complex
than this analysis suggests.
With the seemingly visible emergence of Shariah Councils in Britain their role as
dispute resolution mechanisms has more recently come under scrutiny. In his
study, Warraich, points to the conflation of South Asian Muslim family laws,
localised cultural practices in British Muslim communities and a rigid application
of English family law as the contributory factors leading to the emergence of
these bodies, "who have appropriated for themselves the role and position of
parallel quasi-judicial institutions" (2002:11). He argues that "the lack of space in
the English system for appropriate solutions to dilemmas facing people" has led to
this confusing situation (2001:11). Instead state law must create the space within
its' existing framework and recognise and adapt to the complexities of diversity
and pluralism inherent in the lives of individuals (2001:12). Yet one of the
difficulties with a focus solely upon state law means that subsequently we learn
very little about how the boundaries between state law, personal law and
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privatized dispute resolution within diasporic Muslim communities are in fact
being contested, challenged and appropriated in specific contexts. Secondly, the
conceptual 'space' where the state law and Muslim personal law intermesh
manifests in the sphere of mediation and reconciliation but what is less certain are
the outcomes of such disputes for individuals and in particular women, within
Muslim communities.
Shariah Councils are thus the product of transnational networks and operate
within a national and global space. The emergence of these bodies in Britain must
be understood in relation to how Muslim communities came to be situated "in and
through a wide variety of discourses, economic processes, state policies and
institutional practices" (Brah 1996:182). Thus some religious scholars such as
Maulana Abu Saeed and Dr. Suhaib Hasan at ISC readily admit that they draw
from their experiences as Imams in Pakistan. Dr. Suhaib Hasan explained, "In
Pakistan I have many friends who are learned scholars in Islamic matters
concerning marriage and divorce. I often consult them for advice and this helps
our work immensely". This development of Shariah Councils to mirror the local
ethnic profile of Muslim communities has however been challenged and rejected
by other religious scholars. In interview Dr. Badawi a scholar at MLSC was keen
to distinguish between the role of a Shariah Council and its location, often within
local Pakistani Muslim communities. He explained, "we work on the basis of
Islamic principles and we draw upon a wide range of school of thought in Islam.
We are not made up of just Pakistanis and we do not adhere to Pakistani law. We
are here for all Muslims". However, Dr. Saeeda at BSC acknowledged that she
conceptualised dispute resolution in relation to the needs of the Pakistani Mirpuri
community in Birmingham. This simply meant she was aware of localised cultural
practices and hence the process of dispute resolution was expressed via an
ethnicised idiom.
This raises the question of the legitimacy of Shariah Councils in Islamic law and
their legitimacy of operating in non-Muslim countries. This has been debated
around the issue of voluntary migration for Muslims in Islam and has proved an
area of contention and dispute amongst Muslim scholars and clerics. The early
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jurists demarcated boundary lines between 'dar al-Islam' (the land of Islam) and
'dar al-kufr' (the Land of War) (see Shadid and Koningsveld 1996) and most
jurists largely accept that Muslims could remain on non-Muslim lands as long as
they were allowed to continue the practice of Islam. The point of contention
concerned the jurisdiction of Muslim judges. For Lewis, the most important issue
facing Muslims in Britain is the absence of a "communal jural autonomy in
matters of personal law" something that is allowed to religious minorities or
dhimmis residing in Muslim states (1994:67)
There is much debate and discussion within Islamic texts as to the role and duties
of Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim states. This area of law is both
ambivalent and open to dispute (see FadI 1994). Historically, migration for
Muslims has been linked to forced migration and persecution during the time of
the prophet and the two Quranic verses (4.97-100 and verse 5.44) that address this
issue are both based upon forced migration and persecution. Fadl points out, "It
seems that different jurists were addressing different scenarios in their expositions
without specifically indicating the issue they had in mind" (1994:150). The degree
of conflict between the schools of thought has also exacerbated this confusion.
For example, for Malikis Muslims who find themselves as minorities must
migrate to Muslim countries. Hanabali and Shi'a hold the view that migration was
permitted as long as it did not conflict with the practice of Islam but living in a
Muslim state was the ideal situation even if that state was despotic (see Esposito
1995). Menski is correct when he points outs that, "Muslims as members of
minority communities in the West today, then, have no clear authoritative,
uniform Juristic guidance available to them"( 1998:64).
As discussed in chapter 3 the polarization in this debate has led to new approaches
that reformulate the dichotomy of 'dar al islam' (the house of Islam) and 'dar al
harb' (the house of war). Shadid and Koningsveld develop the concept of dar-
aldawah ('the country of mission') and dar a! and (the country of treaty) where
Muslims can live in non-Muslim lands and organise their lives in accordance with
the Sharia. What becomes evident in these discussions is that Shariah Councils
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must be understood as being relational upon time, space the dynamics of power
and conflicting cultural and religious norms.
4.2.3 Divorce and Shariah Councils
Of the sample, all 4 Sbariah Councils reported marriage breakdown and divorce to
be the two most important issues dealt by Shariah Councils. In relation to divorce,
female applicants contact a Shariah Council where husbands may refuse to grant
them a unilateral divorce (talaq). Thus under Muslim law women are permitted a
divorce without the consent of their husbands but involving the intervention of
religious scholars to determine which kind of divorce is issued. Under Muslim
law, a divorce can be obtained in a number of different ways: talaq (unilateral
repudiation by the husband); khul (divorce at the instance of the wife with her
husband's agreement, and on condition that she will forego her right to the dower
or mehr) and ubara'at (divorce by mutual consent). There is of course much
diversity of approaches to divorce within these three major categories, however
discussion in this thesis will be limited to the type of divorce certificate issued by
the Shariah Councils and this being the khula.
Discussion on divorce, in Islamic literature often begins with a saying found in the
Hadith literature, in which the Prophet explains that divorce is permissible in
Islam but only as a last resort (Engineer 1992). The interesting issue here is that
under Muslim law marriage is a contract and thus the different types of divorce
available are based on ways in which to dissolve this contract. The different
schools of tradition will therefore allow termination of this contract by "wither of
the parties, by mutual agreement or by the courts" (Carroll 1986:45). Yet the
different approaches in classical literature on Muslim law of divorce coupled with
state law interpretations of Muslim divorce in Muslim countries has led to
confusion among both scholars and lawyers.95
Notwithstanding the diversity of literature on the issue of divorce in Muslim law
we can identify two key issues for Muslim women in Britain. The first issue
For example the issue of khul and mubara't has led to interesting discussion on its form and
validity see for example Bharatiya (1996)
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relates to a conflict of law scenario with English law regarding the extent to which
Muslims are being divorced outside the official system and whether this creates a
conflict of law scenario with official law. 96 And secondly, the problem of 'limping
divorces' whereby a civil divorce has been obtained by the woman but her
husband is refusing to grant her Muslim divorce (Menski 1999). Yilmaz points
out that "if the woman is not religiously divorced from her husband, it does not
matter that she is divorced under the civil law, in the eyes of the community her
remarriage will be regarded as adulterous and any possible offspring will be
illegitimate since it is not allowed under the religious law. So, in reality, until the
religious divorce is obtained, the civil divorce remains ineffective because one
party is unable to remarry" (2001:16).
The second issue is on the type of Muslim divorce granted to the women by the
Shariah Councils. If a khul is granted it means that the female applicant must give
up her right to dower or mehr in return for a divorce and this seems reasonably
unfair. Menski describes this process as, "Usually the wife will offer to pay a
certain sum, normally the amount of the dower either given to her or promised to
her, in return for the agreement of the husband to release her from the marriage
tie" (1998:284). Again this is a complex area and one that ensures some
confusion as to the precise amount of dower the husband should receive for the
khul (see Carroll 1986). Aside from this issue the Shariah Councils also deal with
how the female applicant is able to retrieve her dower after her husband has
willingly divorced her. Nasir points out that in theory Muslim women are entitled
to the dower have exclusive right to it under the terms of the contract, though in
practice this may vary "according to the circumstances. She may be entitled to
the whole dower, half of it or may have no dower at all" (1990:103). Furthermore
Afshar points out, that "what women are entitled to and what they get are very
different. Married women are not expected to assert their proprietorial rights.
They are not to bring conflict, but peace" (1992:129).
96 Menski and Pearl (1998) draw upon cases of verbal nikah where the husband has pronounced a
unilateral talaq to explore the nature of the intervention of state law to regulate this area.
One effect might be that the couple are considered to be divorced in one jurisdiction but married
in another. The costs upon Muslim women are particularly high as men may use their powerful
position to make greater demands such as favourable financial settlements (See Hamilton 1995
Carroll 1997: 100; Badawi 1996:77).
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Thus, we are dealing with a complex formulation of Muslim divorce whereby
'legal discourse' is reconfigured in the private sphere. It is to this 'process' of
obtaining a divorce certificate to which we now turn, together with an analysis on
how each council creates new spaces in which marital disputes are resolved.
4.3 Modus Operandi: Shariah Councils "In Action"
Much of the existing literature on Shariah Councils fails to provide an insight into
how these bodies constitute as unofficial legal bodies within local Muslim
communities. It has been simply assumed that they operate in the private sphere of
family, home and local community with little analysis of potential conflicts within
the communities and their interaction with state law. Against this background, it is
noteworthy that we learn very little about the nature of their existence as conflict
resolution mechanisms. This omission is to be viewed as significant if we are
interested in understanding how they may embody a particular set of cultural
practices that may affect the autonomy of Muslim women and in so doing, confer
status and power within the communities in which they are located.
Drawing upon fieldwork data, this section investigates the establishment and
development of 4 Shariah Councils. By directing our focus to their approach to
dispute resolution we are also able to concentrate on the process of mediation and
reconciliation. We then explore their attitudes to the 'formalising' Muslim family
law in Britain, highlighting the initiatives developed by the Shariah Councils.
4.3.1 The 4 Shariah Councils
Before elaborating on each of the 4 Shariah Councils, it is useful to briefly explain
why they were chosen for fieldwork research. As discussed in chapter 2 the
research design in this study was largely influenced by access to respondents and
refusals to participate in the research. Hence the smaller Shariah Councils
approached in Bradford and Birmingham (often in local mosques) refused to
participate. The overriding reason given was that issues of divorce and marital
disputes are private and confidential and hence the religious scholars were not
prepared to jeopardise their credibility by the possibility of intimate facts being
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revealed in public and then obviously to a stranger. Accordingly consent was
withheld and the focus shifted to the larger Shariah Councils who each authorized
limited access.
4.3.2 The Muslim Law (Shariah) Council (MLSC), West London
The Muslim Law (Shariah) Council (MLSC) based in West London was
established in 1985. One of the first Shariah Councils to be formed in Britain, it
aims to resolve disputes faced by the Muslim community and to give 'legal'
opinion on various issues. According to its literature, it is also ". . . approached by
various non-Muslim institutions, organisations and individuals seeking expert
opinion according to Islamic law on current social, cultural, political and
academic issues". It comprises of 21 'ulama' each of which reflect the different
interpretations of Islam in order to represent the various schools of 'Fiqh' in
Britain. Dr. Zaki Badawi, one of its founding members explains that the aims of
the Shariah Council are, "to resolve problems confronting Muslims in the light of
the Qu'ran and Sunnah and according to the agreed principles of the Islamic
jurists" (1992:106). The Shariah Council operates from the premises of the
Muslim College in West London and is also affiliated to the Muslim Council of
Great Britain. The Muslim College has charitable status and pays its staff98
through donations. The Shariah Council is open between Monday-Thursdays
between 1 1-2pm.
4.3.3 The B'ham Muslim Family Support Service and Shariah Council (BSC)
The Birmingham Muslim Family Support Service and Shariah Council (BSC) are
both based at the Birmingham Central Mosque. The Shariah Council was set up
10 years ago to deal with the increased number of inquiries relating to issues of
marriage and divorce. It comprises of 5 scholars who meet every 3 months to
discuss cases, meet clients and issue divorce certificates. The mosque director, Dr.
Nasim acts as the head of the Shariah Council. The Marriage Counselling Service
was set up approximately 7 years ago in the hope of reconciling parties and all
applicants must first meet with Dr. Saeeda, a trained counsellor and her assistant
Saba, to explore the possibility of reconciliation. These sessions take place every
98 One secretary who also performs the administrative duties of the Muslim College.
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Tuesday between 2-4pm as a drop-in service and clients must attend these
meetings for a minimum of 4 weeks. Once Dr. Saeeda is satisfied that the
marriage is beyond reconciliation, the case-file is prepared and is put forward to
the Shariah Council. The service therefore operates on a two-tier basis with the
clear emphasis upon reconciliation. All those involved with the Counselling
Service and the Shariah Council work on a voluntary basis with expenses covered
from mosque donations.
4.3.4 The Islamic Shari'a Council (ISC), East London
From its offices in Leyton, East London 'The Islamic Shari'a Council' (ISC) is
one of the oldest and most established Shariah Councils in Britain. Since its
inception in 1982 and with a body of scholars drawn from ten different religious
organisations in Britain99 it deals with over 350 cases a year. It describes itself as
a 'quasi-Islamic' court applying Islamic rules and principles to resolve
matrimonial issues. The emphasis is not only upon the resolution of disputes but
also upon the active engagement with the Muslim community by "fostering and
encouraging the practice of the Muslim faith according to the Qu'ran and the
Sunnah" (1995:3). The two scholars, Maulana Abu Saeed and Dr. Suhaib Hasan,
offer a drop-in service twice a week. Maulana Abu Saeed works on Tuesdays
between 2-4pm and Dr. Suhaib Hasan works on Thursdays between 2-4pm. In
conjunction with Mr Mushtaq who works as the office secretary (on a voluntary
basis), they meet clients and prepare all case-files. After the initial meeting, the
scholars invite the clients to attend a series of reconciliation meetings. Once it is
agreed that the clients are unwilling to reconcile the case is referred to the Shariah
Council. Members of the Shariah Council meet at the Islamic Cultural Centre, at
Regents Park Mosque on the last Wednesday of each month.
These comprise London Central Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre, London; Muslim World
League, Matkazi Jamiat Ahl-e-hadith, UK; UK Islamic Mission; Dawatul Islam, UK; Jamia
Mosque and Islamic Centre, Birmingham, Islamic Centre, Glasgow, Islamic Centre, Manchester,
Jamia Masjid Hanauiya, Bradford and Muslim Welfare, London. For a complete outline on the
aims and objectives of the Council see, "The Islamic Shari'a Council of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland: An Introduction" (1992:3).
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4.3.5 The Shariah Court of the UK (SCUK), North London
The Shariah Court of the UK (SCUK) is based in Tottenham, North London. It
was set-up in 1992 and is headed by a group of local Imams who felt there were
no services available in the local area to advice Muslims on marital disputes from
an Islamic perspective. Situated within an industrial business complex, the
Council committee of one Imam, a Muslim solicitor and 3 male witnesses (from
the local mosque) meet with new and existing clients every week. All meetings
with clients are run on an appointment system and an average of 4 cases are
discussed at any one given session. The Council is open three days a week, from
Tuesday until Thursday between 1 1-2pm and the staff work on a voluntary basis.
4.4 A 'Common' Approach to Dispute Resolution
In this study, the scholars described themselves variously as a 'Registrar', 'Imam',
'Sheikh', 'Maulana' or 'Qadi'. In this context each term is in essence translated
into 'religious scholar' and the variation in usage depends upon what the scholars
feel comfortable with and, also their general reluctance to associate the councils
on par with official courts. Thus the term 'religious judge' was not used by any of
the religious scholars as it was deemed likely to confuse clients as to the legality
of their verdicts under English law. In fact the scholars were all keen to underline
the fact that their verdicts were not legally binding under English law but served
to uphold "the moral authority of the Muslim community" (Dr. Nasim, BSC). For
the purposes of this study, we use the term religious scholar as a general title so as
to avoid any confusion between the terms.
Notwithstanding the limitations of 'differential '°° to the Shariah Councils
under study, the fieldwork data collated provides an interesting insight into the
strategies, procedures and practices adopted by these bodies. This allows us to
gain a better understanding of how these bodies are constituted as dispute
resolution mechanisms within local communities. Perhaps it should not be
surprising that given the objectives of a Shariah Council that we find they adopt a
strikingly similar approach to resolving disputes. In general, differences only
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emerge in their approach to mediation and reconciliation and we address this in
section 4.6 in this chapter. The figure 4.1 below outlines the general approach to
dispute resolution. From a conceptual standpoint, we see a process that focuses on
collating evidence to determine the grounds for divorce coupled with attempts to
reconcile the parties. In effect, we see a constant effort to reconcile the parties and
the implementation of the administrative procedures serve to reinforce this
process. We turn now to analyzing the first three stages of this process-the initial
contact, the application and the investigation stage.
Figure 4.1	 Process of Obtaining a Divorce Certificate
Initial Contact -	 , Application Form
No Response Positive Response
Second Notice Sent	 Mediation and
Reconciliation
Investigation rocess
Shariah Council Meeting
Inform Applicant .4
	
Issue I Refuse
Divorce Certificate
4.4.1 Stage One: The Initial Contact
In this study, all the religious scholars were keen to emphasise that Muslim
women are neither coerced nor obliged to contact Shariah Councils to obtain a
Muslim divorce. Instead the emphasis rests upon the individual to contact a
100 See chapter 2.
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Shariah Council for help and assistance. Described as "community organisations"
that "act in good faith" while providing a service with "minimal charge and no
financial gain", (Sheikh Abdullah, SCUK) the religious scholars emphasized the
importance of these bodies in resolving marital disputes within the sphere of
family and Muslim community. Mohammed Raza, at the MLSC explained, "We
act in the best interests of Muslim women. . . they come to us for advice and with
guidance from Allah we help them as best we can". Most strikingly, this space is
conceptualised as "the duty upon Muslims to abide by the requirements of the
Shariah" (Badawi 1996:12) Indeed it is the interpretation of this term 'duty' that
transforms this process of dispute resolution for diasporic Muslims in Britain. For
Sheikh Abdullah, this duty becomes a greater "moral obligation" for Muslims
living in the West: "As Muslims, we have a duty to live according to the Qu'ran
and Sunnah even though we may have chosen to live in non Muslim countries. I
think it is incumbent upon us to live up to this responsibility because of the effect
of western influences upon our children and ourselves. It is easy to neglect our
duties in this secular environment". With the perceived weakening of the Muslim
community, the scholars were keen to identify Shariah Councils as key to
strengthening a sense of belonging for Muslims within local communities and as
part of the wider Muslim umma.
Data revealed that contact with the Shariah Councils had been made via
telephone, through letter correspondence and via scheduled and unscheduled
visits.' 0 ' All 4 Shariah Councils reported that in the majority of cases initial
contact had been made by telephone. The point of contact is important as it
reflects the first opportunity for the scholars to dissuade clients from pursuing a
divorce. It also illustrates a fundamental difference in approach between the
councils and this relates to whether the councils should meet with all clients in
person. For example, in contrast to the other councils, the MLSC accepted cases
via correspondence. where there was no face-to-face contact with the client.
Mohammed Raza at MILSC explained, "We get cases from all over the country
and we cannot realistically expect all our clients to visit us in London. This
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doesn't mean that we hand out divorces to anyone who requests one. We make
thorough checks and act in good faith".
This approach is, however, a source of contention for some Shariah Councils.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps 3 scholars argued that the presence of the client at the
Shariah Council meetings was crucial for a successful outcome to the dispute.
This was bore out by the statement of Maulana Abu Saeed at ISC, ". . . it baffles
me, how can you try and reconcile two parties when you have never met them?
No, for us its important to meet with our clients, to reason with them and make
sure they understand the consequences of their decisions." This approach also led
to criticism that it undermines the work of other Shariah Councils. Sheikh
Abdullah explained, "I do recognise the MLSC make thorough checks as best
they can but what we see happening is that if an applicant does not like our
decision they go off to another Shariah Council and if, for example, their presence
is not required this only makes it easier for them to do so". Conceding that choice
is necessary to accommodate the needs of all Muslims, he remained convinced
nevertheless that this approach undermines the work of other Shariah councils and
in so doing challenges the validity of a Muslim divorce certificate issued by a
Shariah Council who does not adopt this approach.
Returning to the initial contact made by female applicants, it is interesting to note
that each council reported a steady rise in the number of cases each year. The
figure 4.2 below illustrates this rise from the period December 2002 to January
2003.
'°' Each Shariah Council reported that they were prepared to meet with clients who made
unscheduled visits but they were reluctant to introduce a drop-in service due to time and fmancial
constraints.
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Unfortunately, precise figures are difficult to ascertain as records are not kept in
any systematic order and hence data presented does not permit accurate
measurement. Nevertheless, what we can discern from these figures are the
variances in the rise between the Councils. This, coupled with the fact that
Muslim women are evidently contacting Shariah Councils in ever-greater
numbers. What remains unexplained in these statistics is why they are choosing to
do so.
For the religious scholars, the powerful determinant for this rise centred on gender
relations with the understanding that Muslim women must be protected and
cherished within the Muslim family. This produced the paradoxical approach with
some scholars lamenting the decline in religious values symptomatic in the
renewed visibility of Muslim women in public and others advocating the
increased presence of Muslim women in the public spheres that allowed them to
instigate divorce in ever-greater numbers. Moreover, one of the most consistent
themes was how modern western societies had led to a situation of uncertainty
and doubt for all Muslims, with the effect of undermining the position of women
within Muslim family. Sheikh Abdullah (SCUK) explained, "In Islam we have
very clear principles on how Muslim women must be respected and protected as
wives, sisters and mothers. Women nurture the Muslim family and today we see
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these roles being undermined and destroyed with this emphasis on material
wealth. Twenty years ago we would not have had so many young women walk
away from their marriages as we see today". Sentiments such as these reflect the
meanings attached to the role of Muslim women within marriage. By contrast, Dr.
Nasim at BSC, welcomed the presence and renewed visibility of Muslim women
in "British life". For him, Shariah Councils had enabled Muslim women to
"challenge patriarchal cultural traditions and free themselves from unwanted
marriages". Likewise, Sheikh Abu Hassan blamed both parental pressures in
forcing women into unwanted marriages and Muslim men for "failing to
recognise change and moving with the times" as contributing to the rise in divorce
applications.
Clearly, the key findings we can draw upon here relate to the centrality of gender
relations in this process. In particular, the duties of Muslim women are juxtaposed
against their individual identities and visible presence in British society. We
discuss these issues in depth in the following chapter.
4.4.2 Stage Two: The Application
Once contact has been made, the next stage involves the client completing an
application form which details the grounds for divorce. Unfortunately, limited
access to case-files did not permit a comparative analysis of this process between
the Shariah Councils. Nevertheless where access was granted we are given an
insight into what the application form entails and are able to analyze the language,
style, and layout of the application form. (See Appendices 1 and 2)
It is clear that the application form represents a pivotal step in the process of
obtaining a divorce certificate. This is apparent from the marked reluctance of the
councils in issuing divorce certificates without detailed information from the
applicant outlining the reasons for the breakdown of marriage. In fact, the
'grounds for divorce' cited in the application form often provide the basis for the
type of divorce certificate to be issued to the applicant. There would appear,
therefore a concern that the evidence presented in this document is checked and
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verified accordingly. We discuss this in more depth in the following section of
this chapter.
Turning to the application process itself, according to Dr. Saeeda at BSC, it allows
the parties an opportunity to consider why the marriage has broken down and
more importantly raise the possibility of reconciliation. She explained, "Applying
for a divorce with us is not as straightforward as it may seem. We meet with the
applicant and their families, sometimes with the husband too.... Myself and Saba
take down the details and we ask them to fill out forms and provide concrete
evidence to back up their claims". It seems, therefore, a further opportunity to
reconcile the parties.
As for the application form itself, it is interesting to note how the Shariah
Councils have devised a form with a layout that draws parallels with official
documentation. For example with three of the councils (MLSC, ISC and BSC)'°2
the applicant is referred to as the 'Petitioner' and the application form is entitled
'The Petitioner's Submission'. The language in these documents works
rhetorically to ensure that the applicant understands the importance of the
proceedings. Sheikh Abdullah at SCUK explained, "We've attempted to develop a
process whereby the clients understand that you don't just get a Muslim divorce if
you want one. They have to understand the seriousness of divorce and this
process helps as they realize they have to provide evidence, that they need
documentation and.. .well just the process the way it works.. .they know its going
to be lengthy". Thus the application form is deliberately constructed in a way that
conveys the seriousness of the process.
Data analysis of 25 case-files at the MLSC highlight the centrality of the
application form. Aside from the general details of age, address and type of
marriage the form is structured around the grounds cited for divorce. It states:
102 By contrast, the SCUK do not provide application forms or any other forms of written
documentation. Instead the onus rests upon the applicants to attend scheduled meetings to discuss
the breakdown of marriage. In this instance access to case-files was refused but observation data
revealed that family members often accompanying clients' to meetings and are permitted to
contribute to all discussions. This is discussed in section 4.9 below.
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"Please outline a maximum of five grievances against your husband to be
considered as the main areas for your separation and request for an Islamic
divorce. You are requested to be precise and concise. Please bear in mind that
the Shariah Council may ask you to provide evidence to support your
submissions".
At first glance, we are given an insight into the factors contributing to the
breakdown of marriage and these include bigamy, violence, adultery, forced
marriage and family conflict. It is noteworthy that in 18 cases additional sheets of
paper are used to describe the events leading up to the marriage, reasons for
marriage breakdown and the applicant's current situation. On closer inspection we
can see how the grounds cited for divorce provide an insight into the experiences
of the women. Extracts from two cases below illustrate some of the reasons in
seeking a divorce cited in the application form:
Case A
1. My husband had previously had an Islamic marriage to somebody else but
only in an Islamic way. He never told me. When I found out I asked him
whether it was true and he lied and denied it but after getting proof he finally
admitted it which completely shook me altogether.
2. I later realised that he had married me because he was trying to get stay in this
country. I did not realise he did not have British nationality in fact later I
found out he was on a claim for political asylum.
3. After the birth of our child he began to act very strange and refused to register
the birth and state that the child was his. Which I have always taken as
doubting the child is his.
4. He is unreliable, a liar and a crook. He has hidden many things, which I have
later found out about. After separation a few friends have questioned him
about his behaviour but he has always denied it.
5. I do not want him to have any contact with the child as I am in fear of him and
fear that if contact were given he may try to harm the child in some way.
Case B
1. He is impotent.
2. He has been verbally and physically abusive towards me, since the day we
were living together.
3. He has subjected me to mental torture and made me cry every single day.
4. He intends to go to Pakistan and remarry without my consent.
5. He has threatened to kill me on several occasions.
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With each of these cases between 3-5 additional pages are attached with the
application form detailing each of the grounds for divorce. Clearly, then, the
applicant may use this opportunity to put forward their version of events.
Similarly, for the Shariah Councils the application form acts as an indicator for
the possibility of reconciling the parties. It therefore forms the basis of the
investigation process whereupon the scholar attempts "to disentangle fact from
fiction" (Dr. Nasim, BSC).
4.4.3 Stage Three: The Investigation
As discussed earlier, divorce under the Shariah is available to women, yet this is
neither the guaranteed nor the inexorable outcome. Once the application for
divorce is completed the process of investigation begins and it is this which
determines whether a divorce certificate can be issued and if so, the type of
divorce certificate to be issued.
The process begins with a set of documents sent to the applicant outlining the
procedures involved in obtaining a divorce certificate (See Appendix 1). This may
include information on a registration fee; a form requesting the agreement of the
applicant to abide by any decision; a letter of acknowledgement of the application
and finally, a request for certain basic information about the dispute 103 (see Shah-
Kazemi 2001:11). The BSC and ISC adopt a similar set of procedures with
variations on the fee charged to cover the administration costs. 104 The issue of cost
creates some consternation with applicants. But in the words of Dr. Saeeda, "we
have no choice but to make a small charge. We work as volunteers and in order
for the service to operate effectively we must ensure that our administrative costs
are covered". In contrast the SCUK are critical of any fmancial charge being
made as Sheikh Abdullah explained, ". . .it's haraam to make money out of other
people's misfortunes. If I'm in a position to help my fellow Muslim brothers and
sisters then it is my duty to do so". Although there does seem to be a difference in
approach here it is largely left unchallenged and, therefore seems insignificant to
the investigation process.
103 This may include copies of certain documents, for example marriage certificates and any civil
divorce proceedings documentation.
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4.4.4 What is 'Evidence'?
The main task of the investigation process is to verify the version of events put
forward by the applicant. Once the applicant submits the information requested on
the application form, the investigation process begins. This process seeks to
determine the background to marriage, the factors contributing to the breakdown
of marriage and the possibility of reconciliation. Although there seems to be no
foolproof means of verifying the evidence, it is generally assumed that the burden
of proof falls upon the applicant to prove the grounds for divorce cited in the
application form. Yet precisely how this works out in practice varies considerably
among the councils. For example, though each scholar was keen to point out that
the applicants' submissions are neither easily accepted and certainly not without
challenge the onus is actually placed upon the husband (See Appendix 2). Thus
of the sample, 2 Shariah Councils place the 'burden of proof' with the husband to
challenge and/or disprove the allegations put forward by the applicant.
Mohammed Raza at MLSC explains; "First.. .we will send a copy of the
woman's allegations to the husband. If he challenges those allegations then
definitely we will demand the applicant produce evidence to prove those
allegations. But if he accepts those allegations or he doesn't reply to our notices or
he ignores those allegations, then perhaps we will take the initial submissions of
the applicant as sufficient for our purpose".
The BSC and ISC follow a strikingly similar procedure but the SCUK deal with
this issue somewhat differently. Here, a joint meeting is arranged with the
applicant and her husband to compare and discuss the evidence presented by both
parties. The evidence is accepted as valid only once 3 male witnesses are able to
act as witnesses to authenticate it. In spite of this imbalance of power relations,
Sheikh Abdullah at SCUK is keen to present this process as "woman-friendly"
and "we abide by Islamic principles both as a moral duty and as a practical
necessity".
range from MLSC (t75), ISC £50, BSC (6O) and SCUK (no charge).
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Where access to case files was permitted we are given an insight into this process.
At MLSC, the process of gathering evidence centres on a number of notices being
sent to the husband. The first notice includes three requests for the husband to:
(1)	 Make every possible effort towards reconciliation urgently through your
own resources;
(ii) To grant your wife a proper Islamic divorce;
(iii) Contact us immediately, through written correspondence only to present
your own side of the case showing reasons why you should not divorce
your wife.
If the husband fails to respond to this notice a second notice is sent which states:
'Please note that if these circumstances remain unchanged and you do not respond
to the laws of the Shariah, the members of the Council comprising eminent
scholars, Imams and Muslim barristers representing various Schools of Muslim
law (Fiqh) in Britain may consider issuing a document with the effect of
pronouncing your Nikah dissolved (Tanseakh) on the basis of grounds valid in the
divorce laws of lisma. We trust as a Muslim brother you will co-operate with us
in resolving this dispute".
A final divorce notice is sent if there is no response from the husband. The
registrar, Mohammed Raa explains, "what happens after issuing that notice is
almost different in every case. There are cases where after receiving this notice
husbands act realistically they agree to a divorce or they issue a divorce. Or they
can just ignore our letters they don't think that we are an adequately constituted
authority so they just throw our letters into the bin. Or they can put their defence
to us and challenge all the allegations submitted by the wife in her application. So
it's a lengthy, a very sophisticated and complicated process where each case is
different from the other."
Analysis of 25 MLSC case-files revealed that in 17 cases, 2 notices were sent out
to the husband and in 8 cases a total of 3 notices had been sent. There were a total
of 19 responses from the applicant's husband and most of these challenged the
grounds for divorce. But it is interesting to note that in 20 cases, rather than
produce any 'evidence' with which to challenge the grounds for divorce cited by
the applicant, the husband requests some form of mediation in the hope
reconciling. Yet in all cases the basis for reconciliation is often tempered with
uncompromising sentiments. For example, in one case the husband states, "I am
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prepared to reconcile with my wife and forgive her for what she has put me and
my family through. But she must change her behaviour, she is selfish and
unreasonable and puts her needs first without any regard for the rest of us".
4.4.5 The 'Grounds' for Divorce
The issue of what constitutes as 'evidence' is administered to identify and verify
the grounds for divorce. At the same time this process raises questions on the
relationship between Islamic law and rules of evidence (see Nasir 1990). Though
beyond the remit of this study, we can consider the extent to which Shariah
Councils draw upon these principles.
Thus an important part of the investigation process involves clarifying the reasons
for the breakdown of marriage and establishing the grounds for divorce. Not only
does this determine whether a divorce certificate can be issued but it also acts as a
pretext to the possibility of reconciling the parties.
As discussed earlier, there are 4 ways in which a nikah contract can be dissolved
without the intervention of the husband. The one most commonly used by the 4
Shariah Councils is known as the khula. As discussed earlier, here the wife is
able to instigate divorce in return for a sum of payment to her husband, which
usually involves the return of the mahr. In doing so she forfeits her right to any
form of maintenance. The other types of divorce that are instigated by women are
mubara'ah, where the marriage has not been consummated due to the fault of the
husband and, where both parties agree to dissolve the marriage. And finally the
faskh or tanseekh where the nikah contract may stipulate the right of the woman
to divorce her husband but this must involve the intervention of the religious
scholar. Of course, there will inevitably be different interpretations as to the rules
governing divorce by the religious scholars and this can undoubtedly lead to
confusion for the female applicants. We discuss this in the following chapter.
Here we are particularly interested in analysing how the Shariah Councils
establish what constitutes as evidence and the decision-making process of the
religious scholar in issuing the different types of divorce certificates. The
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evidence is collated at every point of the dispute resolution process from the
application stage to the investigation stage, the mediation sessions and finally the
Shariah Council sessions.
Case-file analysis with two Shariah Councils reveals that the grounds for divorce
certificate are varied. At the ISC, a divorce can be issued on the grounds:
1. If the husband suffers certain physical defects, which are well known in the
Sharia and are considered to be legal grounds for nullification of the marriage.
2. When the husband accuses the wife of unchastity. In such a case, the process
of "Li'aan" is to be applied (see Surah Al-Nur).
3. When the husband is missing.
4. When the wife embraces Islam but the husband refuses to do so.
5. When the husband ill-treats the wife or fails to perform his marital obligations
or does not maintain her inspite of having the means to do so.
6. When the husband does not or refuses to comply with the judge's order to
divorce his wife for one of the reasons mentioned.
With the SCUK, the following grounds form the basis for divorce:
1. If the husband causes direct harm to her i.e. bodily damage, leaving wounds &
bruises or physical humiliation
2. If the husband causes indirect harm to her i.e. not providing food, shelter and
clothing or oppressing/harming her children or he becomes a faajir i.e
homosexual, alcoholic etc.
3. If she hates him and cannot tolerate him anymore even if he is good towards
her. This will cause harm to her as she will become sinful by not fulfilling her
duties towards her husband.
These grounds include the caveat, "NB: As for the first and second grounds, the
husband is not entitled to the jewellery or any dowry that has been paid and he is
liable to pay the dowry or remainder of it if it has not been paid in full. As for the
third ground, the husband is entitled to the jewellery and mahr that has been paid".
Despite the subtle differences in the grounds for obtaining a divorce, it becomes
clear that each Shariah Council draws upon 5 key factors to determine the
outcome of obtaining a divorce certificate and these include: the validity of
marriage; physical and/or emotional abuse; wider familial conflict; possibility of
reconciliation and, other factors (for example desertion/impotence). Observation
research and/or case-file analysis with all the Shariah Councils reveals that in
most instances, the marriage is dissolved according to the principle of khula.
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In terms of the material evidence collated to verify the grounds of divorce
(including documentary evidence and witnesses), we can see how this process
entails contested meanings while being deeply intertwined with the power of the
religious scholar to disregard any 'unreliable evidence'. Drawing upon case-file
analysis we now briefly outline some of the types of evidence religious scholars
accept.
4.4.6 The Validity of Marriage
The religious scholars all reported concerns on the rise of forced marriage as one
of the primary reasons for women seeking dissolution of marriage. Hence one of
the most important grounds for divorce centres on the validity of marriage. Aside
from understanding why the client had chosen to marry, the scholars were keen to
explore whether the marriage was valid according to Islamic law. Dr. Nasim at
BSC, explained, "In Islam we have very clear guidelines of when a marriage is a
valid marriage. Unfortunately we see all too many cases of young women and
men being forced into marriage in the name of Islam. This is not only morally
wrong but also Un-Islamic. Parents would do well to remember that there is no
compulsion in Islam". While these sentiments were shared by other religious
scholars case-file analysis reveals, that the issue of forced marriage is not directly
addressed by all the religious scholars in the process of collecting evidence. At
this stage it is interesting to note that references to forced marriage are mostly
referred to as 'alleged' in case-files. In interview Sheikh Abdullah at SCUK
explains, "We have no way of verifying that the marriage was forced. We accept
that some marriages are forced. . .but remember some women agree to the
marriage but then change their minds and then claim they had been forced into
marriage. Our duty is deal with the issue as we see it". However ISC have
attempted to deal with this problem and have passed a resolution on what
constitutes as a forced marriage (See Appendix 2).
Instead the focus moves to the marriage itself, for example where it took place.
Thus each applicant is asked to produce documentary evidence in the form of a
nikah certificate and/or civil registration certificate. If for some reason they are
unable to provide this evidence, they are asked to provide an affidavit to
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authenticate that the marriage did take place (See Appendix 3). If the marriage has
not been registered and the applicant does not have a copy of the nikah certificate,
videos and photographs of the wedding are required to prove that the marriage did
indeed take place. This practice demonstrates the conscious attempt by the
Shariah Councils to develop practical solutions to problems as they may arise and
also highlights interaction with state law, an issue we return to later in this
chapter.
4.4.7 Physical and! or Emotional Abuse
Another ground for divorce is physical and emotional abuse and again the Shariah
Councils require documented evidence to verify the allegations. Here case-file
analysis reveals that in cases of domestic violence police reports, court injunctions
and family court orders restricting access to children, are required to prove that
the abuse has taken place.
4.4.8 Wider Familial Conflict
A common complaint by the women in the case-files is cited as 'family
interference' and this can be summed by one client who states, "his family made
everything much worse they always interfered telling him what to do and how to
do things.. ..is this allowed in Islam?" Another letter stated that the reason for
pursuing a divorce was "constant taunting relating to not being a proper Muslim
wife". The clients are not expected to produce evidence to verify these allegations
but these claims are challenged during the mediation sessions and the religious
scholars all explained that often they requested the presence of family members to
"explain their behaviour".
4.4.9 Possibility of Reconciliation
The fact that mediation and reconciliation shape the process of dispute resolution
within Shariah Councils means that if either of the parties is willing to reconcile at
any point of the process the divorce application will not proceed. This is discussed
in the following section of the chapter.
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It is clear that the process of collecting evidence can be eclectic as well as
complex. This is encapsulated by the assumptions of the religious scholars who
have the power to accept and/or reject what constitutes as evidence.
Simultaneously, the onus upon the applicant to produce documentation can result
in lengthy delays. Again this process raises the question of a possible of conflicts
of law scenario with English law. Such an analysis is beyond the remit of this
study, but case-file analysis did reveal that the religious scholars were keen to
avoid any contact with state law in relation to the collection of evidence. For
example in one case a husband had followed his wife's whereabouts and taken
pictures of a man entering her house. He had brought these to the Shariah Council
claiming that she was lying in her application form and had in fact been
committing adultery. However the Shariah Council refused to accept this as
evidence on the grounds that if they did accept it there could be possible legal
implications if the wife reported this to the Police. In a letter to the husband they
are keen to point out that they do believe his version of events "but unfortunately
the law of this country prevents us from taking any action". The nature of what
this action might be is not expressed. A second fmding relates to the fact that a
conflict over evidence arises and cannot be resolved, the scholars choose to
dissolve the marriage and the grant the female applicant the khul.
4.4.10 Case-file Analysis: The Case of X
A better illustration of the process of obtaining a divorce certificate is found with
an in-depth analysis of one case-file. In this case X, a 27-year old British Pakistani
woman contacts the MLSC to obtain a Muslim divorce. The applicant signs a
copy of the 'letter of authority and acceptance'. In her application she states that
she had been forced into marriage with a distant relative. Both parties are British
citizens and have been residing in Manchester. The marriage was not registered
according to civil law but a religious ceremony had taken place (the reasons for
this are not given) and the marriage was subsequently consummated. The
marriage has lasted for two and a half years and the couple have been 'separated'
for 4 months prior to the application of a Muslim divorce.
In the application form the reasons for the breakdown of marriage are given as:
1. deception he lied about his qualifications and age.
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2. consumption of alcohol.
3. gambling led to debts.
4. cannot financially support his wife.
On receipt of the application, a letter dated 29/01/02 is sent to the petitioner. It
states:
Dear Sister
Assalamu Alaykum
We acknowledge the receipt of your application form for an Islamic
divorce. However we note that despite our clear guidelines that were
sent to you with the application form, you have not sent a copy of
your Islamic marriage certificate.
We request that you send this document to us immediately otherwise
your case will be delayed. If you are not in possession of your Islamic
marriage certificate, then please complete the enclosed declaration
form and go to the solicitor or oath commissioner where you can
counter sign the declaration. Once this completed declaration has
been received by us, we will initiate the proceedings for an Islamic
divorce.
A week later the petitioner sends a copy of the marriage certificate to the council.
A note dated 4/02/0 1 states, "divorce notice to be sent to Y". (Each time a divorce
notice is sent to applicant's husband a short note is made in the case-file. Over a
period of 8 weeks 3 divorce notices are sent).
No further action is taken on the case and the next piece of correspondence
involves a letter sent by the petitioner querying the delay:
Dear Mr Raza
I had lodged an application to your organisation since 22/05/0 1 for an
Islamic divorce. I was advised it takes about 6 months. Unfortunately
I have so far not heard from your Council. Can you please update me
on the proceedings?
Yours sincerely
There is no response to this letter, however a few days later, a note in the case-file
states that the petitioner has again contacted the council by telephone. Though we
are not informed of the contents of the telephone conversation a note states, "have
informed client that Mr. Raza will call". A further note dated a few days later
states that Mr Raza has telephoned 'the petitioner' to explain that the delay has
been caused by her husband failing to contact the Shariah Council to put forward
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his version of events. In interview, Mohammed Raza elaborates on this point
further, "You see delays do occur and clients do get upset or think that we're not
doing enough.. .but we must try and get the husband's version of events. In Islam
evidence is only accepted if it is thoroughly checked and verified. We're not in
the business of handing out divorces to anyone who wants one".
There is no further contact until the council is satisfied that enough time has been
given for the husband's response. Precisely 2 months later, the petitioner is sent a
letter dated 16/05/02 whereupon the council have come to a decision:
Dear Sister
Assalamu Alaykum,
Your case has now been discussed by the members of the Shariah
Council and in the light of the fact that your husband has refused to
contact us we have decided to issue you with a divorce certificate.
A copy of this letter is sent to her husband and this propels him to contact the
Shariah Council. He writes to the council a few days later stating that he will be in
touch shortly with "details presenting my side of the case". He is angry and upset
that the Shariah Council have issued the divorce certificate and claims "this is an
injustice and against Islamic law".
The Shariah Council responds with writing to the applicant and informing her that
the divorce certificate has consequently been suspended. The letter states, "the
Council will reconsider and investigate some of the matters raised by Mr S in this
respect and then to deliberate over this case." The scholars are obliged to take this
'evidence' into account. But at the same time the applicant writes to the council to
express her shock and dismay at the suspension of the certificate. She explains,
My husband has no intention of reconciling and no intention of
putting forward his version of events. He is merely making my life
more difficult. I want a divorce and he's trying to stop it from
happening for no reason but to make things even worse.
The case-file contains a letter dated two weeks later from the applicant's husband
in which he refutes all the grounds for divorce but does not provide any
'evidence' to verify his claims. Instead he writes, "X is the one acting
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unreasonably, she has refused all offers of family mediation and has kept all the
money given by my family".
There are no other documents in the case-file apart from a brief note, dated two
months later which states that a divorce certificate was eventually granted after
the applicant had agreed to return the dower.
This analysis of one case-file at the MLSC provides an insight into the process of
obtaining a divorce certificate for the female applicant. Despite the potential
difficulties in obtaining a divorce certificate we see the ways in which the
applicant engages with this process. Moreover this analysis suggests that often the
motivations of the husband are to delay the process and prevent the divorce
certificate from being issued. Consequently the councils issue a khula certificate
which means that the applicant must give up her right of mahr. This is discussed
in more depth in the following chapter.
4.5 Mediation: Aiming to Reconcile the Parties
The investigation stage is accompanied with attempts to reconcile the parties. We
turn now to consider how mediation and reconciliation form a central plank in the
process of unofficial dispute resolution. In marital disputes, the link between
individual responsibility and state intervention raises questions on the role of
unofficial dispute mechanisms providing advice and assistance to the specific
needs of minority ethnic groups. Several scholars have identified the spheres of
official and unofficial mediation as fixed, distinct and separate (Menski 1999,
Yilmaz 2001, Shah-Kazemi 2001). Drawing upon her findings, Shah-Kazemi
observes, "while the MLSC performs a mediation function through the maimer in
which they intervene in marital and intra-family disputes, they do not often
mediate in matters that are now becoming more formally associated with
mediation in England, as the organisation has a deliberate policy of not conflicting
with civil law mechanisms..." (2001:55). Yet, this approach obscures the social
relations upon which official and unofficial mediation are based and we learn very
little of the dialectical relationship between the two. As Santos points out, at some
level this dichotomy between state and non-state dispute resolution is blurred and
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ultimately misleading (1987:35). In this sense, the 'emerging' relationship
between private mediation practices and the move towards official mediation (as
espoused by the Family Law Act 1996) reveals a more insidious, complex
relationship than such literature seems to suggest. The inter-relationship between
the two cannot be perceived as merely partial and incidental. If so, we risk
missing the meaning attached to such processes by female users of unofficial
dispute resolution mechanisms. This does not, however, mean we seek to establish
a definitive link between the two approaches but merely to draw upon fieldwork
data and illustrate the ways in which the two approaches find common ground and
to explore this linkage between private and public spheres. With this critique we
can, for example, examine the ways in which unofficial forms of mediation may
facilitate official dispute resolution processes.
If we recognise this move towards private ordering and community mediation, we
must question the implications of this for female users of Shariah Councils.
According to Poulter (1995) Muslim women may be forced to participate in such
methods of conciliation due to family pressure and concerns about damage to the
'family honour'. A result of this can be the detrimental effect upon their rights
under state law and a loss of autonomy within the family and community.
Viewing Shariah Councils as patriarchal and 'conservative' in nature, that serve to
maintain the existing unequal power relations within the family and community,
Poulter (1998) remains sceptical of their ability to deliberate on family law issues.
Paradoxically he argues that if these bodies were to be formalised and given state
funding this would allow state accountability and protection for those women
compelled to participate in such processes and under this proposal the "full
panoply of the remedies of the English legal system would still be available"
(1995:86). In this context, English law would remain the preferred method of
dispute resolution and Shariah Councils operate merely as a "facility for those
who feel that the English courts are not responsive enough to their religious or
cultural needs" (1995:86). Other scholars, however, reject the intervention of state
law to define the terrain under which Muslim family law must operate. Within
such a conceptual framework, the subordination and exclusion of plural legal
practices assures state law control and dominance (Menski 1998, Yilmaz 2001).
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Yet it is precisely this dichotomous approach that inevitably utilizes the primacy
of one approach as opposed to the other and subsequently, fails to problematize
the very grounds upon which these arguments are based. More precisely still, they
fail to explore the active engagement of women in developing strategies,
negotiations and interrogating spaces that challenge the hegemonic power
inherent within both official and unofficial law. These spaces can act as sites of
resistance, struggle and change.
4.5.1 Mediation in Islam
Given this critique on the limitations of the dichotomous approach, we now draw
upon observation fieldwork to interrogate the practice of mediation and
reconciliation in Shariah Councils. Before doing so, however, it is useful to
briefly locate the importance of mediation and reconciliation within Islamic
thought.
In Islam the concept of reconciliation is grounded in the two most important
Islamic sources, the Qu'ran and the Hadith.'°5 Both of these sources are
instrumental in shaping the model of dispute resolution, from an Islamic
perspective.
In verse 4:39 the Qu'ran states:
"if you fear a breach
Between them twain (husband and wife)
Appoint arbiters
One from his family
And the other from hers
If they wish for peace,
Allah will bring about
Their reconciliation:
For Allah hath full knowledge
And is acquainted
With all things"
And verse 4:31 states:
"Allah doth command you
To render back your Trusts
To those to whom they are due;
known as the Sunnah
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And when ye judge
Between man and man,
That ye judge with justice:
Verily how excellent
Is the teaching which He giveth you!
For Allah is He who heareth
And see all things"
The process of dispute resolution is also based on the principle of tahki,n which
serves to maintain 'social order' in Muslim societies. As Rosen points out, "in the
Qu'ran the image is constantly invoked of mediation and interstitial relationships
as most appropriate to handling disputes (2000:183). Indeed the Prophet is
deemed the first mediator in Islam and set the precedent for resolving disputes via
dialogue and conimunication. And, as Rosen points out this approach serves to
maintain and enhance social order and control in Muslim societies- the
preservation of society against chaos (fitna).
In terms of diasporic Muslim communities there is some dispute on the
appointment of mediators and the legitimacy of their verdicts. For some scholars a
mediator should comprise only of a Qadi (religious scholar) who is trained to
provide Muslims with religious and spiritual guidance but for others all members
of the local Muslim community have a right to intervene in the hope of
reconciling the parties and, usually applying to family members. There is also
disagreement among Muslim jurists about the extent of the mediator's authority.
The Hanafi and Shafi'i schools are of the opinion that mediators have no authority
to issue a binding verdict. Their role is merely to recommend a solution
whereupon the spouses have the right to either accept or reject it. But other jurists
argue that qadi's have full authority both in respect of reconciliation and the
annulment of the marriage (see Esposito 1995).
It appears then that the resolution of marital disputes in Islam becomes
paramount. We come to understand this process as an obligation upon Muslims to
seek some form of arbitration in the guise of family or community
mediation/reconciliation. The tone of this discussion and the verses in the Qu'ran
reflects the importance attached to individual and collective responsibility and it is
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important to note that this process cannot be understood merely as an alternative
to the adversarial approach. It is important, therefore, to be aware of the religious
principles that underpin the nature of mediation and reconciliation within Shariah
Councils in Britain. Most scholars agree that according to the Shariah, every
Muslim community however small its size, must be regulated, as far as possible,
by Islamic legal norms, appropriately interpreted and applied by the most
knowledgeable scholars residing in the community. Moreover and perhaps more
importantly is the way in which such religious norms are interpreted in Shariah
Councils in order to create the conditions upon which the discourses of power are
structured.
4.5.2 Islam and Custody of Children
Interviews with the religious scholars Shariah Councils all reported that they do
not deliberate on issues of access and custody to children. However, observation
research did point to informal negotiations taking place at this space and this
raises wider concerns regarding the enforcement of Muslim legal norms that may
be antithetical to the rights of women enshrined in English family law. It is useful
therefore to briefly outline the issue of custody in Islam prior to analysis of
observation research.
The issue of custody in Islam is contentious precisely because it is not addressed
in the Qu'ran and is based upon two sayings of the Prophet found in the Hadith
literature. The first relates to a woman complaining to the Prophet that after
divorce her ex-husband wished to remove her child, upon hearing this the Prophet
commented: 'You have the first right of the child as long as you do not marry'.
The second saying again relates to a woman complaining that her ex-husband
wishes to take her only child away from her. On this occasion the Prophet is
reported to have said: 'Child, here is your father and here is your mother; make a
choice between the two as to whom you prefer" (quoted in Goolam 2001:186).
Yet all 4 Sunni schools of thought, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali rule that
where possible the mother has prior claim to the custody of the child (see
Engineer 1995).
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There are two ways to characterize this process. On the one hand all conflict with
the English law is avoided if the Maliki approach is adopted which does not
involve the automatic transfer of the child at any age to their father and thus
complies with si 1 of the Family Law Act 1996 with its emphasis on the best
interests of the child. Mufti Kadir a panel member at the at ISC states "Family
courts in the UK and the West in general are broadly in conformation with Islamic
Law of custody, especially the Maliki school of thought. The current priorities of
English law centre on the needs of children and so does Islamic Sharia. Other
perspectives reported earlier, reflect the social trend of the time. For Islamic
Sharia courts choosing from the Maliki perspective is not strange especially if it
reflects current social policy trends. Islamic Shariah councils have little control
over custodial orders. But they have a balancing act to perform when matters are
in Shariah Courts". On the other hand the 1996 Family Law Act with its emphasis
upon mediation may actually encourage settlements regarding access to children
to take place in the 'shadow of the law', a space occupied by Shariah Councils.
We explore these concerns in section below.
4.5.3 The Mediation Process
For all the Shariah Councils, the mediation process is principally an investigation
into the possibility of reconciling the parties. It is by no means an uncomplicated
process and gives rise to an interesting set of cultural and religious practices,
overlapping and, at times in conflict. What becomes clear is the centrality of
gender relations that frame the terms of the discussion upon which the basis for
reconciliation is sought. These 'common understandings' regarding the position
and representation of Muslim women are critical to the outcome of dispute
resolution.
Interviews with religious scholars revealed the importance attached to reconciling
the parties. In this context, reconciliation is understood both as a moral duty (to
preserve the sanctity of the Muslim family) and a religious obligation (a divorce
cannot be pronounced without reconciliation). Mohammed Raza, at MLSC,
explained "We do not just distribute divorces on a footpath.. .we are not
encouraging divorce that's not our role. When a woman rings here to fmd out
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about divorce or to request an application form, we are initially reluctant to issue a
divorce application. We ask her that you should try to rethink your position
because divorce is something that is considered a stigma in society and divorce is
nothing good for you and if they have children that will be another problem after
divorce so we discourage it".
Unsurprisingly perhaps, despite the intervention of religious scholars, divorce
remains the most likely outcome. The scholars were aware of this fact and
explained that their intention was not to stop this outcome, but instead to provide
a 'space' at Shariah Councils where the couple could be reminded of their
"Islamic duties as husband and wife" (Dr Hasan) and an opportunity "to discuss
personal matters from an Islamic perspective with the guidance from learned
Muslim scholars"(Maulana Abu Saeed). Within this framework women are
encouraged to engage and participate in the process of mediation and
reconciliation. Of course, this process is not a simple one and the religious vision
based on the Muslim ideal of marriage and family is neither uncontested nor
unchallenged. Moreover, it is subject to local redefmition and interpretation of
Muslim family law, within the framework of the particular Shariah Council.
4.5.4 How does Unofficial Mediation work?
It is not difficult to identify key generic traits in the mediation process with the
councils under study. There are two key approaches that are distinguishable at the
point of intervention. With the exception of one Shariah Council, the clients must
meet with the religious scholar on a regular basis to discuss reasons for
breakdown of marriage and in doing so the scholars collate evidence to support
the application for divorce. It is during this process that reconciliation is explored
with the applicant. If the client makes a more formal request for mediation, then a
separate process begins involving the applicant, the husband and both of their
family members. If, however, the applicant refuses to participate in mediation and
if it has been unsuccessful during the investigation stage, then the process for
obtaining a divorce certificate takes earnest. With the second approach, all
applicants must first attend a counselling service prior to the case being discussed
by the Shariah Council. Yet what unifies both approaches is the insistence upon
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reconciliation based upon Islamic values. Distancing themselves, however, from
the perils of forced reconciliation, each Shariah Council is keen to promote the
willing participation of female applicants. Yet as discussed in chapter 1 the power
relations aligned within Shariah Councils may in effect regulate, supervise,
observe and confine the behaviour of women, dictating acceptable patterns of
behaviour and particular outcomes (Foucault 1970).
Given the 'observed' general similarities in approach, the differences relate to the
subtleties in the practice of mediation. Here, the powerful role of the mediator in
constructing ideologies and the intervention of family members are two key
features that require closer analysis.
4.5.5 The 'qadi' as unofficial Mediator
The qadi or religious scholar seems to occupy a somewhat ambiguous position
between reconciling the parties and facilitating the successful outcome of the
divorce application. Overall this can perhaps be characterized by the expectations
of multiple parties including the applicant, their families and the scholars
themselves. Yet it is between these multiplicities that we can obtain a more valid
picture of what is 'actually' emerging. At a cursory glance, the key question
which emerges is the reciprocal interactions between the two approaches: to what
extent are both processes overlapping, intermeshed and interconnected?
As discussed in chapter 1, official mediation is predicated on the decision-making
capacity of the individual. The crucial point here is that the parties themselves
retain authority and responsibility for reaching and making their own decisions
(Roberts 1997:2). In this context, mediation is clearly differentiated from
conciliation services as it provides the conditions upon which negotiations are
based in the context of family breakdown. It embodies third party intervention but
the authority of all the decisions remain with the parties themselves. McCroy
(1981:56) outlines four characteristics of mediation:
• the impartiality of the mediator;
• the voluntariness of the process (because the mediator has no power to
impose a settlement);
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• the confidentiality of the relationship between the mediator and the
parties;
• the procedural flexibility available to the mediator.
The legal context of mediation can be described as partial and confusing. At
present, mediation remains outside the legal context though remains officially part
of 'legal policy' as espoused by the Family Law Act 1996. There seems, however,
to be a concerted move away from the dispute resolution in the legal arena and
towards alternative dispute resolution processes.'° 6 For example, it is generally
accepted that there has been a move towards privately negotiated settlements
regarding arrangements for children (Davis et al., 1993). Hence, though not yet
enshrined in English law, mediation has taken on a greater focus and couples are
encouraged to pursue mediation.
Unofficial mediators, in this case religious scholars at Shariah Councils can be
distinguished from official mediators in a number of ways. The most obvious
distinction is the standpoint of the mediator. Here, the approach to mediation is
constructed within an Islamic framework whereupon all negotiations are based
upon divine revelation and drawing upon Islamic social and legal principles, as
briefly discussed above. Secondly, these mediators are often senior members of
the local Muslim community and therefore claim an insight into familial conflicts
based upon local knowledge and experience. 107 And finally unofficial mediators
work on a voluntary basis to ensure their autonomy and independence from state
intervention. Of course, this also has the effect of avoiding state accountability
and we address this later in the chapter (See also Poulter 1998). This raises the
question of the extent to which this form of mediation falls into the category of
community mediation as discussed in chapter 1. To what extent does the state
encourage communities to intervene and resolve disputes?
106 The main body which regulates the role of solicitors using mediation is the Solicitors Family
Law Association. The SFLA have a code of conduct, which solicitors have to apply- basically
their area set of guidelines of when mediation is or is not advocated.
107 In this way a number of scholars reported they were able to mediate between parents and
young women who were being forced into marriage and prevent such marriages.
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4.6 The Mediation and Reconciliation Sessions
When taking a more nuanced approach, we can shift our analytical focus to two
identifiable features in the mediation sessions- the role of the unofficial mediator
and the nature of family intervention.
The underlying difference in approach between the four Shariah Councils is the
point at which intervention to reconcile the parties, takes place. More than this,
the fact that it is compulsory at BSC for all clients to attend reconciliation sessions
clearly reflects the centrality of mediation to some Shariah Councils as opposed to
others. Dr. Nasim, Director of BSC, explains, "we must abide by the Sharia and
we must ensure that all clients understand what divorce means. There maybe
difficulties in the marriage but divorce is not an easy option. We work within the
guidelines of Islam. . . we're a religious body and clients are aware of this when
they come to us." He goes onto justify his approach based on "a large number of
clients who want to resolve their differences.. .coming from an Islamic
perspective". This is a view shared by scholars at the other Shariah councils.
Moreover, this commitment to intervention gives the shape and form to the
framework upon which the dispute resolution is based. The question however
which lies behind this, concerns the extent to which women maybe compelled to
use these bodies. Much of the debate on Muslim family law and 'alternative
dispute resolution' (Shah-Kazemi 2001, Yilmaz 2002) has not developed
satisfactory explanations on gender relations and power on the one hand and that
the empirical reality of women's connections to these bodies, may be very
complex, contested and subject to the contingent local variations in the Councils.
While the potential for mediation and reconciliation bodies emerging within local
communities has been extensively explored in literature on dispute resolution (see
Abel 1979, Woodman 1998, Santos 1992, Fitzpatrick 1996) there has been little
analysis on the growth of religious bodies developing these services within the
private space(s). In fact the growth of typologies that allocate individuals within a
theoretical space presupposes the categories of 'sameness and difference'
(Anthias 2002:283) and fails to ignore the dynamics of power by which
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individuals from one social group may exclude others. Drawing upon Foucault's
analysis of power and the empirical data collected in this study, we can now
explore how the exercise of different forms of power and power relations within
these frameworks of unofficial dispute resolution, may affect the decision-making
capacities of some female users.
Clearly in this situation, the unofficial mediator is in an all-too-powerful position
to coerce the client into reconciling, making the potential consequences for
women particularly disastrous. This argument appears to make a great deal of
sense, particularly if there is little or no screening process to determine which
cases are suitable for mediation. The Family Law Act 1996 contains provisions to
ensure mediation only takes place in the interests of both parties with no risk of
violence or threats of violence to either of the parties involved. Section 1 (d)
states that, "any risk to one of the parties to a marriage, and to any children, of
violence from the other party should, so far as reasonably practicable, be removed
or diminished". This view is further given expression in the Code of Practice of
the UK College of Family Mediators 1998 (see Diduck and Kaganas 2000:351-
3 52).
We clearly need to draw upon empirical research in order to scrutinize this
process of dispute resolution. One practical technique here is to turn the 'gaze'
onto the religious and cultural practices characterized within these bodies.
4.6.1 The B'ham Muslim Family Support Service and Shariah Council (BSC)
The Marriage Counselling Service at BSC, forms the cornerstone of the dispute
resolution process. As discussed earlier, all applicants must attend the counselling
service prior to a meeting with the Shariah Council. The task of dealing with all
inquiries, preparing case-files and providing counselling sessions falls upon Dr.
Saeeda and her assistant Saba Malik.
4.6.2 The 1st Stage: Counselling Sessions
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Observation of 6 'counselling' sessions'°8
 reveals both the established process of
dispute resolution and the dynamics involved in the decision-making process.
While our focus is primarily on the cultural and religious norms that underpin
these processes in particular, we explore how these processes interact with female
users of the Council.
On average, each applicant must attend 3 counselling sessions before the case-file
is sent to the Shariah Council. In other words, the role of the counsellor is pivotal
to the outcome of the case. In interview, Dr. Saeeda outlines the principles upon
which her distinctive approach is based, "As a Muslim woman I am aware of the
need to approach reconciliation with caution. In fact the only time we don't
consider reconciliation is when the woman is facing violence and we get a lot of
cases where women tell me their husbands physically abuse them. It's not
tolerated under English law and its certainly not tolerated under Islam". This does
not mean she ignores the women who wish to reconcile with violent spouses but
observation research reveals how she intuitively uses her position to dissuade any
attempts to reconcile.
Her approach can be described as an attempt to disentangle cultural values from
religious principles. For example, she equates forced marriage, emotional and
physical abuse and family dominance to be synonymous with cultural practices
that in turn confers male authority and legitimation. Women are told that
husbands "are unlikely to change their ways" and they are encouraged to report all
incidences of violence and abuse to official bodies such as the police. At the same
time Islam is presented as an empowering tool for women with its emphasis on
autonomy, choice and consent. Islam is defmed as being based on divine will and
a supreme being who creates a complex but totally logic world for all believers.
Thus, the way in which she speaks to the women reveals a great deal about the
operation of power relations. Her language is one of empowerment as the
following extracts from observation research of counselling sessions demonstrate:
108 This involved a total of 26 cases.
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You must not submit to your parents wishes. It is your life and not theirs,
Islam does not compel you to marry someone against your wishes.
If he wants to re-marry let him take responsibility for the divorce. Allah
knows he is the one who is sinning so let him be punished for this
Women should remember there is no compulsion in Islam. Allah knows
best.
Her approach is based on this imagined Muslim community and by making
gender visible in the process, she provides new insights into the dynamics of these
encounters. She is clearly able to open up dialogue with the women and occupy a
position of trust. She later explains, ". . . a lot of women tell me of the pain and
suffering they go through and they're genuinely distressed. You don't contact me
at the counselling service on a whim, wanting a Muslim divorce". Instead she
points to family pressure as the main reason why women may be keen to
reconcile. Potential compromises to this effect include women who do not wish
to use the counselling service having little choice but to do so if they want to
obtain a Muslim divorce.
In all 26 cases, Dr. Saeeda is keen to explore the nature of family intervention
prior to the contact made with the BSC. Clearly family involvement plays a large
part in the decision-making process and this is best illustrated by the fact that in
24 cases, a family member accompanies the client to the counselling session.
Family members include a mother, father, sister, brother, uncle and in three cases
an extended family member such as a cousin. During the sessions, each applicant
must explain the reasons for family intervention in the marital dispute. Most
importantly, perhaps, the language and discourse is framed around notions of
family honour and shame. For example, 19 women describe divorce as shameful
for their families. In one case, a client explains, "Divorce is something that
families keep hidden, it's not something they celebrate".
Observation research reveals little insight, however, into the nature of such
mediation in the family and home but we are given an interesting insight into
family dynamics in the reconciliation sessions. This would seem to put into
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question the autonomy of the women both prior to and during the mediation
process. Again, it could be argued that unofficial mediation fails to provide
adequate protection against unwarranted intrusion. In one instance, the brother of
one client begins to explain why the applicant seeks a Muslim divorce. Perturbed
by the fact that this client relies on a male family member to explain her situation,
Dr Saeeda intervenes mid sentence, looks at the female client and states, "if you
want an Islamic divorce why don't you speak and tell me, you don't need a man
to speak on your behalf'. On another occasion a mother of a female client begins
to speak, on the behalf of her daughter and again Dr. Saeeda immediately
intervenes, "if there's anything to tell me, she'll do it. If I need any information
from you I'll ask you".
These examples illustrate that Dr. Saeeda is aware of familial pressure upon
women to reconcile and seeks to use these sessions for the women to clarify for
themselves their desired outcomes. Furthermore it soon becomes clear that female
users of the counselling service also bring along family members in order to
counteract any pressure from the mediator to reconcile. Thus friends and/or
family members often act as support mechanisms. Interestingly of the 6 sessions
observed, only 3 women actively seek to reconcile with their husbands. Instead
most women reveal at the outset of the first session that they have been involved
in lengthy negotiations with their families in the hope of reconciling. In one case,
Dr. Saeeda enquires about the nature of family intervention the client replies, "we
tried for months and months. When we couldn't sort things out, my parents got
involved but things just didn't work out". When further probed about the nature of
this family intervention she replied, " well some members of my family got
together, had a meeting and tried to sort things out. But they just didn't want too
know. It never worked out because they weren't interested in sorting things out".
We can of course question how the dictates of honour and shame may compel
some women to seek family mediation even if they are unlikely to reconcile with
their husbands. For example, Dr. Saeeda, explains that she understands the
pressures women may be under and therefore does not compel the women to
participate in reconciling, "these women have been through mediation, they have
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tried to reconcile with their husbands and I believe them, that's the threshold for
me".
This is a complex issue and clearly some women are distressed that they are
compelled to attend these sessions and consider reconciliation. On the other hand
other women actively engage in this process and are upset that family mediation
has failed and they were unable to reconcile. Given these contradictions and
tensions in the counselling process we can identify three aspects of this process
that may raise concerns. Firstly, as discussed above, the nature of family
intervention in the process; secondly the role of the husband in the counselling
sessions; and fmally, pressure to negotiate family law matters (such as access to
children) in this 'unofficial space' with little if any protection from the state.
Observation research reveals that the second concern, the role of the husband in
the reconciliation process, raises an interesting set of dilemmas for Dr. Saeeda.
This relates to the fact that after the first counselling session with the client, the
process of tracking down the husband for "his version of events" begins. Dr.
Saeeda explains, "it's not that we don't believe what the women are saying, but in
Islam, it's our duty to see what he has to say, to give him an opportunity and so,
then we make an informed decision as to whether we should continue with the
reconciliation". This again leads to concerns of possibly involving violent partners
into this process where official mediation may deem this unsuitable and
unnecessary. Even though, as indicated earlier Dr. Saeeda does not proceed with
reconciliation where violence has occurred or continues to exist as a threat,
nevertheless it becomes clear that once contact is made with the husband this can
lead to a renewed threat, for some women. For example, in one session, the
client, Rizwana, informs Dr. Saeeda that attempts to trace her husband have led to
threatening phone calls from him: "I don't want a reconciliation so I don't want
you to contact him. If you do, things will get worse, he's violent and I'm scared
of what he might do". More worrying still is the fact that this client, due to
previous incidences of violence, has an injunction order against her husband
restricting contact.
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In fact observation research reveals 8 women complaining to Dr. Saeeda about the
subsequent intrusion from husbands once BSC contact has been made. In doing so
these women challenge the claim that their violent husbands must participate in
this process of them obtaining a divorce certificate. One client explains, "If you
continue to write to him or speak to him, he will harass me even more. He
doesn't want me to get this divorce so he will use every opportunity to make my
life even more difficult". The presupposition that husbands must participate in this
process therefore can raise serious difficulties for female clients. This is not to
deny, however, that once contact is made, it becomes clear that some husbands are
keen to participate in the reconciliation process. For Dr. Saeeda, contact with
husbands is important is to determine why they may be refusing to grant their
wives a Muslim divorce. Here explanations range from the unacceptable
behaviour of their wives, failure to respect parents and a reluctance to embrace
traditional interpretations of Islam. There is thus, a particular way of
conceptualizing the 'wife' as traditional, passive and insubordinate. What makes
this even more problematic is the insistence that the women ascribe to a particular
set of norms and values defining their measure of social worth according to male
interests in the family, home and community. This taken-for-granted assumption
is challenged at the outset. For example, Dr. Saeeda makes explicit the "project
for all Muslim women" to "challenge the presentation of women lives based upon
'nashuz' (female disobedience)". For this reason, she transforms the discourse
from one based on the duties of a Muslim wife to the responsibilities of a Muslim
husband. It is difficult to doubt the sincerity of her approach but in practice it
seems to have very little impact. Most husbands barely recognize her attempts and
insist that reconciliation can only be achieved on their terms. In this way very
little is achieved in real terms.
4.6.3 The 2nd Stage: Shariah Council Meeting
The second part of this dispute resolution process, comprises of a meeting with
the Sharjah Council. If reconciliation has not been achieved within a minimum of
three counselling sessions, Dr Saeeda must decide whether the case should be
submitted to the Shariah Council. A panel of three religious scholars must then
decide whether a divorce certificate is to be issued. This meeting takes place on a
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quarterly basis, on the last Wednesday of the given period, between 11 .00a.m
until 5.00p.m. Here observation of 2 Shariah Council meetings included a total of
24 cases being discussed.
Prior to this meeting, Dr. Saeeda sends a letter to the applicants requesting them to
attend. Most clients do respond to this letter and attend the meeting and, those
who fail to do so have their cases re-assigned to the next quarterly meeting.
During observation of the counselling sessions, Dr. Saeeda reveals that the panel
of Shariah Council members will "tell her off' at the Shariah Council meeting if
she has failed fulfilled a number of tasks which include establishing the facts of
the case; failure to pursue all avenues of reconciliation; and the failure to present
the information in the case-file in an "orderly manner".
After much personal lobbying, she has been granted permission by the panel to
accompany the women during the meeting but under the proviso that she cannot
contribute to the proceedings unless asked to do so. Thus her role is one of
support for the women during the meeting. This commitment to supporting the
women is best illustrated when we observe how she 'coaches' them on how they
must present themselves to the Shariah Council members. At the counselling
sessions she explains to the women whose cases she has put forward explaining
how the Shariah Council works and explains, "you will have to push for your case
and tell them you do not want any reconciliation" and "be prepared to answer all
the questions" and that "its best to be honest".
In theory each member of the panel is expected to read the case-files prior to the
meeting, but observation research of 2 Shariah Council meetings suggests this is
seldom the case.
The first part of the meeting is devoted to a quick discussion of all the cases, an
exercise undertaken to approximate the time-length to be allocated, to each case.
With regard to issuing divorce certificates, it seems clear that the client's presence
constitutes a further attempt by the scholars to reconcile the parties and halt the
finalisation of the divorce. Because of this, the two main issues addressed in the
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meetings are access/custody of children and reconciliation. In this context, the
scholars are keen to explore whether the client's husband has been given access to
children and if so, whether the wishes of the child have been taken into account.
To this extent some members of the panel do follow the Maliki school of thought
as discussed earlier. Yet we can also see how this approach is not adopted by all
the members of the Shariah Council and this may present a conflict of laws
scenario with state law. Part of the confusion might pertain to the assumptions
held by Shariah Council members that access for fathers should be permitted in all
circumstances or that the threshold for deciding such cases are based on differing
social and legal principles based on Islamic law. The extract below from
observation data highlights the dangers of Shariah Councils discussing issues of
custody and access in this private space.
Parveen Akhtar is 26 years old and has two young children, aged 2 and 4 years,
respectively. She is of Pakistani origin, born in Birmingham and describes herself
as 'British Pakistani'. In 1998, she married a British Pakistani, and describes it as
a 'love marriage'. Both the requirements of civil and religious marriage were
fulfilled and she cites violence and 'emotional abuse' as grounds for seeking a
Muslim divorce.
The scholars request that the client attend the Shariah Council meeting in order to
clarify a number of 'unresolved' issues. It quickly becomes apparent that two of
the scholars remain unconvinced that the client has seriously considered the
option of reconciling with her husband in the interests of their children. The
extract below reveals the exchange between them:
Religious Scholar: Did you consider getting back together with your husband for
the sake of the children?
Client: Yes I did but we've been separated before and we tried to work things out
then but it didn't happen. I just know this time it's the end its not going to work.
Religious Scholar: Why?
Client: Because he'll never change. I don't want to get back together with him.
This time I want a clean break and that's why I'm here. I want a divorce, I want
out.
Religious Scholar: Have you thought what effects your decision will have on
your children?
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Client: Yes I have but its better they don't see the violence, don't see what he
does to me. I want them to grow up in a safe environment.
Religious Scholar: But...
Client: (Interrupts him) Look I understand what you're getting at. You want us to
get back together and Dr. Saeeda has explained to me that in Islam you have to try
and make things work before you ask for a divorce. But I'm telling you I've tried
everything, I was a good wife and I am a good mother but I can't live like this. I
want a divorce.
The client is visibly upset and though Dr Saeeda is relegated to the periphery of
the meeting, she asks to intervene. After being given permission to do so, she
explains, "Myself and Parveen have discussed these issues for weeks and weeks.
There is no possibility of her reconciling with her husband and I support her one
hundred per cent. If you look in the case-file you'll see my recommendation".
Clearly angry with the stance of the religious scholar, she later confides that
"these men have no understanding of what women go through. It makes makes
me so angry! I spend so much time and effort making my recommendations to the
Council but they don't even bother to read them". Frustrated by the low
percentage of those successfully reconciled, it seems that the scholars readily
embrace a less critical stance without considering the implications for women. By
exemplifying the possibility of reconciliation as uncontentious, they fail to
acknowledge the unequal power relations within the marriage.
Observation of the second Shariah Council meeting reveals long discussions
regarding disputes on access to children. In one case the scholar reports that the
client's husband has been in touch demanding the council intervene and negotiate
some form of access to the children. A proposal he is very keen to implement. The
extract below illustrates the potential dangers of this approach.
Religious Scholar: In respect of the children what arrangements have you both
come too?
Client: I don't want him to have any contact with my child and the courts agree
with me. I have a court order.
Religious Scholar: But what does your husband want?
Client: I have a court order (shows him the order) which says that he's not
allowed any direct contact with my child, only indirect contact, he can send cards
and letters but that's all.
Religious Scholar: Why did the courts come to this conclusion?
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Client: Because he lied. He told them that he paid maintenance when he didn't
and that he had done all these other things when he hadn't. They could see what
kind of a person he is, he doesn't really want any contact he's just doing this to
get back at me
Religious Scholar: Well I spoke to him this morning and he told me that he does
want to see his daughter and that if he doesn't get to see her he will take other
steps. He may become violent towards you and to prevent this from happening I
think we should arrange for him to see his daughter at the mosque.
In this case the religious scholar is very persistent and the female client constantly
interrupts him to inform him that she has a court order which clearly states that
her husband is not allowed any access to her daughter. He ignores this and
suggests that the mosque can be used as a neutral place where the husband may
have access to his children. At this point the client gets very angry and states,
"look I haven't come here to discuss my daughter, I came here to get a divorce".
Dr. Saeeda intervenes, "This is wrong. There is no question of negotiation". At
this point another scholar can see that the client is visibly upset and asks the client
to wait outside. He explains to all the members of the Shariah Council, "We
cannot issue a directive which is against the courts. Our discussion is merely
academic. We have no power of enforcement". After a few more minutes of
general discussion they agree that a divorce certificate should be issued and Dr.
Saeeda is asked to go out and inform the client of their decision (see Appendix 3).
The most striking finding of the Shariah Council meetings, is that in many
instances the particular circumstances of the female clients are simply ignored.
The concomitant discussion on reconciliation and access of children to husbands
creates an inappropriate perhaps even dangerous space in which to resolve such
issues. Practical and pragmatic decisions in resolving marital disputes cannot be
understood as devoid from the standpoint of the women themselves. Without its
flexibility and openness this process loses its ability to serve as a locus for
Muslim women to contribute, instigate change and for some to ultimately resolve
the marital disputes.
4.7 The Muslim Law (Shariah) Council (MLSC)
An insight into the process of dispute resolution at the MLSC is based upon
content analysis of 25 case-files and, interviews with the two religious scholars
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Mohammed Raza and Dr. Zaki Badawi. The more overtly form of observing
mediation/reconciliation sessions and Shariah Council meetings was not
permitted, but this does not necessarily merit this analysis any less relevant or
incomplete than the others. It simply means that this limitation was overcome and
managed by the data available.
From this data two key issues arise which merit further analysis, firstly the
emphasis upon mediation/reconciliation and secondly the role of solicitors
(including access to children and the retrieval of dower). It is also worth
highlighting the interesting dimensions of this approach to dispute resolution with
the fact that solicitors actively engage in this process of reconfiguring state law to
negotiate the terms of the divorce, access to children and retrieval of dower. This
leads to the recognition that as discussed in chapter 1, this 'space' at the Shariah
Council means that there is no longer simply 'law' in opposition to 'non-law' or
personal law (Woodman 1998).
4.7.1 Mediation and Reconciliation
The 'model' for mediation and reconciliation at the MLSC can be described as
embodying two key features. Firstly, a separate service exists for all clients who
wish to see a Muslim counsellor and secondly, the husband is seen as key to this
process. Mohammed Raza explains, "We ask the husband that he should try for
reconciliation and if he agrees to it then we offer a full reconciliation service at
the Shariah Council.. .we have a trained counsellor for that purpose".'° 9
 The
emphasis upon obtaining the consensus of both parties to reconcile is considered
paramount, though this approach reveals a contradiction with the emphasis being
placed upon the husband. Mohammed Raza goes on, ". . . our first priority remains
reconciliation. In our notice that is sent to the husband or to the respondent we
ask several things and first of those is that you as a husband must try for
reconciliation. If he agrees and says fine I want to reconcile could you arrange
something and then we try that". This approach is based on the understanding that
most female applicants are reluctant to pursue mediation or reconciliation.
109 Unfortunately permission to interview the counsellor was denied on the grounds of maintaining
confidentiality.
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Mohammed Raza concedes, "I think the husbands they try or they raise this
question in more cases than the wives that contact us. In 95% of the applicants
(who are women), they tell us right in the beginning that reconciliation is not an
option for them now.. .when they come to us".
Data analysis of 25 case-files reveals that the female applicants are all asked to
seriously consider the option of mediation, yet only 2 applicants pursued this
option."° Instead evidence from the case-files suggests that the failure of 'family
mediation' had convinced the applicants of their inability to reconcile with their
husbands. Extracts from case-files illustrate how this space is challenged,
contested and negotiated by the involvement of different parties.
In Case A, the female applicant applies to the Shariah Council to obtain a
religious divorce. After a 4 month period (during which the reconciliation and
investigation aspects of the process were completed) the religious scholar
concludes that the husband should be given further time to try and resolve the
marital problems and seek some form of mediation through family or local
community. The female applicant is clearly angry with this decision and writes to
the council to protest at their decision:
Dear Mr....
Further to our conversation of today I confirm that I am unhappy with
the 3 month extension that you have granted to my husband in respect
of my divorce case. As explained to you, from having been told the
response of his letter he has approached neither my brother or father in
order to resolve the matter. No extended family or local community
are involved, or have subsequently been involved. On the basis of his
evidence in the letter I fail to understand why you have granted him 3
months extension for resolving the matter since I do not wish for a
reconciliation and neither is my husband pursuing for one.
The applicant is clearly frustrated by the repeated attempts by the religious scholar
to reconcile the parties.
°Again access to observe these sessions was withheld on the grounds of confidentiality.
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In Case B the applicant agrees to a reconciliation meeting at the Shariah Council
on the understanding that her husband agrees to grant her a Muslim divorce. She
writes to the council:
As confirmed by yourself I would like to exercise my option of a
meeting being arranged with the appropriate parties concerned, and a
resolution being reached with my husband signing the divorce". She
states quite clearly that her husband should be made aware of her
intentions. In this case the woman was very reluctant to enter into any
form of mediation but felt she had little option but to do so. Her letter
states, ". . .if we are to proceed with a meeting, then for it to be
mutually beneficial my husband should be made aware of the reasons
for meeting in this way.
Thus the emphasis upon reconciliation leads the women to develop strategies to
participate in this process while keeping in mind their own objectives.
4.7.2 The Role of Solicitors
Case-file analysis also reveals the nature of interaction between Shariah Councils
and English law. Out of 25 cases, a total of 15 documented some form of contact
with solicitors and this included queries regarding the validity of marriage;
progress on finalising a decree absolute; mediation; access to children and
attempts to retrieve dower payment(s).
File C illustrates the nature of this interaction. In this case, C a young British
Pakistani woman marries D, also a British Pakistani. They register their marriage
in the UK and also have a nikah. The marriage breaks down with C arguing that
she had been forced into marriage and citing violence and 'neglect' as reasons for
divorce. She informs the Shariah Council that she has instructed solicitors to
begin civil proceedings for divorce. As her husband is refusing to give her a
Muslim divorce she inquires about the possibility of obtaining one without his
consent. In her letter she states, "being a Muslim is important to me, I was
married with a nikah and now that my marriage has broken down its important
that I get an Islamic divorce. My husband is acting unreasonably and I want no
further contact with him". He fails to respond to any of the notices sent by the
Council to get his side of the story and it is decided that contact is to be made
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through his solicitors before a decision is made on the divorce application. This
letter states:
Dear Sirs
May we inform your client that according to Shariah law, he has to
live with his wife and discharge his matrimonial duties and if it is
somehow not possible, then he has to divorce her. An option of a
legal separation is not approved by Islamic law...
A note dated a few weeks later in the case-file states the council has received a
telephone call from the clients husband's solicitors stating that he is prepared to
grant his wife an Islamic divorce but only if she accepts mediation in the hope of a
reconciliation. In this letter they outline her husbands demands, which include
that she must learn "to act like a proper Muslim woman".
A letter is then sent from the council to C outlining her husbands position and to
clarify "whether (she) seeks a reconciliation". The applicant writes back:
I have made it clear on several occasions that I do not wish to get back
together with my husband.
The council decides it is not worthwhile pursuing mediation and sends a final
letter to his solicitor stating:
Your clients wife claims that the couple have separated for 7 months.
In our view, after such a long time of separation, reconciliation seems
to be a remote possibility. We still wish and pray for the success of
any such efforts in this respect. The Council however, thinks that if
your clients wife is adamant for a Islamic divorce, he is expected to
act realistically and responsibly and should divorce his wife in the due
course of time.
There is no further correspondence in the file and a note describes it as on going.
Case D illustrates the possible dangers of solicitors using this space as a forum for
negotiating divorce settlements. In this case a solicitor writes to the Shariah
Council with the proposition that if the female applicant is willing to opt for
mediation and allow his client (her husband) access to the children he will agree
to grant her a Muslim divorce. Content analysis of her application form to the
Shariah Council for a Muslim divorce, reveals that she cites violence and
emotional abuse as two of the grounds for seeking a Muslim divorce. In this
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example we can see how the solicitor and his male client may use the Shariah
Council as a 'space' whereupon they are able to negotiate more favourable terms
for the outcome of the civil divorce. Furthermore the Shariah council does not
challenge this approach, and instead writes to the female applicant informing her
of her husband's wishes:
Dear Sister,
May we advise you to confirm to us through your solicitors that you
have no objection in allowing regular access to Mr XX to see XX.
We await to hear from you.
A letter dated a few days later from the female applicant states:
Dear Mr Raza.. . .1 left my husband because of the violence and abuse
towards myself and my two children. You can contact my solicitor
YY who can let you know why I don't want my husband to have
contact with my children.
Case-file analysis reveals there are a further 6 cases which illustrate the dangers of
unofficial bodies acting as mediation forums to resolve issues such as access to
children. This provides an insight into the ways some solicitors may use the
religious divorce to negotiate acceptable terms for their clients even though this
may put the applicant in a perilous situation. In this case the female applicant was
able to refuse all demands and subsequently was not under any immediate threat.
Negotiating such settlements in this space brings to the fore the issue of custody
and access to children. Zaki Badawi explains, "Under Muslim law a divorced
mother has the right to the custody of her children as long as she does not
remarry. If she does remarry she "loses that automatic right". The children can
only remain with her with her ex-husband's consent and he can succeed if he can
prove that his mother can look after the children. The conflict can arise as under
British law it is by convention that the mother be awarded the custody of the
children and the husband has to prove that she is an 'unfit' mother".
In relation to negotiating dower settlements the following extracts from case-files
reveal the nature of intervention from husbands and solicitors. The issue of
returning the dower is central to a woman being granted a divorce. A number of
letters focus on the demand of the husband that the dower be returned. Dispute
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will often focus on the amount given by the husband and how much he demands
back.
Dear
Following our recent telephone conversation and a very threatening
letter which I received today, to which this is a response. As you
mentioned in our conversation it is in my best interest that I write to
you and ask to make a little request upon my dearly beloved that this
marriage has come to an end due to the single mindedness of the party
concerned. So for there to be an end to it all legally and morally
she/her family should pay costs of the jewerelly and as soon as
possible. I will be more than happy to sign anything to get rid off her.
So I look forward to receiving her response.
A letter from the Council to Mrs B
We refer to your application of an Islamic divorce to the Shariah
Council. The Council after contacting your husband Mr X has
received an assurance from him that he will issue an Islamic divorce
to you provided you return the following items of jewellery, which
according to his claim, was given to you by him at the time of one
year after the marriage
It also includes a list of the goods to be returned to the husband and then goes on:
If you agree to the above details of items of jewellery then according
to Shariah law under the terms of the Khula you are required to return
these items or its cost to your husband in return of an Islamic divorce.
The Council accordingly asks you to accept these terms and co-
operate with us to resolve this case. However if you dispute the
details of the above mentioned items or their value, then write to us so
that we can negotiate further with your husband and try to achieve an
agreed list of items and their value as soon as possible.
This analysis also reveals the confusion experienced by solicitors as to the validity
of Muslim marriage and divorce in Britain. For example in Case E the solicitor
writes to the Council:
We have consulted by.... concerning the requirements of the Shariah
Council in respect of the Islamic divorce. We have discussed with our
client any potential financial claims that she might have arising from
the marriage. Mrs... .has instructed us to inform you that provided a
divorce is pronounced by the Shariah Council within 21 days of 28th
September 1998 then she will make no claims against your client in
relation to financial or property matters arising from their marriage
under Muslim law. We are sending a copy of this to the Shariah
Council.
The Shariah Council respond:
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We acknowledge the receipt of the letter. Out legal advisers advise us
that Ms.. .and Mr... .never registered their marriage in the UK. It was
only an Islamic religious marriage which is not recognised as equal to
a legal/civil marriage. Hence a civil divorce is not required in this
case.
The content analysis of case-files highlights the tensions that exist in this process
of dispute resolution and the dangers of using this space as mediation fora. In
dealing with such important matters such as access to children women find
themselves in a precarious position in their attempts to obtain a religious divorce.
4.8 The Islamic Shariah Council (ISC)
Aside from the similarities in approach with the other Shariah Councils, the ISC
approach to mediation and reconciliation focuses upon the importance attached to
family intervention in the resolution of the marital disputes. There is a deliberate
attempt to involve the families of both parties who are encouraged to attend
mediation sessions and participate in the process. Thus the client is expected to
meet with the religious scholar for a minimum of two occasions and her husband
is expected to attend at least two sessions but he can also arrange to meet with the
husband separately. The aim of these sessions are to tease out any differences
between the parties in the hope of reconciliation.
This approach to dispute resolution is justified by one of the religious scholars
Abu Saeed on the grounds that the Islamic tradition promotes a "family orientated
approach to resolving disputes" and "what differentiates the Islamic approach
from other traditions is its ability to draw upon the Muslim family and the Muslim
community". We thus find policies of reconciliation pursued with vigour and
determination.
4.8.1 The 1st Stage: Mediation and Reconciliation Sessions
The first stage of the dispute resolution process comprises of the mediation and
reconciliation sessions and the investigation process which take place at the
Shariah Council offices based in Leyton, East London. A crucial element in this
process is the role of the mediator and the dynamics of power between the client
and the mediator. Observation of two reconciliation sessions revealed that most
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women were unwilling to engage in this process, without persuasion. Most
notably, the women cited violence and the failure of previous reconciliation
attempts as the reasons for this marked reluctance. Despite their protests the
scholars are very keen to encourage such meetings with husbands so that
"differences could be resolved or managed over a period of time" (Dr. Suhaib
Hasan).
A deliberate attempt, therefore, is made to ensure that the parties actively seek to
resolve their differences in the presence of a religious scholar. This approach has
the obvious potential for tension between the client and the mediator which can
inevitably lead to difficulties. The excerpt below is taken from observation notes
of one mediation session involving a young woman and her estranged husband.
While the facts of this case are applicable only to the parties involved the issues
and concerns it raises are illustrative of another four observed cases.
Prior to the start of each mediation session beginning the religious scholar
explained the background and facts of the case as follows: Z is 30 years old and
has been previously married. She describes her current marriage as 'forced' and
has two young children aged 6 years and 4 years old, respectively. In 2002 she
married W a 35 year British Pakistani with the consent of her parents. Both
parties are practising Muslims of British Pakistani ethnic background and met via
the 'Muslim Marriage Bureau'.
This extract provides an example of an exchange between the religious scholar
and the applicant:
Religious Scholar: In your application you said you had asked his family to
intervene and help sort out the problems?
Applicant: Yes, yes I did but they weren't interested. . . .not interested in sorting
things out. They made things worse blaming me for everything. Everyone
blames me.
Religious Scholar: Why is that?
Applicant: It's him, he's so clever, so manipulative, he can make anyone believe
anything. Really he can, even my parents are on his side. But they don't know
what its like to live with him, its awful I can't move out the room without him
asking where I'm going.
Religious Scholar: He doesn't trust you?
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Applicant: No
Religious Scholar: Why not? Have you given him any cause not to trust you?
Applicant: No, no.. .1 don't know why he's like that but he has so much 'shaak'
(suspicion)
Religious Scholar: Did you fulfil your duty as a Muslim wife?
Applicant: Yes, yes I did. Everything I did I did for the family and him but still
I'm not allowed to go out, If I work he tells me I'm flirting with the men, it's so
difficult. I feel as though I can't breathe. I've tried I really have.
Religious Scholar: Are there any specific reasons you want a divorce?
Applicant: Yes I can't stand it anymore. I can't stand him, he disgusts me and he
hit me".
Unaware the applicant is informed that her husband is awaiting outside with the
hope of reconciling. The clients is very upset and keeps repeating that she does
not want to meet with her husband and does not under any grounds seek to
reconcile. She explains this to the religious scholar, "I don't want to meet with
him, please don't make me. He frightens me". Yet having been assured that she
did not have to meet with her husband if she did not want to she was also
informed that under Muslim law the scholar had to consider the issue of mediation
seriously. He explains, "Look you don't have to sit next to him, you don't have to
look at him but you have made a number of allegations and I need to confront him
with these allegations and get his version of events".
Hence the religious scholar is insistent that he clarifies some of the allegations she
has made with him and where she is also present. The client is very reluctant but
finally agrees to do so under the understanding she does not have to be seated next
to him and does not have to agree to his demands. The religious scholar accepts
these conditions and argues, "if he was to try and make up then we must. . . it is our
duty to try". Once the husband joins the meeting, he refutes all the 'allegations'
made by his wife and seeks to reconcile. When asked whether he was violent
towards his wife he replies, "yes I admit it, once just once. I didn't mean to hit
her but she made be so angry".
What these sessions reveal are the dangers of imposing reconciliation. In most
cases the scholars seem aware that reconciliation is unlikely for the couple but
pursue this as a 'Islamic' duty they must fulfil. In these circumstances women
find themselves constrained by these dictates.
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4.8.2 The 2 Stage: The Shariah Council Meeting
Once the scholars conclude that there is little hope in the parties reconciling the
case-file is sent to the Shariali Council for the scholars to consider whether a
divorce certificate should be issued. There are 6 members on the Council all of
whom are religious scholars and one 'administrator'. The Council meet on the last
Wednesday of each month in a seminar room at the Islamic Cultural Centre,
Regents Park Mosque.
Each scholar is given a sheet of paper that summarises the details of the case.
Observation of one Shariah Council session reveals that a total of 24 cases were
discussed in a 5-hour period. The main issues discussed are dower, validity of an
affidavit, evidence, access to children, forced marriage, domestic violence and
mediation and reconciliation. A total of 3 clients attend these meetings.
Discussion on the cases reveals that often the husband places obstacles to prevent
a divorce certificate from being issued. For example one letter from a husband
states that his wife has been influenced by "women's organisations who are not
Muslim and who favour women to live by western influences and standards". Her
husband is claiming that her western way of life will have a detrimental affect
upon their children and he wants the Shariah Council to intervene to convince her
to adopt a more "Islamic way of life" so they can reconcile. If they are to separate
he seeks the intervention of the Shariah Council to ensure that he is given access
to his two children. The Council members discuss at some length their concerns
over whether they should intervene on matters concerning access to children.
They are aware that the courts have issued an order that states that her husband
must be allowed limited access (not specified) and that she must be encouraged to
comply with this. It is agreed that they cannot intervene and the husband should
instead approach his solicitor to resolve the matter of access to his children. But in
doing so they agree to arrange a meeting with his wife to draw "her attention to
the fact that as a Muslim mother she has a duty to bring up her children as
Muslims".
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On occasions when clients are requested to attend these meetings the discussion
focuses on reconciliation. An extract from observation research illustrates the
process:
In this case the scholar requests that both the applicant and her husband attend the
session. The applicant arrives with her father and is seated on one side of the room
facing the scholars and her husband arrives a few minutes later and sits on the
opposite side of the room to her. A series of questions are put to the applicant with
the focus on reconciling the parties.
Religious Scholar: why are you refusing to reconcile with her husband?
Applicant: We've tried to make things work but its not going to work. Things
have too far and he hit's me, that's why he's not allowed to see the children
Religious Scholar: Who advised you to restrict access to the children?
Applicant: Social Services. . .the children are scared of their father because of the
violence. I have a duty to protect my children that is my priority.
Religious Scholar: Is there anything else?
Applicant: Yes I also want you to know that he has never provided for his family.
I have to work and pay all the bills and the mortgage, as a Muslim man he has a
duty to provide for us but he never has done.
The scholars then turn to her husband. He speaks in Urdu and argues that he does
not want a divorce and claims that his wife is too dominating and taunts him
constantly and must change her behaviour. He states, "she is a disgrace to what it
means to be a Muslim woman and, she has 'shamed' not only herself but the
whole family".
When asked to respond to the allegations the applicant argues that she has never
committed adultery and it is he who is lying and is deceitful. She then produces
bank statements which she argues prove that she pays the mortgage and she also
produces 'police reports' which state that the police were called to their house
during a domestic disturbance.
Another religious scholar then addresses both of them and explains that though he
is aware that there are many problems between them as Muslims they both have a
duty to try and reconcile. Both the applicant and the client remain silent. A third
scholar then suggests that the three of them go now into a separate room to
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discuss ways in which reconciliation can be achieved. The female applicant
begins to protest but the scholar intervenes and says, "Just come and talk, it won't
take long and if you've really made up your mind it won't affect it".
Unfortunately permission to observe this meeting is denied but in the meantime
the scholars discuss the issue with the applicants father and ask him "why have
you not attempted reconciliation?" He argues that he has several times, over the
past 9 years but has now come to the conclusion that they must separate
permanently in order for them both too be happy.
The religious scholar, the applicant and her husband re-emerge 45-minutes later.
Nothing is said and both parties take their belongings and leave. The scholar then
reports back to the council and explains that they were unlikely to reconcile
because it seems "the wife has made her mind up that she no longer wants to
remain in the marriage". The Council decides that they will issue a religious
divorce certificate but only once the civil procedure for divorce is completed.
Once scholar states, "We're not in a rush, let them get on with it". They decide to
write to her informing her of their decision.
Interestingly the scholars are very reluctant even at this stage to issue a divorce
certificate in the hope that reconciliation can be achieved. In terms of mediation
this space is used to negotiate dower settlements for husbands. One of the
scholars explains: "There are cases where we have refused applications of divorce
where we have discovered the man is not to be blamed and he is offering
everything to the woman so without any reason why is she asking for a divorce
and there is principle in the Shariah for that as well and that is in that case you
have to buy your divorce from your husband. The husband has got the right to put
a price on it". We will negotiate the price where the woman is unable to prove
anything against the husband we would say to her well look your case is a 'khula'
then what are you doing, are you in a job what is your bank balances, things like
that we will collect all the information and then we will call the husband and say
look she doesn't like to live with you, you cannot force a woman against her
wishes so you have to divorce her, this is the price in the opinion of the Shariah
council seems to be reasonable so accept it and divorce. You will get all the
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jewellery back, all the expensive items back, the money you have paid as mehr it
will be returned to you plus, £500, £1000 whatever is within the means. We will
offer that to the husband and if he is adamant, no, no even then I won't divorce,
then he will lose everything and the Shariah Council will dissolve the marriage.
There are a total of 7 cases were there are lengthy discussions on the amount of
dower.
4.9 The Shari'ah Court of UK (SCUK)
The process of mediation and reconciliation at the SCUK, rests upon the
participation of family members, including those who may have arranged the
marriage. In these terms, the particular contribution of the 'family' underlies the
paradigm upon which mediation is based and reconciliation sought. In interview,
Sheikh Abdullah explained, "In Islam, marriage is the foundation of the Muslim
family and we recognize that for the marriage to succeed the family plays a vital
role. To that end yes, we actively seek the involvement of family members".
Observation research identified two key features. First, there is a pervasive view
that marital disputes cannot be resolved without the intervention of parents.
Parental consent is considered vital to the happiness of the married couple and
consequently, parents are invited to participate in the process of dispute
resolution. Secondly, there is a shift in approach whereby all reconciliation
sessions are conducted in open with little if any opportunity for the female
applicant to discuss issues in private.
From the vantage point of the religious scholar, observation research reveals his
position of dominance and control. As an individual, he 'presides' over all
sessions and all clients are expected to attend a minimum of three sessions before
a decision on whether to issue a divorce certificate is made. In doing so, he
engages implicitly in a nostalgic appeal to the past, to a situation where Islam,
community and Islamic values provide the solution to the perceived increase in
marital disputes. He uses this space to develop a critique of western mass culture
and the modern forms of consumerism to challenge the perceived fragmentation
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of Muslim belief and practice in the West. More precisely, it is the views of the
scholar based upon a strict distinction between the sacred and profane that reflect
the specific patterns of dispute resolution. Muslim women are associated with
being mothers, wives and daughters, to be protected and cherished. As a result,
they are also conceptualized as threatening the stability and continuity of the
traditional Muslim family. Because western society lacks the moral values
intrinsic to Islam and the Islamic way of life, the existing dangers and problems
for Muslims are perceived as worsening.
During each session, a 'Muslim solicitor' and three male witnesses accompany the
scholar. Though rarely at the forefront of the discussions they seem to occupy a
strategic symbolic importance in fulfilling the requirements of Islamic law
whereupon the evidence of Muslim women can only be verified in the presence of
three male witnesses. This approach, which hinges upon a contested
understanding of the rules of evidence in Islamic law, embodies both a nostalgic
return to traditional Islam and illustrates the tension between an essentialized,
fixed representation of Muslim women and the complex realities of their lives.
These tensions were captured during observation research of six sessions. The
sessions are conducted in English and last approximately 35 minutes. We now
draw upon extracts of observation fieldwork for a closer analysis of the process of
mediation and reconciliation. In particular, we are interested in exploring the
language and discourse on gender and dynamics of power in operation.
During the observed sessions, 12 cases are described by scholars as 'on going'
with 5 new clients. Upon arrival each client is asked a series of questions to
determine the reasons of why a divorce is being sought. Some women obviously
welcome the opportunity to explain their situation. For example Rizwana, 26
years old, is seeking a divorce after just ten months of marriage. She is
accompanied, by her father and brother and explains she had been forced into
marriage against her will. She is articulate and passionate when detailing the
reasons for the breakdown in marriage. She explains, "I was against getting
married from the beginning but I didn't want to go against my parents wishes so I
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did what I thought was right. I married him. But he couldn't cope with the
responsibility of being married and my parents agree we should get divorced".
Interestingly, the most important dynamic in this process is this relationship
between the scholar and male members of the client's family. The scholar does
not address her directly and asks her brother and father to reply on her behalf.
They do so and the session proceeds in this way. This draws attention to the fact
that women occupy a very marginalized role in the whole process. By contrast,
questions are directed at men and they are expected to contribute to the process.
Of the new clients, four women have not registered their marriages according to
civil law and this produced a variety of discussions on the legitimacy of a Muslim
marriage in Britain. A large number of women complain they had been forced into
marriage and the marriages had not been registered to ensure that they had no
legal protection if the marriage was to end. In all cases the scholar engaged in
lengthy discussions on what he described as the 'Muslim principle' to reconcile.
Moreover he explained that with enough influence from male members of the
applicant's family the parties could successfully reconcile.
At the end of first session, an order is issued in all the cases for the husband to
attend the next session so that the process of reconciliation can begin. This 'order'
is either sent to the husband or is posted through his letterbox. In cases where his
whereabouts are not known the sessions are postponed indefinitely so that there is
an opportunity to locate him.
As a strategy to encourage the individuals to reconcile, family members are also
encouraged to attend the sessions. If the husband refuses to attend or is
unavailable he is asked to provide a male witness who can attend and bear witness
to the fairness of the proceedings. Often the sessions are delayed if one male
witness is late. All the female applicants are asked to produce a written
submission of their claims prior to the second session and it is this submission
which provides the basis for the reconciliation. Interestingly, in the second and
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third sessions a large number of the husbands do attend the reconciliation
sessions. In a total of 12 cases, 7 husbands attend the sessions.
The concept of reconciliation sits uncomfortably with the 'space' in which the
sessions are conducted. This space is male dominated with the presence of male
family members, male witnesses and the male 'judge'. It is within this context
that negotiations take place and are unequivocally constructed around gendered
constructions of Muslim identity and female responsibility. Reconciliation is
defined primarily as the acceptance of 'Islamic moral values' and based on the
metaphor of the preservation of the Muslim family whereas the failure to
reconcile is equated with female disobedience. For example, in a number of cases
where the clients are accompanied by parents, the judge lays the blame for the
breakdown on marriage on the female clients, even in cases where they have been
forced into marriage. He goes onto explain, "most women need guidance when
marrying, even if they are over the age of consent, so it's the duty of parents to
make that decision for them"
Observation research reveals the inherent contradictions and tensions in this
process of dispute resolution. The process is embedded in "absolute relativism"
(Frow 1998:57) according to an essentialist model of Muslim community
insider/outsider. In particular the identity of Muslim women is ascribed to shared
cultural understandings and there is little room for challenging this cultural and
religious order.
During the observed sessions Sheikh Abdullah also revealed that social workers
often request to attend the Shariah Council sessions to "understand Islam
particularly when there are conflicts over access to children". Unfortunately this
could not be verified in this study, but if this is the case then it certainly points to
the dangers of practioners using this space to gain an understanding of Islam that
may order to determine issues of access to children. What could be at stake is both
the welfare of the children and women.
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4.10 The 4 Sbariah Councils: Commonalities and Differences
One of the most salient findings in this study relates to how Shariah Councils
constitute themselves around structures of power that defines the group as a
'Muslim community'. In this context, the dialectic of difference is constructed as
exclusionary, whereby individual identities and dissent are perceived as a threat to
this model of 'community'. In this respect, the 'Muslim community' is defined
by its consensus to group norms and values, a manifestation of 'identity politics'.
The recognition of 'difference', therefore, is the dichotomizing of ethnic and
religious communities based on discrete categories of 'religious identity', which
individuals must identify with if they are to participate in this form of dispute
resolution. In effect serving to "reinscribe and rigidify boundaries between social
groups that in everyday lived practice could be 'fuzzy' and across which
individuals might negotiate their multiple group affiliations" (Bennett 1998:12).
The evidence presented above suggests that power within Shariah Councils is
conceptualised in different ways, from controlling the boundaries of the 'Muslim
community', homogenizing Muslim identity to sustaining the ideology of the
essentialized construction of the Muslim family
It seems clear then from empirical data that such bodies are premised on the
notion of community as consensus (see Smith 1988). In this way, they manifest
group decisions in terms of persuasion, silencing and control. This, of course,
takes us back to the normative frameworks upon which Shariah Councils are
based and the cultural norms of the group. Using Foucault's conception of 'power
relations', we can see how such bodies create specific self-identities that fit into
the system of law in operation. Empirical data suggests that in this context, the
specific forms of power serve the function of maintaining the boundaries of the
organisation. The religious scholar exercises this power with his decision-making
capacities and premised upon certain forms of knowledge, in this case 'Muslim
family law'. Foucault points out, "Power is not possessed, it acts in the very body
and over the whole surface of the social field according to a system of relays,
modes of connection, transmission, distribution, etc" (1978:65). In this way, we
can see how power is exercised within Shariah Councils and in particular, the
ways it is exercised over women. The role of religious scholars as bearers of this
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power raises issues on the ways in which unofficial mediators may influence
particular outcomes. In their study of official mediators, Greatbatch and Dingwall
(1993) found that mediators do not act in an objective neutral way and instead
disputants are encouraged to follow a specific set of procedures, which guide
them to outcomes acceptable to them. This illustrates the use of covert coercion.
As Mulchany points out, "Viewed in this way, mediation substitutes the
mystification of law and is more pernicious because its sources are less obvious
and points of resistance concealed" (2000:141).
The normative framework of these bodies based upon a specific set of cultural and
religious norms and values, do not permit alternative interpretations. The data
presented in this chapter illustrates the ways in which women are both represented
and excluded from this process of dispute resolution. For example, the insistence
that all women should participate in reconciliation sessions may serve to reinforce
inequality and disadvantage for those members of communities who may already
be disempowered in the family and community (Grillo 1991). In this context,
feminist concerns of negotiating settlements in such privatized spaces where
women have no access to the protection of state law has led to renewed discussion
on the relationship between the public/private spheres (Thornton 1991).
Yet, as the evidence presented in this study illustrates, this power does not run
evenly across all the bodies in a uniform or homogeneous way. Under Foucault' s
conception of power, where power relations exist there are also sites of resistance,
"Power relationships. . . depend on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play
the role of adversary, target, support or handle in power relations. The points of
resistance are present everywhere in the power network" (1980:95). For example,
at the BSC evidence suggests that there are sites of resistance where for example
the female counsellor may challenge the power of the religious scholar, albeit in
subtle ways. Yet, as demonstrated in fieldwork analysis the resistance is
controlled and maintained within the boundaries of the organisation. Hence, the
female counsellor is consigned to the periphery of the decision-making processes,
her role reduced to that of observer rather than an active participant in the
decision-making process. By contrast, the position of male religious scholars of
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the Shariah Council are strategic and negotiated through the gendered cultural
practices as only men are permitted to be religious scholars. Though we must also
recognise of course, that female members are also implicated in power relations of
the Shariah Councils which raises questions on the relationship between gender
inequality, power and coercion and this is addressed in the following chapter.
This is not to deny that cultural practices within these bodies are neither contested
nor remain challenged however the space in which women are able to engage with
this process remains limited. Yet it is also accepted that the large numbers of
women using these bodies testifies to the fact that 'cross-cultural mediation' must
be seriously addressed. In her study Shah-Kazemi argues that, "negotiations
within the domain of marital disputes assume a very particular complexity as the
dynamics of both gender and identity- defming normative ethics shape the setting
in which the negotiations take place" (2000:304). This approach challenges the
very basis upon which this study is based as Shah-Kazemi argues that a western
human rights approach to notions of justice, equality, choice and rights for
Muslim women inevitably obscures the normative orders upon which this form of
dispute resolution is based. She goes on, "members of the community who
consider themselves to be practising Muslims (and the degrees of adherence vary
considerably) are keen to involve the intervention of outsiders with religious
authority in their marital disputes in an attempt to ensure that the dispute be
resolved within a common normative framework" (2000:307). She is critical of
adopting a neutral approach to mediation, ". . .the insistence upon 'neutrality' as a
notion in mediation parlance, even when that is contrary to the common ethical
framework shared by the parties, results in the imposition of outsiders as
mediators to the exclusion of community members, at the expense of achieving
the ideal of genuine community mediation" (2000:3 19). This study is invaluable
for its insights into the complex dynamics of power within families and
communities (see Witty 1980). Women are involved in the process of dispute
resolution and the participation of family members does indeed challenge the
assumed hegemonic position of the mediator. For this we are given a unique
insight into the dynamics of dispute resolution within minority ethnic
communities. Yet this community 'self-definition' falls into the "charybdis of
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cultural relativism" (Anthias 2002:275). Clearly, this argument is premised upon
fixed understandings of culture, identity and religion. It embraces Shariah
Councils as creating a new discursive legal space constructed by community
members but fails to engage in debates on how they may sanction power within
their boundaries of community and personal law.
In this study a second finding, relates to the way in which these bodies are
constituted as unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms and where they actually
fit into existing 'frameworks' on community and family mediation. Clearly, as
outlined in chapter 1, early literature on legal pluralism and community mediation
embraces a rigid definition on what we understand as 'law' 'mediation' and
'community' and subsequently fails to take into account differences in
communities in relation to gender, age, sexuality and notions of identity and
belonging. Thus official community mediation programmes envisage
communities as homogeneous rather than heterogeneous.
As the data analysis in this chapter suggests Shariah Councils challenge this
traditional defmition of community mediation and have in a sense occupied a new
space in these debates. Interestingly, all 4 Shariah Councils reported little if any
direct contact with official agencies but observation research and data analysis of
case-files suggests that there was contact between the two 'spheres'. Harrington
(1985) points out that contact between these the formal and informal agencies are
complex. In her study, she found that community mediation cases are often
referred from the state agencies such as police and prosecutors, to the informal
bodies to offload work from the official agencies to the unofficial. What we see
happening with Shariah Councils in Britain is an interesting development. Apart
from the process of dispute resolution, solicitors are using this space to negotiate
favourable settlements for their clients in exchange for pronouncing a religious
divorce. In this context official agencies are referring cases to Shariah Councils in
the hope that 'cultural issues' can be resolved within this private sphere. This
form of multiculturalism can inevitably reinforce inequality. Furthermore this
inevitably raises the question of what interest the state may have in allowing some
issues to be resolved in the private and for the state to intervene in others? As
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discussed in chapter 3 the 'politics of multiculturalism' is based upon uncontested
notions of identity while simultaneously recognising 'cultural difference' as fixed
and bounded. Hence black feminists point to the dangers of delegating communal
responsibility to community leaders under the multiculturalist rubric of
'communal autonomy' (Pate! 2003). As Muichany points out, "these concerns are
exacerbated by the fact that many forms of informal resolution, community
mediation included, discourage legal representation"(2000: 140). Yet in this study
though none of the Shariah Councils discouraged the use of state law mechanisms
they did all seek to develop methods of dispute resolution consistent with
'Islamic' norms and values.
4.10.2 Co-operation between Shariah Councils
The degree of co-operation and collaboration between the 4 Shariah Councils
raises interesting questions regarding the competing "cultural logics rooted in
particular structures of power" (Merry 1998:44). In short the differing modes of
representation and the ways in which they may engage in constructive dialogue
with each other illustrates how they are constituted within local communities.
Empirical data reveals little contact between the 4 Shariah Councils and, on
occasions when contact had been made it was done so merely to clarify whether a
new client had approached a different Shariah Council and the reasons why the
application had been refused. Of the sample, 3 Shariah Councils reported their
reluctance in issuing divorce certificates if a different Shariah Council had
rejected a previous application. Strikingly, though they were keen to discuss
mobilization strategies in the context of Islamaphobia they were reluctant to
embark on unifying the different approaches to dispute resolution. Mohammed
Raza at MILSC explained, ". . .1 cannot speak on behalf of other Shariah Councils
but our Shariah Council has some rules to which we are trying to self regulate
ourselves. Like in our application we clearly say that if you have already applied
to another Shariah Council we cannot entertain your application. If other Shariah
Council complaints are lodged with us we do not entertain that at all so we do not
wish to create any conflict among these Shariah Councils.. .they have every right
to work as we have". He went on, "We are all independent from each other but
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we are working for the same purpose. But definitely we don't have any regular
link with each other". This viewpoint was confirmed with the scholars in the
other Shariah Councils. Dr. Nasim at BSC was concerned that the different
approaches adopted by the newer emerging Shariah Councils may lead to
confusion for Muslims using these bodies. He explained, "I know of a few cases
where women have come to us because other Shariah Councils have been
unsympathetic to them and refused to grant them a divorce. This leads to
confusion and our authority is undermined". This was unquestionably a concern
for all the religious scholars but most were reluctant to unify the different
Councils into one body. For Dr. Badawi, adjudicating responsibility to one body
would merely serve to concretise the inherent diversity in Islam, he explained,
"We are not one community but several communities and we should be left to
compete individually and to establish our authorities individually.. .that would be
a better and healthier approach for us". He was critical of shifting responsibility
of such bodies to the State, as this would undermine their autonomy and authority
in the communities in which they operate.
A further concern expressed by the scholars was the role of Imams at mosques.
Mohammed Raza, explains, ". . .we have been reported some cases where a single
Imam in a mosque is claming to be the judge of the Muslim Supreme Court in this
country.. .things like that are happening and perhaps the community needs to be
educated about that. These things should not be handled in such a way where just
one individual is doing everything because he may or maybe not be biased. It is
quite easy to influence one single individual. I do not suspect the integrity of any
of the Imams but it is more exposed situation whereas a board of scholars coming
from all over the world seems to me a safe sort of institution". Again the religious
scholars expressed similar opinions and the response to this was instigate change
from within the community. Dr. Badawi explains, "We need time to educate
ourselves and apply it for ourselves and that is the responsibility of the
community. The responsibility of the community is to live up to Sharia because it
is part of ikaada. So if we are going to live up to the Sharia voluntarily not by the
force of law we have to resolve issues as part of the community". The function of
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Shariah Councils must remain within the private sphere, under the control and
auspices of the Muslim community".
4.10.3 The Establishment of an Official Shariah Council
In chapter 1, we explored the conceptual difficulties of the term 'legal pluralism'
and its inability to incorporate notions of identity, difference and belonging within
diasporic communities in the West. A critique of literature on community dispute
resolution also found that constructions of 'community' and 'dispute resolution'
to be unified and articulated around the boundaries of community insider/outsider.
Undoubtedly, the emergence of Shariah Councils in Britain challenges these
presuppositions and we can apply the notion of 'semi-autonomous social field'
(Moore 1973) to illustrate the existence of multiple forms of legal ordering within
diasporic Muslim communities. This process is not resistant to state law and does
not challenge the hegemonic dominance of state law.
Yet recent developments in Canada 111
 have led to renewed calls for the official
establishment of a Shariah Council in Britain, a form of state legal pluralism
(Woodman 1998). This proposal recently gained momentum at a seminar entitled
"Muslim Personal law" held at the Islamic Cultural Centre in London, on 22nd
August 2004. At this seminar over 80 delegates from Shariah Councils across the
country discussed the possibility of establishing a single Shariah Council in
Britain and the possibility of Britain establishing a parallel legal system for
Muslims in the sphere of family law. Those subscribing to this view included
numerous local Shariah Councils, the 'Union of Muslim Organisations' and the
'Muslim Parliament' who argue that communal homogeneity provides clearer
guidance and authority for British Muslims, seeking to resolve matters from an
Islamic perspective. Even though they are ostensibly opposed to any state
intervention in the organizational affairs of Shariah Councils, it is interesting to
note that state funding and legitimacy are sought after. The reference point for all
"In October 2003 at a conference in Etobicoke, Ontario Canada, Muslim delegates elected a 30-
member council to establish the 'Islamic Institute of Civil Justice'. This coupled with changes to
the Canadian Arbitration Act 1991 has made it possible for Muslim communities to draw upon this
body and enforce 'Muslim' settlements. This has led to extensive debate in Canada on the rights
and autonomy of Muslim women being undermined. See Rhijn (2003).
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Muslims would be this new body yet there was no discussion regarding its
structural power or whether enforcing this right for Muslims would mean
infringing upon other the individual right that may have more value to others.
Maulana Abu Saeed Chairman of the ISC and one of the organizers of the seminar
stated:
After twenty-two years of existence and exercise, we are presenting
ourselves to this elite audience with our evaluation of the phenomenon
and vision for the future to take matters further with your invaluable
suggestions, advice and cooperation. We think and hope that if
concerned Muslims from legal and socio-political spectrum of society
put their concerted efforts with us to persuade the British Authority to
recognize Muslim Personal Law as they did in British India or in line
with the recent Canadian recognition of Muslim Personal Law, or at
least the British Judiciary's sympathy to the Jewish community's code
of 'GET' in as far as divorce is concerned it will be a historic step and
a harmonious relationship between the host and guest communities.
Those contributing to the seminar identified themselves as belonging to a
'collective religious identity' in an all-or-nothing manner. They organized
themselves around the categories of 'Muslim community', 'homeland' and
'belonging' with little if any discussion on the complexities these categories may
entail. For example Dr. Pasha at UMO, explained,
The Muslim community they have to be governed by Allah's order.
The Muslim family law is the holy Qu'ran, there is nothing we can do
about this. If a Muslim says I don't want to be governed by these
laws that means they're not a Muslim and they have to get out of
Is lam. If they can give it to us in India why not here?
These Muslim scholars draw upon the introduction of Muslim Personal Law
Codes in India introduced by the British to advocate a similar approach in Britain.
In so doing they reject the argument that the use of religious personal law in India
was adopted to divide communities and, remains deeply problematic in its
concretisation of Islamic norms and values (see Fyzee 1963). Of course as data in
this study suggests not all religious scholars are in favour of such developments.
For example, 3 religious scholars revealed their deep concerns about such a
development with Muslims being regulated and governed by the Shariah Law in
Britain. Dr Badawi remarked, "uniformity of the law is central in ensuring that
justice is served to all members of society" and "there should be just one legal
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system which should be applied to all". Similarly Sheikh Abdullah stated, "I do
understand why some people want this development but it's a small minority,
more of a political slogan than anything else. You cannot incorporate two
systems into one especially when they are based on two very different ideas, one
is secular and the other divine". This cautious approach was further echoed by
Dr. Nasim who emphasized that the 'legitimacy' of the Shariah must remain in the
private sphere. There was also concern that the establishment of a single Shariah
Council could undermine the autonomy and independence of the Muslim
community. For Dr. Badawi "the responsibility of the community is to live up to
the Sharia because it is part of our 'ikada".
Whilst these scholars emphasised the need for all Muslims to abide by the Shariah
they argued that the ethics of Muslim law permitted these processes to remain
within the private spheres of family, home and community. In this scenario
conflicts of law may arise but their resolution would take place without the
intervention of state law. Dr. Badawi explains, "what we are doing now is trying
to resolve issues, to keep the identity of our community, to keep its laws, to keep
it whole, while at the same time not breaking the law of the state. . . to use our own
private language while speaking the common language" (1996:80). He argues
that uniformity of the law is central in ensuring that justice is served to all
members of society. He states that there should be "just one legal system which
should be applied to all" and points to the practical difficulties in applying two
different legal systems that are in fact based upon two completely different
notions, one secular and the other based on divine law. In fact to implement and
set up the Sharia would be 'Unislamic' as Shariah law can only be implemented in
a Muslim country. Whether these disputes are resolved within a local, national or
international context these debates are constructed in fairly essentialist terms. For
example all the councils reported that diversity within and between Shariah
Councils means that Muslims have the option to choose between the various
councils available. That Muslim communities should be allowed to compete
individually and to establish their authorities individually. Mohammed Raza
explained, "It is impossible to bring and wait for a unified opinion on any of these
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issues and I think that the attitude towards resolving these issues should always be
of flexibility".
Yet this model of Muslim unity as intensified with the emergence of the 'Islamic
Council of Europe' (see Nielsen 1998) lobbying on behalf of the interests of
Muslims at a European wide level (see Modood 2003). The emphasis here is upon
the language of community, 'difference' and human rights guaranteeing the
freedoms necessary for the full realization of the demands of the Muslim
community. Freedom of religious belief and practice in the context of personal
laws are thus transformed from the private realm into the civil jurisdiction and
accomodation is premised on identification with the Muslim umma (community)
and Muslim identity on difference (see Sarat and Berkowitz 1998: 95). In fact the
very emergence of such a force reflects that the reality of plurality may prove a
constraint for those deemed outside this idea of a unified Muslim umma
(community).
4.10.4 The 'Complementary Approach'
The MLSC has embarked upon developing a 'complementary' approach between
English Family law and Muslim Personal Laws but one that avoids any conflict
between the two. In doing so they have introduced a Muslim marriage contract
that stipulates the grounds for divorce and the rights of Muslim women seeking
divorce (See Appendix 1). This contract stipulates the rights of the Muslim
woman within an Islamic framework but allows flexibility of a woman to "divorce
herself if there is a need" (Badawi 1995:112). Dr. Badawi concedes however that
"we are now trying to make it a standard marriage certificate all over Britain but I
don't know whether we will be successful or not. We have in this country Shariah
councils and groups of scholars who are very conservative and who are not really
ready to embrace to accept any change". There have also been developments in
curbing the use of talaq where the presence of two reliable witnesses is needed.
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4.10.5 The Jewish Beth Din
For many scholars developments in the Jewish communities" 2
 and the
'recognition' of the rabbinical courts identified as the 'Jewish Beth Din' provides
the impetus for developing a complementary approach. The London Beth Din is
headed by the Chief Rabbi Dr Jonathan Sacks.
In Britain non-state dispute resolution mechanisms must operate within the ambit
of the law as they are subject to civil or criminal action thus they can use state
law, making their decisions subject to a binding contract in the case of the Jewish
Beth Din. This court was established under Jewish religious law and stipulates
that all those who wish to use its services must accept the provisions of the
Arbitration Act 1979:
In Jewish Law, Jewish parties are forbidden to take their civil disputes
to a secular court and are required to have those disputes adjudicated
by a Beth Din. The LBD sits as an arbitral tribunal in respect of civil
disputes and the parties to any such dispute are required to sign an
Arbitration Agreement prior to a Hearing taking place. The effect of
this is that the award given by the Beth Din has the full force of the
Arbitration Award and may be enforced (with prior permission of the
Beth Din) by the civil courts113.
Cownie and Bradney point out that the issue of choice over whether or not the
individual wishes to use these alternative bodies is crucial as "in the case of state
courts the state itself can compel the presence of one of the parties to an action but
in this context it seems that parties are obliged to take part in the proceedings
whether they want to or not" (1996:7). The parallels with the Muslim community
are two-fold. Firstly Jewish women have had similar problems in obtaining a
religious divorce the Get. And, secondly some Muslim scholars advocate a
complementary approach whereby the state intervenes to resolve disputes
generated by personal religious laws. For example to ensure that Jewish women
are able to obtain a religious divorce from their husbands the Divorce (Religious
Marriages) Act 2002 stipulates that the husband or the wife will now be able to
apply for an order that a decree of divorce is not to be made absolute until they
have both produced to the court a declaration that they have taken such steps as
112 1t is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the parallels in any depth but see Berg (1994).
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are required to dissolve the marriage in accordance with Jewish law. Furthermore
the court has discretion whether or not to grant such an order and will only grant it
if is "satisfied that in all the circumstances of the case it is just and reasonable to
do so" and the court can cancel the order at any time (see Faith and Levine
2003:13).
Religious scholars such as Dr. Nasim (BSC) and Dr.Badawi (MLSC) are in favour
of such developments rather than a strict parallel legal system for Muslims. Dr
Nasim explained, "The Beth Din is just like us there is no difference at all. They
are local just like we are and they function in the community just like we do. We
are not really courts of law in the sense that we cannot enforce our decisions but
we have a moral authority and position within the community and in the sense that
our people would listen to us. I mean a woman for example would never go and
re-marry without a certificate from a Shariah Council to say that she is eligible for
remarriage".
4.11 Conclusion
To acquire an understanding of how Shariah Councils constitute as unofficial
dispute resolution bodies in Britain we must engage with empirical research.
Thus, in this chapter, we have drawn upon research data to explore the complex
ways in which these processes shape the intersection of official law with
unofficial law. And this intersection involves more than the fact that there may be
a conflict of laws scenario. What this data reveals is that the duality of law and
unofficial law is misleading and fails to capture the complex ways in which these
'legal processes' shape the patterns of dispute resolution for Muslims in Britain.
A very brief summary of the findings in this chapter reveals how gender relations
are introduced, redefined and appropriated in a social field of power constituted
by the Shariah Council. The important question about gender relations and power
relates to "how particular cultural conceptions and practices become embedded"
(Merry 1998:46) into these bodies. For example, the data reveals that the process
of dispute resolution is 'gendered' to produce particular outcomes. The
"3 For more information see http://www.unitedsynagogue.org.uk/ibd.html
contradiction of a traditional interpretation of the role of women in Islam with the
complex realities of these women's lives is neither explored nor challenged by the
religious scholars as the meanings of culture and religion are understood as
homogeneous and fixed. At the same time, these bodies do provide the normative
framework for disputes to be resolved from particular Islamic perspectives.
A second fmding relates to the internal contestation of power within these bodies.
As discussed in chapter 1 Yilmaz argues, "Muslims do not only wish to be
regulated by the principles of Islamic law when they are living in a non-Muslim
state; they also seek to formalize such an arrangement within the states own legal
system" (Yilmaz 2001:299). Yet empirical data in this study found little support
or enthusiasm for such a development. The apparent unitj of Muslims presented
in such literature bears little resemblance to the diversity on the ground. For
example, there are conflicts over the different approaches to dispute resolution
and differences over the interpretation of Islamic principles relating to divorce and
interpersonal conflicts within these bodies. In his study, Geaves reports on
conflicts between Imams based at Shariah Councils and those who have attempted
to resolve and conciliate in conflicts between different groups fighting for control
of mosques in Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester (Geaves 1996:175).' 14 The
fact that a Shariah Council may provide space for Muslims to resolve marital
disputes away from the context of a western secular framework does not imply
that these local settings predetermine a more suitable outcome. Existing literature
presents the process as almost mechanical, structured and fixed. For example
Pearl states that "proceedings in the English court will exacerbate the difficulties
and an imposed solution will be unacceptable to the cultural expectations of the
parties" with little understanding of conflict, resistance and diversity within
"cultural groups" (1986:32).
This is not of course to deny that Muslims do not adhere to a complex set of
unofficial Muslim laws clearly many do. However empirical research suggests
this process is multifaceted and complex as different levels of adherence are not
114 For a fascinating account of the different Bareiwi traditions practised in 3 different mosques in
Birmingham see Geaves (1996:169-192).
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only contextual upon factors of time, social context and the specific branches of
Muslim law but also in relation to gender and identity. Identities must be
understood as dynamic, fluid and contested within Muslim communities,
especially relating to women and the laws of marriage and divorce. The
dichotomous approach that posits 'law' and unofficial law as opposite and in
conflict consequently it fails to explore the spaces 'in between, the sites of
resistance and change. Undoubtedly, as empirical data suggests, this is a dynamic
process, but one which is also contested. This leads us to the final chapter in the
study drawing upon interview data to explore the experiences of 25 Pakistani
Muslim women using Shariah Councils in Britain to obtain a religious divorce.
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CHAPTER 5
MUSLIM MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SHARIAH COUNCILS:
TILE EXPERIENCE OF BRITISH PAKISTANI MUSLIM WOMEN
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 4, we drew upon empirical findings to identify the significance of
Shariah Councils operating as unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms within
local Muslim communities. Rather than just try to establish a detailed analyses of
each Shariah Council, the chapter scrutinised the process of dispute resolution
with particular emphasis on the practice of mediation and reconciliation, to
consider whether this led to the unequal treatment of women. Indeed what
emerges from this discussion is the contradictory and at times ambiguous position
women seem to occupy in this process. It would seem that in this context, the
'meaning' of reconciliation becomes less a matter of resolving the marital dispute,
and more a process to establish the grounds for divorce. The concern here,
however, is that we fail to analyse this process from the perspective of female
users. The primary task of this chapter therefore is to draw upon interview data
with 25 Pakistani Muslim women to analyse their experiences of using a Shariah
Council to obtain a Muslim divorce.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 5.2 focuses on the
Islamic marriage process, the nikah. In chapter 3 we drew upon interview data to
analyse the types of marriages found in this sample. Within each category of
marriage we discovered that the decision-making power of women to be located
in the family and home and often dependant upon a number of different and
conflicting set of factors. Here we draw our attention to the meanings attached to
the Muslim marriage, in order to evaluate its importance from the standpoint of
the women. In particular we explore how women are able to mobilize cultural and
religious resources in the diasporic space of 'Muslim marriage' and analyse the
'symbolic power' associated with the nikah (Baudrillard 1998). A related matter,
of course, involves exploring the reasons why such marriages may not be
registered according to civil law and we go onto outline the statutory provisions
available in dealing with Muslim marriages.
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Following these discussions on Muslim marriage, section 5.4 explores the reasons
for marriage breakdown and divorce. An understanding of the factors involved
allow us to assess the ways in which the 'family' and 'community' may seek to
prevent and/or facilitate this process. Official dispute resolution services, include
the option of family mediation, available to all. 115
 Yet this form of family
mediation embodies a hegemonic set of practices produced to uncover similar
deep underlying issues that keep the dispute manageable and confined.
Consequently, one way of reading the discourse on dispute resolution is this
perceived juxtaposition between official and unofficial processes, neatly parcelled
into the public/private divide. Very little is said on the privatized form of 'family
mediation', which takes place in the private sphere of family and home and its
interaction with the state. In focussing merely on official family mediation, there
is a danger of a partial analysis which privileges public space and ignores the
multiple subjective experiences of women utilising privatized forms of family
mediation. Accordingly we have very little understanding of how the women
engage in this 'diasporic space' represented by the Shariah Council.
The fmal section moves onto analyse the experiences of 25 Pakistani Muslim
women using Shariah Councils to obtain a Muslim divorce." 6
 We explore the
reasons why contact was made with a Shariah Council(s), examine the nature of
this contact and most importantly consider whether this process affected the
autonomy of the women in any way. In particular we focus on the bargaining
strategies adopted by the women during the process of mediation and
reconciliation. This leads us on to briefly explore the ways in which the religious
divorce process interacts with civil law procedures of dissolution of marriage. In
doing so, it moves beyond discussions of 'legal pluralism' to consider the
practical implications of resolving family law matters under the 'shadow of the
law' (Griffiths 1997:10). If we understand this unique process of dispute
' The main body which regulates the role of solicitors using mediation is the Solicitors Family
Law Association. The SFLA have a code of conduct a set of guidelines of when mediation is to be
applied.
1 6 As discussed in chapter 3 most South Asian Muslims in Britain belong to the Hanafi school of
thought and this was reflected in the sample of women. The issue of marriage and divorce under
Islamic law will draw primarily from this school of thought.
201
resolution, as one that is based on a variety of cultural and religious values and
practices, culminating in differing 'cultural translations' (Bhabha 1997:130) we
are able to conceptualise the experiences of these women beyond the
particularities of belonging to an ethnic and religious collective. As Bhabha points
out, "Ambivalence and antagonism accompany any act of cultural translation
because negotiating with the 'difference of the other' reveals the radical
insufficiency of our own systems of meaning and application" (1997:133).
5.2 The 'nikah' (Muslim Marriage)
In order to understand the complexities of the nikah process, we must draw upon
the expansive and wide-ranging literature from within the disciplines of Muslim
theology, jurisprudence, philosophy and Muslim Family Law (see Rahman 1983,
Nasir 1990, Esposito 1987, Engineer 1994, Welchman 2000). This literature,
traces developments of the nikah in the different schools of Islamic thought to its
judicial interpretation in jurisdictions ranging from North Africa, South Asia to
the Middle East. Of course it is beyond the remit of this study to engage in these
debates in any depth but what we can discern from this literature is that the nikah
is neither homogeneous in theory nor unified in practice (see also Ali 2001).
What is not in doubt however, is the centrality of the nikah in the construction of
the 'Muslm family' (see Nasir 1990, Ali 2000).
Most commentators agree that the nikah contract provides the framework for
procreation and children (Mulla 1995:387). Ali points out, "The central idea in
Muslim Family law in the institution of nikah or marriage. Almost every legal
concept revolves around the central focal point of the status of the marriage. It is
through marriage that the paternity of children is established and relationship and
affinity are traced" (2002:157). Thus the intersection of religion and law under
Islam has been described as a 'symbiotic relationship' (Siddiqui 1996:46). The
requisites of a valid nikah contract include 'legal capacity' (individual to be of
sound mind and has reached puberty), consent, acceptance and the dower or
mahr.'17
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In Britain, the nikah encapsulates a contested space where 'religion' and 'law'
interact and highlight the complex realities of the process of marriage for British
Pakistani Muslims. Existing literature, however, posits official law against
unofficial law and as such, documents the conflicts of law scenario between the
two 'systems' while outlining the concessions granted by English law (Menski
and Pearl 1998, Poulter 1998, Yilmaz 2001). Yet this conceptualisation rarely
explores the dynamics, which underpin this process. In this context, the religious
marriage and divorce are pushed to the periphery where state law fails to
recognise their importance and influence in the lives of Muslims in Britain.
Indeed by assuming that all religious personal laws are bound by a similar set of
religious norms and cultural practices, ignores the diversity and multifaceted
nature this process entails. As we shall see the experiences of Muslim women
participating in this 'diasporic space', articulates with a complex web of relations
based upon notions of belonging and resistance to the disjunctures of time, place
and tradition (Bhabba 1994: 127; see also Hall 1996).
5.2.1 Validity of the nikah under English Law
Before we analyse the subjective experiences of the women, it is useful to briefly
outline the validity of the Muslim marriage under English law. In a context where
women engage in a plural set of legal 'practices' the ambiguity surrounding the
legitimacy of religious marriage in Britain can have adverse consequences for
them, as discussed later in section 5.7 of this chapter.
At present all marriages, which take place in Britain, must be conducted within
the framework of the Marriage Acts 1949-1994. Under this framework, Jews and
Quakers are afforded special treatment whereby they retain the right to determine
who should marry couples, when and where, leading to concern that other
minority groups are denied equal recognition (Poulter 1998). In response, the
government has published a White Paper with proposals to put all non-Anglican
marriages on an equal footing.'18
117 For discussion on the elements within a Muslim marriage contract see Doj (1984:56).
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According to most scholars, the Muslim marriage contract, the nikah, contracted
in England is not recognised as a valid marriage (Ahsan 1995:22, Menski and
Pearl 1998:167) even if the parties believed the marriage to be valid (Yilmaz
2000:4). Yet as Probert (2000: 399-400)" demonstrates, recent developments in
case law have brought to the fore the contentious issue of when a religious
marriage is deemed valid, void, non-existent or presumed in English law. She
questions, "How strong is the presumption in favour of marriage at the start of the
twenty-first century? Is it possible to presume that a valid marriage has taken
place where there is evidence that the only known ceremony was invalid?"
(2002:399). In other words, what status should be given to marriages that are
celebrated outside the provisions of the Marriage Act 1949 but where the parties
believe the marriages to be valid?
Recent case law has raised conflicting issues regarding the validity of a religious
marriage. In Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath' 2° the courts addressed the issue of
the validity of a religious marriage in an unlicensed building. In A-M v A-M'21
and Gandhi v Pate! 122
 the courts discussed the validity of polygamous ceremonies
in the private sphere, challenging the basis upon what constitutes as a valid
marriage. Probert points out that both rulings have only further increased the
confusion as to what is deemed as a valid religious marriage. For example in Bath
the courts ruled the marriage was valid on the basis that there was no "provisions
invalidating it" (Probert 2002:401). Hence due to the fact that the marriage could
not be deemed void it was concluded to be a valid marriage. This contrasts with
ruling in Gandhi v Pate! and A-M, where it was held the applicants had "failed in
multiple respects to comply with the formal requirements of the Marriage Acts,
and therefore. . .was incapable of creating a marriage recognised as such under
English law" (Probert 2002: 403). Such case law, on the validity of a religious
118 See White Paper "Civil Registration: Vital Change- Birth, Marriage and Death Registration in
the Twenty-First Century" (Cm5355, 2002) 1992.
119 Probert provides a fascinating historical account of the British institution of marriage in and
how it continues to be deeply influenced by English history to maintain its privileged status.
120 (2000) 1 FLR 8.
121 (2001) 2 FLR 6.
' 22 (2001)1FLR 603.
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marriage demonstrates that this area of law continues to be ambiguous and
unclarified.
Presently, all religious marriages taking place at unlicensed buildings must have
their marriage registered to give it legal validity. One requirement here is that in
order for the building to qualify, it must be a 'separate building' and 'a place of
meeting for religious worship'.' 23 Consequently the majority of mosques have
been excluded from this process, as many mosques are part of larger buildings,
that include community centres. Thus in 1998 there were only 109 mosques in
which a marriage could take place, out of 561 that were certified as public places
of worship. Thus, only 189 Muslim marriages were recorded as taking place in
1998 (see Probert 2002:408).124
There is another interesting development regarding the validity of nikah under
English law and this relates to marriages conducted abroad. For application of law
in relation to personal matters it is the law of the domicile, which is taken into
account under the English legal system (see Hamilton 1997). In this sample, there
were 5 marriages conducted in Pakistan and upon return to Britain 3 women,
chose to register their marriages according to civil law with the remaining 2
choosing not to do so. This situation has led to a conflict of laws scenario
whereby individuals and practitioners are confused as to the validity of a religious
marriage conducted abroad. In his study Warraich (2001) points out that for
British Pakistanis the nikah contracted in Pakistan is a valid form of marriage and
that second generation Pakistanis are under Pakistani Law dual nationals.
Alongside the failure of English family law to recognize the pace of social change
in South Asia (in its understanding of Muslim family law) he emphasizes the rigid
application of forced marriages within diasporic communities that have
contributed to this confusing situation as to when a religious marriage is a valid
marriage (2001:13).125 In an attempt to clarify the issue he points out that if a
woman has not registered her marriage in the UK she "can seek to have her
123 Marriage Act s.41(1).
124	
statistics have been taken from ONS Marriage, divorce and adoption statistics, 1998
(London: Stationery Office, 2000) Tables, 3.43 and 3.42.
125 English Civil marriages are recognized as valid in Pakistan.
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marriage validated in Pakistan because non mere registration of marriage can be
done at any time" (2001:46). What we can discern from this study is the link
between local, national and global legal processes, interacting and intermeshing in
this space of religious marriage. Empirically there are grounds to suggest that
some women are willing to access remedies in other jurisdictions such as
Pakistan, where the marriage may have taken place. And, as data in this study
suggests women are actively involved in developing strategies to remedy their
situation(s). Nevertheless it would be wrong to conclude that reconceptualizing
these conflicts from one legal sphere in Britain to that of Pakistan necessarily
provides a solution to these problems. These issues must instead be understood as
part of the entanglement of law, identity and belonging and must take into account
the complex social dynamics and identifications associated with the marriage
process. For example, in this study of those women who married in Pakistan, 4
categorically stated they did not wish to use remedies available in Pakistan for a
number of reasons. As one interviewee put it,
This is my home, I'm British and this is where I want the law to help me. I
don't want to go back to Pakistan certainly not after what I've been out
through.'26
5.2.2 Locating the 'Self' in the nikah
In this section, we discuss the experiences of the women in one aspect of the
Muslim marriage process, the nikah. In doing so we interrogate this space of
religious marriage to explore how the women in this sample, were able to
challenge, resist, accept, redefine or displace its 'boundaries'. It is the underlying
notions of power that we are particularly interested in. The fact that women
inhabit a pivotal space in this process of religious marriage means we are able to
explore their relationship in the context of the social, discursive and individual
relations of power. For example, how did they perceive the functional aspect of
the nikah, what procedures do they rely upon and what outcomes did their
participation produce? It is from this perspective that we critique the limitations
of existing literature that describes such a complex process as merely fulfilling the
126 This raises a different set of questions on utilizing national and international legal remedies that
cannot be addressed here.
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o Very Important
o Important
o Not Important
4
requirements of Muslim marriage from a religious and cultural perspective (see
Mirza 1989, Hiro 1991:159; and Hamilton 1995:74 Menski 1999, Yilmaz 2003).
Of the sample, 22 women emphasised the 'importance' of participating in the
nikah process. This is outlined in the figure 5.1 below and while bearing in mind
that this chart does not capture the complexities of why the nikah was described in
such terms, it serves as a useful starting point for a closer analysis.
Figure 5.1 The Nikah Ceremony
3
The framing of this discussion in terms of 'importance' reflects its perception with
the women in this sample. While it seems that for some women being married
'under the eyes of God' not only represented an important symbolic marker of
their religious identity but also publicly displayed their membership to the Muslim
'Umma' (Muslim community), other women did not conceive the nikah in such
terms.
I've never questioned it, its all part of being a Muslim. If you're a Muslim
you would have one... it doesn't even have to be that you're really religious.
Getting married in God's eyes is more important than getting married for
English law (Raheela, London).
I very much saw the civil side of it as something that we just had to do. Had
I never had that I would have still felt very married because I had the nikah
because that's a very sombre, a very real experience (Anisa, Bradford).
The registry marriage was a formality, it was the nikah that was important.
It's the 'nikah' that's binding in the Islamic setting and its at that point
whether you have the registry marriage or not that you're considered to be
married by people in the family, the conmrnnity you know people who know
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you, know your family. Were all Muslims and we know what's important to
us (Sameena, Birmingham).
Well the Islamic marriage is very important for me. I could get married in a
civil registry office and not regard myself as married, I might be legally
married but I wouldn't be married in my heart and in my mind (Fauzia,
London).
The nikah was very important to me and it was at that point I felt married.
But we did both feel it was important for us to also register the marriage. I'm
a British Muslim so in a way both ceremonies kind of represent who I am.
For me it completed my marriage.., and of course the law gave me
protection, I understood that (Noreen, Birmingham).
It's difficult to explain what it means. Its not the most crucial thing for
Muslims but I guess we all do it cause that's just the way it works. I mean it
doesn't make me feel any more Muslim than I already feel.. .if that's what
you mean? (Farhana, Birmingham).
Thus for many interviewees the nikah was seen to encapsulate a part of their
religious identities as Muslims in Britain. However, for some it was simply
fulfilling the requirements of Muslim Law, whereas for others it held great
significance and formed an integral part of their Muslim identity. Yet most
women also acknowledged ambivalence as to the practical requirements of the
nikah and we now draw upon interview data to explore the relationship between
autonomy and the space during the nikah ceremony.
5.2.3 The nikah Ceremony
In her study, Mirza describes the marriage process for Muslims in Britain as ". . .a
series of discrete events each with a particular function, with its own customs and
traditions, all contained within a firm but not unvariable order. Many of these
events have a well-established lineage and, crossing geographical and cultural
boundaries, have retained similarities across very different contemporary Muslim
societies" (2000:4). She goes onto analyse the changes and transformations of the
marriage process for the British Muslim diaspora in Britain and, this includes the
extra dimension of the register office ceremony (2000:4). Thus from this
perspective the marriage process is more than merely tautological and is construed
as embodying socially transformative norms. The 'sites' of religious and civil
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marriage are transformed by the emergence of hybrid cultural and religious
practices and the process is open to change, contestation and interpretation.
Moreover, the nikah ceremony itself only constitutes one aspect of the Pakistani
marriage process. Werbner, drawing on her extensive work with British Pakistanis
in Manchester, outlines the marriage process as four-fold: the Mehdi, the nikah,
the Rukhsati and finally the Valima with each step constituting a move away from
sexual chastity and moving towards sexuality (1990:46). Mirza explains, "Each
step marks a further stage in the alteration of the condition of the bride and groom,
as those forbidden from expressions of their sexuality, and prohibited to one
another, to their recognition as sexually active individuals on the conjugal unit.
The sequence of marriage events is therefore an explicitly transformative process
with each stage utlising colour, space and the gaze in a specific manner, each
defming and signifying the sexual state of the couple- with particular focus upon
the bride- at each point in this process" (2000:9). From this perspective the
marriage process embodies the confluence of the past and the present, whereby
notions of 'homeland' and 'belonging' illustrate new cultural idioms in which
new forms of hybridity emerge. Badawi points out that these customary
ceremonials are merely customs and in reality have no place within Islamic law
(1995:57).
Yet exactly what these processes symbolize to the women in this sample, raises
interesting questions not only regarding how these processes create a new 'space'
but also the understandings attached to the marriage process.' 27
 Thus while this
process purports to balance family expectations and traditions on the one hand
with individual choice on the other, in practice the process inhabits a gendered
social space based on social and spatial divisions that constitute gendered Muslim
space (Mirza 2000:19). It is within this space that we can explore the experiences
of the women in this sample and in microcosm we can how see this process can
both involve and sideline women.
127 Due to the limitations of the study, we focus on one aspect of the marriage process only, the
nikah.
209
5.2.4 Consent in nikah
As discussed above, one of the essential elements in the nikah contract is the free
consent of the individual contracting into marriage. Ali explains the significance
of this consent as, ". . . the focal point on which this entire debate rests appears to
be the legal competence of the adult female, a capacity which is considered
suspect" (2001:165). Even bearing in mind that of the four Sunni schools of
thought in Islam, the Hanafi's advocate an adult woman to marry in her own right,
this creates a sense of ambiguity and confusion as to what is understood as
consent. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, in Britain most Pakistani's are of
Sunni origin and belong to Hanafi school of thought, hence the implication of
such ambiguities being transmitted to Pakistani Muslim women in relation to
marriage are potentially huge.
In Islamic law, the issue of consent in marriage has largely been discussed in the
context of marriage "of a minor and the role of the guardian" and the way in
which consent may be assured is problematic" (Siddiqui 1996:52).128 It is
accepted that a lack of consent from the woman invalidates the marriage and the
principle of Kafa'a 129 which is the principle of compatibility and/or equality, may
give the power to the guardian to apply to a Qadi to set aside the marriage.
Siddiqui points out that, "There is a tension running through the Hanafi
arguments; family involvement in the arrangement of marriages is part of the
social fabric and yet men and women, having reached legal majority, have the
right to choose their own partners" (1996:53). Hence under the laws of marriage a
woman may be given the right to choice and demand consent in marriage but that
her position is ultimately subordinate to that of her father or guardian and that "the
ties that bind a woman to her male relatives ensure both her protection and
subjugation" (Siddiqui 1996:53). This analysis seems to suggest that the principle
of consent in Muslim family law maybe counterposed to the complex lived
128 For example a refusal or abstention to the marriage may constitute as consent. See Welchman
(2000).
129 This takes into account six considerations including, descent, Islam, profession, freedom, good
character and wealth. It effectively means that a Muslim women may only marry to someone her
equal and not of lower status. See Siddiqui (1996).
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realities of Muslim women's lives. And, consequently we are engaging with a
complex understanding of consent in marriage.
With regard to findings in this study as discussed in chapter 3, marriage embodies
a wide range of experiences for Pakistani Muslim women, based upon practical
compromises to social strategies and for some, coercion and compulsion to marry.
It is within this dynamic lived experience, closely related to their identities as
British Pakistani Muslim women that we can explore what consent in Muslim
marriage means to them and how it interacts with the process of nikah.
Within this context all the women underlined the importance of the principle of
consent to marry in Islam. They often used expressions of "being empowered"
and "belonging" with the emphasis on the equality between the sexes in Islam.
Here, differences did emerge in the sample of women in relation to those who saw
themselves on a spiritual quest and thus drawing upon Islamic thought, to those
who were less practicing but still identified themselves as Muslims. There were
however no discernable differences between those women of a Punjabi or Azad
Kashmiri background, and discussion focused on developing a fuller
understanding of marriage in Islam.
When my parents starting talldng about getting married I started reading
around what marriage in Islam actually means. What I read made sense to
me. As a Muslim woman I have the choice to marry whoever I want as long
as he's a Muslim. My parents wanted me to have an arranged marriage
because that's what Pakistanis do and I understood that was important to
them. I'm not saying that culture isn't important to me, cause I love
speaking Punjabi and everything else but I wanted to choose who I could
marry and Islam gave me that (Sadia, Birmingham).
I've read quite a bit around Islam and Muslim women and rights in marriage
and all that.. .1 understand its very important to make sure a woman gives
her consent. But I think most parents still want to give their consent to who
you marry, even if they're a Muslim, they still think that's the most
important thing. So I had to sit my parents down and talk to them, you
know, explain that it's my consent that matters! (Shabana, London).
Retaining an understanding of marriage and Islam the women were thus able to
interrogate and in some cases challenge the existing power relations in the family
and home. In this way it was critically important for them to engage with the
negotiation process and to see solutions through various kinds of religious
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appropiation (see Merry 2001:50). Au, points out that under Muslim law a
Muslim woman does have the capacity to enter into a marriage contract without
the consent of her parents but she accepts that "the notion of a woman being able
to exercise her choice by entering into a contract of marriage is seen as an affront
to the male honour as she is considered the izzat of the family and negotiating a
marriage contract with a male without an intermediary poses a threat to existing
social structures" (2002:167). This was confirmed by fmdings in this study. For
example the women emphasized how their decision-making abilities to negotiate
were limited within the cultural framework of the family but that Islam provided
clearer guidance. With some interviews this led to discussion on how full
religious observation and how wearing the hijab had enabled the women to create
a space to challenge marriages arranged by parents (see Afshar 1994). Of the
sample 2 women wore the hijab and these women did not identify themselves as
Pakistanis but as Muslims and instead only drew upon their cultural backgrounds
to forge links with family and local communities.
More importantly, for those women who had been forced into marriage the
strength of redefming marriage according to the tenets of Islam lay in the struggle
between a search for transforming oppressive cultural practices and seeking to
express themselves as British Muslims. As one interviewee explained,
I wasn't allowed to say no, so no my permission wasn't even a factor. For
me, Islam was a way of telling my parents that I did have rights as a woman.
As a Muslim woman, I have the right to choose (Zareena, Bradford).
The issue of forced marriage under Muslim family law in Muslim literature has
been discussed around the principle of the 'option of puberty' (khiyar-al-bulugh)
a measure designed to free those women who have been forced into marriage.
There is no divine revelation on this issue but has been discussed among the
various Islamic schools of thought (See Engineer 1992). In Hanafi law, if a young
woman is forcibly married prior to puberty she can repudiate this contract once
she reaches puberty. Other Sunni law schools recognise this option in the case of
jest or duress (see Nasir 1990). Women are central to these debates and those
women who remain virgins are under the dictates of their fathers who are seen as
their guardians. As Menski and Pearl point out, "The woman only becomes
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capable of contracting herself in marriage when she ceases to be a virgin by
reason of a consummated marriage or an illicit sexual relationship" (1998:142).
Understanding how the issue of consent translates in this 'hybrid space' the
interview data reveals a reciprocal relationship between autonomy and control.
On the one hand the process can be described as managed and confined with little
input from the women. Yet at the same time the nikah contract, which forms the
basis of the nikah ceremony does assign women rights in marriage and divorce
and at this stage women are encouraged to enter into negotiations. We discuss the
practical realities of this aspect of the nikah ceremony in the next section.
In terms of where the nikah was performed it is useful to note that in Islam there
are no restrictions on where it can take place and in this study the nikah was
performed in the family home, the 'wedding hall' and the local mosque.
Interestingly there were no marriages performed in a licensed mosque according
to the Places of Worship Registration Act (1855) and only one interviewee had
checked prior to the religious marriage as to whether the mosque had been
registered as a licensed building. Unable to clarify this, she had gone ahead with
the nikah at the mosque, on the understanding that the marriage was due to be
registered, shortly afterwards. Again with this fmding there was little
differentiation according to class, education and/or sectarian differences. Eade
(1996) points out that the differences in the 'space' of where a nikah is conducted
largely depends upon family and cultural traditions and is created "purely by ritual
and sanctioned practice and is not dependant upon the creation of any juridically
claimed territory or formally consecrated space, or indeed, the production of
architecturally specific place" (1996: 231). At one level, this was confirmed by
findings in this study. A number of the women reported that the decision as to
where the nikah should take place was taken after lengthy discussions with
immediate and extended members of their family. It often rested on the dictates
of family and cultural traditions, at times both in Britain and Pakistan. Some
women described in great length the involvement of family and family friends in
the arranging the nikah ceremony which included the length of the ceremony, the
role of family members and the terms of the marriage contract but for others their
was little negotiation.
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My mum made it pretty clear that the nikah was going to happen in our
house. Apparently that's the way it's always been done in our family and yes
I was ok with that. She discussed it with me and I was ok with it (Nighat,
London).
We had the nikah first. My parents did that. We had it in the wedding hail
and the Imam came from his aunt. I think traditionally the Imam who
conducts the ceremony is meant to come from the groom's side they're
meant to provide you with the Imam. So the Imam came from the aunt and
he was known to the family for about 30- 40 years. He had done their aunts
marriage and all her brothers and sisters marriage in Pakistan (Fauzia,
London).
In terms of the length of the ceremony the experiences were all described as being
'quick' and 'short' and involved their minimum participation of the women in the
process. The extracts below from interview data illustrate this:
It was really quick, over in like 2 minutes. He asked me (the Imam) whether
I gave my consent and I said yes, I mean he only asked me once, which I
don't think is right. Then he said something in Arabic and that was it really.
All over in 2 minutes in my parent's front room (Sameena, Birmingham)
I don't remember much about it cause it happened so quickly but then I think
its meant to be like that in Islam, you know marriage is just a contract,
somebody asks you, you say yes and then that's it (Zareena Bradford).
Maybe I would have liked more involvement but I don't think its meant to
be a long and drawn out... practical thing, its more symbolic and that's what
it was, symbolic (Naheed, London)
However, the presence of witnesses at the nikah ceremony did generate interesting
discussion. Under Hanafi law, a contract can only be fulfilled in the presence of
witnesses, which can be either two males or one male and two females (see Nash
1990). More generally this process highlights the cultural significance and the
symbolic representation of the marriage process. Thus Mirza, points out that "the
presence of the witnesses is essential for the valid solemnization of a marriage as
their attendance ensures publicity, this being the decisive symbol that demarcates
the line between lawful wedlock and fornication or zina"(2000: 14). There is little
question then, of the significance of witnesses as they evoke a symbolic meaning
as well as constituting a physical presence in the nikah ceremony.
In this study, the witnesses in the nikah ceremony comprised of male members of
the family, including fathers, uncles and brothers. By contrast, female witnesses
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were involved in only two cases, involving female family friends. For the
purposes of this study by exploring the individual meanings attached to the nikah
we can begin to analyse the significance of the nikah contract for the women.
The husband and wife are not supposed to be in the same room. Basically
they pray and everything and make 'dawah'. There must be 3 witnesses
present and when he is ready they ask him, do you want to marry this
woman 3 times and he says yes and then he signs the certificate to make sure
he agrees and he's happy with the marriage. After that they come to me and I
was at my mum's house, 3 men come, 3 witnesses and they ask me d'you
want to marry this man and I said yes I do 3 times and then you sign the
book (Fareeda, Birmingham).
There's 2 witnesses from his side, 1 witness from my side. My witness was
my uncle and his witnesses was his 2 uncles. My part of it was that before
they come and do the nikah bit in the mosque they come and ask me whether
I agree to the marriage. I was at home and they came over, they asked me,
well they basically said you are getting married to such and such person and
do you agree to it and you have to say geehaa (yes) three times and that was
that, done. Then they go to him I'm not sure what happens in the mosque but
basically they ask him the same question. I think they do a lot of prayers
(Salma, London).
Women aren't allowed in the mosque so it was upstairs in my mum's house
and it was just us ladies in the room. Then they went to the mosque where he
was and they said to the maulvi the girl has said yes three times and she
signed this paper and that was the marriage certificate. Then he went through
more or less the procedure but its just a bit longer because what they do
before is give a bit of a lecture before the nikah itself you know they just tell
him about how they should look after a wife etc. After they ask him what
they asked me and I think the men have to say yes twice, I think so I'm not
quite sure and then basically then everyone congratulated him and then he
came to the hail where the reception took place. And that's it basically
everyone eats (Shabana, London).
I can't say its religious really because he didn't actually read anything from
the Qu'ran or give a sermon, like my brother got married recently it was
quite different and the chap who married them was from the London mosque
and he prepared a special sermon and made it quite a special occasion and
he's known for this. That's why it's so very different, each sermon or each
marriage contract is so different according to what the mullah is doing it
(Rabia, Birmingham).
Initially the Imam didn't ask me 3 times so my mum had to ask him to do
what he hadn't. He asked me just once and my mum had to go and get him
to do it properly and then he came and asked me 3 times (Fauzia, London).
On one level, these experiences symbolize the ambivalence associated with the
nikah as the process is neither straightforward nor unproblematic. The site of the
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nikah marks the physical presence of different parties including male witnesses,
the Imam, parents and family members. For some women this was difficult and
complex, as they did not feel involved in the process and the shared space. For
others, it simply involved their presence at this site and the meaning of nikah was
symbolic, on a deeply personal level. Yet all the women in this study did interact,
engage and identify with the nikah. Significantly for those women who had been
forced into marriage the nikah ceremony certainly marked the end of their attempt
to avoid marriage and was thus closely associated as a marker of discipline and
control. These women were more disengaged with the process than those women
who had participated in arranged marriage or chosen their own spouses. For the
women in the latter group the nikah was the most distinctive part of the Muslim
marriage process and they were able to move onto new sites and spaces.
It sort of marked a different status in the eyes of people. It was from then on
that I had the Status of coming into the family. I mean lots of doors opened
then, I mean socially and community wise that I wouldn't have had
otherwise (Anisa, Bradford).
Yet the discursive framework of the nikah is based on the specific gender
relations that underpin this process. The formal aspect of this process, the nikah
contract creates a more interesting space in which to challenge the unequal
cultural norms that maybe embedded in this ceremony.
5.2.5 Dower in the nikah
A final element of a nikah contract is the dower which has been described as "a
sum of money or other property which the wife is entitled to receive from the
husband in consideration of the marriage" (Mulla 1995 at 387 quoted in Ali
2001:158). The characteristics of what constitutes as the dower are however open
to dispute and as Ali points out, that rather than perceived as a form of
consideration it is largely understood as a debt to repaid to the wife by the
husband in event of death (2001:158). In this way the dower is understood as an
effect of the marriage contract and not an exchange for the marriage. The amount
216
of dower is expressly stipulated in the nikah contract and is classified as either
deferred or prompt.13°
Before we analyse the experiences of the women in this study, it is useful to
briefly draw upon Muslim feminist literature to explore the underlying premise
upon which the relationship between dower, Muslim women and the nikah
contract is based. Such aspects are of course bound up with the positionality of the
women within the socio-cultural setting of the marriage process and the family but
these critiques identify this relationship as interrelated rather than discrete from
the underlying relations of power. This approach opens up new avenues on the
symbolic space that the nikah constitutes.
It is largely accepted that the nikah in theory allows women "some legal
autonomy in order to bargain over her own destiny" (Haeril99O:57). Yet the
nature of this contract is subject to extensive critique with the underlying
assumptions of ownership and purchase within the contract and its legitimacy of a
patriarchal understanding of the male-female relationship. Thus it becomes
evident that for Muslim feminist scholars the concern is how the body becomes an
obvious site for sacrifice, discipline and control (see El-Nimr 1996, Abu-Odeh
1996). Coulson argues that the nikah contract constitutes a sale due to the 'transfer
of an absolute propriety" (1964:111). This is accepted by Haeri (1990) who
argues that the nikah embodies an inherent determinism which acts as a
justification for the existing sexual inequalities and explains, "Because marriage is
a contract from an Islamic point of view, the phenomenon of intercourse, vatye, is
inevitably intertwined with monetary exchanges. The underlying assumption here
is two-fold. First, as 'purchasers' in a contract of marriage, men are 'in charge' of
their wives because they pay for them and, naturally they ought to be able to
control their wives' activities. Secondly, women are required to submit that for
which they have been paid for, or promised to be paid. It follows therefore that
women ought to be obedient to their husbands" (Hareril99O:58). It is evident
therefore that the symbolic significance of the dower must be situated within the
to Islamic legal principles this payment can be paid promptly at the point of
marriage or deferred and to be paid after the breakdown of marriage. See Engineer 1992.
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context of the ideological construction of women in Islam. A construction that is
of course challenged by Muslim feminists (see Yai Mamani 1996).
If we move from this general discussion of dower to an analysis of the
experiences of the women in this sample, we can see how this process generates a
number of interesting outcomes. There are three key issues that emerge from data
analysis, firstly the confusion between the dower and dowry, secondly the failure
to negotiate a 'reasonable' amount of dower in the nikah contract and, finally the
limited use of the nikah contract to retrieve the dower upon breakdown of
marriage and divorce.
In this study only 13 women had obtained a copy of the nikah contract. This
document included personal details such as name, age, address, date of birth, the
date of marriage and the signature of witnesses. In terms of the dower all the
women reported that they had received a nominal sum, ranging between £100-
200. Thus for most women the nikah contract became synonymous with the nikah
ceremony rather than a formal document which they would consider invoking
during the breakdown of marriage. Yet this fmding must be met with some
caution as the nikah contract was accepted by some women as being of
importance on par with formal documentation. This was particularly the case
with those women whose marriages had not been registered according to civil
law. This leads to a different reflection on the interconnectedness of this
document in the lives of these women in terms of providing them with legal
redress. Clearly the nikah contract is then, firmly rooted in the space of 'justice'
for the women who actively engage in strategies deriving from an Islamic
perspective and utilising state law mechanisms. Thus the presence of the nikah
contract serves as a useful mechanism, in which the marriage breakdown and
divorce can be in some ways be managed, confined and justified.
In terms of what the women understood as the dower what we see is a conflation
of terms with the term dowry and it was described as 'haq mehr', 'jahez', 'dower'
and 'dowry'. To an extent this complicates the way in which the nikah contract
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provides a space for 'justice' for the women. The extracts below highlight what
the women understood as dower.
Haq mehr is the property or the sum of money or whatever you want it to be
which the woman can ask for from her husband at any time during the
marriage but at the divorce it has to be passed over. I know from other
people's wedding that things can stop there for hours and hours. Because
there's a problem with the 'haq mehr' like the guys side is saying you know
we thought we'd get something else, and the girl's side thinks that
something else has been arranged. Or sometimes it's so enormous the sum
the girl couldn't get out of the marriage because the guy's side wouldn't be
able to pay that. There's a lot of politics around the amount that you put
forward. But Islamic law says it should be something like for 3 months or
something like that (Shabana, London).
The whole idea of the mehr is that you show the value of that particular
individual. It has to be a reasonable amount of money as well that's the
other thing that I was aware of as well, it can't just be something that's a
throwaway sum of money that's not going to cause any hardship to the man
if there is a divorce. Its got to be something that means something to him
not that's something that's just done for the sake of doing it. For me it's a
form of protection and I was quite definite on that (Fauzia, London).
The Imam was in the room with my father and some men and he talked to
my father about whether he was happy giving me away and what the haq
mehr should be. You know we hadn't even discussed it before. I didn't
know what it meant and I don't know what they decided (Rubina,
Birmingham).
The problem that arose at the time of the nikah was we were talking about
what was going to happen and all the procedures. But they hadn't mentioned
anything about the mehr or clothes, you know exchanging of gifts and we
were beginning to think this was a bit strange. My mum was getting a little
worried because it had come up to 2 weeks before the wedding and still
nothing had been mentioned. In our family its important for the girl to be
given clothes before she gets married. My mother told my future mother in
law and the response was well as far as the mehr is concerned we're going to
set it at the same amount as we set our other son's and I can't allow her to
have a higher mehr than my other daughter in law. As far as I'm concerned
they're equal (Sameena, London).
Nothing, I have nothing to show that's its an Islamic marriage. I don't even
have a certificate. I think he did make a certificate and he said come next
week but I never went back. At that point I didn't think it was important so I
don't know what the dower was for my marriage but I think they gave us
some clothes (Nasima, London).
Of course this confusion between dower and dowry does not deny the value the
women placed upon the nikah contract and the dower. Instead what we see in
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evidence is the interwoven religious marriage process interacting with a cultural
setting, to shape the temporal and spatial boundaries of the nikah ceremony
(Bhabba 1994). In this way some women were able to distinguish between
religious and cultural practices to draw attention to the power relations that
underpin the nikah ceremony and contract. Yet most women were at the margins
of negotiating the terms to be included in the nikah contract but interestingly they
called into question their own lack of knowledge and ignorance of Islam that had
led to this situation:
For me to get the nikah right was really important. But I didn't know I was
really stupid at the time I really didn't know everything. I knew some of
what I was entitled too but I really didn't know the level of my rights. For
instance I didn't know I could stipulate terms of divorce at the time of the
nikah. I didn't know I could ask for the rights to divorce at that time or I
didn't know I could stipulate various other things at the time of the contract.
I just went as far as saying that look if you're going to give a mehr it has to
be a reasonable amount and it has to be an agreement between me and him
not your parents or not your aunts or anyone else (Fauzia, London).
I did not know much about it actually I think I learnt more about the nikah
after I got divorced. Like for example that in Islam you can have a pre-
nuptial arrangements, you don't have to change your name when you get
married in fact its better to keep your own name, you don't have to agree to
agree to live with the guy's parents. Its up to him to look after his family but
he's got no right to impose it on you, things like that. So I found out things
like that and I was surprised really. I could have said that before I married
him but I didn't because I don't think it's the right way of starting a
relationship by splitting him from his family. If he doesn't want to do that I
didn't want to come between them but I didn't make that as a condition. I
now know a lot of girls who do that these days (Salma, London).
When the Imam was conducting the ceremony and although he had written
the correct amount of the mehr on the certificate that he had, after I said yes
3 times and I was seated officially next to my husband and when they got me
to sign the thing I noticed on the certificate next to the mehr amount they
had written deferred and I didn't know what that meant. And I saw it and I
thought well I didn't agree to this but I there was about 100 people there and
I couldn't say anything. I just noted it and I thought well it shouldn't really
mean anything so I just signed my name to it but no-one had consulted me as
to whether this mehr was deferred or not because the understanding behind
the haq mehr is that its supposed to paid to the wife preferably before the
marriage is consummated. There wasn't any mention of it being paid. I
mean it doesn't have to be paid but at least I could have been spoken to
about why a deferred term was included in the contact (Naheed, London).
It is clear that for these women, a lack of understanding of the nikah contract
coupled with the gendered relations underpinning the nikah process had denied
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them a context in which they were able to engage with a process to negotiate their
terms for the nikah contract. Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that there was
by no means, a taken for granted consensus over what signifies as the nikah
contract or the importance of the dower. Certainly the interview data reveals that
the nikah contract became of increased importance for those women whose
marriages had not been registered. And, as discussed in chapter 4, this has led to
attempts by some religious scholars to strengthen the nikah contract by
introducing a single nikah contract for all Muslims in Britain. We discuss this
proposal in a later section of this chapter.
5.3 Civil Registration of Marriage
The figure 5.2 below presents results of the number of marriages in this study that
complied with the Marriage Acts 1949-94 and those who went through the nikah
ceremony only. Less than half the sample who had married with a partner
domiciled in England had registered their marriages, meaning that the largest
group in this sample was women who were in effect deemed unmarried according
to English family law.
Figure 5.2 Types of Marriage Ceremonies
Nikah	 Nikah & Civil Marriage 	 Civil Marriage
Type of Manage Ceremony
As indicated in chapters 1, 3 and 4 there are long-standing debates in social, legal
and political theory over the extent to which religious personal laws should be
accommodated within the framework of existing English law. The essence of
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these arguments are predicated on raising our awareness to the fact that Muslim
women are choosing not to register their marriages according to the formalities of
civil law and, thus reinforcing the argument for the introduction of some kind of
parallel legal system to accommodate the needs of Muslims in Britain. At first
glance, the absence of formal registration of marriage does seem to legitimize
such arguments but on closer inspection we see that the picture maybe a little
more complex than at first envisaged. What becomes clear is that such outcomes
must be understood in relation to the situated positionings of the women in family
and marriage relationships (Anthias 2002). Equally it is difficult to ignore the
relations of power and the gendered cultural norms and values that underpin these
decisions. Hence for the women the level of negotiations in this study did depend
upon their position within their family, their husband's families and
contextualized by a particular gendered construction of disempowerment and lack
of autonomy in the marriage process. Thus the women usually relied upon a level
of trust and reciprocity from their husbands that the marriages would be registered
and in cases where this trust had been violated the marriages they had not been.
One interviewee explained,
I think a lot of people are naïve they just trust their husbands in that they will
get a registered marriage. Its not that they don't know about registry or that
they don't want it, they are just naïve in believing their husbands. I tell all
my friends now that you must have a legal marriage first because if you have
an Islamic marriage first then they will not agree to do a civil marriage. I
mean you can do it on the same day there's nothing stopping you doing that.
Because I really think that guys would begin to take marriages more
seriously (Salma, London).
As the nikah is not recognised as a valid form of marriage in Britain this led to a
commitment to cultural relativism by some women who advocated the
introduction of a parallel legal system as a means of redressing their situations.
The extracts below from interview data reveal the underlying reasons of why
marriages were not registered according to civil law:
Well to tell you the truth I honestly thought that the Muslim marriage
certificate would be recognised I was quite shocked when I found out that it
wasn't. I thought hold on a minute we got married didn't we? I had a
massive wedding I've got the wedding photos to prove it, the wedding
cassette to prove it. I have all this to prove it so how can they turn round and
say to me that sorry no it's not recognised. The only difference is.. .the only
thing that we didn't do is swap some vows in the registry office. I mean
that's the only difference (Mina, London).
222
Well I understand that Islamically it says that you have to have a nikah in
order for your marriage to be recognised but I would have been happy if it
had been registered straight away then I would have felt that I am on the safe
side that at the end of the day. I'm not happy with what happened to my
marriage at all, my marriage was planned and the breakdown of my marriage
was planned (Shazia, London).
I said to him we need to get registered and he said oh no we don't cause the
Muslim certificate is recognised now and I was so naïve I believed him so I
thought oh well it must be. He said yeah well I thought it wasn't as well and
last time I got registered it was just a big hassle to divorced and I believed
him (Sadia, Birmingham).
What happened was when I got engaged he promised me we'd get
registered, we'll get a house of our own, we'll do everything. When I got
into our marriage because they had a bad family name, in that they treat the
daughter in laws so badly that's the reason why they refused to let us get
registered. I said to my husband no we have to get registered cause it's the
law in this country that we get registered but he kept saying yeah, yeah we'll
do it but he never would. Anyway a year later I started getting worried
cause I thought if something happens then I would have nothing. I said to
him you know I'm worried what if your mother says oh you know kick her
out I just don't feel safe and he said oh no nothing's gonna happen like that.
Islamically we're married we don't believe in getting registered that's just
this country's law he turned round and said that our family only believe in
the nikah and that's it. So he just refused and they were just playing it
cleverly (Parveen, Birmingham).
Before I married him I did say I'd like to get registered and he said we'll do
it after we get the nikah done, that's what more important and personally that
is how I saw it then too but I see it differently now, obviously. At the time
for me Islam was number one, I was more bothered about Islam rather than
anything else really but that doesn't mean I didn't want to get the marriage
registered. I did and I knew that I may not be protected with just having a
nikah. It was exactly a week after we got married I got a little concerned and
I asked him when are we going to get registered and he said well no we're
not and I said well why and he said cause if we split up you'll want half of
everything that's mine and I went oh is that what you think. I was absolutely
gutted because that wasn't my reason. I did not marry him with the intention
of splitting whereas he had looked that far ahead (Sabia, London).
It is noteworthy that these extracts reveal the precarious situation in which the
women found themselves. For example of the sample only two women had not
been aware of the validity of the nikah under English law and believed they were
legally married. A further two women had agreed with their husbands to forego
civil registration for fmancial reasons. But the largest group of women involved
were those who were aware of the need to register their marriage according to
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civil law and had expected their marriages to be formalised. Hence the
consequences for the women of being intentionally misled led them to facing a
multitude of social and legal problems.
Those women who had believed that their nikah had been a legally recognised
form of marriage also speculated on the lack of available information for their
misunderstanding. Blame had been directed towards Imams and community
leaders.
I think the Imam who married us should take the blame because surely it's
his duty to explain everything to us before we go through with it. Surely
Imams should know that the nikah isn't recognised in this country (Mina,
London).
I find it shocking that Pakistanis have been in this country for decades and
decades and still no-one seems to know if the nikah in England is recognised
or not? Solicitors and the community need to be trained, especially the
Imams we go to them for advice so its really important they know at least
what's going on (Shazia, London).
We return to this issue in section 5.8 of this chapter.
5.4 Muslim Divorce
In his study of Muslim legal pluralism Menski points to what he describes as "the
legal de-recognition of Muslim divorces.. .in the United Kingdom"(1998:382).
By this he means the lack of provisions in English law to recognise religious law
as an official form of divorce. In the present, revised English family law there is
only one way to obtain a divorce, on the grounds that the marriage has
irretrievably broken down, after a two-year separation where the decree is made
absolute. Muslim divorces granted through a "non-judicial process" (talaq)
(Poulter 1986:98) in Britain are generally not recognised has valid, a situation
which has led to the creation of "limping marriages" (Menski and Pearl
1998:383). This has meant that women who may have been divorced through
civil procedure continue to be married under Muslim religious law and those who
may have been divorced abroad may not be legally recognised in this country as
divorced and thus continue to be legally married. Consequently this has led to a
conflict of laws scenario.
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As discussed in chapter 4 under Muslim law, a divorce can be obtained in a
number of different ways:
• Talaq (unilateral repudiation by the husband),
• Khul (divorce at the instance of the wife with her husband's agreement, and on
condition that she will forego her right to the mehr and
• Ubara'at (divorce by mutual consent).
In this study obtaining a Muslim divorce was important to all the women. Given
the fact that the issue of divorce is fraught with difficulties and tension for women
within South Asian Muslim communities, we focus upon the strategies adopted in
obtaining a divorce certificate. Hence many questions can be raised about the
processes involved in obtaining a divorce from the perspective of female users of
Shariah Councils. These relate to issues concerning negotiations, conflict and
decision-making both within the family, community and via unofficial dispute
resolution bodies such as Shariah Councils. So how did this sample of women
negotiate issues of marriage breakdown and divorce within the family, home and
community? And at what point was contact made with a Shariah Council? We
have already highlighted the fact that most women contact a Shariah Council for
the purposes of obtaining a divorce, a consequence of the husband's refusal to
consent to divorce.
5.4.1 Marriage Breakdown
The reasons for breakdown of marriage in this sample were cited as forced
marriage, family interference, 'clash of upbringing', adultery and domestic
violence. A staggering 18 women reported that they had experienced some form
of emotional, sexual and/or physical abuse during their marriages and a small
percentage of women continued to face this threat (see Kelly and Radford 1996).
The figure 5.3 below highlights 'domestic violence', 'forced marriage' and
'family pressure' as the three key factors in the breakdown of marriage.
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Figure 5.3 Reasons for Marriage Breakdown
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The reasons for breakdown in marriage were premised upon inter-family
inequalities with discussion focussing on issues of power, negotiation and
struggle. In relation to 'family pressure' the women described relationships with
in-laws as being particularly difficult and fraught. Those who opposed or
challenged their authority were ostracized and alienated from other members of
the family. For other women the control of their physical movements meant they
were given very little space to assert their independence within the family context.
In three cases this had led to increased levels of domestic violence. The extracts
below provide a brief snapshot of the effects on the women:
It wasn't that bad in the beginning but over time he became very violent and
by the end I wasn't allowed to go out by myself (Mina, London).
I tried to commit suicide. I used to go to my doctor and I used to complain to
him all the time. He told me to leave. At one time I never used to eat (Sadia,
Birmingham).
My dad was never on my side, when he found out about the problems he
always used to shout at me saying that I must do everything they tell me to
do. He only said that cause he was scared that I was going to end up
divorced and he kept saying don't get divorced, don't get divorced (Zareena,
Bradford).
Patel (2003) identifies the control of women within minority communities, as an
issue that needs greater attention. Leaving aside the issue of control within the
family, she argues the state affords black women little protection. In response
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women's organisations such as Southall Black Sisters' 3 ' and Newham Asian
Women's Project' 32 have developed critiques on state accountability and
strategies to support vulnerable women. Like so many of the women leaving
proved a difficult and traumatic experience. One interviewee, Sameena explained
the lengths she underwent prior to leaving the marriage,
I knew I had to be really careful because they wouldn't have let me go. But
one day when they were all out I just left and took my children without any
belongings. I went to the health officer and they put me into a bed and
breakfast.
5.4.2 Marriages conducted in Pakistan
For those women whose marriages had been conducted abroad in Pakistan factors
such as forced marriage and "a conflict of upbringing" were cited as the two main
reasons for breakdown of marriage. One interviewee explained,
I think there's a conflict with women who are brought up here and men who
come from Pakistan to get married. We just saw things differently. For him
it was a problem that I wanted to work, that I was pretty independent and
this was important to me. It didn't mean I couldn't be a good wife but he
just couldn't see things from my point of view (Zareena, Bradford).
In her report Shah-Kazemi (2001) found immigration regulations to be a
significant 'equation' in the breakdown of marriage and had these regulations not
been in place the outcome of the marriage would have been very different. She
points out that, "If immigration regulations were not in existence, and unrelated to
marriage, men would not be interested in exploiting women solely for the purpose
of immigration, women would not be vulnerable to the pressure to allow the
marriages to continue, nor indeed would the women go through the hardship of
having to wait for their husbands.. ." (2001:33-34). It was evident from fmdings
in this study that the women who had been forced into marriage in Pakistan
believed they had little option but to use immigration legislation to prevent their
husbands from gaining entry into the country. It was also clear that in two cases
where entry had been permitted the interviewees had sought the advice of police
' Southall Black Sisters was set up in 1979 to meet the needs of Asian and African-Caribbean
women. See SBS 2003.
' 32 Newham Asian Women's Project was set up in 1983 to meet the needs of Asian women in East
London.
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and the home office in their attempts to deport their husbands. One interviewee
explained,
For the past 3 years he's made our lives hell. He constantly harasses us and
his family used us so he could come into this country. I want him out and
I'll do everything in my power to make sure it happens (Nasima,
Birmingham).
In both cases the women reported little success. While it is easy to condemn these
strategies which effectively give the state a further opportunity to introduce even
tighter controls and restrict immigration in Britain (see Patel 1999) we need to
explore the underlying issues which compel women to resort to such drastic
tactics.
5.4.3 The Decision to Leave
Unsurprisingly perhaps there was a close association between the decision to
leave the marriage and fmancial independence. Those women financially
dependent upon their husbands were more likely to have remained in the marriage
when compared to those who were not.
Fauzia confirmed that her decision to leave was made easier with the knowledge
that her family could provide her with fmancial support. In turn, S alma drew
attention to the "assumed link between tradition and being backward".
I am traditional and that's important to me. I like to wear Asian clothes and
you know do Asian things but people make assumptions. Like my in-laws
they thought that my parents would never want me back if they treated me
badly and if I wanted to leave, just because of my religion and the way I
was. I felt as though I was tricked into the marriage and when I told his
family they said well so what? As if I would just stay in the marriage.
She left to return to her parent's home. It is also useful to know that those women
educated to university level, mentioned education as a contributory factor in the
breakdown of marriage. Parveen described how the difficulties in the marriage
were compounded by the fact that she was perceived as being too educated and
hence "too independent".
I did everything they wanted me to do, I cooked, I cleaned I looked after
them as well as my husband but still it was never enough. Just the fact that
I'd been to college that I had an education was a problem for them.
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At the same time, the interviews revealed that the women experienced specific
problems relating to "being too westernised". Interestingly these views did not
transcend class and education differences and a number of the interviewees were
keen to discuss familial expectations.
I could never win in the eyes of my in-laws, never. I could never do right,
that's how it always felt.. .1 wasn't traditional enough, I just didn't fit the
mould of a traditional girl and that's what my mother in law really wanted
(Shabana, London).
He started imposing things on me like you have to wear a scarf and I'm not
really comfortable with it you know and I told him well I'm not really
comfortable with it and I don't believe I should do something that someone
is making me do it. Islam is within myself, I do it because I want to do it.
I'm not saying I don't have any intention of it, I will do it but not just yet
and he was more worried about his dad than himself. The impression I got
was that he wasn't really that bothered himself he was more bothered about
his family (Nighat, London).
But in my in-laws family it was like you can't go out, you can't do this, you
have to wear a scarf all the time, you have to wear shalwar kameez all the
time, you can't wear anything else. So I thought oh my God I can't live like
this! (Yasmin, London).
Eventually I spoke to a friend of mine, she's quite religious and what she
told me was that women couldn't be compelled to do things in Islam its
wrong and its Unislamic (Humeira, London).
In Islam we need women's voice to be heard. Not just talk about the need for
change but actual change towards the acceptance of recognizing women as
equals (Anisa, Bradford).
I always did what they told me cause my parents taught me that when you
get married you should never speak in front of your mother in laws. But in
this family they really used Islam against us. If we argued and said
something was wrong they would just bring Islam into it, saying Islam says
this and Islam says that but whenever they did anything bad to me they
brushed Islam under the carpet and do what they want cause Islam never
said you can treat your wife like that Islam says that a wife is equal to your
mum but I was never treated like that (Sadia, Birmingham).
The descriptions of 'being controlled' eventually proved a catalyst for these
women to seek change in their lives. This analysis demonstrates how the patterns
of family dominance and control within the framework of marriage led some of
the interviewees to question whether they had a right to assert their independence
in Islam and the right to be respected as equals. We return to this issue later in the
chapter.
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5.4.4 Unofficial Family Mediation
Family mediation was the central cornerstone to Part II of the Family Law Act
1996 with its emphasis upon the responsibility of managing divorce moving back
to the parties themselves and the state redefining its role in the whole process.'33
This piece of legislation aimed to provide separating parties with greater
responsibility in negotiating their separation and divorce whereupon the
preconditions of information meetings and mediation reflects, a subtle but
fundamental change in the state involvement of family disputes. Roberts argues
that such changes inherently challenge the centralist power of state law and
consequently the state simply lacked the political will to introduce such wide-
ranging changes, "All of these provisions could be seen as a development of a
particular style of government and made the Act vulnerable to critique as an
archetypal instrument of 'informal justice" (2001:256).' In terms of the
existing provisions an on-going debate exists over the extent to which the state
should intervene in matters of marriage breakdown, separation and divorce (see
Roberts 2001:271, Davis 2001:371, Furniss 2000: 255; Maclean 2000:24,
Eekelaar and Maclean 1986, Eekelaar 2000, Freeman 1998, Olsen 1985. Cretney
1995). However few studies explore the nature of 'unofficial family mediation' in
the context of family and home within minority ethnic communities in Britain.'35
In this vein, the gap between the two constitutes an opportunity to draw Upon
interview data and explore this 'space' in more depth.
In this study as well as arranging the marriage the family played a vital role in
organising and facilitating attempts to reconcile the parties. The interview data
revealed the inevitable conflicts and disputes generated by the breakdown of
marriage but of the sample, 20 women explained they had been involved in
lengthy discussions with their families prior to any contact with a Shariah
Council. Shah-Kazemi (2000:3 12) points out that family mediation takes on a
particular significance for minority ethnic communities and this was confirmed in
this study as it seems that the importance of this intervention is closely associated
133 See The White Paper, Looking to the Future: Mediation and the Ground for Divorce (1995)
Cm2799, at para 5.3
134 See chapters 1 and 4 for discussion on the relationship between law and community.
For a study on the Hindu Gujerati community in Leceister see Goodwin et al (1997).
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to the families arranging the marriage. It seems that this gives rise to a set of
obligations and responsibilities for both parties.
The thing with arranged marriages is that when it breaks down you're not
really left alone. It's the family that arranges it so when it breaks down they
go into this motion of trying to sort things out (Shazia, London).
Yes I did expect my family to help me and yeah I do think it was because I
had an arranged marriage. I suppose the way I got married was different to
how my English friends get married and they probably don't expect the kind
of help that I got (Humeira, London).
Well there is a system to prevent breakdown and it's a very invisible one, a
very subtle one and it starts with your own family the community at large are
prepared to play a reinforcing part and what your family is doing is they say
are you alright and you're expected to say yes, how are you you're expected
to say I'm fine and what you do is you make sure that everything that
happens in your household remains there nothing goes outside of that
(Nasima, Birmingham).
When I eventually decided to leave home and I called my family together.
My family had no idea what had been going on and how abusive he had
been and all the neglect and all the treatment that myself and my daughter
had had because why should they? Because he never made it public and also
I think people let things go because they don't want to know. But they were
very upset that I hadn't told them (Rubina, Birmingham).
The interview data reveals 3 types of family mediation see figure 5.4 below.
These can be broadly categorized as the intervention of the immediate and
extended family, the involvement of community members and family friends and,
finally advice from the local Imam.
Figure 5.4	 Types of Unofficial Family Mediation
In their management of the marital dispute the interviewees were involved in a
complex and shifting process of fulfilling social and cultural expectations while
negotiating their terms for reconciliation. This demonstrates the dilemmas and
conflicts that women's identities as individuals and as members of the family
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group may give rise too (see Helium 1999:88). As discussed in chapter 3 the
plurality of shifting identities for women in South Asian Muslim communities
provides an insight into complex relations in the home, family and community.
Well initially I told no-one cause I didn't want my parents to get involved
and then you know for things to get worse, the more people that get involved
then things can get out of hand. I was a bit scared anyway because I hadn't
been married that long and if I say I've got problems, they'd be really really
worried about it.. .It was too difficult I was expected to make it work so it
really had to get bad before I could tell them (Farhana, Birmingham).
I spoke to one of my uncles but I made him promise me that he wouldn't tell
my parents because they'd be really, really upset about it so I said to him I
want you to help me sort out this mess because he had been involved in
getting me together with my husband. So they came over and they had a
word and they said well you know its not fair that you're doing this. I was in
real state. (Sabia, London).
Well not my side of the family but his side of the family did get involved.
His eldest sister in law did give me a lot of support. She said this is not right
something has to be done and then she told her husband and they talked
within the family and they told me they did speak to him but I don't know
what was said (Shaheen, London).
It was hard for me to go to my parents they didn't want me to marry this guy
so when things started to go wrong I tried to deal with it myself. But then it
got pretty bad, you know he hit me and stuff so then I called them. They
were really upset at the start but then they were OK they helped me sort
things out (Mina, London).
As discussed in chapter 3 the dilemma of preserving the 'family honour' can limit
the decision-making abilities of women within the home and family. Thus the
issue of 'leaving' the marriage was neither easily resolved nor uncritically
accepted and some women grappled with the pressures of maintaining the "izzat
of the family" (family honour) while others expressed ambivalence.
I couldn't tell my parents straight away cause of the izzat thing. They were
always saying that my marriage had kept the izzat of the family, so when
things started to go wrong it was difficult for me to explain to them how I
was feeling and what I wanted to do about the situation (Nasima, London).
None of my family wanted me to get divorced but in a way it was easier for
them to accept that it was over, that it hadn't worked Out but that I had tried
to make it work. They blamed my husband for a lot of what was going on,
so they didn't talk in terms of izzat or sharam (shame) when I said I wanted
to leave. We spoke about what was right and wrong and what he did was
wrong. So no I wasn't worried about losing the family honour (Shaheen,
London).
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I never once felt that I was in some way losing the honour of the family, how
absurd! Talk to him if you want to know about no honour, it's him and his
family who have lost the family honour... if they ever had any (Fauzia,
London).
My parents aren't educated and we're not middle-class.. ..But we're
Muslims and they understand right from wrong. I wanted their help to sort
things out and in Islam they have a duty to support me in my time of need.
We discussed things together and only when they came to the conclusion
that things wouldn't change did I make up my mind that it was time to go
(Zareena, Bradford).
These findings suggest that some women were able to challenge the notion of
family honour, reconceptualize it's meaning, reject its imposition in determining
their decision to leave and were able to transfer this 'responsibility' to their
husbands. In this way family honour was characterized, as an obligation to fulfil
social and cultural expectations during the process of marriage and, in some cases
this shift challenges the potency of the argument that women are reluctant to
leave, due to concerns of preserving the family honour. Yet the interview data
also revealed the close connection between family intervention and the decision to
reconcile. The failure of the family to resolve the marital difficulties was then, for
some a source of regret.
Thus at one level the women engaged in complex negotiations with parents and
wider family to either justify their decision to leave or to establish the grounds
upon which divorce should be sought. In addition, the support generated by
female members of the family was of particular importance and this for many
women had been a significant factor in their decision to leave. In this way the
women were able to create alliances with mothers and sisters, highlighting the
importance of inter-woven solidarity between them and thus challenging the
dynamics of patriarchal power inherent within the family (Bhopal 1997).
Notwithstanding the obvious value of these relationships, at the same time this
'collective approach' reveals a number of ambiguities and contradictions, as this
form of 'strategic essentialism' is imbued with possibilities and limitations. It is
true that the women were able to gain support and strength but in doing so many
reported they had to respond with an axiomatic acceptance of arranged marriages.
Even though ostensibly opposed to re-marrying some women accepted a new
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marriage to be arranged on their behalf by parents in exchange for exit out of the
present marriage. In what at first seems like a new space of dialogue and
autonomy in the family can in some cases rely on the traditional framework of
power (Anthias 2002). For some therefore, the impact of family mediation was a
distressing experience. Nabila complained that her parents had been unwilling to
accept that her marriage was over and her subsequent refusal for family mediation
was met with stern opposition. This had led to a deterioration of relations with her
husband and family, culminating in her parents blaming her for the breakdown of
the marriage. It has been simply assumed that this process takes place unhindered
by any forms of pressure or coercion. Regrettably in this sample, pressure to
return to the family home led to the increased risk of physical and emotional
abuse for some women.
This form of family mediation is legitimated under the public/private distinction
(see Roberts 1997). Eekelaar, describes this in terms of the relationship between
social and legal norms, "there exists within society a network of social norms
which is formally independent of the legal system, but which is in constant
interaction with it. Formal law sometimes seeks to strengthen the social norms.
Sometimes it allows them to serve its purposes without the necessity of direct
intervention; sometimes it tries to weaken or destroy them and sometimes it
withdraws from enforcement, not in an attempt to subvert them, but because
countervailing values make conflicts better resolved outside the legal arena"
(2000:8). Feminists have extensively critiqued this tenuous relationship between
family and state intervention across a wide spectrum of disciplines (see for
example O'Donovan 1985, Bunch 1995, Connors 1989, Corrin 1996, Dobash and
Dobash 1980, Gelles 1997). In particular the criminalization of domestic violence
has to some extent shaped the nature of state intervention over the past decade and
these Sites continue to be contested in debates recognising cultural autonomy for
minority groups. Thornton also points out that unofficial family mediation
ensures the state absolves responsibility. She explains, "In mediating interests
which appear to be irreconcilable, the task of the liberal state is made easier if
there are some areas conceptualized as 'private' with which it does not have to
grapple" (1991:167).
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Clearly, unofficial family mediation demonstrates the complicated ways in which
power is expressed via the family idiom. There is little mention in writings of
official family mediation of the ways in which families organise dispute
resolution within the private sphere of the family and home and thus raising the
question of why some women may choose not to opt for official mediation. The
findings in this study suggest that the interconnected and mutual values of family
honour and shame can impose upon some women to comply with this traditional
mode of dispute resolution. Whereas other women embrace this form of family
mediation, reformulate it to suit their needs and which then provides them with
the 'space' upon which to challenge abusive relationships. Thus this process
needs to be understood as ambiguous and in constant flux as families are
structured by multiple differences with multiple experiences reflecting their
different normative frameworks. Thus data analysis in this study reveals a
plethora of experiences.
Yet it is precisely these divergent experiences that render proposals to develop
family mediation to suit the specific needs of minority ethnic communities
problematic (see Shah Kazemi 2000, 2001). There is an inherent conflict with
recognizing identities as multiple and fluid and formulating social policy
initiatives that are based upon specific cultural practices as cultural and religious
practices are open to change, contestation and interpretation. At the very least we
must ensure mechanisms are in place to ensure those who wish not to partake part
in such processes are not compelled to do so. It is within this context that
concerns have been raised about how such proposals can lead to delegating rights
to communities in regulating family law matters, effectively a move towards some
form of cultural autonomy. Maclean rightly questions, "What are the implications
for family justice of this move towards private ordering? Is this form of
'privatization' safe?" (2001:137). Undoubtedly in this context formal law
provides protection against abuse in the 'private' sphere in which this legal
ordering operates. Maclean questions, ". . .is it dangerous to remove disputes from
the legal system with the advantage of due process, plus protection of those at the
wrong end of the far from level playing field, and visible negotiation and
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settlement which takes place of not in court than in the shadow of the law?"
(2001:136). We return to this issue later in the chapter.
5.4.5 Community Intervention
In this study, unofficial family mediation was also shaped by the involvement of
local community members. Many of those involved comprised of family friends
but interestingly data analysis also reveals the intervention of Imams, as
particularly significant. With the perceived weakening of family ties parents in
particular encouraged the intervention of Imams from local mosques to resolve
the marital disputes. Once admitted into this process it is interesting to explore
how they may influence the outcome. Furthermore this aspect of reconciliation
reveals the changing and interconnected understandings of positioning and
belonging of the women within local communities. Again as discussed in chapter
3 in order to analyse the experiences of the women in this sample it is important to
avoid essentializing either community, culture or family. Retaining an
understanding of identity, culture and religion as diverse and multiple enables us
critically situate these experiences in relation to different positional conditions.
The decision to invest in community resources lay with parents, the wider family
and the women themselves. In defining the problem via the local community and
seeing solutions through various kinds of cultural and religious mechanisms some
of the women were able to mitigate the effects of divorce for themselves and their
families. Hence utilizing the local community eased the pressure and in some
cases strengthened fragile relationships with local community members.
My dad is quite well known in the community and the community did know
that if I came back there's a good reason for it so not really know. I mean
people talk but you can't do anything about that (Fauzia, London).
When I came back everyone was looking at me thinking that well all of us
go through hard times right but at the end of the day you could have tried a
bit harder. The community were badmouthing me they were looking at me,
look at me in a degrading way like I was second class basically. But I just
said well accept it, I mean if I had let it get to me it would have mentally
affected me (Zareena, Birmingham).
It really helped my parents that they were able to talk to their friends. I
know they got a lot of support from them and that kind of eased the pressure
of me (Nighat, London).
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Well they went to see our Imam and explained everything to him, what I had
been through and how my parents had tried to help, tried to talk to his family
but were shoved away. So it really helped them to know that under Islam we
had done nothing wrong, that it wasn't my fault or their fault and they had
nothing to feel ashamed about (Shabana, London).
We were really surprised that we got so much support. It was good... good
for my parents, its been harder for them cause they've had a lot to deal
with... especially when no-one in our family has ever been divorced before
(Parveen, Birmingham).
The significance of community involvement in the early stages of the marital
dispute raises the question of whether these women were establishing "new more
inclusive collective ethnic identitifcations" (Alexander 2000:144) and if so what
these identifications were premised upon. The equation of community with terms
such as 'belonging' and 'dialogue' reflects how the women were able to self-
consciously reconceptualize constructions of community as fluid and changing.
In reality they were self-consciously aware of belonging in the community as a
contested position and were thus able to manipulate both its' resources and at
times side-step its obvious constraints. Both as Pakistani women and as Muslims
the women in this sample were aware that their position had to be constituted and
negotiated within their communities and families.
There's a huge sense of belonging within the community. I've grown up in
the Muslim community and it's important for me to feel that I'm part of the
community (Nadia, Birmingham).
If you had a love marriage and it failed you would have a divorce and then
you would be likely to be rejected by the community. You would have
nowhere to go (Mina, London).
I worked very hard at perfecting my community role whether that was as a
daughter as a niece or as a wife or as a mother or as someone who did the
'tabliq' work or whatever it was. I did all of that because I knew how to do it
cause someone before me had done it (Yasmin, London).
It took me a long time to get the strength to do what was right. My dad goes
to the mosque a lot and he spoke to one of the maulvis there and he came
back to me and said that only my husband could divorce me and that I
should stay with him to make it work (Zareena, Bradford).
The community doesn't particularly care... it just fills up the gaps so as long
as his seen in the mosque as long as his seen fairly respectability cause most
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of the marriages are judged by how the women behave as well and how the
children are so therefore we have this façade (Parveen, Birmingham).
It was difficult because my family used to say to me well you're away from
home, you're away from the community so you don't have to listen to this
but we do. I would say to my family ignore them but they can't because
they live in the community and that's their life, that's their lifestyle. I felt as
though people were judging me and my family. I felt really sad because my
parent are basically good people. They're good Muslims that have never hurt
anybody, they didn't deserve it. (Rabia, Birmingham).
Hence whilst the women speculated on precisely the role of the community it
seemed many were simply reluctant to opt out or what commentators refer to has
exercising the 'exit option' (Phillips 2003, Chambers 2002). The point, however,
which seems to be crucial, is that the women were able to draw upon the
community for support while also criticising its lack of resolve in challenging
cultural practices deemed oppressive and 'Un-Islamic'. Thus for some women the
community acted as a support mechanism, even if this meant they did not always
agree with its position. Yet all the women were reticent in identifying themselves
as 'outsiders' and participated in developing ways in which they could fulfil
expectations of the community while the idea of 'community expectations' was
also challenged and resisted in different ways.
5.4.6 The Intervention of Imams
Interview data reveals a protracted and ambivalent relationship between the
women and Imams. On the one hand the Imams were deemed pivotal to the
consultation process, negotiating the terms for reconciliation. But on the other
hand there was also a deep anxiety attached to the nature of their intervention and
this related to concerns over the pressure to reconcile and for them to accept the
terms of the reconciliation negotiated on their behalf. For example 8 women
talked in terms of 'persuasion' when discussing the reasons why Imams intervene
in cases of marital conflict. Similarly, a further 5 women explained they were
unable to be completely honest with the Imam as they had been appointed by
family members, in most cases parents. As Shazia explained, "The role of the
family particularly and the community at large is to make sure that you stay
together". To this end she felt that although her opinion was taken into account
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her viewpoint might not prevail because of her limited decision-making rights. In
his research Bunt (1998) found that informal dispute resolution processes were
largely based in mosques where the Imam played a critical role in the nature of
the advice given. His findings reveal Imams to be 'conservative' in nature and
encouraging Muslim parents to arrange 'quick' marriages for their daughters so as
to maintain the stability and honour of the family and community.
In this study, not all the women were critical of the intervention of Imams. For
Shabana, dispute resolution in the family and home, provided the space
whereupon she was able to challenge parental pressure to reconcile. At the same
time, she was coming to terms with the end of her marriage. She explained,
He was really good. I explained the situation to him and he told me that its
not God's intention that you sit in that unhappiness, you need to have a
decent husband and I don't think you'll find it in this relationship. It won't
be any shame on you to leave and end it.
In this context she was able to exit the marriage without her family pointing the
accusatory finger of blame towards her. Morally the women were also able to
gamer considerable support from Imams to convince parents that divorce was
permissible in Islam. As Rabia explained,
My parents are strict Muslims.. .They thought he's a good and decent man so
it was important for me to explain everything to him so that he could make
my parents understand that it was ok to get divorced and also.. .you know
how to deal with the community who would definitely be gossiping.
This approach echoes the stance of Fauzia who described the Imam as being able
to successfully mediate between the two families in redistributing financial assets
and differences relating to the return of the 'dowry'. On this occasion the Imam
had travelled to Manchester to return monies acquired upon marriage. At the very
least, this shows that some women in this sample were able to maintain their
autonomy during this 'privatized' form of dispute resolution. Yet this intervention
takes on various forms and as discussed earlier can in some cases lead to coercion
to reconcile.
Because of the various ways in which the women are positioned in their families
this reflects their relationship with the local communities. What the data analysis
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highlights is how culture is socially constructed, contested and transformed
(Griffiths 2001:119). So for example some women were very critical of
community intervention and the relationship was clearly difficult and fraught yet
in this specific context they were able engage with this process to support
themselves and their families. In her work on Kwena women Griffiths (1997)
points out that women engage in this process ". . .from an understanding of
themselves as forming a part of the same society as that of Kwena men. Their
primary aim is not to subvert or radically alter the premises of society but seek to
transform its practices in a direction more responsive to their needs" (2001:119).
As one interviewee put it, "Divorce brings shame onto the family and my parents
would have to bear the brunt of that".
5.5 Contact with Shariah Councils
With the exception of one interviewee all the women had contacted a Shariah
Council voluntarily, notwithstanding guidance from family, friends and the local
Imam. In most cases initial contact had been made via telephone and this was
followed up with an application form citing the reasons for seeking a religious
dissolution of marriage. The most obvious question for us concerns the autonomy
and independence of the women during this process. In particular we are
interested in assessing the effectiveness of mediation and evaluating the response
of the women towards reconciliation practices. Existing literature does not present
consistent evidence to support the view that women are marginalised and denied
equal bargaining power during official mediation processes (Davis and Roberts
1988). On the other hand there is evidence, which runs flatly counter to this view
and reveals a deep anxiety of all women at the prospect at and during official and
unofficial mediation (Bottomley 1983, Roberts 1997). As we have seen in chapter
4, reconciliation remains a central tenant to the process of dispute resolution
within Shariah Councils and the experiences of women within minority ethnic
communities must also be understood in relation to this unique form of privatized
dispute resolution. It seems that wider issues concerning the rights, autonomy and
the voice of women appear to have been lost in existing literature.
5.5.1 Reasons for Contact
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As can be seen from figure 5.5 below, the reasons for contacting a Shariah
Council varied but for most women it was to obtain a religious divorce. Of the
sample only 3 women elicited the help of a Shariah Council in the hope of
reconciling with their husbands. However we should not lose sight of the fact that
the women were all encouraged to participate in unofficial family mediation prior
to obtaining a divorce certificate.
Figure 5.5 Reasons for Contact with Shariah Council
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As discussed in the above section, prior to the involvement of a Shariah Council
there would appear to be a number of different parties involved in attempting to
reconcile the parties. In particular the intervention of family members and the
Imam would seem to suggest that the decision of whether to contact a Shariah
Council and if so which one, may not have been entirely the women's own. All
the respondents in the research agreed that they had little if any knowledge of the
existence of Shariah Councils prior to seeking a religious divorce. In fact often it
was family members who had made initial contact with the Shariah Council
providing an address or telephone number. One interviewee explained,
The family got me the address for the Shariah Council. I didn't know the
process, I had an aunt who is like one of the eldest in the family and takes
care of these things. She said to me I had to write to them and tell them my
case and ask for a khula (Sameena, Birmingham).
Despite these initial reservations the women were surprised to discover that under
Islamic law they did have the right to instigate divorce. One interviewee recalled,
241
I remember saying to my uncle why didn't you ever tell me about this before
and he said well you know... it wasn't really important that a woman can
divorce her husband in the first place. But for me it was (Yasmin, London).
Thus aside from the local mosque acting as a place for spiritual guidance they
relied on elder members of the family or friends for information on the services
available within the local community.
5.52 Initial Contact
Initial contact with a Shariah Council had been made via telephone and/or letter.
Of the sample of women, 18 had made a telephone inquiry, 4 had written to the
Shariah Council and three women approached the organisation in person. As
discussed in the previous chapter, at this stage a successful outcome for the
scholars was to dissuade the women from going ahead with the religious divorce.
So how did the women respond to the initial advice given to them? One might,
for example, anticipate a tension between the objectives of the applicant in
contrast to the outcome sought by religious scholars and family members. Indeed
differences emerged albeit more subtle than envisaged and often dependant upon
which Shariah Councils the women had contacted. Thus for some women the
initial advice given was described as helpful and sympathetic which enabled them
to pursue the divorce whilst others were critical of the initial perception formed by
the scholars at these bodies. Sameena explained,
I rang the number of this Shariah Council that our Maulvi had given to us. I
told them what had happened to me and that I wanted to divorce my husband
but that he wasn't happy with it and wouldn't agree to it. They were very
helpful, they explained that divorce was wrong but that in Islam in some
circumstances it was allowed.. . they took my address and contact details and
told me they would send me some forms to fill in and then decide whether it
would be possible.
Likewise, 13 women reported that they were pleased with the initial advice as it
had helped to convince their parents that divorce was permissible under Islam and
their husband's consent was not required.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, some women were critical about the initial advice given
to them. For example 4 women reported that after the initial contact they had
been left with the impression that in some way they were at fault for the
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breakdown of marriage, even when they had failed to disclose the facts of the
case. Similarly Yasmin stated that at one Shariah Council she was informed that
"they did not represent bad girls". As discussed in chapter 4 fieldwork data
suggests that some Shariah Councils adopt a conservative, male centred approach
to dispute resolution while others seek to deliver a more 'woman-centred
approach'. Unwilling to accept this some women were left with little choice but to
contact a different Shariah council, one which they perceived as more flexible and
sympathetic to their needs. Demonstrating therefore, their potential to challenge
conservative interpretations of Islam, which may bear little relevance to their own
identifications as British Muslim women in Britain.
5.6 Obtaining a Muslim Divorce: The Process
The process of obtaining a Muslim divorce certificate was almost invariably
described has complex, protracted and complicated. More specifically, it was
compounded by the reluctance of some religious scholars to accept the applicants'
version of events and their insistence upon reconciling the parties. It is clear from
the analysis in chapter 4 that compliance to mediation and reconciliation within
Shariah Councils can render some women vulnerable to physical and emotional
abuse. If, however, as Shah-Kazemi (2001) argues, women choose to participate
in such privatized forms of unofficial dispute resolution then it becomes crucial to
analyse this process from the perspective of women themselves. We now draw
upon interview data to explore this in more depth.
5.6.1 The Investigation
In the previous chapter we found that the main objective of the investigation
process is to collate all the information relating to the validity of the marriage
from both parties in order to establish and verify the grounds for divorce. This is
done in order to attempt to reconcile the parties or if this fails, to determine the
type of divorce certificate to be issued. We also found that the applicants cannot
assume that a divorce certificate will be granted unconditionally, and on occasions
the Shariah Councils have rejected applications altogether.
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From the experiences of the women in this sample, it becomes clear that the
lengthy investigation process can cause confusion and resentment. As discussed in
chapter 4 this includes information and an application form. Fauzia explained,
They sent me some forms to fill in. They wanted to have copies of my
marriage certificate my nikah certificate, copies of petition and a copy of the
decree absolute and a cheque for £50. I also had to fill in some of their
forms which stated why I wanted to have a divorce, what were my reasons.
In cases where documents such as proof of marriage (a copy of the nikah
certificate or civil marriage) were unavailable the women were required to
provide an affidavit to confirm that the marriage had taken place. Notably most
women did not have a copy of the nikah certificate and in these cases they did
provide an affidavit. Unsurprisingly perhaps, what we ascertain quickly from the
interview data is the desire of all the women to complete the process with minimal
disruption and conflict. Despite this, a total of 23 women complained of the
process being inchoate, time-consuming and at odds with Shariah Council claims
of being sympathetic to needs of women.
They heard his side of the story and then I heard nothing, nothing months
and months passed. And I wrote them reminders but nothing (Sadia,
Birmingham)
I got a letter back from them saying they were looking into the case and in
the meantime I think they had met with my husband and heard his side of the
story. But I'm not sure everytime I asked what was going on I never got an
answer (Rabia, Birmingham).
At the same time the women reported understanding the need to verify their
version of events according to Islamic law. Even so, the popular view was that the
Shariah Councils relied too heavily on their husband's willingness to participate
in the process when it was quite obvious to them that some husbands were
deliberately creating obstacles and adopting 'delaying tactics' to delay the divorce
certificate from being issued.
It's not as though its my fault. I know he's making it harder than it has to
be. Of course he is, he just didn't want me to get my Muslim divorce and
now that he knows I'll get it without him he's just trying to make things
more difficult (Hina, London).
In this case as with several others her husband had refused to communicate with
the Shariah Council consequently delaying the outcome of the application by
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several months. As discussed in chapter 4, the scholars conduct the investigation
in this way so as not only to ensure that it is consistent with the requirements of
Islamic law but also to ensure that the disputant is able to contribute to what was
essentially a form of dispute resolution. Another reason for the delay in the
investigation process included awaiting the outcome of a civil dissolution of
marriage (with some cases this led to delays of up to a year). Another interviewee
complained that they were not taking her case seriously enough.
I had no sense of what was happening with the case, whether they that meant
they were proceeding with it or not then one day I phoned them and I spoke
to someone I don't know who it was and they said that they were really not
happy with my case because obviously I had behaved very badly, that they
weren't there to represent bad women and they were only there to represent
good women (Humeira, London).
Appalled with this response she eventually asked her aunt to intervene.
My aunt was furious and she told them she knew someone on the committee,
she then spoke to someone more senior, she told this guy that I'm going to
be writing to so and so and speaking to so and so and miraculously they find
my file and said oh we think there's been a misunderstanding. We had seen
this case and we had agreed that yeah obviously she should be divorced and
its all been sorted and you have our blessing and agreement that this has
happened. So it all got sorted in a matter of days with a phone call and I got
a letter saying it was all done.
Clearly, the important issues here relate to the lengthy bureaucratic approach
adopted by the Shariah Councils, leading to long delays in issuing divorce
certificates. As an illustration of this point it was interesting to note that a number
of women remained sceptical of the motives of the Shariah Council at this stage of
the process, summed up by one interviewee,
I think they were kind of holding out.. .hoping that we'd get together and
sort things out (Rubina, Birmingham).
As discussed in chapter 4 the process of mediation and reconciliation is central to
the process of dispute resolution at Shariah Councils. We now explore the
experiences of the women in this sample.
5.6.2 Mediation and Reconciliation
As discussed earlier, under present family law proposals, there has been much
debate on the "delegalized family obligations" that has led to "a retreat from legal
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intervention into private family arrangements" (Maclean 1997: 156). One of the
key objectives is the move towards resolving family disputes away from the
public sphere and towards this form of 'private ordering'. In particular, the ways
in which Shariah Councils have occupied this space reflects concerns of 'justice'
being administered in the private and under the 'shadow of law'. Thus under the
current climate whereby individuals are encouraged towards informal settlements
achieved through negotiation, conciliation or mediation we explore these sites of
'privatized dispute resolution' from the perspective of the women. Before we do
so it is useful to outline some of the findings in chapter 4, as data analysis
suggests that unofficial mediation and reconciliation practices are far more
complex than previously envisaged. Notwithstanding the difference in approach
between the councils we see that an important function of the Shariah Council is
to reconcile the parties. This is principally achieved through establishing a
dialogue with the female applicant and her husband. It is primarily via this
dialogic relationship that we see evidence of some women being put at risk of
violence and abuse, from their estranged husbands. This contentious approach
continues with the intervention of some solicitors contacting Shariah Councils to
negotiate more favourable terms on behalf of their male clients, in return for a
Talaq. In most cases these negotiations involve securing increased access to
children even in cases where an injunction has been issued to prevent further
access. Furthermore under the rubric of 'diversity' one Shariah Council reported
social workers attending reconciliation sessions to understand how "Islam works"
in cases where access to children is contested.
Therein lie at least, the seeds of the argument that the autonomy of the women
using these services may be undermined or curtailed to some degree. Closely
connected to these debates, are calls for the development of mediation and
reconciliation services suited specifically to cater to the needs of religious
minority communities. As we shall see, the wide-ranging disparities in approach
to unofficial mediation and reconciliation may render this approach problematic.
These findings are not necessarily inconsistent with existing research (see Shah-
Kazemi 2001:55) but it is not of course the same as arguing that Shariah councils
successfully avoid any conflict with civil-law mechanisms.
246
Interview data with this sample of women, confirms the findings in chapter 4 that
the significance of mediation and reconciliation becomes pivotal during the
investigation process. Similarly, it illustrates the centrality of gender relations in
the process of dispute resolution but also that this site is negotiated, contested,
challenged and resisted by the women. For example through this process some
women were able to explore the relationship between power/knowledge (Erasmus
200 1:194) where cultural practices such as forced marriage were challenged as
"Un-Islamic" and anthetical to the values of "being a Muslim".
A number of women expressed ambivalence about the reconciliation sessions and
in fact opinions ranged from indifference, outrage to one of genuine commitment.
The extracts from interview data illustrate this varied experience:
They wanted me to meet with my husband. In fact they said that I couldn't
have a divorce unless we both met with the Imam. But it wasn't as bad as I
thought. My husband took it very seriously.. .what the Imam was saying. I
think he needed a religious person to explain to him where he was going
wrong and why I was leaving him (Sabia, London)
I needed to explore the possibility of us getting back together from an
Islamic perspective. I'm a Muslim so it helps if you can get advice and
assistance from another Muslim. I think a Muslim woman would have been
able to understand where I was coming from (Humeira, London).
Well at the end of the day we had the responsibility to make it work so I
can't blame those who were trying to help us. Besides by that stage it was
too late to get back together we'd been through too much and our families
weren't even speaking to each other (Noreen, Birmingham).
I agreed to three sessions where basically the Imam wanted us to discuss
everything, just so we understood what divorce meant and also I think to try
and get us back together again. I was ok with that... only I felt as though he
wasn't really listening to what I had to say. My husband spoke and then the
Imam spoke to me, you know explained to me what I should be doing as a
Muslim wife (Parveen, Birmingham).
Yet as confirmed in chapter 4, this process takes place in a space that is
preoccupied with reconciling the parties, male dominated and often imbued with
conservative interpretations regarding the position of women in Islam. Interview
data reveals that this can create discomfort and unease for some women who were
regarded as the potentially dangerous participant in the process. Here the central
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focus of contention is the lack of opportunity the women may have participating
in the process. One interviewee explained, "it was weird but it felt as though I
was the one being told off and when I tried to put across what I thought was
wrong.. .its as though he didn't want to hear it".
In this way her position and participation in the process was predominantly
characterized in relation to her gender. This was confirmed by other interviews
and is a crucial observation for our understanding of how the reconciliation
sessions can marginalize women. Again the extracts below illustrate this:
No I didn't find it was helpful at all. Just the way it was set-up meant that
things weren't going to change (Shabana, London).
They were right from the beginning on his side they didn't even listen to
what I was saying. I mean I do read books. I don't go into it that much but I
do know the basics you know what a husband as to do. I was really
disappointed with the mulana's because he just wouldn't blame my ex-
husband (Mina, London).
To be honest I didn't understand the point of it. I told the Sheikh that I
didn't want to be in the same room as my husband, that he might lash out
cause that's what he's like, he's unpredictable. But he was insistent, that we
had to both be in the same room, that that's how it's done in Islam (Raheela,
London).
Perhaps a more troubling finding related to how 10 women reported that they
were coaxed into reconciliation sessions with their husbands even though they
were reluctant to do so. More worrying still 4 of these women reported that they
had existing injunctions issued against their husbands on the grounds of violence.
Again an extract of interviews reveals how potentially dangerous this maybe for
women and illustrates how husbands may use this opportunity to negotiate access
to children and in some cases fmancial settlements, which are in effect being
discussed under the shadow of law.
I told him that I left him because he was violent but he started saying things
like oh how violent was that because in Islam a man is allowed to beat his
wife! I mean I was so shocked. He said it depends on whether he really hurt
me! I was really shocked because I thought he was there to understand but
he was trying to make me admit that somehow I had done wrong (Shazia,
London).
I was very upset, in tears, holding my friends hand. It was awful but
apparently that's what it says in Islam, the husband and wife have to meet
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like this. I didn't want to but I didn't really have a choice. As a Muslim I
wanted to do the right thing, in God's eyes (Farah, London).
Feminist scholars have warned of the dangers of resolving marital disputes away
from protection of formal law. This may include situations where "cultural norms
deny women decision-making authority" (Roberts 1997:129) and where the
mediator is not neutral and provides the "normative framework for discussion"
(Roberts 1983: 549) which can transform the nature of the discussion and curtail
the autonomy of the disputant. Brunch raises concerns that negotiations occur in
private "without the presence of partisan lawyers and without access to appeal
(Brunch 1988:120). Numerous studies point to the fact that official mediation
places women in a weak bargaining position encouraged to accept a settlement
considerably less than had they gone through adversarial process. In their study
of mediation and divorce Greatbach and Dingwall found that mediators do not act
in a neutral way and enter the mediation process guiding the participants to
particular outcomes (1993:208). There is a strong imbalance of power and the
parties are not equal and do not respond is a fair way. Furthermore Bottomley
reminds us that conciliation "has not arisen in a vacuum and is not practised in
one" and we need to explore the dynamics of power, which underpin this process
(1984: 45).
Hence mediation promotes a particular familial ideology that is based upon social
control and patriarchal norms and values. In operation is subliminal coverts forms
of power and coercion. In this context formal law provides protection against
abuse in the private sphere. In response to the move towards private legal ordering
critics argue mediation fails to deliver on the key issue of 'justice'.
On a practical level the development of mediation practices has been led by the
Solicitors Family Law Association. The issue of mediation was also at the
forefront of the government White paper in its attempt to challenge the traditional
linkage between lawyers, courts and divorce based on the idea that divorce should
become a non- adversarial, non- state procedure. The White Paper was primarily
concerned about cost and whether the courts and lawyers are the most appropriate
forums for resolving family issues instead of how mediation can play a most
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effective role. The issue of access to justice is central to debates on mediation-
justice must be achieved through both the process and outcome. It was therefore
concerned about results rather than justice. Diduck and Kaganas (2000) point out
that in fact there are practical and fmancial considerations such as the need to
reduce soaring court costs, which must be taken into account)36
Of the sample, one interviewee opted for counselling sessions with a Shariah
Councils in the hope of reconciling with their husbands. The Shariah Council in
question did not form part of this study.
5.6.3 Case A
A is 34-years old from Birmingham and has two young children, aged 2 and 3
years old. In 1997 her parents arranged her marriage to S, whom she later married
that year. The marriage had not been registered on his insistence and in 2002 he
left the marital home. Up until the present time he has refused to grant A, a
Muslim divorce which she believes is an indication of his willingness to reconcile.
If not, then she seeks a divorce. She has gained permission from the Shariah
Council for one counselling session to be observed, but on the strict undertaking
that the Shariah Council remains anonymous and is not used as part of the
study.' 37
 Here we explore the underlying relations of power in a session prior to
where both parties will attend.
The session opens with the counsellor informing A that her husband has been in
touch and wishes to reconcile and will attend the next session. Significantly, the
session begins with Islam presented to the client as essentialist, clearly bounded
and internally homogenous, with little room for challenging the dominant
discourse presented by the mediator. Here diversity is presented as a problem.
Interestingly the client is unwilling to accept the framework on which the
discussion is based, shifting attention instead from a general discussion on Islam
136 Maclean outlines two reasons as to why this may be a dangerous precedent. Firstly, it is not
only the interests of the divorcing parties that must be addressed but also the needs of the child and
secondly we must consider the financial implications for the weaker fmancial parties- often the
women (1997:140).
137	
religious scholar has not gained the consent of the committee which makes up the council
and is therefore reluctant for the council being used as part of the study.
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to focussing on the practical realities of her life. Inspired by her readings on
women and Islam she is able to raise new questions and transcend certain
impasses.
Religious Scholar: In Islam it is a wife's duty to listen carefully to the needs of
her husband, she must respect him and not argue with him...
Client: I understand that but he has to make it work too. He just left, left his
children...
Religious Scholar: Well I've spoken to him on the telephone and he tells me a
different story, that you would taunt him and belittle him. In Islam women must
obey their husbands, the relationship must be based on love, understanding and
respect...
Client: He has walked out and just left us because he couldn't cope? How am I to
cope by myself?
Religious Scholar: A woman must support her husband and...
Client: I did support him and I understand there were problems but we have to
sort them out together. I've been reading books on Islam and a husband also has
duties to his wife.
The mediator then subtly alters the tension between the traditional discourse on
the position of women in Islam to the demands of the present. Rather than
focussing on the contradictions presented in the lifestyle choice of the client he
then attempts to negotiate her experience and expectations and still maintain a
consistent attitude on attempting to resolve the marital dispute from an Islamic
perspective. Moreover, in the hope of a adopting a sympathetic approach the
mediator presents this site as a forum for empowering Muslim women and
ultimately a advising a more favourable outcome. A striking feature in the cases is
the engagement of the female client in the process.
However, as discussed above, during the investigation, all the women had
participated in some form of mediation and reconciliation. Hence there would
appear to be no clear and consistent approach to reconciliation with Shariah
Councils. For example some women reported that mediation involved no
discussion of fmancial matters or issues of custody and access, whilst other
councils were keen to intervene and reconcile parties and if not then contribute to
other family law matters such as custody and access to children.
5.6.4 Retrieving the Dower
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In section 5.2.5 we discussed the centrality of the dower in the Nikah contract. In
this study it became apparent that for various reasons most women had not
attached any importance to the dower. Upon breakdown of marriage and in
complicated ways this situation had radically changed. It prompted a number of
the women to concentrate their efforts in retrieving the dower for two reasons.
Firstly for women whose marriages had not been registered according to civil law,
the importance of this approach lay in the belief that they were entitled to some
kind of financial redress upon breakdown of marriage. Secondly where the Nikah
contract had been a focal point of negotiations prior to marriage, the women
concentrated their efforts on keeping any financial monies or goods received upon
marriage while also seeking to obtain a Muslim divorce. In this way the Shariah
Councils opened avenues for strategic action within the contested space of
'personal law' and in so doing these women transformed this 'space' of
reconciliation into a site of mediation and negotiations for settlement of financial
matters.
However given the fact that the terms dower and dowry were used
interchangeably it often meant that such demands were reframed within the
context of culture rather than the application of religious personal law. And, given
the fact that this site embodies the intermeshing of cultural and religious practices
it is useful to note that when some women were informed by religious scholars
that upon receiving the Muslim divorce, the khula, they would be required to
return the 'dower' to their husbands they proceeded to then base their claims
towards those of culture and identity rather than religion. For example the terms
'haq mehr', jahez' and 'dowry' were articulated to invoke a cultural component of
Muslim marriage. To this end for some women invoking cultural or religious
practices became a matter of choice warranted by the unfair way they had been
treated by husbands during their marriage. And, as discussed in section 5.2.5 most
women expressed misgivings about the possibility of retrieving the 'haqq mehr'
while questioning the motives of their husbands.
By contrast the religious scholars expressed concern with this quite obvious
conflation of religious principles with cultural practice. Interviews revealed that
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they believed the onus was on Muslim women to educate themselves on the
principles of Muslim marriage and divorce. Mohammed Raza at the MLSC
explained, "Muslim women are simply not aware of their rights at marriage, have
little knowledge or understanding of dower and subsequently fail to meet their
demands upon breakdown of marriage". To remedy this situation the IvILSC
propose the introduction of a marriage contract agreed prior to the marriage and
which stipulates the terms of both marriage and divorce. Furthermore the MLSC
believe that to ensure sufficient understanding of the requirements of dower,
women must not only be party to such discussions but also demand a voice and
influence in the process as a whole. In theory this development not only ensures
women are given 'legal protection' but in doing so they gain greater control over
matters concerning divorce and separation.
For these reasons it would appear that the women in this sample, support the
introduction of a marriage contract. Their response to the proposed duty on all
parties to negotiate terms prior to marriage suggests that at the very least they
demand autonomy and respect in this process of decision-making. One
interviewee explained,
I wasn't aware that I could demand my rights when I got married. I didn't
even know that if the marriage broke down and it wasn't my fault I could
demand maintenance under Islamic law. I don't understand that has Muslim
women we're not taught this, why not? We didn't register the marriage and
when he walked away I was left with nothing (Salma, London).
Therein lies the argument as to why some women were more concerned about the
recognition of Muslim family law in Britain than others. In sum those women
whose marriages had not been registered faced greater obstacles for redress under
both English and Islamic law. Subsequently they were particularly aggrieved by
the circumstances in which they found themselves and used this situation to
legitimise arguments for the recognition of Muslim family law in Britain. Of the
15 women who had not registered their marriages, a total of 12 women had
contacted a solicitor to clarify their position relating to the validity of the nikah
ceremony and the possibility of maintenance. Of this group one woman was
involved in litigation suing her husbands under contract law to claim the dower.
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5.6.5 Type of Divorce Certificate Obtained
In this sample, a third of the women were awaiting a decision on the outcome of
their divorce application while the majority who contacted a Shariah Council for a
divorce certificate had successfully obtained the khula. The women in the former
category were more likely to be critical of Shariah Councils primarily because of
the lengthy delays in the process exacerbated by husbands deliberately placing
obstacles in order to prevent the divorce certificate from being issued. It was
notable that those women who had applied for a divorce at more established
Shariah Councils such as the BSC, ISC or IvILSC, were less critical than those
who had gone to small Shariah Councils based at local mosques. One interviewee
explained,
When I first tried to find out about getting a Muslim divorce it was awful, I
went to 6 different mosques and they all told me something different. Some
said not it just wasn't possible that I had to try and make my marriage work,
you know divorce is wrong in Islam. Others explained that it was possible
but I had to give back all my dowry. It was so confusing I just didn't know
what to think. But then someone told me about Dr. Saeeda they had seen a
TV programme on her and what she does and when I went to see her it
began to make a lot more sense (Farhana, Birmingham).
For the majority of women who had obtained a divorce certificate it was the
khula. As discussed earlier a key condition with this type of divorce is for the
wife to forego her dower. And, while in practical terms there were slight
variations in the amount of dower stipulated in the Nikah contract two particular
criticisms related to this type of divorce being issued. Firstly the women were
financially disadvantaged in having to return the dower and dowry when they
passionately believed that they had not been at fault for the breakdown of the
marriage. Given the deliberate obstacles placed by husbands to prevent any kind
of divorce being issued (by continually challenging the evidence put forward by
the applicant) the second criticism related to religious scholars failing to challenge
their husbands behaviour and too readily resorting to issuing the khula.
Just the fact that I'm the one who has instigated the legal proceedings that
goes against me even though its not my fault. Even though they gave my
husband the opportunity to divorce me and he didn't meant that he was
holding me in a kind of 'limping marriage' being a twilight zone of being
neither here nor there. Which I believe was a deliberate ploy (Rubina,
Birmingham).
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Men are keen in blackmailing their wives for divorce you know as long as
you give up the jewellery and return the mehr I will give you a divorce. And
this is what happened with me, this is what my husband said that if I
returned all of those wedding gifts he would give me a divorce and I refused
(Fauzia, London).
In the majority of cases the women had been asked to partake in negotiations at
the Shariah Council to determine the amount of dower and dowry to be returned.
The first observation to make of this outcome is the conflation between the dower
and dowry. It seems that in most cases because the dower only reflected the
nominal sum stipulated on the nikah contract (the average being £100) this was
consequently largely ignored and, instead the basis for negotiations moved
towards the dowry which involved much larger sums of money, including
clothing and jewellery. Thus the intermeshing of cultural and religious practices
condoned by the religious scholars was met with considerable hostility from the
women. Sadia exclaimed, "I couldn't understand their decision, it wasn't my fault
but in effect I was having to pay him to divorce me! That's not right." Analysis of
case-files in chapter 4 confirms this.
This outcome was accepted by the religious scholars as being unsatisfactory but
was justified on the grounds that religious practices had to be reformulated to
meet the needs of local Muslim communities and often this meant taking into
account traditional cultural practices. Dr. Suhaib Hasan at ISC explained, "we do
recognize that some women are reluctant to give up their dower and in some cases
the dowry, but this is a precarious situation and we have to think of the welfare of
all the parties involved. You see if we keep the proceedings dragging on it affects
all the parties, including the children so its best to sort things out as quickly and
easily as possible. In cases where we feel the husband is not at fault then the
applicant must decide if she wants the khula and under Islamic law she has every
right to do so".
5.7 Interaction with State Law
Earlier we drew attention to the fact that of the sample, only 10 women had
registered their marriages according to civil law and had also obtained the nikah
contract. For this group of women there was the added dimension of obtaining a
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civil divorce. And, as discussed in chapter 4 religious scholars often demand that
where required to do so applicants obtain a civil divorce prior to an application for
a religious divorce is considered, in an attempt to avoid a conflicts of law scenario
(see also Shah-Kazemi 2001). This process raises an interesting set of questions
relating to the ways in which the law defines religious personal laws and the ways
in which such 'legal processes' share a similar set of beliefs, ideas and approaches
to the dissolution of marriage. For the purposes of this study however, we are
interested with the second category of women in the sample, those whose
marriages had not been registered according to civil law. It is clear from interview
data that the emphasis upon 'justice' propelled a number of women to seek state
and community intervention to clarify the validity of their marriage certificates. In
particular the appropriation of solicitors dramatically introduced a new social and
legal space to deal with the complexitites of the situation the women confronted.
As discussed in chapter 1, Moore (1978) refers to these different spaces as 'social
fields' which meet, clash and grapple with each other. In this case the use of
solicitors was intended to increase the protection of the women by the law and as
stated above, to provide 'justice' in terms of fmancial redress. Thus this social
field is constituted by several competing 'cultural logics' rooted in particular
structures of power (Moore 1978).
In practice the use of solicitors was problematic, difficult and at times antagonistic
for both parties. In her study Shah-Kazemi, found that solicitors often dispensed
with erroneous legal advice as they were not aware of the validity of Islamic
marriages and therefore misunderstood at what instances a civil law divorce was
required (2001:53). This was confirmed by fmdings in this study. Moreover, the
capacity of solicitors to advise and represent the women was undermined by the
fact that they had little understanding on the reasons why a Muslim woman should
choose to partake in the process of religious marriage and divorce.
The reasons for contacting a solicitor were three-fold: to clarify the validity of a
religious marriage conducted in an unlicensed building in England; to determine
the validity of a religious marriage conducted overseas (in this case Pakistan) and
to think of strategies and avenues on the possibility of claiming back the dower
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under contract law. In each case the interviewee had contacted a local solicitor
specializing in family law matters. Yet in each case the interviewee had been left
disappointed with the advice given. Thus complaints ranged from inadequate legal
advice that drew upon racist stereotypes of Muslim women as passive and
disempowered to a complete lack of understanding and empathy for the their
situations. Extracts from interview data reveal an interesting insight into the
experiences of the women and perhaps more importantly invites attention to the
inadequate legal advice from solicitors.
I was very disappointed with my solicitor because I rang him time and time
again but he just couldn't understand the issues in my case. He just told me
my marriage was valid when it wasn't so he obviously didn't know the law
himself (S alma, London).
I said to my solicitor I want to be paid back penny that they've done to me
and she said yeah fair enough you do have a case. I've spent a year in this
case and I've got nothing out of it. At the beginning she said everything was
ok and then a couple of months later she writes to me and says well I'm
sorry we're going to have to take the divorce proceedings out of the court
because its not recognised only some courts recognise islamic marriages not
all the courts recognise them. So I turned around and said well why did you
say to me they were recognised this was the only reason I took the case
forward. And she said well I have dealt with this case before I have had a
lady who has been through the same thing as you and her marriage was
recognised in the courts so I thought that your case was the same thing but
when we took it into court they said no its not recognized (Zareena,
Bradford).
I don't think its fair that I should have to pay my solicitor to have to learn
about my religion and its doctrines on divorce. I don't think its fair that I
should have to pay the extra money to him so that he reads something in
order to understand where I'm coming from and I don't think I should be
obliged to go to a Muslim solicitor and that's one of the reasons why I went
to an English one (Fauzia, London).
Why should I have to pay for solicitors who aren't even able to help me? I
had to do all the chasing up, the reading and discussing with my solicitors
what would be the best options. I had to do the work they couldn't do all
because they just didn't know (Parveen, Birmingham).
I was really upset and I went to see one of the senior partners and I told her
that I was really upset because he had given me the wrong advice. Then he
eventually called and I said look at the end of the day I came to you for
advice I made a lot of decisions based on what you said. Had I known that
my marriage was not valid I would not have made a fool out of myself like
doing a petition and all that against him. I even had to pay for it all (Nigaht,
London).
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What they were basically trying to say is its in your community to sort this
mess out you know its nothing to do with them. Well as a Muslim woman I
was quite offended with the way that these solicitors were basically
badmouthing our religion. And I felt as though they were laughing at my
expense which I think is wrong (Shaheen, London).
Well what they were basically saying was that if you're not going to learn to
stand up for yourself then what do you expect. I was like I do stand up for
myself and it was my ex-husband that gave me the problems and I did it the
way I did out of respect for my parents but you know he should try to
understand but basically he just did not want to know (Farhana,
Binningham).
Such experiences had left the women feeling both angry and vulnerable.
Furthermore interviews with two solicitors in Bradford revealed the level of
confusion among some solicitors, where in some cases petitions for divorce were
being lodged where no valid marriage had taken place. One solicitor explained,
"with the growing Pakistani Muslim community in Bradford, we do get a fair
amount of cases when issues like this come up. I'm dealing with one at the
moment and I know solicitors could do with some training so that clients aren't
put in difficult situations.. .situations that I understand can be costly."(See
Appendix 5)138 In terms of utilizing state law to claim the dower it is beyond the
remit of this study to explore these issues in any depth however one interviewee
was currently in the process suing her husband under contract law to retrieve the
dower. She explained, "I have been told that the chances of me winning the full
amount are limited."
It is also useful to point out that 4 women were also critical of Imams for failing
to register mosques as licensed buildings. One interviewee had begun a
'campaign' in Bradford to make sure mosques and Imams are taking the issue
seriously. Salma explained,
If our mosque was registered than our marriage would have been recognised
but our mosque wasn't registered so at the end of the day I think the muslim
leaders can do a little bit more. If they got registered then this wouldn't be an
issue it would be counted like an English wedding.
138 For more discussion on training the judiciary see Judicial Studies Board, Handbook on Ethnic
Minority Affairs (JSB, London 2002-2003).
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Putting aside the issue of inadequate legal advice, it becomes clear from interview
data that most women were able to manoeuvre effectively between the different
legal processes and contested spaces in operation. However there are strong
grounds to suggest that issues of custody and contact of children are in some cases
being discussed and negotiated at this juncture- a space where state law interacts
with personal law. In this way the Shariah Council becomes the setting in which
traditional religious norms and values may be reinforced and which at the very
least undermine the welfare and autonomy of these women. Of the sample 5
women reported an offer from the Shariah Council to intervene in contested cases
of access to children and, 3 of these interviewees had also been sent letters from
the Shariah Council promoting its role as mediating in civil law dispute. Some of
the women found this incredulous and each had rejected the offer and seemed
aware of the dangers of negotiating family law matters (such as access to
children) in this arena.
No it never crossed my mind because if I had done that I still wouldn't have
any rights with them to do stuff like that (custody). I don't know first of all,
what their system is and secondly whether I would have had faith in their
system. Eleven men sit around and judge whether I'm a fit mother or
not.. .you know as much as I may complain about 2 women social workers
sitting around and making un-PC, inappropriate decisions at the end of the
day I could work with that system because I could also contribute (Sameena,
Birmingham).
I don't think they should be sending me letters saying we need to talk about
house and the possessions and the child, when actually they have no legal
rights to do any of those things. I don't think they're qualified lawyers so I
don't think they know what they're talking about and I don't think any of
those people employed at the Shariah councils have any of those secular
legal roles either (Yasmin, London).
Thus for these women without the frame of state law, safety disappears. This is
not of course to deny no criticism of the official process of dispute resolution.
Fauzia explained that her husband ". . .was going to go through the courts to give
me a hard time and he did that for many years." The extent to which the official
process is to some extent imposed upon them recasts the perception that the law
provides equal protection and entitlements to all its citizens (Santos 1987). And,
in this sample 6 women complained about the failure of state law recognizing
religious differences.
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I really resented all that official intervention because it was about judging
me. None of them understood where I was coming from. They couldn't
understand why I wanted a religious divorce (Noreen, Birmingham).
I don't necessarily think the British system, the official system is any better
and I think they get very confused with trying to be PC and trying to do the
right thing and knowing what the cultural etiquette's are and respecting
them. There's a real fine line between trying to do the right things and
actually doing the right thing and they sometimes mess up. I found that
whole set-up really disturbing (Hina, London).
It would then appear that, despite an apparently more positive image of official
law the women were critical of its ability to make reasoned decisions based upon
their unique experiences. For Hina the problem was that the official law had no
insight into what cultural and religious difference actually meant in the lives of
Muslims.
If they understood where I was coming from I think I would have had more
confidence in it. We do things differently because we are different in some
ways.
Not surprisingly some of women were in favour of the formal recognition of the
nikah under English law. But even here, such understandings were constantly
being renegotiated. For example while some women favoured the recognition of
Muslim marriage under English law, they opposed the complete transfer of power
to Shariah Councils. Thus in this context where the women were obviously
seeking different avenues for remedies the justifications for the recognition of
Muslim family law in Britain must be understood in this context. Furthermore
because the terms of the debate have been framed around constructions of
'Muslim identity' we learn very little about the power dynamics that underpin the
reasons of why women may support a strictly legal pluralist arrangement.
5.8 Formalising Shariah Councils
In chapter 3, we outlined demands by some Muslim leaders for the establishment
of a single Shariah Council with state recognition, to legitimize the group's
autonomy in matters of family law. The growth of these demands attests to
increasing attempts by some individuals and groups to unify the 'Muslim
community'. In this context communal autonomy takes the form of decision-
making power, which maintains the group's membership boundaries vis-à-vis the
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larger society. An integral aspect to this project is the preservation of Muslim
identity and it is the unique position of women within these groups as "cultural
conduits" that gives rise to the problem of gender-biased norms and practices
which often subordinate women (Shachar 2001:50). As discussed in chapter 1 for
liberal feminists this raises a clash of values scenario which undermine the liberal
principles of justice, common citizenship and equality before the law. 0km
questions, "What should be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions
clash with the norm of gender equality that is at least formally endorsed by liberal
states (however much they continue to violate it in their practices)" (1987). She
lists a number of possible clashes with Islam that include Muslim children
wearing the headscarf, polygamy and clitoridectomy amongst others.'39
Yet it is precisely this dichotomous approach that posits feminism and
multiticulturalism as oppositional and assumes women are victims of their
cultures and religions (VoIp 2001:181) that renders this argument problematic.
Moreover this obscures the complexities in the realities of women's lives and
privileges one form of discrimination over others (Crenshaw 1994). For example
race and economic inequality are given little in any consideration and 'race' and
'gender' are perceived as oppositional and mutually exclusive (Yuval-Davis 1997,
Anthias 2002, VoIp 2001). As Volp points out, "The tension believed to exist
between feminism and multiculturalism, or universalism and cultural relativism,
not only relies upon the assumption that minority cultures are more sexist, but also
assumes that those cultures are considered traditional, and made up of unchanging
and long practices that warrant submission to cultural dictates. Non-western
people are assumed to be governed by cultural dictates, whereas the capacity to
reason is thought to characterize the West" (2001:192). Again, as discussed in
chapter 1 other feminist scholars have developed a more complex nuanced
approach to understanding these 'dilemmas'. The 'intersectionality' approach
points to the complex embeddedness in social life of race and class from patterns
of gender discrimination that are construed as culmulative and intersecting (see
Crenshaw 1994, Yuval-Davis 1997). More importantly the concept of
'translocational positionality' allows us to challenge the dichotomous approach
139 Unfortunately she fails to explore the complexities of culture and identity. See Volpp (2001).
based on the fixed categories of insider/outsider in understanding the relationship
between Asian Muslim women, family and community but allows us to introduce
a more nuanced approach of the interplay of power, complexity and difference in
the lived realities of women's lives.
Undoubtedly empirical findings in this study confirm the existence of intra-group
inequalities such as forced marriage and, observation research in chapter 4 found
that Shariah Councils construct boundaries for group membership that often rely
upon traditional interpretations of the role of women in Islam as mothers, wives
and daughters. Thus under such conditions the multicultural accommodation of
Muslim family law in Britain may lead to the violations of citizenship rights for
Muslim women. It may mean the shifting of state regulation to the private
domain, thereby giving religious leaders greater power to dictate acceptable
patterns of behaviour. The women in this study echoed this caution and in doing
so they articulated a wide range of differing opinions from the implications of
being governed by a separate legal process, to the impracticalities of bodies such
as Shariah Councils administering 'justice' they explored the contradictions of
group interests versus individual choice. This discursive process raised the
conceptual and political dilemmas, which frame these debates. Yet they were keen
to explore these issues while occupying differential positions in the family and
with different levels of educational attainment. For example for 6 women who
were not financially independent this kind of "religious work" deserved official
recognition but this view did transcend class divisions.
This sense of belonging was articulated in different ways and the social
representation of Shariah Councils was important for some women as a linkage to
Muslim communities and wider British society
I'm a Muslim I identify as one and anything that helps to validate and
enhance my role as a Muslim in British society obviously I welcome and I
will support it (Yasmin, London).
To be Muslim is to be part of the Muslim umma. If they (Shariah Councils)
are recognised, I think that's great, an important development for all
Muslims (Sadia, Birmingham).
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Of particular importance for some women was the distinctiveness of Shariah
Councils from other community bodies as a focal point of reference to belonging
to a wider Muslim Umma. Seen in this way, some women defined their role as
bridging the gap between older and younger generations and, challenging intra-
family inequalities such as forced marriage. It is worth noting a general point
here that in principle initiatives that did facilitate relations between individuals
and their families were welcomed by all the women yet, at the same time the
women expressed a desire to choose whether or not they would wish to use these
services.
They serve a useful purpose but really when people ask for these councils to
be formally recognised, alarm bells go off in my head. When you start
bringing in special things I think there's two things that can happen. One I
think you can have ghettotization you have a community within a
community that is ostracised and marginalised and you then become a target
for many other things. Secondly I think why? Why would you need it?
(Anisa, Bradford).
In some ways I think it would help the British system to wash their hands of
us and say oh there you go deal with it yourself, look after these problems
within your own community and that's just a way of getting out of it. We
are here and we pay our taxes and we have our rights so therefore we want to
be taken seriously. Don't tell us to go to go and sort our own problems out
(Yasmin, London).
I do identify myself as both British and Muslim, so I don't want to support
initiatives that mean that I have to choose between one kind of legal system
and you know choose whether I'm British or not and then which legal
system to go too. It's just not feasible and anyway it's not right. Reality is a
lot more difficult than choosing between one or the other! (Parveen,
Birmingham).
I don't know what their terms of reference would be and I don't know how
they would set the parameters for their own jurisdiction. I don't know who
would be the best authority to do it. I don't know how legally binding it is,
there's still so many things yet to be sorted (Noreen, Birmingham).
I still think it would be very, very male dominated and therefore how
experienced and relevant is their life experience to interpreting my life
which they would do. And when I've met women who have been involved
with Shariah Councils I don't think they have much autonomy within the
system and I think you have to be a certain kind of woman to be eligible and
I think being married and coming from certain structures I think are very,
very important. So I worry about the practicalities of it not so much their
motivation (Raheela, London).
If the group of men at the Shariah council are to sit and decide my life it
terrifies me on what their criteria and what their checklist should be. I think
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it would be very different to what I would think my life should be and that's
no less Islamic. And also they do a lot of things in the name of Islam when
absolutely are one hundred per cent pure culture and I find that really
upsetting that Islam is used to do that and if we as a community can't make
sense of that then we can't ask another system to come in and develop new
laws when we can't actually distinguish.. .1 mean who appointed them, how
would they qualify what have they done to make them know more. Do they
even work in Shariah law? (Shazia, London).
Well at the moment I don't think they work because there is no one to tell
them off if they do something wrong, like this man was telling me he was
the president of the Shariah Council and he could do anything. So one
person shouldn't have that much power anyway (Mina, London).
If it's about community control I think they (Shariah Councils) should be
honest about that but I don't know if it is. I mean women want the Islamic
divorce and I guess they are providing a service. Its just the way some of
them do it that's the problem (Sabia, London).
Hence the observation that such bodies may in fact fail to capture the complex
realities of the women's lives and, consequently unfairly situate Muslims on the
periphery of British society. From this perspective formalising Shariah Councils
may serve to essentialise their social and legal identities as fixed and unchanging.
Moreover, these extracts demonstrate that the women expressed confusion as to
the limits of the powers of these bodies.
I couldn't understand. . .they wrote me a letter saying that there was issues to
be taken into account that was about child custody, which was about the
house, which was about possessions, which was about... all kinds of things.
I thought, hold on what jurisdiction do they have? I've already been through
the courts what do I have to go through a set of Islamic courts? Do I have to
go through them again its all been done and what if it means I can't have
custody? Who wins English law or the Islamic Shariah Council? (Yasmin,
London).
Of particular concern was the lack of female representation on these bodies. In
fact most women were in favour of developing specific services such as Muslim
counselling to meet the needs of Muslims in Britain but emphasised the need to
involve women to ensure that all women were not compelled to use the services.
I think that women's organisations should be taken seriously as well,
whether they're Muslim women or Asian women. They know the lifestyle of
women within Britain today, having been brought up as Asian women and
being British themselves so I think they're more than qualified (Nasima,
Bradford).
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When was the last time a women's organisation was invited to contribute to
the legal system in order to analyse for example the impact of marital
breakdown in Shariah Councils and the courts, I just don't think it happens
and yet a British Muslim women is more of an expert than the imams I can
think of (Naheed, London).
Undoubtedly the site of Shariah Councils makes gender visible and in this context
the women who use its services identify themselves as Muslims and Muslim
women. This is particularly significant for Muslim women's organisations such as
Muslim Women's Help-line (MWHL) and the 'An-Nisa Society' both of whom
advocate the development of social policy initiatives to meet the needs of
religious communities based upon their religious identities rather than focussing
upon the categories of race, gender and cultural differences. These approaches
acknowledge the power and presence of Muslim women as actively instigating
change within communities. As Parker points out, "Exploring these experiences in
a particular setting demonstrates that an understanding of multiculturalism
requires a much closer specification of the perspective from which it is being
understood" (2000:93).
In this way the MWHL have successfully created an interesting space within
Muslim communal politics and women's activism, while developing strategies
meet the needs of Muslim women. Such strategies include providing pre-marital
counselling based upon Islamic perspectives, training Imams and community
leaders to challenge the practice of forced marriage and setting up Muslim refuges
for Muslim women escaping domestic violence. However MWHL warn of the
dangers of relying on rudimentary Islamic principles' 40 and instead advocate
education and discussion within Muslim communities with Muslim women being
at the forefront of these debates. In terms of challenging the unequal cultural
norms imbued within Shariah Councils they have produced a guide entitled
"Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage According to the Principles of Shariah"
which draws upon the work of Muslims feminists and scholars. 14 ' Ms Sheriff
states,
'40 For more discussion on this see Shah-Kazemi 2001:75.
141 The MWHL has been actively engaged in calling for the regulation of Shariah Councils and
consultation between Shariah bodies and civil legal authorities. See Muslim News, "Islamic and
Civil legal Structures need to interface" Friday 19" December 2003. On 18th May 2003 they held a
265
It is high time that our leadership bodies got to grips with such
problems and provided clear and effective leadership and more
importantly were seen to publicly support the victims of unscrupulous
behaviour at individual and institutional level. But the responsibility
lies not just with the Establishment and the community. In the middle
of these two are the Muslim and civil legal structures which urgently
need to talk to each other and ensure that they are better informed so
that vulnerable people, particularly women, are at least not misled as
to their rights. Awareness and training is one such step that is needed,
but there is so much more that needs to be done.
5.9 Conclusion
The process of Muslim marriage and divorce in Britain, encapsulates an
interesting set of cultural formations. Existing research seems to promise
heterogeneity but clearly marks this practice of Muslim personal laws in Britain as
homogeneous, a narrow particularism, which ignores the subjective experiences
of women and the articulation of power in this diasporic space. This conflation of
what is cultural practice and what is state law attempts to make the experience and
outcome of the process as one for all and unified in the Muslim community.
Clearly this is not the case. What these commentators have succeeded in doing is
privileging a particular religious practice as part of a specific Muslim identity.
The problem with this approach is it tends to ignore the possibility of alternative
narratives. Clearly in this sample, for example, there was a sense of belonging to
a Muslim community, which the women expressed. Yet these descriptions of
belonging, community, and homeland were articulated in different ways,
disrupted, challenged, resisted and accepted. Some women had been
marginalized, others occupied a closer position to the acceptable dictates of
community expectations. It is the strategic use of this diasporic space that is
important to explore.
Thus the management of the marital dispute gives rise to a different set of
responsibilities and obligations. Women, who participated in this process, viewed
themselves as not only individuals but also as members of families and
communities. In a situation where notions of religious identity, belonging and
symposium at their premises to discuss the issue of Muslim marriage and divorce in Britain and
have also held meetings on forced marriages.
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familial norms and values interact with the values of individual choice and
consent, we see that some women were successfully able to negotiate between the
plurality of norms and values that exist within the context of family, home and
Shariah Councils. An important aspect of such findings, therefore, is to challenge
the perceived inherent marginality of women in this process. For example, it is
interesting to note that several women reported that they were aware that the
meanings and interpretations of some Islamic perspectives put forward by
religious scholars, were contested and therefore open to change. In this way they
were able to disregard them and were fully aware of the need to utilise state law
for protection and entitlement of rights. For this reason they were able to
challenge their weak bargaining position in the marriage, to occupying a space at
the Shariah Council as a basis for entering into negotiation, dialogue and possible
change. In such a situation some women participated in the reconciliation process
as a strategic manoeuvre to challenge conflicting interests. Yet this shift of dispute
resolution from the public to the private sphere raises serious concerns on how
power is effectively reconfigured from the state to the family and community.
From such a perspective the differential treatment of women in the process of
marriage and divorce, can lead to a conflict between equality and autonomy and
the conflicting interests of the protection of family, culture and religion as
enshrined by the norms and values of Shariah Councils.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
In conclusion we return to the two key questions posed in this study: how do
Shariah Councils constitute as unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms? And,
what are the experiences of Pakistani Muslim women using such 'privatized'
forms of dispute resolution to obtain a Muslim divorce? While the discursive
focus in this study has been on the socio-cultural and Teligious practices
underpinning these processes of dispute resolution, we have also drawn upon
debates on citizenship, multiculturalism and identity. Simultaneously, the new
discursive legal space where formal and informal law meet, provides the
opportunity to conceptualise the emergence of 'informalism' in the form of
unofficial mediation operating as part of the 'semi-autonomous social field'
(Moore 1978). This intellectual strategy of drawing upon different theoretical
paradigms illustrates not only the 'interpenetrations' between the different
approaches (Santos 1987:67), but also enables us to locate these debates within
the specific lived realities of women's lives (Griffiths: 2002:120).
In Britain the recognition of these plural legal orders has led to interesting
scholarly debate on what is understood as law, legal pluralism and Muslim family
law (Carroll 1997, Hamilton 1995, Menski and Pearl 1998, Shah-Kazemi 2001,
Yilmaz 2002). While most literature presents these developments as a reflection
of cultural and religious life, we are also drawn to the conclusion that
understandings of culture and religion are to be understood as fixed, bounded and
indeterminate. This is particularly clear from the work of legal pluralists such as
Menski (1998) and Yilmaz (2002) that present the duality of culture and religion
as the underlying premise upon which this presupposed framework of dispute
resolution must be understood. In turn state law is presented as overarching and
universalist with the power to annihilate or accommodate difference at its whim.
More interestingly still, the debate in Britain has been closely framed around the
construction of a homogeneous 'Muslim identity' that leads to the demands of a
parallel legal system, which presupposes a deeply felt cultural and religious
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conviction, without providing adequate analysis of the complexities that identity
entails. As exemplified in this study, the task of exploring the multiple ways in
which British Pakistani Muslim women perceive dispute resolution, means it is
necessary to engage in the analysis of gender and its intersection with culture,
rights and unofficial law. Viewing these debates from an interdisciplinary
perspective transforms the analytical framework from fairly essentialist terms
prevalent in existing literature, too much more fluid and contradictory
understandings. This gives rise to a pluralism that is neither essentialist nor
relativist but a provides a "stronger grounding in the conversation between theory
and method" (Cowan, Dembour and Wilson 2002:20). Thus by taking into
account these specificities we pose one fmal question in the study: does this
research provide us with any new understandings?
6.2 Shariah Councils, Unofficial Mediation and Power
Surprisingly a review of literature in chapter 1 found very little attention paid to
the multiplicities of law, dispute resolution, identity and diaspora in Britain. At
present the dominant view of Shariah Councils is that they accommodate the
needs of Muslims in Britain and defme themselves according to Muslim norms
and values and, Islamic legal principles. Hence we fmd that these developments
challenge the hegemonic power of state law and, points to the possibility of these
bodies effecting social, political and legal change in their engagement with
multiculturalism and the rights discourse. This is particularly evident in the
projection of Muslim legal pluralism by some writers as unified, harmonious and
shaped by common goals and strategies. For this reason the complexity of Muslim
legal pluralism is represented as oppositional to state law. Indeed while existing
literature warns against determinism and 'legal centralism' inherent in state law,
the very existence of legal pluralism is also classified and structured according to
the ontological divide of state law versus personal law. For this reason, writers
such as Menski (1998), Poulter (1998), Shah-Kazemi (2001) and Yilmaz (2002)
locate their studies within the framework of 'thick multiculturalism' whereby
notions of group rights, culture and religion are modelled on more or less
essentialist terms. In the struggle for the recognition of diversity and pluralism
identities are marked around cultural and religious boundaries and as this study
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has found, deeply at odds with the complex realities of women's lives. In reality
communal boundaries are continually being challenged, resisted and accepted.
Not least for this reason we must be careful to avoid the pitfalls of identity politics
and what Anthias terms "the Scylla of feminist fundamentalism and the charybdis
of cultural relativism" (2002:275).
In Islam, resolving disputes via the informal methods of mediation and arbitration
exists among other reasons in a bid to establish societal order. The development of
'local informal courts' in Islamic states demonstrates how these processes are
presented as discrete, clearly bounded entities rivalling the structure of state law
(see Rosen 2000:14). It is clear from discussion in chapter 4 that the 'discourse of
disputing' (Hirsch 1998:18) is central to the emergence and development of
Shariah Councils in Britain. Without doubt these bodies challenge the cognisance
of state law with respect to resolving marital disputes and intervening in the
process of divorce. Yet unsurprisingly this process of dispute resolution in Britain
has been disrupted and reformulated by the 'diasporic experience' to suit the
needs of local Muslim communities (see Werbner 2000). Rather than embodying
a singular set of shared cultural and religious norms the Shariah Councils in this
study were imbued with differing power relations revealing internal contestation,
conflict and change. In this context legal discourse reconfigures as "different
levels of legality" (Santos 1987:113) and raises our attention to the paradox of
there being new "interdisciplinary dialogues around questions of state power,
cultural domination, resistance and hybridity" (Greenhouse and Greenwood
1998:8).
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4 the ways in which Shariah Councils constitute as
unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms reflects how they are situated within
local Muslim communities. Hence by simply focussing on the paradigm of legal
pluralism or dispute resolution, obscures the complex contestation within the
'community' over its 'identity' in multicultural Britain. And, by positing these
processes in the terms of either assimilating into majority society or exercising
their choice not to 'belong' leaves unaddressed the issue of the internal dynamics
of power. This is not of course to deny that these bodies do not share a set of
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'common characteristics' based on religious norms and values clearly they do and,
in doing so they identify in their unity of belonging to a universal Muslim
community. In this way their mark of othemess derives from a shared set of
understandings with little need or desire for state recognition. Instead the private
sphere provides the space and opportunity for them to develop forms of
communal autonomy and the regulation of communities, away from state
interference. From this perspective Shariah Councils do fit the model of the 'semi-
autonomous social field' (Moore 1978) since this approach places very little
demands on the state and, remains autonomous but also recognises the power of
state law. However as fieldwork data suggests, given the strong desire to ground
and establish these unofficial legal processes within the framework of state law
some Shariah Councils do seek the establishment of a parallel legal system in
Britain. For this to be met, the universal language of rights, autonomy and choice
are reformulated within particularistic claims for recognition (based on religious
specificity) as the basis for differential treatment.
As discussed in chapters 1 and 4, official family mediation occupies an
intermediate legal and social space at the boundary of state law and non-state
forms of ordering (Santos 1987). This conceptual space between state law and
personal law is contested whereupon state law and personal law struggle to
establish control (see Abel 1984, Fitzpatrick 1992). This is a process whereby
unofficial mediation marks the site upon which to resolve marital disputes from
the perspective of Muslim personal law. Because of the centrality of gender
relations in Muslim family law and in particular the position of women in relation
to marriage and divorce, attempts to strengthen or develop unofficial mediation
bodies raises questions on the position and autonomy of women using these
bodies to resolve marital disputes.
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5 there are sharp differences between official and
unofficial mediation'42 but one issue addressed in this study is whether state law is
142 Critical legal literature on community justice has focussed on whether these movements can
have a social transformative effect on the legal system (Santos 1979, Fitzpatrick 1983, 1988,
Henry 1983). It is argued that these movements are not completely autonomous and independent
from the state nor are they completely dependant upon the state thus there is a state of ambiguity
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moving from a position of formalism to 'informalism' whereby power is in effect
transformed to the sphere of the private and to 'informal bodies' such as Shariah
Councils. At one level one could quite legitimately argue, that this debate is
redundant, as under existing family law provisions couples are not required to
seek mediation prior to the formal dissolution of marriage. 143 After all Part II of
the 1996 Family Law Act is not enshrined in law and fieldwork data found no
evidence of a formal, intertwined relationship between the two processes, obliging
divorcing couples to seek official mediation. Here it is important to bear in mind
that at a formal level both legal processes are keen to avoid any conflict.
Yet in practice a very different picture emerges with fieldwork data fmding
evidence of the multiple legal processes interacting and intermeshed. A particular
cause for concern is the role of solicitors and how they may reformulate mediation
and reconciliation to fit within the framework of unofficial dispute resolution
epitomised by the Shariah Council. We found evidence that some solicitors
encourage clients to negotiate settlements at this space, a space that provides no
formal protection against those who may feel compelled to use the mediation or
reconciliation services in order to obtain a Muslim divorce. Thus the complex
relationship between individual, community, informal and formal law
dynamically interacts in the area of mediation and reconciliation. The relationship
between these four inter-linked processes increasingly raises important yet
complex questions on the relationship between gender disadvantage, the
public/private divide, the sphere of regulation and a sphere of non-regulation
(Fletcher 2002: 145). As fieldwork data reveals these bodies may eschew gender
equality in favour of religious and communal homogeneity.
6.3 Feminist Research, 'Standpoint' and 'Cultural Difference'
and this ambiguity gives the potential for a social transformative effect on the wider structure of
the legal system (Henry 1987, Harrington 2000 and Merry 1988). As Cain (1985) argues the
relationship can be both supportive and oppositional.
143 But undoubtedly social policy initiatives are being developed to encourage resolution of marital
disputes via mediation. This raises the two key questions: firstly whether the state may implicitly
recognise religious bodies as suitable arenas for mediation and whether has led to religious bodies
taking up the role of mediation bodies. In this regard a critical reading on the relationship between
state, law and power analysis allows us to question the extent to which state powering this way
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Drawing upon the concepts of 'standpoint' and 'difference' in chapter 2 we
explored the possibility of adopting a methodological approach that is able to
capture the complexity of "individual histories, shared family lives and
standpoints of gender, generation, class and ethnicity... all interwoven in these
related but individual accounts" (Mccarthy, Holland and Gillies 2003: 19). This
approach allows us to interrogate what we understand as culture, community and
identity as fluid, changing and contested entities that are open to social and
cultural contestation within diasporic communities. Furthermore instead of
denying the importance of the standpoint of the researcher in the field this
approach demands a critical analysis of their engagement in the research process.
The usefulness of this approach lies in the fact that it provides the means by which
we are able to interrogate the power relations upon which the research is based.
At an intuitive level the concern of conducting research deemed 'sensitive' means
that we are able to identify the importance of local context. Here it is important to
bear in mind the difficulties of access to participants and the role of 'gatekeepers'.
In the light of Islamaphobia and the rising number of attacks on Muslims' the
benefits of contributing to research that addresses difficult questions may not
understandably be of instrumental benefit to the complex Muslim demands for
recognition. In the face of such difficulties in this study access to material was
withheld, research observation limited and access to the female users of the
Shariah Councils chosen denied. Nonetheless with the material made available
we were able to provide an insight into how these bodies constitute as unofficial
dispute resolution mechanisms in Britain.
The sample of British Pakistani women was not also perfectly representative but
again did provide an insight into the diverse and complex experiences of obtaining
a Muslim divorce. Thus the debate over accommodating cultural difference in
feminist research highlights the problems with theoretical explanations of social
continues to control the dynamics of 'legal ordering' within the private spheres of the family and
home under the guise of 'informal justice' (Abel 1982:11).
Interestingly the rise of Islamaphobia is now being documented frequently in all the national
newspapers. See Dodd, V and E MacAskill, "Muslims Fear Backlash" The Guardian, September
25 2004.
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categories and identities of women. As Andersen points out, "Building more
inclusive ways of seeing requires scholars to take multiple views of their subjects,
abandoning the idea that there is a singular reality that social science can
discover" (1993:43). This is not to claim that differences or cultural difference per
se acts as the reference point for all experiences but that we recognise the
complexities that data produces and explore the processes behind data collection.
Thus universal theories on gender remain both limited and inadequate has
fieldwork data in this study reveals. The dichotomies of male versus female,
cultural rights versus women's rights means that they fail to capture complex
processes and uneven and social and legal change. Instead we need to adopt a
more 'grounded approach' based on empirical studies to understand how gender
relations are constituted in specific situations and processes.
6.4 Citizenship and Muslim Claims for Recognition
The emergence of anti-essentialism in scholarly debate has led to greater analysis
of the relationship between community, identity and claims for recognition.
Indeed, it seems that one of the most pressing questions today is whether Muslims
have become a politically effective diaspora that challenges the national polity?
(See Werbner 2000). More recently multicultural debates have focussed on the
relationship between state intervention, non-intervention, a dialogue between
majority and minority communities and the right to exit a group in cases of forced
marriage (see Phillips 2002). In chapters 3 and 4 we outlined the nature of South
Asian Muslim settlement in Britain and engaged in recent discussions on 'claims
and belonging' and the relationship between the 'local' and the 'trans-national'.
For Soysal (1999) the fact that Muslim claims are based upon a 'Muslim identity'
that are not only located within local particularistic claims of recognition but also
framed within the context of international universal human rights has led to a
process of de-coupling of rights and identity which in turn creates a different
relationship between the individual and the state, than the one espoused by
traditional definitions of citizenship. In this way citizenship is transformed from
the homogeneous conceptions of the British nation to a more nuanced
investigation of cultural difference and contemporary multiculturalism. The
dynamics of these processes are imbued with differential power relations that
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redefine the relations between the local, national and global Muslim umma. Thus
we also see the emergence of localised identities for example the expectations of
British Pakistani Muslims may differ to some extent from British Bangladeshi
Muslims.
Drawing upon this approach, we found that some sections of the Muslim
community in Britain would like to claim legal autonomy in matters of family
law, to enable Muslim law to be applied in the 'private' sphere of family relations.
If this claim were accepted in Britain, a different system of personal laws would
govern Muslim citizens from those applied to the community at large. But this
would raise the issue of how to deal with those individuals who do not wish to
conform to the traditional customs of their communities. Clearly, such a group
right is problematic if it is based on the exclusive recognition of a single common
identity for all the members of the cultural and religious minority. As
Montgomery points out, support for such a right rests on a number of
assumptions. First, the group must have some discrete identity, which enables its
members to be distinguished from outsiders. Second, the group must be
essentially homogeneous in respect of its desire for the special treatment. Third,
not only must the group generally want special treatment, but also the treatment
must be of a nature, which creates liberties that can be exercised by all
(1992:123). The claim for an exclusive or territorially based separate personal law
system remains problematic since the cultural boundaries of groups is rarely
unambiguous. This is because, as Verman points out, "Individual people are likely
to feel part of one group in some contexts and of another in relation to different
issues" (1982: 32). Boundaries are more easily defmed when minorities are
concentrated territorially, as is the case with indigenous minorities. A further
option, the one adopted in India, is to create two parallel systems of personal law -
customary/religious and civil and allow all citizens the right to choose between
them.
The debate as to whether Britain should adopt a pluralist legal system to
accommodate the practice of South Asian religious personal laws must be
approached with great caution. Within the English legal system the rights of
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minority groups have been defined through anti-discrimination legislation. At
present the cultural rights of minority groups are recognised and protected in
English law as long as they do not violate national and international human rights
law. We have seen that this may present problems in the case of South Asian
personal laws. The law must also take into account the heterogeneity of South
Asian and Muslim settlers in the UK and the many different varieties of religions
they practise. Clearly, no single authority can define Muslim personal law, and
individuals, in line with liberal principles, would have to be able to opt for a court
of their choosing. The danger of a rigid pluralism is evident: it would encourage
the creation of separatist politics, ghettoising minority communities outside the
mainstream legal system and thus defming them as the 'other'. As a result, instead
of enhancing the rights of South Asians or Muslims in Britain, it would serve to
curtail their rights and to segregate groups from one another. This would lead to a
reduction of cultural and religious diversity, dynamism and pluralism, rather than
enhanced integration. Thus we must move away from dealing with questions of
citizenship we see how the current debate focuses on the relationship between
community versus individualism, solidarity versus diversity, continuity versus
change and responsibility versus duty and obligations.'45
6.5 Recognising Complexity and Difference: Translocational Positionality
At first glance a review of literature in chapter 1 appears to highlight the
difficulties in adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law, dispute
resolution, gender and identity in Britain. The failure of legal pluralists in Britain
to develop critiques on the internal dynamics of power within diasporic
communities reflects the desire to present communities as homogenous and
indeterminate. Because the emphasis here is upon group membership to the
community, proponents of this position are keen to draw a sharp distinction
between the public and private. As long as we accept the profound commitment to
religious practice in the private sphere as fundamentally different to religious
practice in the public sphere we are in a better position to analyse the operation of
differing legal orders within the overarching power of state law. Thus in Britain
145 In a recent and controversial essay Goodhart (2004) claims that liberals must re-think the notion
of diversity to correct the eroding impact migration has had upon settled communities and the
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some sections of the Muslim community have been campaigning for state funding
of Islamic schools while at the same time demanding autonomy in regulating
family law matters in the private spheres. This reinforces the dichotomization of
the public/private spheres and has served as a useful tool for the state to define
acceptable levels of intervention into the private spheres of family, home and
community.
In trying to understand these socio-legal processes requires a critique of the
underlying power relations within family, community and state. The concept of
'translocational positionality' (Anthias 2002:275) addresses the potential conflicts
and tensions that arise in different and at times conflicting social contexts,
including intra-family relations. Drawing from this concept in chapters 3, 4 and 5
we found that the experiences of marriage, divorce, family and community
relationships for the women in this study, to be messy, fragmented and complex.
These findings suggest that during the process of marital disputes women cannot
be stereotyped as requesting no family support or going down the road of nothing
but family support. Instead they are themselves negotiating the outcomes of their
disputes. Pakistani Muslim women have complex views about whom and what
they are and thus identity cannot be understood as a dichotomous variable of
insider/outsider, muslim/non-muslim. Instead the narratives produced by the
women themselves justifies attention to their participation, interaction and
outcomes with these 'unofficial' bodies. The space(s) inhabited by the Shariah
Council is neither distinct from local communities nor in totality separate from
state law instead, it is a space that intersects with contested sites of local
communal power and in this way is a unique formation of a British diaspora. As
Soysal (1999) points out this space draws upon local and transnational networks
for legitimacy connecting with the global Muslim umma while developing
strategies to fulfil the needs of specific local Muslims. As Mohammed Raza at
MLSC explained, "We stay away from catering only to a particular group of
Muslims but let me tell you, up and down the country there are lots of small local
Shariah Councils who just deal with a specific groups of Muslims. For example in
Leceister there is a Shariah Council that caters to the needs of Gujerati Muslims
notion of a British identity. 	
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and I hear there maybe a new one developing in Southall to cater for the needs of
Somalian Muslims."
Data in this study demonstrates the ambivalent relationship between British
Muslim women and Shariah Councils. While on the one hand the women
identified themselves as Muslims and recognised the importance of Shariah
Councils in helping them to obtain a Muslim divorce, they were also critical of
these bodies as mediation fora and the consistent attempts to reconcile them with
their husbands. Yet in transcending the ethnocentric construction of Muslim
female identity as 'victims' they were able to redefine what it means to be a
Muslim woman and adjust their participation with these bodies according to the
social contexts in which they were situated. This research thus reveals the
dynamism of these women and in particular their capacity to shift, change and
develop in response to new needs and situations. This draws upon the work of
legal pluralists who have incorporated an understanding of gender relations and
the dynamics of power in their work. Thus Griffiths (2001) calls for a non-
essentialising pluralism which is grounded in the reality of women's lives and
which is neither universalist nor pluralist and Hellum advocates an understating
based on the 'processual' approach that takes into account "perceptions and
values in complex chains of human relationships." (1999:96).
The very notion of difference as a site of struggle involving the contestation of
meanings often imbued with internal contradictions, leads us to briefly consider
how we can develop strategies that challenge intra-family inequalities and
community regulation of women, while recognising identities as complex and
fluid.' In a sense this brings us back full circle and the theoretical discussion in
chapter 1 on the relationship between legal pluralism, identity, multiculturalism
and feminism.
For most scholars the dissembling of the western human rights framework
provides the means by which we are able to transform human rights from its
146 It is beyond the remit of this study to engage in these complex debates hence the discussion is
jevitably limited.
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western hegemonic position of power to the more complex picture of rights in
relation to culture, community, socio-economic conditions and localized religious
practices. Undoubtedly the human rights discourse remains problematic for its
universalizing approach to understanding cultural and religious difference. In her
study Ali (2000) provides a fascinating legal analysis of women's human rights in
Islam on the basis of sources of Islamic law. Drawing upon her extensive work in
Pakistan she illustrates the multiple spaces in law, that both restrict and empower
women in different contexts. The claim that Islam is anthetical to safeguarding
women's human rights is effectively challenged yet the question of how we
challenge intra-family inequalities within the family, home and community and
based upon localized cultural and religious practice is left open. Other Muslim
scholars such as An Na'im contend that local communities must engage in the
process of change and renewal and dispose of oppressive cultural practices. This
internal process of change can only be achieved via local dialogue within
communities whereupon individuals are able to draw on their commonalities and
differences, while in the process challenging oppressive cultural practices (1992).
He explains, "In this way, the combination of all the processes of internal
discourse and cross-cultural dialogue will, it is hoped, deepen and broaden
universal cultural consensus on the concept and normative content of international
human rights" (1994:174).
Yet as data in this study suggests dialogue is often imbued with power relations
and is constituted in relation to controlling family and communal boundaries. For
example, we found that the relationship between the female users of Shariah
Councils and religious scholars are often predicated on the religious and socio-
cultural terms that marginalize women (which included the female counsellor
based at the Shariah Council). As Anthias points out "effective dialogue requires
an already formulated mutual respect, a common communication language and a
common starting point in terms of power" (2002:288). It is the 'common starting
point in terms of power' that raises the dilemma of the multi-cultural question of
"how then can the particular and the universal, the claims of both difference and
equality be recognised?" (Hall 2000:235)
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Undoubtedly we need to address these issues in the light of empirical findings
rather than solutions based upon an abstract theoretical discussions. We need to
incorporate debates on complexity, difference and diversity to understand the
complex realities of British Pakistani Muslim women's lives. As this study
demonstrates women feel the contradictory pulls which these forces exert but their
narratives must be heard. Some are happy to conform others are not, some trade
identities but for others there is a primacy of a Muslim identity. Many are reluctant
of state intervention challenging cultural norms deemed oppressive because the state
has not historically acted as the neutral arbiter of disputes (HaIl 2000:238).
Furthermore some women see "themselves strictly bound to submit to the dictates
of Islamic law and the commands of the authorities charged with its execution"
Mayer 1999:45) and we must recognise this as their lived experience.
More importantly the argument that all Muslim cultural and religious norms
inherently render women powerless and insubordinate is simply wrong. What we
see today is a rigid understanding of culture and religion that endorses the idea
that formal mediation is problematic and informal mediation is either acceptable
or dangerous. As discussed in chapter 5 MWHL argue that such a dichotomous
approach obscures how norms are challenged within a cultural and religious
group, by female members of the group. Clearly to impose a blanket ban on
informal mediation would prove difficult to implement and of course legitimize
the idea that western conceptions of justice, equality and rights are morally
superior to Islamic perspective and Muslim approaches to dispute resolution.
Muslim women are actively engaging in these spaces and their voices must be
heard. Findings in this study suggest that some women are in favour of using
Shariah Councils as reconciliation bodies but others clearly are not. To judge the
women in the latter category as in some way any less 'Islamic' than their
counterparts is simply wrong. To judge the women in the former category as
fundamentalist or traditional is also false. Yet the problem with current literature
on legal pluralism, multiculturalism and feminism is that it employs a culturally
relativist approach to challenging state power and oppressive cultural norms. The
danger of this approach is that there is a growing polarity in the ways in which
each of these approaches inhabits a social space that operates on the fixed
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constructions of insider/outsider, those who belong and those who do not, a space
that in reality bears little resemblance to the complex lives realities of women's
lives.
For some Muslim women's organisations multiculturalism is understood as a
strategically useful process with which to challenge state power but also the
secular narratives that claim to speak on behalf of all women. In interview Ms.
Sherriff co-ordinator of MWHL explained,
By recognising our needs as Muslim women does not mean that we delegate
our space and power to men inside or outside of our communities. We work
with young Muslim women so they are able to use Islamic principles, to be
empowered to stand up and say no. It is not us who are fundamentalists but
the secularists, they are fundamentalist in the way that they deny us our
voice, our experience as Muslim women.
Thus the ideological differences and practical approaches espoused by Muslim
women's organisations in challenging intra-family inequalities such as forced
marriage or domestic violence has inevitably led to conflicts with secular
women's organisations such as Southall Black Sisters (SBS). Rahila Gupta a
long-serving management committee member of SBS states,
We are suspicious of developments such as the setting up of refuges for
particular religious denominations like those for Muslim women. Do their
experiences vary greatly from other women of other women's organisations?
Or is the real reason for setting up such refuges an attempt to contain the
issue of domestic violence, to ensure that women return to the marriage after
a period of respite without challenging the status quo? (2003:270).
In an apparent attempt to unify women's experiences it seems that such
approaches fall into the trap of 'identity politics' that liberal feminists demarcate
as the space that symbolizes and brings to the fore tensions between
multiculturalism and feminism and, the moral frameworks of universal rights and
the politics of cultural relativism. Yuval-Davis observes with reference to feminist
identity politics that identity politics are usually "perceived to constitute a
basically homogeneous social grouping with the same interests" and "women's
individual identities have become equated with women's collective identity" and
differences are either ignored or perceived as "reflections on different stages of
raised consciousness" and thus such differences appear as expressions of a deficit
that will- and has to- disappear (1997: 119). Accomodating the principle of
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equality to reflect the experiences of women means going beyond these
distinctions.
This research demonstrates how identities are fluid, multiple and changing. The
women in this study identified themselves variously as Muslims, as British and as
Pakistani in different contexts. Cultural, religious and legal diversity must
therefore be understood to be in flux, contested and open to change. As Hall points
out, "The temptation to essentialize community has to be resisted- it is fantasy of
plentitude in circumstances of imagined loss. Migrant communities bear the
imprint of diaspora, 'hybridization' and difference in their very constitution.
Their vertical integration into their traditions of origin exist side by side with their
lateral linkages to other 'communities' of interest, practice and aspiration, real and
symbolic" (2000:209).
At the outset of the twenty-first century and with the emergence of the third and
fourth generations of South Asian Muslims in Britain, we must embrace this
complexity, difference and transformation in an attempt to challenge oppressive
cultural norms and values rather that seek to produce a common language of
homogeneity from both a secular feminist or religious position. Difference is an
integral part of being a British, Pakistani, Muslim woman. Furthermore difference
as well as the difference that conflict generates is also part of the Muslim tradition
as Muslim feminists point out (see Mernissi 1989, Siddiqui 1996, El-Saddawi
1990, Ahmed 1990, Haeri 1991).
The picture painted by legal pluralists on understanding this process as structured
by the dialectic of Muslim personal law and state law is also very different from
the picture emerging from the data in this study. Instead we can see how
difference is constituted in multiple ways in between these differing social and
legal processes (Santos 1987). This process moreover is interactional, negotiated
and shaped by the specificities of the complex realities of the women's lives.
The real conflicts are not so much the theoretical debates on multiculturalism and
feminism or state law versus unofficial law but between power and how the
competing voices for power and representation ignore the internal voices of
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dissent and change, most often the voices of women. And, we should not forget
that complexity, difference and ambiguity open up the conceptual spaces for us to
explore the entanglements of law, gender, community, diaspora and identity and,
the contestation over cultural and religious meanings. As Bauman points out,
"From whatever side you look at it, difference is today an asset rather than a
liability and those different from the dominant majority may reasonably expect to
gain rather than lose" (1999:13).
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APPENDIX 1
MUSLIM (LAW) SHARIAH COUNCIL DOCUMENTS
1. Letter of Authority and Acceptance
2. Application Form
3. Islamic Divorce Certificate
4. New Maniage Contract
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A
The Muslim Law
(SHARIAH) COUNCIL
20-22 Creffield Road - Ealing, London W5 3RP
'0l3l-992 6636/Fax 0181 993 3946
Letter of Authority & Acceptance
.Tc be completed and returned to us
I(Name)...........................................................................................................................
Residentof (Address)............................................................................................................
TelephoneNumber...............................................................................................................
authorise the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council to investigate my case and then to consider my application to
obtain an Islamic Divorce (Talaq) according to the rules and regulations of the Council.
1 I promise to accept the decision of the Council irrespective of my own personal interests in order to
maintain the supremacy of Shariah over all other considerations. However I may withdraw my application
before the Council's decision, but I understand that once the Council has initiated the proceedings I will not
be able to claim the refund of the fee paid.
2 I confirm that I have not applied to any other Shariah Council/Court for my Islamic Divorce. Before I do
so, I will inform the Council and withdraw this application.
3. I also promise not to enter into another marriage contract (Civil or Islamic) before the verdict of the
Council.
4. I also solemnly swear that at the moment I am not violating any of the matrimonial laws of the Shariah.
Signed..........................................................
Date............/............../...............Place..........................................................................
Witness 1 (Must be an .Tinam of a Mosque or Chairman or Secretwy of a Mosque Committee or Head of a
!.ocal Muslim Organisation - if you live in an area where there is no Mosque or Muslim organisation this
brm may be signed by your GP or Solicitor.)
4ame...........................................................Signature...................................................
4osque/Organisation Name.....................................................................................................
)ffice Held (ie Ixnam, Chairman, President, Secretary).....................................................................
.ddress of Mosque/Organisation...............................................................................................
ate............/.............../...............Tel No........................................................................
ease print seal of Organisation/Iviosque here.
'itness 2 (Must be a Muslim Man/P oman over the age of 18)
ime.........................................................Signature
Idress.............................................................................................................................
7be 'Y!3tstim Lnw (9hcuinh) Council Z1J
FORM TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT
(Please complete this form carefully. If it is sent to us incomplete, the proceedings may not
even begin in your case).
1. Islamic Marriage (Nikah)
a) Date ofNikah	 /...../19	 b) Place ofNikah
2. Civil Marriage
a) Date of Registration 	 /...../19	 b) Place of Registration
3. Separation
(The date from when you began living separately from your husband - when all conjugal
relationship ceased)
a) Date of Separation	 ..../...../19.....
4. Civil Divorce
(The Divorce Decree pronounced by a Civil Court in the UK - If the Decree Absolute is yet to be
pronounced, please leave this blank)
a) Date of Decree Nisi	 /...../19	 b) Date of Decree Absolute ....../...../19
c) Name and Place of Court
where Decrees were pronounced
5. Husband's Details - (Please do not send your application without this)
Name of Husband
Countryand Date of Birth ....................................Nationality
Address of Husband (If not known, insert the address of his next of kin i.e. Parents, Brother.
Sister or Uncle. etc. in the UK or Abroad)
Tel No.
1ame of Applicant
ountryand Date of Birth ....................................Nationa1iy
;ignature	 Date/...../.....
5
6
D
0
N
C
Si
The Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK
FORM TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT
(please complete this form carefully. If it is sent to us incomplete, the proceedings may not
even begin in your case).
. Amount of Dower (Mahr) Agreed (Please specify currency as well)
a) How much has been paid 	 b) How much has been deferred
Amount in figures
Amount in words
2. Have you received items of jewellery from your husband, his parents or relatives at the time of
marriage or afterwards	 YESINO
If Yes, please give details below
Item	 How many	 Composition	 Estimated Value
(gold, platinum, diamond, etc.) 	 in Pounds Sterling
2
5
6
7.
3. Details of Children from this marriage
Jo you have children from this marriage 	 YES/NO
f Yes, please give details below
Name	 Sex	 Age
4. Access to Chil.tii
the children live with you	 YES/NO
the children live with your husband 	 YES/NO
ill you be ready to agree regular access of those children to your husband after Islamic Divorce 	 YES/NO
ame of Applicant	 ..
untrvand Date of Birth	 ..................................	 Nationality
;nature	 ......................................Date	 /..../
4L4I
THE MUSLIM LAW (SHARIAH) COUNCIL UK
20 –22 CREFFIELD ROAD, EALING, LONDON W5 3PP
Islamic Divorce Certificate
C– 10
CaseRef.No.:..	 Date:.2°
NOTE The grounds /recisons which are applicable to this divorce are indicated by the mark
This is to certif5i that the petitioner Ms :1 ......................................of
(Address).—...J.fl...
	
-	 _. ...............................
whomarried the respondent Mr ..i1	 1 .1:: .....................................of
(Address)	 ..-...............LI.... .L.I....I.. .11. .
	
........Ji.......................
accordingto Islamic Law on 9. ........ 	 in	 ....................................
is now divorced according to Islamic Law (Shariah) on the following grounds with the A-t .
conditions listed overleaf.
The petitioner (wife) separated from the respondent (husband) on (Date of separation)
.9. r..................Since then, she has had no marital relationship with him.
Since separation / marriage the respondent has not maintained or supported the petitioner at
all.
During this period of sepamtion of more than .9.....years 	 .... months, all efforts to
resolve this dispute by way of reconciliation have failed.
lJ 4 Despite several written requests from the Shariah Council to grant his wife (petitioner)
Islamic Divorce, the respondent has not fulfilled his religious obligations.
In the light of above mentioned grounds / reasons, the Council has concluded that the maage has
irretrievably broken down. Therefore, in order to safeguard the religious and social interests of
Ms..5 ................................... the Nikah is hereby dissolved with
immediate effect on the basis of Dhirar as per the conditions listed overleaf.
Sired..............
DR. M. A. ZAKI BADAWI (Chairman)
On behalf of the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council C
For conditions and clauses applicable to this Divorce Certlji
- ck.
/ ,r.	 N
7...
/ v..-.	 \, 0/	 \
	
(.	 ,tI...
I-
ii 
\	 J
e,plea,e seo'vrIeaf /
\	 ,	 //
Conditions of the Marriage Contract (Nikah)
Thiscontract is made on the ......................day of ..........................(month) 19.......
between(Name) .......................................................................................................(husband)
of (address)
and (Name)	 .........................(wife)
of (address)
Whereas the parties to this agreement wish to enter into the contract of marriage with each other;
Whereas neither party knows of any just cause or impediment, personal or otherwise, which may prevent
them entering into such a contract;
It is hereby agreed by the parties that such contract is entered into upon the following terms and
conditions:
1. The parties to the marriage contract (Nikah) shall live together in a mutually agreed country and
establish their matrimonial home therein. The present mutually agreed country is
2. The wife is entitled to obtain an Islamic divorce (Talaq) if her husband enters into a polygamous
marriage without her written consent.
3. Failure by the husband to maintain his wife shall entitle her to obtain an Islamic divorce from a properly
constituted Shariah Council
4. If the husband abandons his wife for six months without reasonable excuse the wife shall be entitied
tà obtain an Islamic divorce from a properly constituted Shariah Council.
5. If, after the marriage the husband suffers from any mental illness or is sent to prison for a continuous
period of two years the wife is entitled to obtain an Islamic divorce from a properly constituted Shariah
Council.
6. In the event of the husband becoming impotent for a period of one year continuously the wife may
obtain Islamic Divorce from any properly constituted Shariah Council
7. In the event of the husband deliberately denying his wife sexual intercourse for a period of four
months continuously the wife may obtain Islamic Divorce from any properly constituted Shariah
Council
8. Cruelty and violence whether physical mental or emotional by any party to this marriage contract
towards the other or towards the children of the marriage or children of either party, shall be one of the
grounds for seeking Islamic Divorce from a properly constituted Shariah Council.
9. During the currency of the marriage the wife shall continue to perform her Islamic religious obligations
without any hindrance from her husband.
10. In the event of failure to perform duties and obligations by the wife towards her husband (laid down by
the Shanah) the husband, at the time of Islamic Divorce shall be entitled to an exemption of either total
or part-payment of the Mehr to the wife. Such an entitlement will be judged by a properly constituted
Shariah Council
Agreed and accepted.
Name.................	 (wife)	 Name.............................	 (husband)
Signature.................... 	 Signature...................
Jate..........I..........I. 	Date..........1..........I.....
Nitness1 ............... 	 Witness2 .........................................................
3ignature............... 	 Signature........................................................
Date.......... I..........I. 	Date..........I..........I......................
APPENDIX 2
ISLAMIC SHARIAH COUNCIL (ISC) DOCUMENTS
1. Application Fonn to File a Divorce Petition (Khula)
2. Interview Form
3. Verdict on Forced Maniages
4. A copy of a letter from Applicants Husband
5. Letter of Intent
6. Solemn Declaration
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4:J (JdJ47he jstmic $hri'n Council
In the Name ofA&h, the Most Merczjih the Giver ofMercy
34 Francis Road Leyton . London E10 6PW . Tel: 020 8558 0581. Fax: 020 8558 7872
OurRef:. ..
	
.............................................. Your Ref:..................................................Date ....................................
APPLICATION FORM TO FILE A DIVORCE PETITION (KHULA)
(Please read carefully and all sections affheform must be filled)
WIFES DETAILS	 HUSBANDS DETAILS
1. Name: -	 1. Name: -
2. Address:	 2. Address:
Tel:	 Tel:
3. Date & Place of Birth:	 3. Date & Place of Birth:
4. Nationality:	 4. Nationality:
5 *Ddte & Place of Nikah: _______________________________________________________
6.*Date & Place of Regisation in UK: __________________________________________
7. Amount of Dower (Mahr) Agreed: 	 -
a) How much has been paid:	 b) How much was deferred:
S. If you have received any Jewellery/ Land/Money from your Husband, please give detail:
9. Main reason for asking Divorce:
10. Details of Children from this marriage:
Name	 Age	 Name	 Age
11. Date since seperation from Husband: _________________________________________
12.* Have you applied for Civil Divorce? YES I NO
If YES, date of decree absolute, if applicable:
13. Did your Husband defend the Divorce petition in court? _____________________
*NOTE: Please provide of all available documents, e.g. Nikah/Civil Marriage Certificates, Decree
Nisi/Absolute, Solicitor's Court Document showing that the husband did not defend the divorce.
For enquiries telephone the Secretan' on 020 8558 0581 Monday to Thursda y 11.00arn to 500pm
Website: wv'wislamic-sharia.co.uk
7h' jtmic $hnri'c ,ouncil L7
YES
	 NO	 IF NO, PLEASE GIVE DETAILS
Q 0
0 0
0 0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
In the Name ofAllah, the Most Merczfs4 the Giver ofMercy
34 Francis Road. Leyton. London ElO 6PW. Tel: 020 8558 0581. Fax: 020 8558 7872
OurRef:.....................................................Your Ref:..................................................Date ................................
INTERVIEW FORM
Name of Representative:
Dateof Interview: ____________________
CaseRef: CB ____________
ClientsName: __________________________________
(Please check f information on application form is correct.)
Clients Address:	 ____
Partners Name
Partners Address
Clients Contact No.
Clients Nationality
Partners Nationality
Date of Nikah
Place of Nikah
Date of Registration
Place of Registration
If you have not registered your marriage please state why?
Appliedfor Civil Divorce	 0	 0	 _________________________________________
Dateof Deaee Absolute 	 _____________________________________________
DidHusband Defend	 0 0 ________________________________
IF YOU HAVE REGISTERED YOUR MARRIAGE OR YOU ARE A BRITISH CITIZEN, YOU WILL HAVE TO
APPLY FOR CIVIL DIVORCE BEFORE YOUR CASE CAN CONTINUE WITH TffE ISLAMIC SHARI'A COUNCIL.
DateSince Seperaon	 0	 0	 _____________________________________________
ChildrensDetails	 IJ	 0 __________________________________
Have you recieved any of the folowing from your husband. If so, please give details
Money0 ______________________________
Jewellery 0 	______________________________________
LandIJ	 _______________________________
Or any other form of
Dower(Mahr) 0
	 ______________________________________
DECLARATION
I BEAR WITNESS THAT I HAVE SUBMITrED KHULA APPLICATION HAVING FEAR OF ALLAH IN VIEW OF MY RICE-ifs IN
THE LIGHT OF QUR'AN & SUNNAH AND MAY ALLAH (SW) CURSE ME [F I AM DOING WRONG OR IF [AMA LIAR.
All Information on my application form is thie and if any changes occur, I will inform you in writing immediateI
Signature:	 Representatives Signature
Date:	 Date:
For enquiries telephone the Secrerar on 020 8558 0581 Monda y to Thursday 1100am to 500pm
\Vcshsite: www.j.s!amic-.s1-iaria.co.uk
7he jstnmc $1jnri'ti Council 4L	 LY'
Please quote your reference numb the Name ofA&J,, the Most Merczfiul, the Giver ofMercy
on	 all	 correspondence	 and
telephone calls.
34 Francis Road . Leyton . London ElO 6Pw . Tel: 020 8558 0581. Fax: 020 8558 7872
OurRef:.....................................................Your Ref:..................................................Date ....................................
28/08/03
FORCED MARRIAGES
Wed 27th August (monthly meeting at ICC) 2003 following resolution was past:
If a women claims she was forced into marriage her claim could be accepted provided three
circumstantial evidences are found out of the following four:
1. Efer parents or one of them admits either verbally or in writing that they have forced
her into marriage.
2. A woman stops her husbands application for 'Visa as soon as she comes back from
the country were marriage took place.
3. She refuses to allow consummation of marriage.
4. She provides evidence on being forced into marriage.
In this case the normal procedure of Khula is not to be followed. Instead one letter is to be
sent to the husband (P26) with demand to sign the Talaq Nama.
The Islamic Shari'a Council.
(I1( J II(S rIephone Lhe	 i_U ,	 '.M :ik,n..i	 u I'li ijrsthn ii. 0 'am u 5. uOpn
.iia,ntc-,iu,ru .. ,.i
t	 DAIr.
786
To,
The Islamic Slzari'a Council,
34, Francis Road,
Leyton,
London, ElO 6PW.
To Whom It Ma y Concern:
Assalamo A.lykom wa Rahmatullah.
I've received your letter sent on 05/09/2002, regarding m y wife "Saba Asghar",
expressing her wish to seek Islamic divorce.
In response to your letter, I, IF would like to inform you that
my wife and me have a very good marriage relationship and have iiTi kids from this
marriage. Her father is my first Uncle, I would never try to break family ties and under no
circumstances I would wish to divorce my wife (1.. -
	 T.
Of course misunderstandings do take place in many relationships, so in ours. Her.
family has misled her, mainly her father. I have a very great concern about her and our
children and I hope that she also has as well. If there's any misunderstanding that she or
her family wish to clarify, I'll be very happy to co-operate in this regard. I really want tc
have my family back.... 	 . . .	 .. . .	 .
Last but not least I repeat Under no circumstances I would divorce my wife
"Saba Asghar".
I hope that these few words will be sufficient for your satisfaction. If you require
further Information regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours faithfully,
Li i_•I
3L	 jJ7he jstnmic $Juri'n Council
In the Name ofAllah, the Most MerczL the Giver ofMercy
34 Francis Road Leyton London ElO 6PW . Tel: 020 8558 0581. Fax: 020 8558 7872
OurRef:.....................................................Your Ref...................................................Date ....................................
LETTER OF INTENT
Dear
Assalamu Alaikum,
The Islamic Shari'a Council in its recent meeting held on _____________ based upon
the evidence provided, has decided to dissolve your marriage.
The derision has been made after taking into consideration all aspects of Sha.ri'a, which
allow a Qadi or an authoritative Islamic body in a non-Muslim country to accede to the
request of a woman seeking divorce, providing that the grounds are found to be valid.
Prior to issuing a divorce certificate, the council would like to hear from you esperially if
you have any valid objections based upon Shari'a, regarding this matter.
Note: In the case of dissolution of marriage, you are entitled to receive back the dower!
jewellery from your wife which you have given her at the time of marriage. Therefore, we
urgently need your detailed claim along with all the evidence, i.e, receipts etc.
The divorce certificate will be issued four weeks to date, if we do not hear from you or
your objections are found to be invalid.
WaSalam
Secretary
Islamic Shari'a Council.
For enquiries telephone the Secrelan' on 020 855i 051 Monda y to Thursday 1100am to 500pm
Websitcs: ww'.]5laImC-sjiaria.co.uk
7hc j(nmic hcrii Cpuncil 43
hz the Name ofAILz/j, the Most Mercfl the Giver ofMercy
34 Francis Road Leycon . London ElO 6PW. Tel/Fax 020 8558 0581
OurRef......................................................Your Ref:..................................................Date ..................
Solemn Declaration
I BEAR WITNESS TEIAT I HAVE SUBMIIThD KHITLA APPLICATION HAVING FEAR OF ALLAH
IN VIEW OF MY RIGHTS IN THE LIGHT OF QUR'AN & SUNNAH AND MAY ALLAH (SWT)
CURSE ME IF I AM DOING WRONG OR IF I AM A LIAR
All Information on my application form is true and if any changes occui. I will inform you in
writing immediately.
I Testify That
Signature:	 Name:
Reference No: GB	 Date:
* False information given to obtain a Divorce certificate or Talaq Nama will result in your
Certificate being revoked by The Islamic Shari'a CounciL
For enquiries telephone the Secretary on 020	 0581 Monda y to Thursda y 1100am to 500pm
Website. wvw.islarnic-sharia.co.uk
APPENDIX 3
THE MUSLIM FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICE
AND SIIARIAH COUNCIL DOCUMENTS
1. Application for Divorce
2. Form for Affidavit to prove Religious Marriage
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In the name of lila/i, the Benejicient, the WercifuL
THE
MUSLIM FAHLV SUPPORT
LSER VICE
180 Be!zrave Road. Birmingham 012 OXS. Tel: 021-446 4157
OUR REP:
YOUR REP:	 DATE:
Date:
I, your name, daughter of,father 's name, have had
an Islamic marriage - nikah - with, husband's
name, son of,father 's name, on date. I do not have
possession of my original nikah certificate.
I did not have a civil marriage in England.
Signed:
Date:
Founded by:
ilirmlniinam ''eiural Mosque
In the itame of Allah. rise Benejicienr, the MerrifuL
THE
MUSLIM FAMILY SEJPPOR
______________- SERVIC
180 Belgrave Road. Birmingham B12 OXS. Tef: 021-446 4157
OUR REF:
YOUR REF:	 DATE:
I,	 , would like
to apply for a khula (Islamic Divorce) from my
husband,.	 at the
Birmingham Centraf Mosque
Signed:
Date:
Witness':
APPENDIX 4
THE SHARIAH COURT OF THE UK DOCUMENT
1. The Islamic Verdict
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THE SAR'AH OUR7 OF THE UK LT7L.
	
j1
RegiiLeied Chardy No. 1037957 In eo-ooeratian with Th London School of Snari'ah & The Socty of Muslim Lawyers
Case Na:
	 Your Ref.:	 Date:
The Islamic Hokm (Verdict) regarding Khufru (Repudiation)
The legal principle of khullu in Islam is to prevent the husband harming the wife. The
woman is allowed to obtain khullu from her husband on one of the following grounds:
1- If The husband causes direct harm to her i.e. bodily damage, leaving wounds & bruises or
physical humiliation.
2- If the husband causes indirect harm to her i.e. not providing food, shelter and clothing or
oppressing/harming her children or he becomes a faajire.g. homosexual, alcoholic etc.
3- If she hates him and cannot tolerate him anymore, even if he is good towards her. This
wiH cause harm to her as she will become sinful by not fulfilling her duties towards her
husband.
NB: As for the first and second grounds, the husband is not entitled to the jewellery or any
dowry that has been paid and he is liable to pay the dowry or remainder of it if is has not
been paid in full. As for the third ground, the husband is entitled to the jewellery and rnahr
that has been paid.
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Mr Nadat
Faxed
Dear SLr
We have been consulted by our above named client who has now been handed by
process server a copy of the Divorce Petition issued by your client on 21d September
2000.
Our client is at a loss to understand how your client is in a position to issue Divorce
proceedings when in fact our respective client's did not undergo a valid ceremony of
marriage.
You will no doubt be aware of the provisions of the Marriages Act 1949-1986 which
quite categorically state that where parties marry disregard of certain requirements as
to the formalities of marriage then the marriage is not valid under the provisions of
the said act and therefore there is no marriage between our respective clients.
Yo will also l,e.aware from the Marriage Certificate which hat b eapro.vide&to you
to enable you to lodge the DLvorce Petition that it is merely a piece of paper/ordinary
fbrm which is drawn up similar to that of a certified marriage certificate fr the
purposes of confirming that the parties have undergone Nikali ceremony (Islamic
Marriage) in the Mosque concerned.
Your enquiries will no doubt reveal through the Central Register Office Marriages
Section that our respective parties have not undergone a marriage under the provisions
of the Marriages Act 1949. Furthermore we would ask that you make enquiries of the
Blackburn and Darwin Borough Council which will no doubt confirm to you that the
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Mosque in which our respccvvc clients underwent the marriage ceremony is merely
svgistcrad p.aDd.not. cc furnriages. Therefore this 15 not in
accordance with the Marriages Act to enable them to undertake formal marriage
ceremonies.
As no doubt you will be aware our client has now undergone a valid ceremony of
marriage and his marnage is infact recognised under English Law.
Under the circumstances we consider that the only stepsavsilable t you is to seek a
dismissal your_clienrs.-Divurce pctitioii on the basis that she is not in a position to
- - -uidtak such proceedings and this would obviously be without any costs
implications on our client.
If this is not acceptable then clearly there is going to be an unnecessary expense on
our client and therefore we will seek to file an Answer for dismissal in the Blackburn
County Court with an Order for costs against your client.
We would also be grateful if you would confirm whether or not your client is in
receipt of Public Funding/Legal Help.
Accordingly we would be grateful if you would return back to us with your client's
further instructions in this matter by close of business on Thursday 5th April 2001 to
enable us to advise our client further on this matter.
We awjit to hear from you with some degree of urgency.
Yotfaithfully
BASHIR
